Defective polities: a history of an idea of international society by Castro e Almeida, Manuel
1  
DEFECTIVE POLITIES: A HISTORY OF AN 
IDEA OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manuel Castro e Almeida 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the 
PhD in International Relations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of International Relations 
 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
University of London 
2012 
2  
Declaration 
 
 
 
 
 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD 
degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my 
own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of 
others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any 
other person is clearly identified in it). 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is 
permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not 
be reproduced without my prior written consent. 
 
 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the 
rights of any third party. 
 
 
I declare that my thesis consists of 99.383 words. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Carlos Manuel Ventura de Oliveira Ramos 
4  
Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis is about the idea of defective polities. It addresses two 
important understandings in the literature which inform current theory 
and practice surrounding failed states. First, the thesis addresses the 
conventional standpoint that the end of the Cold War generated a new 
challenge for international society, widely known as the challenge of failed 
states. It aims to counter the ahistoricism of the literature on failed states 
in IR and cognate fields by showing that the nature of the issue of ‘failed 
states’ precedes the emergence of the concept in post-Cold War 
international society. Second, we respond to the view that international 
law/the doctrine and norm of state sovereignty have been essentially 
instruments in the hands of the most powerful members of international 
society, often used to justify practices of imperial and colonial nature. 
According to this perspective international law/state sovereignty explain or 
are crucial in the perpetuation of the idea and category of defective 
polities. By looking at the history of the relationship between the doctrine 
and norm of state sovereignty and the idea and category of defective 
polities, our aim is to show that these views about the role of international 
law are, to a great extent, misleading. 
Bearing in mind the possibility that concepts perform functions, the 
central hypothesis this thesis will be testing is the following: failed states are 
the latest of a number of concepts prevalent in international society that refer, 
or did so in the past, to the idea and category of defective polities. Although 
this argument implies a sense of continuity, the history of this idea is 
characterised by an evolving normative context. Thus, this thesis combines 
an English School approach with history of ideas, a meta-theoretical choice 
that is simultaneously sensitive to notions of continuity and change. This 
framework involves an attempt to: (a) identify and comprehend these 
concepts; (b) understand what functions these concepts served; (c) shed 
light on the kind of motives and legitimating arguments used by the actors 
uttering the concepts; and (d) understand if and how conceptual changes are 
related to normative changes in international society. 
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Introduction: Defective Polities and International Society  
 
This thesis is about the history of the idea that certain peoples/political 
communities are incapable of or unsuitable for self-government, hereafter 
referred to as defective polities. We look at the political and moral 
international context in which a number of concepts, all expressions of the 
idea of defective polities, were uttered by stastemen, diplomats, thelogians, 
philosophers, and scholars. This is not primarily a comparative study that 
attempts to identify the merits and shortcomings of these various concepts. 
Likewise, the aim is not to put forward an explanatory theory of why some 
political communities were/are defective. Instead, the general purpose is to 
understand and shed light on the specific historical contexts in which these 
various concepts were uttered, in order to show that, despite their differences 
and particularities, they were all manifestations of the same idea of defective 
polities. Furthermore, the aim is to provide a critical assessment of the idea 
of defective polities, and to evaluate its “power” throughout the history of 
international society.  
While the idea of defective polities is the overarching theme of the 
thesis, our point of departure is the predominant, contemporary expression of 
that idea, i.e. the concept of failed states. Since its emergence in the early 
1990s, this concept has been a powerful one in international society. For 
example, the magazine Foreign Policy, one of the most widely read 
publications of international affairs, issues annually since 2005 the ‘Failed 
States Index’, in collaboration with the Fund for Peace. In it are ranked 
dozens of states according to a complex set of data carefully updated, 
analysed, and refined every year. Afghanistan and a number of African 
countries like Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe or Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) traditionally dominate the top ten, with Somalia invariably occupying 
the top spot. The purpose of the rankings, according to its publishers, ‘is 
not to claim that all states in the list are failed,’ but to ‘provide a guide to 
those states at serious risk of state failure’, or ‘in danger of collapse’ 
(Foreign Policy, 2005). The criteria by which these states are ranked 
comprises: economic benchmarks such as ‘uneven development’ and 
‘economic decline’; institutional (in)capacity, including the status of ‘the 
security apparatus’ and availability of ‘public services’; and humanitarian 
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standards such as ‘refugees,’ ‘demographic pressures’, and ‘human 
rights’ (Foreign Policy, 2009; 2011). Two features become apparent even 
after a brief overview of these rankings. One is the emphasis on the lack 
of capacity of these states for self-government. As exemplified in the 
definition of state failure that accompanies the publication of the rankings, 
‘attributes of state failure’ include ‘an inability to provide reasonable public 
services’, or ‘the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the 
international community.’ This highlights the other feature: ‘failed states’ are 
being judged and compared to those states that perform well in the various 
areas (e.g. Rotberg, 2003a: 3-5). It denotes a spectrum, with 
successful/capable states on one end, and failed states on the other. 
Since the early 1990s plenty has been written about failed states, the 
contemporary manifestation in international society of the idea of defective 
polities. However, there is very little in the literature about the history of this 
idea. Save a few exceptions, one is left only with some clues and hints about 
“how did we get here.” It is not the case that IR has been oblivious of history. 
Nevertheless, this is generally true when it comes to the literature on failed 
states in IR and cognate fields. This neglect of history seems to derive, at 
least partially, from the immediate connotation of the concept of failed states 
with the post-Cold War, because it was then than the concept gained 
international prominence. Moreover, this neglect of the historical background 
of the issue also brushes aside questions about the legacy of external 
interference in the affairs of these peoples/political communities. The aim 
here is to fill in this gap by showing that the history of the general idea of 
defective polities long precedes the emergence of the specific concept 
of failed states. The proposition is to study this topic through history of ideas. 
This intellectual field offers the lenses by which to look at the historical 
nature of contemporary problems, but it has also challenged the assumption 
that certain issues have always been with us, that all questions of 
mankind are timeless. In other words, this intellectual field is 
simultaneously sensitive to notions of continuity and change. The 
importance of accounting simultaneously for continuity and change is 
justified by the need not to overemphasise novelty while ignoring history, 
but also to avoid simplistic associations between present and past for the 
sake of accentuating aspects of continuity (Bain, 2011: 31-38).  
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History, International Law, and Echoes of the Civilising Mission 
 
 
 
The meta-theoretical approach of this thesis draws substantially on the 
English School (ES). Within the ES, Bain (2003a) offers some valuable 
insights about the historical background of the issue we refer to as defective 
polities, and its connections with contemporary practices in international 
society. Bain (2003a: 192) makes the case that present-day international 
practices of trusteeship associated with so-called failed states are 
manifestly connected with paternalistic notions and specific visions of 
how political communities should be organised. In his view, ‘trusteeship 
cannot escape its imperial past, no matter how enlightened or well- 
intentioned it might be, because it belongs to a mode of conduct that is 
imperial by its nature.’ In this logic, he determines that trusteeship is 
fundamentally incompatible with the ideas of human dignity, independence, 
and equality of all human beings that today form an important part of the 
normative framework of international society. As Bain (2003b: 67, 70) puts it, 
the practice of trusteeship ‘sanctions the rule of one man over another, in 
lands that are not his own, so long as the power of dominion is directed 
towards the improvement of the disadvantaged’. Thus, trusteeship ‘stands 
rather uneasily in an international society constituted by sovereign states that 
are equal in respect of authority and jurisdiction.’ Nevertheless, these 
practices have persisted, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq, to name a few examples of these ‘new protectorates’ 
(Mayall and Oliveira, 2011: 2). As Bain (2007: 181) notes, contemporary 
international practices, often justified with the ‘promotion and protection of 
fundamental human rights,’ such as International Territorial Administration 
(ITA)/international statebuilding missions, represent a ‘subjection to alien 
rule.’ 
How to make sense of the perpetuation of these practices of imperial 
nature? On the one hand, it is reasonable to assume that values such as 
human dignity, independence, autonomy, non-interference, and equality of all 
human beings form an important part of the normative framework of 
contemporary international society. On the other, the perpetuation of some 
practices of inherent imperial/colonial nature suggests that those principles, 
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reflected by the norm of state sovereignty, are constantly violated or side- 
lined. Is this evidence that moral principles and rules in international society 
matter very little? A possible answer to this apparent contradiction is that 
principles and rules do matter, but the most powerful members of 
international society have used international law as an instrument in the 
pursuit of their interests and agendas, often of an imperial nature. 
This possibility is supported by a few recent contributions to the 
debate. One example is Simpson (2004), who argues that the Congress of 
Vienna (1815) represented the first crucial constitutional moment in the 
history of international society that institutionalised legalised hierarchies 
between states. In particular, it established in international law two 
categories: (1) the Great Power status and the responsibilities in the 
management of international order associated with that status; and (2) the 
outlaw state, ‘estranged’ from and ‘demonised’ by international society ‘on 
the basis of its moral characteristics or internal politics.’ This does not mean 
that the principle of state sovereignty is irrelevant. Simpson (2004: 9, ix-xi) 
emphasises the ‘role of sovereign equality in establishing the originating 
‘groundnorms’ of the international legal order’. The key point is the concern of 
the Great Powers in ‘willing into existence new legal regimes in moments of 
constitutional crises, invoking a community of interests/the interests of 
humanity, to ensure their actions are in accordance with international law.’ 
Another example is Anghie (2005: 3, 312), who argues that the 
civilising mission and the consequent political, economic and cultural 
subjugation were central in the formation of international law and its founding 
concept, sovereignty. Anghie examines the historical relationship between 
international law and the Third Word, which he defines as ‘the contemporary 
term for those non-European societies and territories which were colonised 
from the sixteenth century onwards by the European Empire, and which 
acquired political independence since the 1940s.’ Looking at different phases 
of the ‘colonial encounter’, he argues that international law has always been 
driven by the ‘civilising mission’. He concludes that ‘international law remains 
oblivious to its imperial structures even when continuing to reproduce them.’ 
Yet another example is Wilde (2007: 41-43) who, by looking at the 
‘colonial analogy’, explores the way ‘mainstream international policy 
discourse has used the “international”, i.e. international organisations and 
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international law, to legitimise contemporary instances of ITA.’1 According to 
Wilde, the arguments that justify ITA are the following: (a) it rests on lawful 
authority as opposed to colonialism; (b) it consists of the implementation of 
universally validated policies and not of the agendas of particular states; and 
(c) is carried out by humanitarian international organisations rather than by 
individual states with particular motives for action. These arguments which 
constitute the normative kernel behind the legitimation efforts of 
contemporary instances of ITA represent an attempt to draw a distinction with 
colonialism. Yet Wilde (2008: 252) contests the ‘post-colonial label’ of ITA. In 
his view, ITA is often a statebuilding enterprise that involves very specific 
ideas of how states ought to be built and governed, namely ‘democracy,’ ‘rule 
of law’, and ‘free-market economy’, and thus it has close similarities with the 
civilising mission and the colonial era. 
These contributions that explore the history of the relationship 
between imperialism/colonialism and international law, suggest that 
international law and the principle of state sovereignty are inherently 
imperial/colonial in their nature. State sovereignty, the key norm of 
international society, not only sanctions inequality but causes and 
(re)produces it as well. In this perspective, the principle is not only about 
equality, justice, autonomy, and pluralism. It is also, and more significantly, 
an arrangement that promotes an international order slave to the imperial 
appetites of the Great Powers/hegemons of international society. State 
sovereignty sanctions inequality, injustice, dependency, and an ethically 
questionable type of solidarism. This view contrasts patently with a notion 
that was at the basis of another ES study about the topic, namely that ‘Third 
World states are to an exceptional degree… beneficiaries of international 
morality and international law’ (Jackson, 1990: ix). 
Thus, the main purposes of this thesis are essentially two. One is to 
trace the history of the idea of defective polities, by identifying and 
understanding the conceptual manifestations of that idea throughout the 
history of international society. The intent is to shed light on the “power” of 
this idea and the functions it served. The other main purpose of the thesis 
is to address and discuss a number of arguments regarding the 
relationship between imperialism/colonialism and international law in 
international society, in particular the doctrine of state sovereignty. By 
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addressing these arguments, the aim is to understand the extent to which 
the doctrine of state sovereignty has played a role – in the view of a 
number of scholars a key one – in the perpetuation of the idea we are 
concerned with, and related international practices. 
 
Questions and Hypotheses 
 
 
 
Beyond the assumption that the concept of failed states reflects or describes 
a concern with a problem in international society, more important for the 
purposes of this project is the perception that it represents a category.2 In this 
regard, it should be noted that one of the central claims of the Cambridge 
School (CS) of conceptual history – which informs the meta-theoretical 
framework of this project – is that concepts perform political and social 
functions. This point has been highlighted by scholars in relation to the 
concept of failed states. According to Jones (2008: 181-182), it is striking the 
way a ‘category used in the policy making sphere has been so readily 
absorbed in academic analysis with little concern or critical reflection’. He 
argues that very small steps have been taken in critically analysing ‘the 
very notion of the “failed state” and the underlying assumptions, in 
situating the discourse itself and its ideological character in historical 
terms, and emphasising its current role in legitimising intervention.’ 
Regarding the functions or the political consequences of the 
existence of this category, Boas and Jennings (2005: 387) argue that despite 
the fact that ‘the policy adoption of “failed states” is quite recent, intellectually 
speaking the concept has been around for a long time.’ Thus they see failed 
states as ‘the most recent in a long list of modifiers that have been used to 
describe or attempt to explain why states residing outside of the geographical 
core of Western Europe and North America do not function as “we” think they 
are supposed to.’ Yet perhaps a consequence of the overtly inward character 
of many IR debates, Boas and Jennings refer to a number of Cold War and 
post-Cold War concepts, e.g. neopatrimonial, lame, premodern, which were 
never really prominent in international society beyond some restrict 
academic/intellectual circles, the exception being failed states. Bilgin and 
Morton (2002: 55-57) locate this category in the context of the culmination of 
a broader set of concepts and approaches of the social sciences rooted 
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distinctly in the logics of the Cold War. These practices consist of the 
representation of post-colonial states ‘around elements of deficiency or 
failure’, e.g. quasi-states and rogue states.3 They suggest that despite the 
fact these labels refer to different characteristics of states, common to all is 
that they ‘enable certain policies which serve the economic, political and 
security interests of those who employ them.’ 
Bearing in mind the possibility that the concept of failed states 
represents a category, and that concepts perform functions, the central 
hypothesis this thesis will be testing is the following: failed states are the 
latest of a number of concepts prevalent in international society that refer, or 
did so in the past, to the idea of defective polities. A number of 
questions/themes follow from this central hypothesis. These include an 
attempt to: (a) identify and comprehend  these  concepts;  (b)  understand  
what  functions  these concepts served; (c) shed light on the kind of motives 
and legitimating arguments used by the actors uttering the concepts; and 
(d) understand if and how conceptual changes are related to normative 
changes in international society. In this regard, this study is interested in 
comprehending how the history of the doctrine and norm of state sovereignty 
relates with the history of this idea and category, namely with the latter’s 
perpetuation. Beyond seeking to counter the massively ahistorical take in 
the literature on failed states, here lies much of the relevance of this study. 
 
 
Thesis Outline and a Note on Sources 
 
 
 
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 1 looks at the concept of failed 
states. Only by shedding light on the contemporary expression of the idea we 
are interested in is it possible to enter the endless realm of international 
history in search of its prevalence. Hence, this chapter provides an overview 
of the history of the concept of failed states since its emergence in 
international society. The aims are to flesh out the questions and normative 
themes that characterised the issue; to shed light on the kind of interests and 
values involved; and to illustrate how the concept of failed states not only has 
a meaning but performs certain functions. Another aim is to show that the 
burgeoning literature on failed states in IR and cognate fields is strikingly 
ahistorical. 
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Chapter 2 discusses the meta-theoretical framework of this project. 
The aim is to explain and justify the choice of combining the English School 
(ES) framework with a number of insights from international conceptual 
history/history of ideas. It addresses the concept of international society, the 
related notions of understanding and interpretation in the study of 
international society, and the role of norms and rules in international society, 
especially its foundational norm of state sovereignty. Related with this 
normative dimension, the chapter reflects on the notion of practice(s), and 
the issues of causality and change in the ES. Given the choice of a historical- 
empirical approach, it also addresses the legacy of the ES when it comes to 
the study of international history in general and the history of international 
society in particular, and clarifies the lenses through which we will look at the 
history of this idea in international society. The chapter then provides an 
overview of the various schools of conceptual history, before discussing in 
more detail the Cambridge School (CS) of conceptual history, from which 
this project draws a number of important meta-theoretical insights. It 
explains the choice of combining an ES approach with history of 
ideas/international conceptual history, and how this move is compatible 
with ES cognitive goals. It also outlines what international conceptual 
history can offer to the study of the history of international society and the 
political and social concepts that shaped it, namely questions of continuity 
and change. 
The following chapters trace the history of the idea and category of 
defective polities in international society. The aim of these chapters is 
essentially twofold: (a) to identify and comprehend, in the history of 
international society, the concepts that expressed that idea, their political and 
moral context, and the functions the concepts served; and (b) address a set 
of arguments in the literature about the role of international law, particularly 
the principle of state sovereignty, as a key element/ cause behind the 
perpetuation of that idea and category, and respective international practices. 
The sources of this thesis are divided into primary and secondary 
sources. Within the former are included all the original documents, from 
official strategies of states and international organisations to important works 
by philosophers and intellectuals that shed light on the nature of the idea and 
concepts that are relevant for our purposes. Regarding the secondary 
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sources, these can be broadly divided into four groups. The first is the ES 
literature, which includes theoretical discussions about the concept of 
international society, the role of morality, norms and rules in international 
society, and the debates about the ES approach to history. Evidently, it also 
includes a number of ES studies about the history of international society and 
the history of its imperial expansion. This thesis also draws from the literature 
of history of ideas/international conceptual history, in particular the 
Cambridge School of conceptual history. Moreover, there is research within 
the field of history of ideas about the idea and concepts we are concerned 
with, as well as other ideas that are relevant for our purposes. Another 
importance source is international history, namely history of European 
empires and the history of international law. Finally, to understand the nature 
of the concept of failed states, this thesis is informed by the literature on 
failed states in IR and cognate fields. This includes not only the literature that 
employs explicitly the concept, as well as a number of related/analogous 
ones, e.g. weak states, collapsed states, quasi-states, fragile states. It is also 
a reference to the existing work concerned with issues often associated with 
failed states, including threats to international order/security/peace or 
cosmopolitan notions of international justice that derive from civil wars or 
severe humanitarian violations. Likewise, it includes the body of work that 
focuses on the international practices commonly related with the problem of 
failed states, including humanitarian intervention, international development, 
peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding, nationbuilding, statebuilding, 
conflict resolution/prevention, and ITA. 
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Chapter 1 - Failed States: The Clout of a Concept 
 
 
 
 
 
The end of the Cold War left a band of failed and weak states 
stretching from the Balkans through the Caucasus, the Middle 
East, Central Asia, and South Asia. State collapse or weakness 
has already created major humanitarian and human rights 
disasters during the 1990s in Somalia, Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia, 
Kosovo, and East Timor. For a while, the United States and other 
countries could pretend these problems were just local, but 
September 11 proved that state weakness constituted a huge 
strategic challenge as well. 
 
 
Francis Fukuyama (2004: x). 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
 
 
To shed light on the history of the idea of defective polities, it is first 
necessary to comprehend the most prominent contemporary expression of 
that idea, i.e. the concept of failed states. Only by understanding the present 
nature of the issue it is possible to enter the endless realm of international 
history in search for the concepts that represent the perpetuation of this idea 
in international society. Thus, the main purposes of this chapter are: to 
map the rise of the concept of failed states over the last two decades; flesh 
out what kind of issues and normative debates are associated with it since 
its emergence; and illustrate how, in relation to the claim that those states 
are incapable of or unsuitable for self-government, the concept of failed 
states not only has a meaning but it performs certain functions. 
In mapping the history of the concept of failed states in international 
society over the last two decades, this chapter also provides an overview of 
the kind of academic debates that the issue generated. In particular, one of 
the goals is to show that the burgeoning literature on failed states in IR and 
cognate fields is strikingly ahistorical. The final section of the chapter 
addresses and discusses a scholarly approach to the topic that can be 
termed ‘the liberal peace critique.’ Over the last two decades, this scholarly 
approach attempted to capture and deconstruct the overarching ideas, 
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interests and values that informed the international involvement in the so- 
called failed states. 
 
 
1.2 A ‘New World Disorder’ 
 
 
 
It is difficult to determine whether the concept of failed states was first coined 
in the policy-making sphere or in academic circles. The first scholar to use 
the term ‘state failure’ was probably Migdal (1988: 4-9, 203-204), when 
looking back at what he saw as ‘the inability of the Egyptian state under 
Nasser to operate the changes it envisioned in society and to consolidate 
social control.’ Migdal asked ‘why have so many Third World states been so 
ineffective in accomplishing what their leaders and others had so eagerly 
expected of them.’ A few years earlier, Jackson and Rosberg (1982) 
questioned ‘why Africa’s weak states persist.’ They argued (1982: 17, 21) 
that ‘juridical statehood’, i.e. ‘the existence of mutual rights and obligations 
that form the cornerstone of the international society of sovereign states, 
including the right of a country to exist and not to have its jurisdiction violated, 
and its duty not to violate the rights of others’, was ‘more important than 
empirical statehood in explaining the persistence of states’ in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Jackson (1990: 1) explored this issue further by characterising these 
states as ‘quasi-states’, i.e. those who lack the ‘marks’ and the ‘merits’ of 
‘empirical statehood.’ 
The concept of failed states emerged in full strength after the Cold 
War. It was Madeleine Albright, at the time the United States (US) Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations (UN), who lifted ‘failed states’ to ‘fame’. 
By the occasion of the killing of four US servicemen in Somalia, she 
explained in The New York Times (1993) the US involvement in the UN effort 
to restore ‘that failed state.’ She justified the decision to remain in Somalia to 
prevent the country from falling ‘back into the abyss’ and to ‘help lift the 
country and its people from the category of a failed state into that of an 
emerging democracy. For Somalia's sake, and ours, we must persevere’, she 
wrote. The price of failure would be the continuation of famine and civil war, 
and a corresponding threat to international society, ‘because anarchy may 
produce refugees, uncontrolled arms peddling and targets of opportunity for 
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terrorists and their state sponsors.’ A year later in his well-known article ‘The 
Coming Anarchy’, Kaplan (1994) drew an alarming picture of West Africa, in 
which ‘disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, 
refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international 
borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and 
international drug cartels’, would wreak havoc a whole continent. This 
scenario of ‘several West African nations collapsing at once’ would, in 
Kaplan’s predictions, emerge as a major foreign-policy issue for the US. His 
article was widely cited in speeches by US President Bill Clinton and other 
administration officials (Del Rosso, 1995: 197). 
This anxious picture only expresses one of the dominant sentiments 
of the time. This moment was also interpreted as one of opportunity. While 
President George H. W. Bush announced ‘A New World Order’ (Bain, 2011: 
54), the Clinton administration put forward the concept of ‘democratic 
enlargement’ as the new post-Cold War strategy aimed at building a world 
order based on open economies and democratic states (Mayall and Oliveira, 
2011: 6). Also in the UN, this period was seen as one of opportunity for the 
organisation to perform a different role, a much more active one, in 
safeguarding international order, peace and security. In this context, the 
issues of state failure and severe human rights violations soon became a 
priority for the organisation. The resolve to address these issues through a 
comprehensive approach was expressed clearly by UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (1992). Boutros-Ghali also 
published ‘An Agenda for Development’ (1994) and ‘An Agenda for 
Democratisation’ (1996: 2), where he emphasised that most UN 
peacekeeping mandates ‘include both the restoration of democracy and the 
protection of human rights.’ This tripartite objective of peace, development, 
and democratisation would become common denominators in the 
international efforts to address the issue of state failure. 
From its creation until 1989, the UN deployed five peacekeeping 
missions to deal with intrastate conflicts. From 1989 to 2000, that number 
reached thirty eight (Lacina, 2004: 192). A landmark in the UN’s efforts to 
perform a new role in addressing severe human rights violations was the UN 
Security Council Resolution 688 (1990). It stated that the treatment given 
by the Iraqi government to its Kurdish population constituted a ‘threat to 
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international peace and security’, according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
(McCormack, 2007: 79). This was the first time that a UN member state’s 
repression of its own population was declared by the Security Council to 
have international consequences for peace and security (Wheeler, 2000: 
168). This resolution created an exception to the principle of non-intervention 
by consenting external coercive actions in matters that were, at least in 
principle, the exclusive jurisdiction of the state (Helman and Ratner, 1993: 9). 
As far as we are aware, there were no references to Iraq as a failed state in 
this period. However, the portrayal of events taking place in the internal realm 
of a state as a threat to international peace and security became a 
widespread practice related with humanitarian tragedies in those states 
associated with the category of ‘failed’. During this decade, the UN would get 
involved in a number of peacekeeping, statebuilding, and territorial 
administration missions in Somalia, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor, to name 
but a few examples. All these missions were supported by UN Security 
Council resolutions passed under Chapter VII of the Charter. Illustrative of 
the kind of deep international commitment in these operations, in Cambodia 
the UN was responsible not only for humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks 
but it also had control of foreign affairs, finance, and internal security. In this 
context, the UN’s inaction in the face of the genocide in Rwanda was a target 
of major international criticism, and it also came to highlight the selective 
nature of these international practices (Mayall and Oliveira, 2011: 6, 11). 
Other international/multinational organisations came to develop their 
own role in addressing state failure. The international financial institutions, 
namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), 
developed their own concepts of state-building (Goetze and Guzina, 2008: 
325-326). In 1997, the WB published the renowned ‘World Development 
Report: The State in a Changing World.’ As explained by its authors, the 
report was ‘devoted to the role and effectiveness of the state: what it should 
do, how it should do it, and how it can improve in a rapidly changing world.’ 
Essentially, it argued that the ability of states to enforce the rule of law was a 
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vital condition for economic development, whereas ‘the absence of such 
rules is a defining feature of a failed state’ (World Bank, 1997: 161).4 
For the European Union (EU) and its Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CSFP), the main concern was that, with the collapse of the USSR, the 
Eastern European states coming out of the Soviet bloc could create a zone of 
instability in the borderlands of the EU (Winn and Lord, 2001: 174-179). In 
the words of Jacques Delors (1994: 3), at the time President of the European 
Commission (EC), ‘outside Europe many regions are witnessing conflict and 
the disintegration of political structure. What there is, then, is the acceleration 
rather than the end of history. Instead of a new world order, a new world 
disorder is being presaged.’5 
 
Likewise, the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) shifted 
an important part of its new mission towards the issue of failed states (Asmus 
et al, 1992). Faced with a struggle for adaptation to the post-Cold War world, 
the future of NATO generated an important debate about whether or not, 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the organisation still had a purpose 
(Kratochwil, 1989). NATO recognised this necessity to adapt to a new 
international context in its ‘London Declaration on a Transformed North 
Atlantic Alliance’ (1990), as well as in its 1991 Strategic Concept. The latter 
asserted that the ‘new risks’ were more likely to originate in potential state 
failure situations, arising from ‘the serious economic, social and political 
difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced 
by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.’ Reaffirming its 
commitment to the ‘common values of democracy, human rights and the rule 
of law’, the Strategic Concept identified crisis and conflict in the allies’ 
Southern and Eastern borders as the biggest obstacles to enforce those 
values.6 
 
In the context of normative debates and tensions between the 
principle of state sovereignty and ‘the evolving international norms related to 
human rights and the use of force’ (Welsh, 2004: 1), it was possible to 
observe a concerted move in some segments of international society in 
defence of the contingent nature of state sovereignty. This, Del Rosso (1995: 
179) argued without any historical evidence to support his claim, contrasted 
sharply ‘with previous eras when sovereignty was indivisible and absolute.’ 
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Two developments reflecting this move towards state sovereignty as 
contingent were the idea of sovereignty as responsibility – of which an early 
advocate in academia was Deng (1996) – and the expansion of what 
represented a threat to international peace and security under chapter VII of 
the UN Charter (Welsh, 2004: 2). In this logic, states should be held 
internationally responsible for protecting their citizens’ basic human rights, 
and also for avoiding internal crises turn into threats to international peace 
and security. 
Another related development was the rise of the concept of human 
security. The 1992 UN Security Council summit-level session proposed 
expanding the concepts of human rights and human security and revisiting 
UN Charter’s Article 43 on a UN standing army (Holm, 2001: 361). The 
formula human security, as Henk (2005: 92-93) explains, aimed to shift the 
focus of security from states/territories and armaments to a notion centred on 
people and sustainable human development. It occupied a central place in 
the 1993 and 1994 Human Development Reports, published by the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP).7 A key figure in the development of 
 
the concept of human security was the scholar and UN consultant Andrew 
Mack (e.g. Mack, 2005). Among many other studies and reports, he was the 
main author of the section on global security in ‘We the Peoples: The United 
Nations in the 21st century’ (2000: 9-17), the report of the Secretary General 
to the Millennium Assembly. 
The emphasis on human rights and a cosmopolitan notion of justice 
were associated with the cause of liberal internationalism. A famous 
proclamation in this regard was the speech in Chicago by British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair (1999), which formed the basis of what became known as 
the ‘Blair Doctrine’. Blair argued that ‘the most pressing foreign policy 
problem we face is to identify the circumstances in which we should get 
actively involved in other people’s conflicts.’ This was as much an issue of 
interest as of principle: 
 
 
In the end values and interests merge. If we can establish and 
spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an 
open society then that is in our national interests too. The spread 
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of our values makes us safer. As John Kennedy put it ‘Freedom is 
indivisible and when one man is enslaved who is free?’ 
 
 
The task of securing international order was associated in the UN realm with 
the goal of promoting a cosmopolitan notion of justice, namely economic 
development and human rights. In his well-known article for The Economist 
titled ‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty’, Annan (1999) defended the priority of 
peoples’ sovereignty over the sovereigns’ sovereignty. In the context of the 
interventions in Kosovo and East Timor, he noted the redefinition of 
sovereignty in international society by the ‘forces of globalisation and 
international co-operation’ towards a much more cosmopolitan vision of the 
norm. Thus, international peace and security, and the protection of human 
rights globally were gathered within an overarching political project 
(McDonald, 2002: 278). 
As Annan predicted when he wrote that this doctrine, at least ‘in 
some quarters’ would arouse ‘distrust, scepticism, even hostility’, the idea of 
sovereignty as responsibility did not go unchallenged. On the contrary, it 
raised great tensions in international society. Annan noted how in the case of 
Kosovo, ‘a group of states intervened without seeking authority from the 
United Nations Security Council.’ Classified as ‘illegal’ by both Annan and the 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, NATO’s intervention gave 
rise to a major debate about legality and legitimacy in international society 
and the gap between the two, as well as the question of whom, in 
international society, should be the judge and enforcer of international norms 
(Cunliffe, 2005: 42). NATO member states justified the intervention with the 
attempt to prevent an imminent humanitarian catastrophe and to put a halt to 
the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, which ‘could not be allowed to stand in a 
civilised Europe and that it posed a long-term threat to European security’. 
The language of Security Council resolutions 1199 and 1203, passed under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, was used by leaders of NATO member-states to 
defend the legitimacy of the intervention (Wheeler, 2000: 265-276). This 
change in UN Security Council practice which, as Wheeler (2004: 29) puts it, 
was ‘pushed by leading Western states that sought to secure UN legitimacy 
for interventions to protect civilians in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans’, 
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was often faced with the opposition, sometimes the scepticism of China and 
Russia (Mayall and Oliveira, 2011: 15-16). 
The following words by India’s Permanent Representative to the UN, 
Nirupam Sen, are a prominent example of resistance to the doctrine of 
sovereignty as responsibility. He declared that 
 
 
in recent years… the developmental activities of the UN have 
diminished while the regulatory and punitive aspects have 
acquired prominence. The developing countries are the target of 
many of these actions which has led to a sense of alienation 
among the majority of UN Member States […] The Security 
Council’s legislative decisions and those on the use of force … 
appear as an arbitrary and alien power: this is an alienation not of 
the individual or class but of countries. 
 
 
As Cunliffe (2005: 43) notes, these words bear ‘the imprint of Third Worldist 
politics, principled attention to issues of self-determination, development and 
non-intervention.’ Another example of opposition to the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention is the declaration of the foreign ministers of the 
non-Aligned countries in April 2000, shortly after NATO’s intervention in 
Kosovo: ‘we reject this so-called “right” of humanitarian intervention, which 
has no legal basis in the UN Charter or in the general principles of 
international law.’ 
That humanitarian intervention remained a controversial norm 
(Welsh, 2004: 2) in international society is an undeniable fact. Yet the 
position of the so-called emerging powers/developing states cannot be 
defined simply as one of opposition/resistance to this norm. It was far more 
ambivalent and complex. For example, seven non-NATO developing states 
voted against a UN Security Council resolution sponsored by Russia that 
condemned NATO’s illegal bombing of Yugoslavia (Wheeler, 2004: 44-45). 
Another important example is the considerable manpower contribution from 
India, Pakistan and South Asian countries to UN 
peacekeeping/peacebuilding missions (Cunliffe, 2005: 45). Yet another 
example is the way African states and organisations, partly motivated by their 
natural distrust regarding outside interference in African affairs, took in their 
hands the issue of conflict in the region – although in a rather limited fashion. 
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The deployment of an African Union (AU) force in Darfur is a prominent case 
(Clapham, 2011: 73-82). 
Indeed, it is also not possible to talk about a clear position of Great 
Powers such as China or India in relation to the issue of state failure and 
related international practices. In the case of China, the scepticism regarding 
the doctrine of sovereignty as responsibility, and the distrust regarding 
international actions of an imperial nature, was tempered by China’s concern 
of being part of the Great Powers’ decision making beyond the UN Security 
Council (Suzuki, 2011: 83-93). In particular, Suzuki (2011: 93) noted the 
Chinese elites’ reluctance to use the term ‘state failure’ due to the obvious 
connotations with ‘Western intervention.’ Yet there was not a total rejection of 
the need to address state failure, but a defense of the view that the issue 
ought to be dealt with in the UN realm. The Chinese participated in UN 
peacekeeping operations in East Timor, Lebanon, and Haiti (Suzuki, 2011: 
93-102). In the case of India, Ghandi’s motto that ‘good governance is no 
substitute for self-government’ still seemed to hold sway after the Cold War, 
and thus reinforced India’s commitment to a pluralist international society. 
However, as mentioned above, India’s armed forces participated in 
numerous peacekeeping operations (Ray, 2011: 108-120). 
The centrality of the issue of failed states in international society 
generated a burgeoning interest in IR and cognate fields. Explanations for 
the rise of the issue of failed states after the Cold War thrived. The most 
common is the idea that the two superpowers provided stability and material 
support to several Third World countries. With the demise of the superpower 
rivalry, Third World states lost the political, economic and military support 
received during the Cold War from at least one of the superpowers (e.g. 
Holm, 2001: 360; Andersen, 2007: 22). A related explanation is the supposed 
rise in the incidence of civil wars (Goodhand and Hulme, 1999: 13-23), 
branded by Van Creveld (1991) as ‘new wars’ characterised by ‘low-intensity 
conflicts’, tribal, religious or ethnic in their nature. These views about the 
novelty of the ‘new wars’, and in particular the notion that the post-Cold War 
period witnessed a rise in the number and intensity of civil wars, was 
challenged by a number of authors. While Berdal (2003: 483) noted the 
‘perfunctory, uncritical, and ahistorical manner in which this claim is often 
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presented’, other scholars showed that, despite the complexity of defining a 
civil war, the number of wars, including civil ones, actually declined since the 
mid-1980s (e.g. Mack, 2005: 147-158; Call and Cousens, 2008: 6). 
Contradicting to a certain extent the generality of the literature that sees 
failed states as an international problem that emerged essentially after the 
Cold War, Zartman (1995: 3) mapped the phenomenon of state collapse as 
having occurred in two waves. The first of these waves came ‘toward the end 
of the second decade of independence, when regimes that had replaced the 
original nationalist generation were overthrown, carrying the same state 
structure with them into a vacuum’, as with cases of Chad, Uganda, and 
Ghana. 
Other explanations focused on perception. As a result of the decline 
of superpower rivalry, the superpowers ceased to be supportive of autocratic 
regimes whilst turning a blind eye to their governance records and treatment 
of their citizens. Thus, civil wars and severe human rights violations were no 
longer a secondary issue, and ‘started to receive a flurry of media, policy and 
scholarly interest’ (Lacina, 2004: 191-192). Widely regard as contributing to 
this change of perception was the role of globalisation and technology, 
namely the ‘CNN effect’ (Krauthammer, 2004), despite the numerous 
definitions and range of phenomena associated with it (Strobel, 1996: 357- 
358). 
Generally, the legacy of colonialism was secondary at best in the 
debates about the reasons states fail. One exception is Mayall (2005: 37, 56- 
57), who explored briefly how the universalisation of the sovereign state and 
of principles such as territorial integrity and non-interference is a ‘colonial 
export’, a result of imperial conquest. This, according to Mayall, played a 
substantial role in the failure of these new states – that previously adopted 
other forms of government and social organisation – ‘to provide the most 
basic public goods, namely law, order and minimal welfare.’ Against this 
picture, Herbst (1997: 121) noted that even ‘trenchant critics’ of colonialism 
recognise that European rule had positive effects. Chief among these were 
the creation of states and the replacement of numerous forms of political 
organisation with ‘clearly defined (albeit inappropriate) boundaries.’ 
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According to Sabaratnam (2011), ‘the merging of peace studies and 
security studies from the late 1980s onwards, its engagement with theories of 
human need and social grievances informing analysis of armed conflict, 
coupled with the new departure in UN thinking’ regarding intrastate conflict, 
explains the huge interest in research on conflict prevention and resolution. 
Major studies included the UN Research Institute for Social Development’ 
(UNRISD) War-Torn Societies Project (1994-1998) and the Carnegie 
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1994-1999). These studies 
represented the continuation of the legacy of scholars such as Johan 
Galtung, who for decades published prolifically on the topic of peace and 
conflict. The economic motivations behind the beginning and perpetuation of 
civil wars also deserved its deal of attention in academia (e.g. Berdal and 
Malone, 2000). 
Academics and pundits advanced definitions for failed and collapsed 
states (Zartman, 1995: 1, 6), or even other sets of adjectives to classify these 
states (Gros, 1996: 458-461). Zartman (1995: 1, 6) defined a collapse of a 
state as ‘a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, 
and political order have fallen apart.’ According to him, the twin feature of 
state collapse, also understood as ‘the breakdown of good governance, law, 
and order’, is societal collapse, defined as ‘the extended breakdown of social 
coherence’. In this perspective, a collapsed state ought to be seen ‘as a rare 
and extreme version of a failed state’. Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia, 
Burundi, Chad, DRC, East Timor, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Kosovo, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and 
Uganda, were usually among the cases of failed and collapsed states 
identified in the literature. Despite the emergence of other concepts such 
as ‘complex political emergencies’, ‘low-income countries under stress’ as 
used by the WB, or ‘fragile states’ as adopted in recent years by the 
British Department for International Development (Foreign Policy, 2005) and 
the US Agency for International Development (USAID, 2005), failed states 
was the dominant concept to refer to the crisis of Third World states. 
Echoing the concerns of policy makers about all the problems 
associated with state failure, from humanitarian tragedies and refugee flows 
to armed conflict  and  economic  privation  (Deng,  1995:  207),  it  seemed 
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consensual that this ‘disturbing new phenomenon’ would pose a ‘different’ 
challenge (Helman and Ratner, 1993: 3). The view that domestic and 
international order were ‘inextricably intertwined’ (Ayoob, 1996: 37), and that 
these conflicts had important regional and international consequences 
(Wallesteen and Sollenberg, 1998), became widespread. In these attempts to 
‘manage global chaos’ (Crocker et al, 1996), and study failed and collapsed 
states in order to ‘learn how to put them back together’ (Zartman’s, 1995: 
267), the issue of intrastate war or ‘ethnopolitical conflict’ (Gurr, 1994), 
including conflict prevention and resolution, generated huge interest (e.g. 
Crocker et al, 1996; Gurr, 1996; Lund, 1996; Rotberg, 1996). It should be 
noted that it is virtually impossible to find a consensus around the notions of 
peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding, nationbuilding, and 
statebuilding, either within academia or in the policy-making sphere. These 
are essentially contested concepts (Berdal, 2000; 2009: 16-17). Yet these 
terms reflected an evolution towards a more expansive and comprehensive 
engagement, a more lasting international footprint by the international actors 
involved (Goetze and Guzina, 2008: 139), from the traditional peacekeeping 
operations to more ambitious and lengthy nation/statebuilding enterprises. 
This led scholars to refer to several generations of peacekeeping (e.g. 
Goulding, 1993: 456-458; Richmond, 2002; Paris, 2004: 13-39; Call and 
Cousens, 2008). 
 
 
 
1.3 Failed States in the Age of ‘Global Security’ 
 
 
 
When it took office in January 2001, the administration of George W. Bush 
was less interested about failed states and statebuilding than the previous 
Clinton administration (Stohl and Stohl, 2008: 56-57). The events of 11 
September 2001 would change this. Al-Qaeda’s attacks at the heart of the 
world’s superpower were compared to historical landmarks such as the 
assassination of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, or Japan’s attack on Pearl 
Harbour. Particularly in the West, claims of unpredictability, uncertainty and 
the global nature of the terrorist threat (Halliday, 2002: 31-32), shaped the 
idea that what was required was also a global response. 
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Once again, a feeling of anxiety was coupled with one of opportunity. 
The deadly attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon were quickly linked 
to Afghanistan where Al-Qaeda had found its ‘safe haven’ under Taliban 
rule. Propelled by the events of 11 September 2001, the US gained 
considerable support to the quest of holding to account those ‘aiding, 
supporting, or harbouring the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of these 
acts’ (Hurrell, 2002: 193). The US National Security Strategy (2002: 1, 4) 
placed ‘failed’ and ‘weak’ states as one of the top priorities of the Bush 
Administration, together with terrorism: ‘America is now threatened less by 
conquering states than we are by failing ones.’ ‘The events of September 11, 
2001, taught us’, the document also emphasised, ‘that weak states, like 
Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong 
states.’ 
The following passage from the 9/11 Commission Report (2004: 
 
367) exemplifies not only the concern with the terrorism-failed states nexus, 
but also illustrates the concept of failed states as a category that performs a 
function: 
 
 
In the twentieth century, strategists focused on the world’s great 
industrial heartlands. In the twenty first century, the focus is in the 
opposite direction, toward remote regions and failing states. The 
United States has had to find ways to extend its reach, straining 
the limits of its influence. Every policy decision we make needs to 
be seen through this lens. If, for example, Iraq becomes a failed 
state, it will go to the top of the list of places that are breeding 
grounds for attacks against Americans at home. 
 
 
‘Nation building’ was back to the top of Bush administration’s foreign policy 
agenda, in deep contrast with its previous declarations regarding the issue. 
The instrumental use of this category, in the context of the US-led 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, generated once more the debate about 
whether ‘the agenda of state building operations was being determined by 
the need of the post-conflict society, or by the strategic interests of the Great 
Powers’ (Chesterman, 2005: 340-350). Although there were references to the 
connections between failed states and terrorism during the 1990s (e.g. 
Albright, 1993; US National Security Strategy, 1998), this link would come to 
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the forefront of all US foreign policy priorities. The 2006 National Security 
Strategy reasserted and emphasised the idea of its 1998 and 2002 
predecessors. The then presidential candidate Barak Obama, pointing out his 
views and main priorities for American foreign policy in an article for Foreign 
Affairs (2007), identified ‘weak states that cannot control their territory or 
provide for their people’ as a main threat to the US. 
With September 11 and the US-led ‘War on Terror’, the UN as the 
central institution concerned with international peace and security placed the 
nexus of terrorism failed states on the top of its agenda. Expressions of this 
commitment are Kofi Annan’s statement of 4 October 2002 and the move to 
enforcement in the decisions of the Security Council, including through 
Chapter VII (Newman, 2007: 117-125). This was the case with Security 
Council resolution 1368. It determined that ‘the situation in Afghanistan 
constituted a threat to international peace and security.’ It also recognised 
‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with 
the Charter’ (UNSC, 2001: 1). Resolution 1368 is interpreted as giving 
authorisation for US-UK joint operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan 
(Luck, 2004: 99). Important UN documents regarding the organisation’s 
efforts to adapt to the challenge of terrorism and its relation with failed states 
are the UN Security Council resolution 1373; the final report of the High Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, ‘A More Secure World’ (2004), 
and The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its ‘Plan of 
Action’ adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2006. 
The sovereign state was identified as the key to combat this complex 
challenge of security and development that involved weak and collapsed 
states, civil wars, terrorism, WMD, and that required a huge investment in 
peacebuilding and the strengthening of state capacity. Yet in this endeavour, 
in Kofi Annan’s (2005: 6, 38-39) words ‘to strengthen states and enable them 
to serve their peoples better’, the UN did not forgo the issue of democracy 
promotion, nor of human rights and human security. Annan’s (2005) report, 
‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for 
All’, is quite illustrative of this mind-set. A few years earlier, in ‘An Agenda for 
Democratisation’, Boutros-Ghali (1996: 4) clearly stated that the UN does not 
promote a specific model of democracy: ‘each society must be able to
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choose the form, pace and character of its democratisation process.’ 
However, as Newman (2007: 112) noted, ‘the concepts of national 
representation, equality, individual rights of citizenship, and secular and 
accountable forms of civil society’ were all represented in the UN’s approach 
to democracy. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
became the largest UN agency, with 90,000 troops deployed under its 
authority and a budget that increased from one to five billion US dollars 
between 1997 and 2006 (Yost, 2007: 68). Again, the UN led or was involved 
in a number of peacebuilding and statebuilding missions in Afghanistan, 
Liberia, Burundi, Haiti, Iraq, and Somalia, to name some of the most 
prominent examples (Chesterman, 2004; Malone, 2004). The UN’s 
involvement in Iraq, with all its particularities, was a source of major debates 
and controversy in international society (Malone, 2006: 185-221), due to 
widespread views that the US invasion was an illegal enterprise (Simpson, 
2005). 
According to Mallaby (2002: 3) the idea that the ‘anti-imperialist 
restraint that emerged since World War II’, particularly the ‘refusal of orderly 
societies to impose their own institutions on the disorderly ones’, was 
‘becoming harder to sustain’ in this post-11 September period. Illustrative of 
this are the opinions expressed by Robert Cooper, who assumed the role of 
Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the General 
Secretariat of the Council of the EU in 2002, in an article for The Observer 
entitled ‘The New Liberal Imperialism’ (2002), and in his book The Breaking 
of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century (2003). Cooper 
(2002) argued that in spite of the conditions for imperialism being there 
 
 
the supply and demand for imperialism have dried up. And yet the 
weak still need the strong and the strong still need an orderly 
world. What is needed is a new kind of imperialism, one 
acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values. 
The challenge posed by the pre-modern world, a world of failed 
states, is a new one, and instability in your neighbourhood poses 
threats which no state can ignore. Bin Laden has now 
demonstrated for those who had not already realised, that today 
all the world is, potentially at least, our neighbour. 
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According to Cooper (2003: 70-71), the ‘general form of imperialism, also 
voluntary, which takes the form of trusteeship usually exercised by the 
international community through the United Nations’, offered ‘the people of a 
failed state a breathing space and some international assistance to enable 
them to re-establish a more sustainable state.’ 
Although it emphasised the need for a comprehensive approach (aid, 
diplomacy, military power) to respond to terrorism as opposed to the US-led 
more aggressive ‘War on Terror’ (Biscop, 2008: 13-16), the EU also identified 
failed states as one of the five key threats it faced. In the European Security 
Strategy (ESS) (2003: 5), state failure was described as ‘an alarming 
phenomenon that undermines global governance, and adds to regional 
instability.’ The other four key threats identified in the ESS are terrorism, 
WMD, organised crime, and regional conflicts, all associated with the issue of 
failed states.8 
 
The promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, all 
figured in the EU’s new ‘responsibility for global security’ (ESS, 2003: 1, 10). 
As Javier Solana expressed: 
 
 
We do not want the benefits of the Union to end abruptly at its 
external borders. Nor do we want the benefits of the Union to be 
reserved just to those countries that are current or future 
members. Why not? Because the Union cannot exist as an island 
of peace, prosperity and stability in a wider sea of turmoil… 
Borders matter less, and, while the extent of states has become 
less relevant, so the content of states has become more important’ 
(in Gheciu, 2008: 45, 53). 
 
 
Solana’s words give credit to the argument that the ESS pursued a strategy 
that seek to change the world essentially in the EU’s own image (Howarth, 
2007: 200). This renewed commitment to peacekeeping, statebuilding, 
conflict prevention and crisis management beyond the EU’s neighbourhood 
(Howardt, 2008; Gheciu, 2008: 167-168) is evident in the number of civilian, 
police, military, and naval missions launched by the EU. These took place in 
the Balkans and beyond, namely in Macedonia, Bosnia, DRC, Chad, Central 
African Republic, Somalia, and Afghanistan. The EU also provided major 
financial  support  for  other  reconstruction  and  development  operations 
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(Kosonen, 2006: 32), with a contribution of 40% to the UN’s 2004 overall 
budget for peacekeeping (Biscop and Drieskens, 2008: 126). 
After September 11 and for the first time in its history, NATO invoked 
its Article 5, the alliance’s mutual defence clause. Although the allies were 
concerned with the same ‘risk’, i.e. ‘the nexus of a failing state, terrorism, 
crime and poverty’, fundamental differences existed in matters of approach to 
the problem (Williams, 2009: 117). Yet as recognised even by European 
officials, ‘the key decisions are taken in Washington’. What the Bush 
administration had in mind for NATO, as Yost (2007: 102, 139-140) explains, 
was that the organisation should not be limited to military operations, the 
traditional collective defence view, but that the Alliance’s capacity should be 
built up to assume responsibilities of stabilisation and reconstruction tasks in 
cooperation with other international organisations. NATO’s new mission was 
now to build stable democracies with the purpose of tackling the dangers 
arising from failed and collapsed states (Williams, 2008: 49). The 
declarations of NATO’s Secretary General Lord Robertson (2002a; 2002b; 
2002c) are a clear defense of the view that building democratic states was 
the solution to the problem of state failure/collapse. Among other scenarios 
where it was already involved (e.g. Kosovo), NATO also deployed troops 
in Macedonia (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006: 83). However, the 
alliance’s main focus was Afghanistan, as clearly stated in the 
International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAD) ‘Strategic Vision’ (2008). 
Gathered in Bucharest, the heads of state and government of the alliance 
reaffirmed the determination to ‘help the people and the elected Government 
of Afghanistan build an enduring stable, secure, prosperous and democratic 
state, respectful of human rights and free from the threat of terrorism’. NATO 
would also support statebuilding efforts in Iraq by training Iraq’s security 
forces and played an important role in maritime operations in the Horn of 
Africa aimed at countering Somali piracy, in accordance with UN Security 
Council resolutions (NATO, 2005; NATO, 2009). 
Attesting to the influence of the doctrine that state sovereignty ought 
to be contingent is the publication of 2001 Report ‘The Responsibility to 
Protect’ (R2P) by the International Commission on Intervention (ICISS). The 
R2P represented the highest stage so far of the doctrine of sovereignty as 
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responsibility. An initiative of the Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, 
it counted with the participation of a number of prominent figures, including 
Michael Ignatieff, a Canadian academic and liberal politician, Ramesh 
Thakur, the Senior Vice-Rector of the UN University, and Gareth Evans, 
former Australian Foreign Minister. The central idea of the report was that the 
norm of state sovereignty was not only about autonomy, non-interference, 
and inviolable legal authority, but also about responsibility. This responsibility 
of states exists not only towards the protection of their citizens, but also to 
the society of states, namely in preventing difficulties within a state’s borders 
turning into ‘threats to international peace and security.’ The logic behind this 
document is the sense of obligation lying with international society to fulfil its 
responsibilities if a given state is not able or willing to meet them (Cunliffe, 
2005: 39-41). Among the greatest supporters of the report was Kofi Annan 
(2005: 57), who defended the ‘emerging norm that there is a responsibility to 
protect.’ Once more, the notion of sovereignty as responsibility was faced 
with opposition in some segments of international society. As Cunliffe (2005: 
43) notes, this opposition was mentioned by the ICISS report itself, when it 
stated that ‘for some, the new interventions herald a new world in which 
human rights trumps state sovereignty; for others it ushers in a world in which 
big powers ride roughshod over the smaller ones, manipulating the rhetoric 
of human rights.’ 
The academic literature on the topic of failed states witnessed a 
further upsurge after 9/11. The nexus of terrorism and failed states (Takeyh 
and Gvosdev, 2002) was used to show why failed states matter even more 
than in the previous decade, because it transformed the issue into a global 
security problem (e.g. Rotberg, 2002a, 2002b, 2003b; Chesterman, 2005; 
Patrick, 2007; Robinson, 2007), one that transcended ‘its previous 
humanitarian dimension’ (Fukuyama, 2004: 93). This nexus was also 
associated with ‘all sorts of illicit activities such as drugs and weapons trade,’ 
and thus as a source of ‘threats and instability to their region and beyond’ 
(Einsiedel, 2005: 13). The concerns of policy-makers about the issue of failed 
states and intrastate wars were reasserted in academia, with the emphasis 
on this ‘new type of organised violence’ in today’s failed states, especially in 
Africa and Eastern Europe, as ‘one aspect of the current globalised era’ 
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(Kaldor: 2007: 1, 7-8). Other scholars were more sceptical, and considered 
the implications for the norm of state sovereignty of this blurring of the border 
between internal and international security (e.g. Bigo, 2001). 
Again it was possible to identify a variety of attempts to define, 
characterise, and distinguish weak, failed, and collapsed states (e.g. 
Rotberg, 2002b; Milliken and Krause, 2002; Rotberg, 2003a; Jenne, 2003; 
Wainwright, 2003; Patrick, 2007). In this regard, there was a proliferation of 
international rankings according to which the ‘performance’ of states could be 
measured, including Foreign Policy’s Failed States Index, UNDP’s Human 
Development Index, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index, and Freedom House’s Freedom of the World Report (Rotberg, 2003a: 
4). It is important to note that, amidst a wide set of criteria used to define 
state failure, there seem to be a certain consensus that these states were 
characterised by particularly violent conflict involving government forces and 
insurgencies, and where the distinction between warring parties and civilians 
is often blurred (Rotberg, 2002a: 85-86; Bain, 2003: 141-142). 
Once more, numerous ‘causes of state failure’ were listed, either at 
the leadership level, state level, or system level (Einsiedel, 2005: 16). These 
included among others: (a) ‘geographical, physical, or fundamental economic 
constraints, internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed, despotism, or 
external attacks’ (Rotberg, 2003a: 4); (b) the inadequacy of the European 
model of the nation-state to the African continent (Einsiedel, 2005: 16-17); (c) 
the crisis of legitimacy of the post-colonial state that leads to violent 
contestation (Rubin, 2005: 96); and (d) the role of ‘neighbourhood’ in 
spreading state failure, in the sense that states like DRC or Afghanistan 
create ‘regional conflict complexes’ or ‘regional conflict formations’ (Cramer 
and Goodhand, 2002: 886; Armstrong and Rubin, 2005: 79-82). This vast 
body of literature is explanatory, with a ‘problem-solving’ approach to the 
topic. Though it never went away, the debate about ‘fixing’ failed states 
(Ghani and Lockhart, 2008) and how to achieve success in state-building and 
prevention of state failure re-occupied a centre stage (e.g. Rotberg, 2002a, 
2002b; Cramer and Goodhand, 2002; Crocker, 2003; Dupont et al, 2003; Call 
and Cousens, 2008; Stohl and Stohl, 2008). The literature on potential 
shortcomings of and obstacles to these efforts by states, IOs, and NGOs to 
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address state failure also proliferated (e.g. Rotberg, 2002a; Chesterman, 
2005; Rubin, 2005: 100-104; Coyne, 2006; Bickerton, 2007; De Guevara, 
2008; Berdal, 2009). The need ‘to focus on the state’ (Cliffe and Luckam, 
1999: 27), justified by the assumption that, without ‘minimally functioning 
state institutions’, peacebuilding becomes a fruitless endeavour explains, 
according to Call and Cousens (2008: 9), the shift from peacebuilding to 
statebuilding. 
The debate about the economic causes of conflict continued. One of 
the most prominent theses about the issue was Collier’s (2000; 2007). He 
argued that it is ‘greed’, i.e. economic opportunities, rather than ‘grievance’, 
i.e. discontent with a given ruler, that most often explains the agendas of 
different groups in ‘large-scale civil wars’ and the perpetuation of these since 
1965. In this regard, Cooper (2002: 935-936) looked at how actors in these 
conflicts explore the connections between the local and the global economy. 
Keen (2008: 30) challenged Collier’s thesis, in particular the latter’s inability 
to understand ‘how greed and grievance interact’. 
Although recognising that the comparison between contemporary 
engagement with failed states and previous models of trusteeship is 
problematic, calls were made for the need to think about how could state 
building efforts reproduce ‘the better effects of empire’, e.g. peace, without 
reproducing its worst features (Chesterman, Ignatieff and Thakur, 2005: 383). 
In this logic, the accepted rules of sovereignty ought to be transcended to 
create ‘shared sovereignty’ in those states ‘that suffer from some 
combination of internal strife, poverty, limited governmental capacity, or a 
dearth of liberal institutions’ (Krasner, 2005: 69). Looking at the 
responsibilities that the UN and other international bodies in operations of 
international administration of war-torn territories, and thinking particularly of 
the cases of  Eastern Slavonia, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, Caplan 
(2002: 7) argued that ‘international trusteeship for failed states and contested 
territories has become a reality in all but name.’ In this regard, Caplan (2007: 
232, 240) suggested that ‘shared sovereignty’, during a limited period of time 
and under the basis of consensus is a more promising alternative to ‘neo- 
trusteeship’.9  Despite the historical analogies, there is not much of an effort 
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within these debates to comprehend the normative context of the principle 
and practice of trusteeship in history. 
 
 
1.4 The Liberal Peace Critique 
 
 
 
The critique of the liberal peace by a number of scholars attempted to 
capture and deconstruct the overarching interests, ideology, and values that 
informed what was described as a liberal international project that, in broad 
terms, endeavoured to establish peace and transform weak, failed and 
collapsed states into stable and functioning democratic ones. It should be 
mentioned that this liberal international project was not only influential in the 
formulation of policy, but it was also deliberately defended in academia (e.g. 
Baker, 1996: 530; Muravchik, 1996: 573; Reychler, 2002; Kaldor, 2007: 11). 
Perhaps the most prominent critique of the liberal peace came from 
Duffield (2001: 1, 11-16). He illustrated an emerging and complex system of 
global governance, composed of governments, NGOs, private companies, 
international organisations, including financial institutions and UN agencies. 
Common to this complex system is the shift from ‘aid policy’ to ‘a new 
humanitarianism’ based on ‘conflict resolution and societal reconstruction’, 
explained largely by what Duffield calls the new ‘security-development 
nexus’, i.e. the idea that development is not possible without security, and 
vice-versa. The overarching aim of this system is the political project of the 
liberal peace: ‘to transform the dysfunctional and war-affected societies that it 
encounters on its borders into cooperative, representative and, especially, 
stable entities’. 
Another important contribution is the work of Paris (1997: 56-63). He 
argued that liberal internationalism has been the central paradigm guiding the 
efforts of most international agencies involved in peacebuilding activities, 
defined ‘as an enormous experiment in social engineering’ that ‘involves 
transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic organisation 
into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict.’ While noting that 
there is ‘no single manifesto or central authority that guides the work of these 
peace-building agencies’, he makes the case that ‘the promotion of free and 
fair elections, the construction of democratic political institutions, respect for 
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civil liberties, and market-oriented economic reforms’ are most often present 
in these attempts to achieve ‘peace through political and economic 
liberalisation’. 
Despite a consensus that the liberal peace represents ‘a single and 
coherent object of inquiry’, recent contributions observed that the liberal 
peace is not constituted by ‘a singular logic or set of assumptions’, and that 
‘different ideas are at work in the movements between peacebuilding and 
statebuilding as modes of conflict management’ (Sabaratnam, 2011). As 
Mayall and Oliveira (2011: 12) put it, ‘the consistency of such an agenda 
should not be overstated.’ In this regard, Richmond (2005: 125-177; 2006: 
292) called for a more elaborated understanding of ‘the different 
conceptualisations of peace, and the different graduations of the liberal 
peace.’ He noted in particular the existence of a ‘weak consensus’ among the 
various actors (UN, NGOs, major states, and donors) involved in these 
international interventions, regarding the forms and models for the pursuit of 
market democracy, the rule of law, and development. This understanding has 
led to somewhat limited efforts to discuss and understand in more depth the 
liberalism, or as Simpson (2000) argued, the different liberalisms at play. 
The liberal project of transforming failed states according to the 
values and interests of the liberal world was criticised by a number of 
scholars. Two aspects in particular dominated the debate. One was the 
emphasis on its utopic nature (e.g. Paris, 1997: 57; Miliken and Krause, 
2002: 762; Sens, 2004: 147; Collier, 2009; Williams, 2010). The other main 
criticism questioned if these interventions aimed at establishing liberal forms 
of governance are actually illiberal practices (e.g. Chandler, 2004; 2006: 1; 
Richmond, 2005: 173-175). This literature is filled with analogies between the 
imperial/colonial past and what is seen as the possible reproduction of those 
practices through the contemporary international peacebuilding activities. 
Paris (2002: 637-638) associated the contemporary international 
peacebuilding missions with the sense of duty of the mission civilisatrice, due 
to the liberal peace’s ‘particular vision of how states should organise 
themselves internally’. He nevertheless argued that there are qualitative 
differences between the two, namely that the ‘fact that European colonialism 
was practiced primarily to benefit the imperial states themselves, whereas 
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the motivation behind recent peacebuilding operations is less mercenary’. A 
similar comparison, yet one that casts doubt on the existence of a qualitative 
difference between past and present, came from Duffield (2005: 141) who, 
drawing on Rousseau and Foucault’s analysis of the concepts savage and 
barbarian in the eighteenth century historicopolitical discourse, defined 
development and underdevelopment biopolitically. The contemporary 
development project carries this vision, and is thus a ‘radical and intrusive 
endeavour’ aimed at ‘transforming societies as a whole within the global 
borderland’ for the sake of security, thus very much a continuation of the old 
colonial logic. 
Despite these analogies, efforts to move beyond brief parallels 
between present and past to a more comprehensive understanding of the 
historical background of this issue were limited. Paris (2004: 40-54) referred 
to the historical idea, defended both by liberal philosophers of the 
Enlightenment and by liberal internationalists after World War I, that 
liberalisation and liberal forms of government could be a remedy for violent 
conflict within and between states. Likewise, Richmond’s (2005: 4-6, 23-49) 
brief historical overview attempted to show how the contemporary notion of 
the liberal peace consensus, i.e. ‘peace as governance’, is a result of older 
discourses. He argued that this liberal peace consensus reflects the merging 
of different notions of peace: ‘victor’s peace’, the ‘institutional peace’, the 
‘constitutional peace’, and the ‘civil peace.’ Richmond rightly noted the 
complexity of the attempt to reach a core meaning of the term peace, given 
its changing and contested character according to historical periods and to 
the agents involved. Yet, a critique that can be levelled at this approach is 
that it oversimplifies a much more complex picture for the sake of the 
argument that the pursuit of peace was a dominant international trend since 
the Enlightenment. The attempt to discern a single motive behind 
international practices is an unwarranted one. Reading history through the 
lenses of peace inevitably leads to this result, either by omission or by 
choice. As Bain (2011: 37) pertinently puts it, ‘human conduct rarely, if ever, 
springs from a single motive. To identify any one motive as the primary cause 
of things promises the simplicity that academics crave and the cover 
practitioners need.’ 
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Finally, it should be noted that the account provided by the liberal 
peace critique is very much in tune with the idea that the end of the Cold War 
and the implosion of the USSR did not mark the collapse of the old 
international order. Instead, this period marked the consolidation and 
expansion of the order that the US and its allies created after World War II. 
According to Ikenberry (2001: 215-256), this order was built essentially 
around four ideas: (a) ‘a commitment to open markets’; (b) ‘the management 
of this order through international institutions and agreements’; (c) ‘a social 
bargain to secure the welfare of the people’; and (d) ‘a cooperative Western 
security order.’ In Ikenberry’s (2010: 535-536, 546-548) view, what really 
changed with the end of the Cold War in t h e  perspective of this 
‘American-led liberal hegemonic order’ was the ‘security problem’, 
whereby superpower rivalry and possible direct confrontation was replaced 
by ‘violence and instability emerging from weak, failed, and hostile states.’ 
Thus, this ‘liberal moment’ was also one of ‘opportunity’ and optimism to 
promote democracy and free markets, and enlarge the group of democratic 
states. Nevertheless, there are differences between the liberal peace 
critique and liberal institutionalists. Chief among these differences is the 
former’s focus on what they see as non-benevolent/imperial practices, in 
contrast with the latter’s tendency to talk about a benign hegemony, even 
if there are exceptions to this rule (e.g. Ikenberry, 2002). 
 
 
1.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
 
 
Since its emergence at the end of the Cold War, the concept of failed states 
occupied the central stage of international society. The functions that the 
concept served are evident. Any state susceptible of being associated with 
the category of failed due to developments within its borders, be it severe 
human rights violations/humanitarian catastrophes, endemic conflict or the 
existence of terrorist safe havens, could eventually become the target of an 
external intervention, especially if those developments were interpreted as a 
threat to international order, peace, and security. These interventions were 
most often sanctioned by UN Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII 
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of the charter, and many of them involved a prolonged and noticeable 
foreign/international interference in the state(s) in question. 
The issue of failed states was marked by important debates about 
the principle of state sovereignty and what it should entail, as well as 
questions of legality and legitimacy in international society. Particularly 
among Western and like-minded states and in the UN realm, there was a 
concerted move towards the interpretation of the norm of state sovereignty 
as contingent, namely that autonomy and non-interference were rights that 
carried with it responsibilities towards both the state’s own citizens and 
international society. Other segments of international society often expressed 
their concern about the doctrine of sovereignty as responsibility, and related 
liberal internationalist practices. However, the posture of Great Powers such 
as India, Russia, or China regarding the issue, as well as that of some the 
so-called developing states, is more complex that simply one of opposition to 
these international practices. 
Regarding the literature on failed states in IR and cognate fields, it is 
generally descriptive and tends to go hand in hand with the policy-making 
concerns of the moment, with a problem-solving approach to the topic. This 
literature, including the debates about the reasons of state failure, is also 
strikingly uncritical and ahistorical. The liberal peace critique came to counter 
the uncritical nature of the literature, by highlighting an overarching trend in 
most of these international practices aimed at establishing peace and 
rebuilding the state, according to a particular vision of how these states 
should be governed. This raises inevitable links with the US-led liberal 
hegemony in international society. These scholars correctly underline that a 
concern with peace, human rights, free elections, democratic political 
institutions/forms of government, economic development or free markets are 
traits most often found in these international practices. Within the liberal 
peace critique, there is a tendency to refer to the imperial nature of these 
contemporary international practices, in the context of which brief 
associations or comparisons between the imperial/colonial past are made. 
However, attempts to counter the ahistorical character of the literature on the 
topic of failed states are still very limited. 
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The discussion in this chapter seems to confirm the notion suggested 
by Simpson (2004), Anghie (2005), and Wilde (2007; 2008), that international 
law has been used, at least in the last two decades, to justify and legitimise 
the reproduction of practices of imperial nature, in particular by the liberal 
hegemonic core of international society. The same applies to Wilde’s (2007; 
2008) argument that the notions of the ‘international’ and ‘international 
organisations’ have masked the particular ideologies and interests that drive 
interventionist practices and subjection to alien rule. 
Yet, a few important questions remain unanswered. First and 
foremost, to what extent was, and is, international law and the principle of 
state sovereignty decisive in the perpetuation of the idea and category of 
defective polities and related international practices? The answer to this 
question is closely related with and dependent on the interpretation of the 
place of international law in international society, of what international law is 
and how does it matter. One possibility, as discussed above, is that 
international law has been crucial in the perpetuation of practices of imperial 
nature by the most powerful members of international society, by allowing 
them to justify and legitimise such practices. Another possibility is that 
international law is more epiphenomenal than indicated in Simpson (2004), 
Anghie (2005), or Wilde’s (2007; 2008) accounts. International law and 
principles of morality matter, as the constant invocation of principles and 
rules by actors in international society reveals. However, instead of a cause 
of international behaviour, international principles, rules, and norms such as 
the doctrine of sovereignty as responsibility, or the UN Security Council 
resolutions defining developments within the realm of a state as a threat to 
international peace and security, might reflect a wider context in international 
society. In particular, the normative issues discussed in this chapter reveal: 
(a) a substantial degree of contestation about the key principles and norms of 
international society; (b) the preponderance of the US-centred liberal 
hegemony and of liberal principles in international society; (c) divergent ideas 
about how states should be governed and what ‘the moral purpose of the 
state’ (Reus-Smit, 1999) ought to be; and (d) the importance accorded by 
Western and like-minded states to the values of peace, human rights, or 
economic development. This, of course, is not to argue that these values are 
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universal. Moreover, the aim of universalising these values does raise 
important questions about whether there is a break with the imperial past. 
The point is that there might not be anything inherently imperial and 
oppressive in the nature of international law. 
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Chapter 2 - A History of an Idea of International Society 
 
 
 
 
 
Generations come into the possession of words and ideas as they 
come into the possession of public buildings. They call them ‘their 
own’ and no longer remember who built them and for what 
purpose. 
 
 
Richard Koebner and Helmut Dan Schmidt (in Waever, 2002: 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
 
 
To test its hypotheses and trace the idea of defective polities in the history of 
international society, this study combines an English School (ES) approach 
with insights from t h e  history of ideas and international conceptual history. 
The first section of this chapter reflects on the concept of international 
society, and what it means to speak of understanding/interpretation in the 
study of international society. It explains how this historical-empirical 
account relates with the issue of normativity. Because the history of the 
idea this study is concerned with has an important normative dimension, 
the following section looks at the role of norms and rules in international 
society, particularly state sovereignty. Related with the issue of norms and 
rules, it also reflects on the notion of practice(s), and the issues of causality 
and change in the ES. The third section focuses on the ES contribution to 
the study of history in IR. The aim is to discuss the theoretical and 
methodological lenses through which we will look at the history of this idea 
in international society, and address some concerns that have been levelled 
at the ES approach to history. The implications of treating the sovereign 
state as an historical construct are also addressed. 
The final section provides a brief overview of the various schools of 
conceptual history, before discussing in more detail the Cambridge School 
(CS) of conceptual history, from which this project draws a number of 
important meta-theoretical insights. It explains the choice of combining an ES 
approach with insights from history of ideas/international conceptual history, 
45  
and how this move is compatible with the ES cognitive goals. It also 
discusses how international conceptual history can be of value to understand 
the ideologies, values, beliefs, and interests in international society that 
generated, shaped, and changed the concepts we will be looking at. 
 
 
2.2 An English School Approach 
 
 
 
2.2.1 derstanding International Society 
 
 
 
The choice of an ES framework rests, first of all, in the meta-theoretical value 
of its central concept, international society. As Bull (1977: 13) defined it: 
 
 
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of 
states, conscious of certain common interests and common 
values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves 
to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one 
another, and share in the working of common institutions (Bull 
1977: 13). 
 
 
According to Bull (1977: 9-13), any international society is necessarily 
preceded by an international system, defined as a system of states and of 
states only, and thus ‘formed when two or more states have sufficient contact 
between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to 
cause them to behave – at least in some measure – as parts of a whole.’10 
It is consensual that international society is the key element of self- 
identification of the ES. Yet there is some disagreement about the ontological 
status of the concept of international society. Some scholars (e.g. Dunne, 
2004: 66; Navari, 2009b: 44) claim there are important differences among the 
members of the ES regarding their understanding of international society. 
Navari argues that Wight ‘conceived his subjects primarily in social and 
cultural terms’, whereas Bull ‘tended to view his subjects as rational agents’, 
driven essentially by interests. Yet in Bull’s definition of international society 
above, as well as more generally in his work, interests and values are 
accorded the same degree of importance (Alderson and Hurrell, 2000: 5-7). 
As noted by Wilson (1989: 53-54), Bull’s conception of international society is 
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quite similar to Manning’s, and in fact its ontological status is constant across 
various key figures of the ES, not only Bull and Manning but also Wight, 
James, and Vincent. Attesting to the ES approach to international politics 
based on interpretation or understanding, international society is, according 
to Manning, a ‘socially prevalent idea.’ In other words, international society is 
‘an idea generally held’, ‘prevalent in the minds of men,’ one among the 
numerous notions that influence the conduct of international actors but that 
shapes to an important extent the practice of statecraft and diplomacy. Thus, 
the crucial test of whether or not this idea of international society influences 
the conduct of international relations is the extent to which statesmen believe 
this idea exists and thus ‘act accordingly’ (Wilson: 1989, 53-54). 
There is also a debate about the aim of ES theory (Buzan, 2004a: 
12-14; Linklater and Suganami, 2006: 43-44). In particular, as Buzan argues, 
there is often a conflation between the normative and empirical strains of 
thought within the ES, and he calls for a following of the latter.11 We embrace 
this view, with an approach based on the sociological understanding of 
international society. This approach follows Manning’s (1975: 209-210) 
concern with ‘the layout of the social world and the relation of the elements 
within it’, with understanding ‘the collective life of social man’. Manning’s 
sociological interpretation of international society was given continuity by the 
likes of Bull (1977) and James (1986) (Suganami, 2001: 105), and paid 
particular attention to international law and other principles, norms and 
conventions (Wilson, 2004: 759). Although Manning recognised the 
importance of history, he did not embark upon any significant historical study 
(Linklater and Suganami, 2006: 84-85). In this thesis, the sociological 
understanding of international society is applied to its history. 
While this project opts for a historical-empirical approach, the 
normative is always present in the ES, the question is how it is applied to the 
study of international relations (Buzan, 2004a: 14-15). As Mayall (2009: 210) 
explains, there are two senses of normative in the ES: (a) sociological, i.e. 
‘discerning norms or practices of a particular society’; and (b) philosophical, 
i.e. ‘determining the right or the good or the proper form of action.’ This 
thesis’s approach is identified with the former. An example of the latter is the 
pluralism-solidarism   debate.   The   historical-empirical   approach   is   also 
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normative, but in methodological terms is the opposite of the pluralism- 
solidarism debate. Instead of taking normative positions about the present 
international society and how it should look like, the historical-empirical mode 
of enquiry focuses on what kind of norms derived from practice in order to 
gain a good understanding of the nature of international society. It is more 
about how it was, and the way that that past relates to the present, rather 
than how it ought to be/have been. A good example of this historical- 
empirical approach is Bain’s (2003: 9) enquiry into ‘interpreting human 
conduct’ and not ‘explaining human behaviour.’ His goal is to understand the 
practice of trusteeship in the history of international society, to then reflect 
upon the extent to which it is a morally appropriate practice in contemporary 
international society, in the light of its present normative context. 
This concern with international human conduct echoes the notion of 
‘practice.’ This notion has gained considerable prominence in IR, reflected in 
what is called the practice turn in the discipline. This has led to a few 
attempts to clarify what is meant by practice in the ES and other IR theories. 
One is example is Adler and Pouliot’s (2011: 1, 4) definition of practices as 
‘socially meaningful patterns of action.’ This conceptualisation, particularly 
the reference to practices that are ‘socially meaningful,’ echoes very much 
the ES approach based on the interpretation/understanding of ‘social facts’ 
and ‘human conduct’ (Jackson, 2009: 21). For the ES, studying practice 
entails a concern with the customs, norms and values, as well as the ideas 
and beliefs that can be associated with international conduct (Navari, 2011: 
13). 
The interpretative stance of the ES has been object of criticism from 
the realist, institutionalist and constructivist realms alike. These criticisms are 
directed at what is seen as the School’s ‘methodological quietism’ and 
‘neglect of causal propositions’ (Navari, 2009a: 1-2). Thus, there has been a 
call for a ‘refinement’ of the ES so that it can identify ‘the motors for change 
and lines of causation in world politics’ (Bellamy, 2004: 3). Against these 
views, Navari (2009a: 1-2) argues that there is not an absence of method in 
the ES, and these criticisms derive essentially from different notions of what 
method is. The most important idea to keep in mind in this regard is that, for 
the ES, to conduct the study of international relations within a strictly defined 
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set of rules does not make any justice to the object of study (Wilson, 2009: 
184-185). As Mayall (2009: 209) puts it, ‘the English School serves its 
method when it wears it lightly.’ 
According to Linklater and Suganami (2006: 34), there are two 
meanings for the interpretative approach of the ES. One of these, articulated 
by Suganami (1983) and Wilson (1989), places the emphasis on 
understanding and interpretation regarding the ‘cultural and institutional 
assumptions of those who speak and act in the name of the states in order to 
be able to make sense of what goes on in international relations.’ Another 
meaning, present in Wight and Bull’s approach, and further explored by 
Dunne (1998), refers to the ‘attempt to interpret what goes on in world politics 
in the light of the three or more Western traditions of international thought 
identified in the ideas of international lawyers, political philosophers, 
diplomats and state leaders.’ Far from opposite, however, these two 
meanings reflect a prioritisation of different but related levels of analysis, the 
political and the philosophical, while the emphasis on understanding is 
shared. This prioritisation of one over the other in IR enquiry might 
sometimes be necessary for practical reasons. Moreover, because the state 
remains the cornerstone of contemporary international society, it is only 
natural that the practice of statecraft occupies a central place in the ES. Yet 
beyond the fact that Linklater and Suganami include the concern with the 
mind-set of state leaders in their two meanings of interpretation, any attempt 
to study international relations through one of these two forms of 
interpretation necessarily relates to the other, even if unconsciously. How can 
one make sense of the political sphere of a given time period without having 
a notion of the philosophical context, or study the philosophical realm without 
understanding the political environment in which the philosophers and 
international lawyers worked? In practice, the frontier between the two 
realms is a thin one. 
Members of the ES have contributed to debates about the merits and 
setbacks of drawing distinctions between state, government, and society 
(Suganami, 1988: 71-75; Buzan, 1991: 59).12 One of the outcomes of these 
debates is a greater willingness to overcome the academic divisions between 
IR, political science, and sociology. Such move makes room for a more 
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comprehensive understanding of the state, and to account simultaneously for 
its internal and international dimensions (Shaw, 1991: 3; Little, 1991: 20). In 
recent years, driven by both the perception that ‘international society deals 
with a wider number of questions that has hitherto been acknowledged’ 
(Bellamy, 2004: 10-11), and by the need to consider other actors in 
international society beyond the state (Buzan, 2004b), the concern with 
methodological pluralism (Buzan, 2004a) has become an explicit one in the 
ES.13 
 
 
 
2.2.2 Norms and Rules in International Society 
 
 
 
One of our main aims is to understand the possible role that the principle of 
state sovereignty and respective norm has played in the perpetuation of the 
idea of defective polities and related international practices. As it is clear in 
the ES definition of international society, and as reflected by the emphasis on 
the common rules and values embedded in the very concept, the ES 
operates in the realm of the normative (Jackson, 2009: 21), the study of ‘what 
ought to be’ (Bellamy, 2004: 5). As Watson (2007: 2, 22) notes, ‘the ethical 
and moral dimension of the relations between states’ has always been a 
concern of the ES. In particular, the issue of moral obligation as ‘a matter of 
belief’ has been a central theme, as reflected in the works of Butterfield and 
Wight. Also related with the idea of moral obligation is the notion of legitimate 
authority and legitimate action as shaping the minds and the practices of the 
actors in international society. 
Following Wight’s (1977) work, there are attempts in the ES (e.g. 
Clark, 2005; 2007), to dig further about the preoccupation of agents in 
international society to act in accordance with, or supported by the notion of 
legitimacy. Clark (2005: 2) shows how legitimacy is constantly present not 
only in the language of scholars but that of ‘practitioners.’ According to Clark, 
legitimacy ‘represents the very essence of what is meant by an international 
society.’ Yet his observation that principles – of morality, legality, and 
constitutionality – matter in international society is simply a reassertion of ES 
essential tenets. Doubts remain about the fruitfulness of this endeavour to 
reach an account of international society based on the concept of legitimacy. 
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As Clark (2007: 17) recognises, this concept is essentially a contested one 
and it is likely to remain so. He lists a number of categories to conceptualise 
legitimacy – ‘empirical/normative; descriptive/prescriptive; a form of 
compliance, distinct from coercion, or self-interest; input/output; 
substantive/procedural’ – that do little to overcome these obstacles. The 
vagueness and lack of clarity of the concept of legitimacy has been noted by 
a number of authors who have questioned its usefulness (e.g. Hyde, 1983; 
Koskenniemi, 2003; Mulligan, 2004). It is highly problematic to speak about a 
certain action as legitimate or illegitimate, at least without clarifying an 
endless list of issues. To speak about a certain action as legitimate or 
illegitimate implies the existence of a clear set of criteria to judge the extent 
to which that action conforms with the norms of international society. It also 
begs the question of who is the judge of this, not to mention the misleading 
idea that norms in international society do not clash with each other. Despite 
all these problems in classifying practices in international society in terms of 
degrees of legitimacy, the concern of actors in international society to justify 
their actions in relation to existing norms or rules to which they have 
subscribed to is easily observable. 
According to Clark (2007: 15), ‘international legitimacy has long been 
a deeply entrenched practice within international society, and, as such, 
serves as a powerful constraint upon behaviour.’ Because legitimacy is 
appraised in relation to existing norms/rules, the latter lead – implying here a 
relationship of causality – actors of international society to behave in manner 
x or y. This view seems to fit within a burgeoning scholarship that, since the 
1980s, sees norms as ‘independent variables’ that influence or shape the 
behaviour and policies of states. As Navari (2009a: 4-6) explains, this 
scholarship has also looked at norms’ ability ‘to influence domestic actors, 
which affects states, which in turn produces international cooperation’ (e.g. 
Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Cortell and Davis Jr., 1996; Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998). According to Reus-Smit (2004b: 14-23), the most prominent 
IR schools view international law in the following manner: (a) for realists, 
international law is ‘either irrelevant or a simple reflection of the prevailing 
balance of power’; (b) neoliberal institutionalists see it ‘as a set of functional 
rules promulgated to solve co-operation problems under anarchy’; and (c) 
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constructivists emphasise the mutually constitutive relationship between 
international law and international politics. This latter belief that international 
rules cause behaviour is a central assumption of those who argue that 
international law/ state sovereignty have played a key role in the perpetuation 
of imperial/colonial practices (e.g. Anghie, 2005; Wilde, 2007). 
Contrary to these views, for the ES norms ‘do not cause things to 
occur, because in logical terms they do not exist before being demonstrated 
in action’ (Navari, 2009a: 4-6). As Jackson (2009: 22) puts it, one ought to 
avoid committing the error of seeing norms as ‘both causes of behaviour and 
standards of conduct.’ Thus, rather than causes, norms are effects or 
outcomes.14 As Wilson (2009: 172-173) notes, Bull emphasised this point 
regarding formal rules when arguing that ‘international law is a social reality 
to the extent that there is a very substantial degree of conformity to its rules; 
but it does not follow from this that international law is a powerful agent or 
motive force in world politics.’15 Thus, practice in international society, which 
according to Watson (2007: 22) ‘always has some element of hegemony in 
it,’ precedes the establishment of formal rules. 
As mentioned before, for the ES, international law matters. The 
legacy of the ES challenges the assumption that politics and international law 
have long been considered as separate domains in IR, and counters the 
generalisation that until recently there were almost no attempts to understand 
how the two realms interact (e.g. Reus-Smit, 2004a: 1-2). The notion of 
common norms and rules is central in the concept of international society. As 
James (1973: 68) fittingly highlighted, ‘international law supports a structure 
of expectations without which the intercourse of states would surely suffer an 
early collapse.’ It is this collective understanding and expectation, this 
normative ‘behavioural framework’ provided by norms and rules about what 
is proper conduct, that confers the necessary confidence for the ‘orderly 
conduct’ of ‘social activity’ in the international realm (Wilson, 2009: 171). 
The perception that hegemony is often the driving force behind 
practice in international society, and thus generates norms/rules, raises 
some issues regarding the ES account of the relationship between power 
and international law. This has been pointed out as one of the weak links of 
the ES approach to international law (Wilson, 2009: 180-181). Wilson 
notes how the most powerful states have the political and economic clout 
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to more effectively face accusations of behaving contrary to existing 
norms/rules, and react more effectively in the face of other states’ 
violations. Thus, if norms generate expectations about what is proper 
behaviour in international society, and if these norms/rules often emanate 
from hegemonic practices, how do less powerful political communities fit 
into this framework? 
This question has much in common with the theme we highlighted 
before. On the one hand, a few scholars believe that there is a relation of 
causality between international law/state sovereignty and the perpetuation of 
imperial/colonial practices. Then, logically, to understand the perpetuation of 
these international practices related with idea of defective polities, one should 
look at the colonial/imperial nature of international rules. On the other, 
contrary to ‘the instrumentalist’ view of rules in international society, 
members of the ES have continuously underscored that ‘law always reflects 
the society from which it emanates.’ In line with the ES’s sociological 
approach, ‘any given system of law can only be properly comprehended and 
evaluated by examining the social milieu that gives rise to it’ (Wilson, 2009: 
168). Thus, to understand the perpetuation of imperial/colonial practices, 
instead of looking at the nature of international rules, one should look at the 
nature of international society. 
These contrasting interpretations derive to an important extent not 
only from opposing understandings of what international law does, but also 
from different conceptualisations of what international law is. A criticism of 
the ES approach to legal rules is that it conceives international law in a rather 
restrictive manner (Wilson, 2009: 175). For example, Bull (1977: 127) defined 
law as ‘a body of rules’, formal and informal, which binds states and other 
agents in world politics… and is considered to have the status of law.’ This 
latter aspect – that law is what actors in international society (especially but 
not only states) identify as law through their practices, as carrying a sense of 
obligation – is in tune with recent analysis of the relationship between 
international relations and international law (e.g. Shelton, 2009: 68; Carty, 
2009: 82). Bull also noted that international rules may originate from various 
sources, including ‘morality, custom or established practice,’ as well as 
international law itself (Armstrong, 2006: 122). As Wilson (2009: 168, 175- 
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178) explains, against this conceptualisation, there have been calls for an 
approach to law that encompasses ‘the entire decision-making process’, from 
‘the revisionist stance of Rosalyn Higgins to the instrumentality of the New 
Haven school and the radical rejectionism of Martti Koskenniemi and Critical 
Legal Studies.’ In the light of domestic law, they tend to see international law 
as ‘a means of social control’ or an ‘instrument of social reform.’ In this 
perspective, ‘international law is never neutral.’ It is instrumental for the 
pursuit of certain goals. This way of explaining law/legal rules is vulnerable to 
the critique that it obliterates all distinctions between the notion of law as a 
body of rules, and basically every other social practice that relates directly or 
indirectly with those rules. The concern with what is seen as the legal 
process also leads to a confusion regarding ‘the identity of the norm’ and the 
political and social context that precedes it and surrounds it (Wilson, 2009: 
168, 175-178). 
Because practice in international society changes then necessarily 
norms also change. Thus, the framework of this thesis ought to be sensitive 
to normative change, in particular when it comes to the vital norm of 
international society, i.e. state sovereignty. Normative change is another 
aspect of the ES approach to international law that has been pointed out as 
in the need of further exploration (Wilson, 2009: 192). For one, a causal line 
of enquiry would distort the ES approach based on interpretation and 
understanding of international society, and a scepticism regarding scientism 
in IR (Bellamy, 2004: 5). Yet the ES opposition to scientism should not serve 
as a deterrent to shed light on normative change. As Linklater and Suganami 
(2006: 2) note, ‘contemporary analysts frequently rely on the School’s 
principal themes’ to attempt to understand ‘continuity and change in the 
structure of international politics.’ The aim of this study is not to resolve the 
essentially contested nature of the concept of sovereignty (Jackson, 1999a: 
424-425) by pointing out a given definition as the most desirable one. Also in 
this regard, the approach will be sociological, with emphasis on the attempt 
to understand the doctrine of state sovereignty and respective norm in its 
historical context(s), and how it fits in the history of the idea this thesis is 
concerned with. 
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As a response to the question of whether state sovereignty is a legal 
idea, i.e. it exists as a right, or a political idea that exists only when exercised 
– an aspect which highlights capacity and power (Buzan, 1991: 67), a certain 
consensus has been developed that the answer lies somewhere in the 
middle. In relation to the opposing views that statehood is ‘a matter of fact 
and not of law,’ i.e. a ‘legal status independent of recognition,’ or on the other 
hand ‘rights and duties pertaining to statehood derive from recognition’ only, 
Crawford (2006: 4-5) notes that neither view is satisfactory. In practice, the 
recognition of sovereignty in international society involves a juridical aspect, 
i.e. the recognition of independence as a right, and a political aspect, i.e. the 
recognition of autonomy (Jackson, 1999a: 424-425). Jackson’s (1990: 27-29) 
application of Isaiah Berlin’s notion of positive and negative liberty to the 
concept of sovereignty illustrates the often existing tension between the 
political and juridical aspects. He defines ‘negative sovereignty’ as a ‘formal- 
legal condition’ of freedom from outside interference and ‘positive 
sovereignty’ as the possession ‘of the capabilities which enable governments 
to be their own masters’ (Jackson, 1990: 27-29). Although ‘the substantial, 
positive content of sovereignty has always been contested,’ Sorensen (1999: 
595) notes, ‘the rules of sovereignty exist irrespective of the fact that many 
sovereign states have not always enjoyed the autonomy implied in the notion 
of constitutional independence.’ 
Another differentiation in the literature is between the internal aspect 
of state sovereignty and its international dimensions. While the former refers 
to the question of ‘who is sovereign’, the latter raises the issue of who ‘is 
illegible to be a member of international society.’16 Jackson’s (1999b: 433) 
point that ‘sovereignty is the assumption that a government of a state is both 
supreme and independent’ illustrates well the two faces of the coin. 
Conceptually, this attempt to treat both dimensions separately might make 
sense, but looking at practice in international society it is evident that the two 
are intimately related. For example, the rise of the principle of self- 
determination is surely not alien to the move in Europe from dynastic to 
popular sovereignty in the context of the American and French Revolutions 
(Mayall, 1999: 476). 
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In his attempt to reach the core meaning of sovereignty in 
international society based on the study of practices, James (1986: 266) 
highlights the notion of ‘constitutional independence’. It is constitutional 
independence that ‘makes a territorial entity eligible for membership in 
international society.’ By ‘constitutional’ is not meant necessarily a book with 
written rules/principles or a democratic system. As James (1999: 461) 
clarifies, ‘any government requires a constitution, whether de jure or de 
facto.’ As he explains, ‘a constitution of a state… consists of the body of 
principles and basis rules in the light of which is to be governed.’ Contrary to 
this picture that state sovereignty has had an essential core meaning along 
its history, Taylor (1999: 563) provides an account of the constant 
reinterpretation of sovereignty in practice according ‘to the circumstances of 
time and place’, which produces continuous controversy in international 
society. 
Breaking this continuity-change dichotomy is Jackson’s (2007) 
historical overview of the idea of sovereignty, a persuading account that there 
is both continuity and change in the idea of sovereignty. In his view, 
sovereignty is better seen as ‘an evolving idea of authority embodied in those 
bordered territorial organisations we refer to as ‘states’ or ‘nations’ and 
expressed in their various relations and activities, both domestic and foreign’ 
(Jackson, 2007: ix). This idea has both a political and a juridical component. 
‘The former is the idea of supreme authority in the state and the latter the 
idea of political and legal independence of geographically separate states.’ 
But what exactly continues, and what changes? Jackson (2007: 23) argues 
that there is continuity in the notion that ‘a sovereign government is an 
authority that is supreme over all other authorities in the same territorial 
jurisdiction, and is independent of all foreign authorities.’ What changes are 
the questions of ‘who is entitled to hold and exercise sovereignty’, and ‘what 
are the uses to which sovereignty can be put.’ In this regard, Sorensen 
(1999: 590-591), makes a distinction between ‘constitutive rules’, which 
remain unchanged, and ‘regulative rules’, which change constantly and over 
time. The constitutive ‘content’ of state sovereignty is formed by states with 
territory, government, and population, plus constitutional independence as an 
expression/recognition of legal equality, all in the wider context of an
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international society. The regulative rules are those that regulate the 
‘sovereignty game’, a foremost example being rules of admission to that 
‘game’. These are marked by a set of often unclear criteria that was shaped 
across the history of international society by a number of elements, including 
the interests of the European Great Powers or the ideas of popular 
sovereignty and self-determination (Sorensen, 1999: 592-596). As Mayall 
(1999: 476) puts it, the question of who are ‘the appropriate collective selves 
whose right to self-determination must be recognised’ remains unanswered 
and it might only be possible to answer it in practice. This contested nature of 
the regulative rules of sovereignty reflects the existence of competing values, 
beliefs, and interests in international society. 
 
 
2.2.3 The History of International Society 
 
 
 
One of the central purposes of this thesis is to trace and shed light on the 
idea of defective polities, by identifying and understanding in the history of 
international society the concepts that expressed that idea. International 
history and the history of international society have always occupied an 
important place in the ES.17 This is certainly not alien to the fact that two of 
the ES original figures, Wight and Butterfield, were themselves historians 
(Bain, 2009: 148). The list of major ES historical studies is a long one, of 
which the following ought to be mentioned: Wight’s (1977) comparative 
sociology of states-systems; Bull and Watson’s (1984) edited volume on the 
expansion of the international society of European states, and its transition 
from European-dominated to a global international society; Gong’s (1984) 
exploration of how the idea of a standard of civilisation emerged and evolved 
constitutionally within European international society, and the role it played in 
its expansion; Jackson’s (1990; 2007) work on the evolution of the idea of 
sovereignty; Watson’s (1992) comparative study into world history of different 
international systems and societies; Buzan and Little’s (2000) study of 
international systems through a world historical perspective; and Clark’s 
account of the international practice of legitimacy as the basis of international 
society (2005) and the development of this notion in international society and 
in a possible world society (2007). 
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Although it is consensual that international history matters for the ES, 
it has been argued that it is less clear what exactly ES writers mean by 
historical enquiry, and how historical enquiry contributes to the study of 
international politics (Linklater and Suganami, 2006: 6; Navari, 2009a: 11). 
One issue around which there is some consensus, however, is the ES’ 
rejection of a causational or mechanicist approach to history. Butterfield, for 
example, believed that such an approach was neither possible nor desirable. 
As Wilson (2012: 141) explains, for Butterfield history was ‘a labyrinth of 
multiple causes and multiple effects, a product of a complex series of 
interactions in which outcomes are not really outcomes but mediations – 
mediations between conflicting wills and forces that are rarely the direct 
product of intentions.’ Butterfield believed that the role of the historian is ‘to 
understand the past for the sake of the past’, while avoiding the interpretation 
of the past and moral judgements based on contemporary standards. Both 
Butterfield and Wight highlighted the importance of ‘getting inside history’, of 
understanding the ideas and the minds of individuals and societies (Bain, 
2009: 148, 152). As Jackson (2008: 363) puts it, ‘Wight was a historian of 
ideas, but he never lost sight of the fact that ideas begin and end with human 
beings.’ 
The rejection of causal/mechanicist approaches to history should not 
deter one’s attempts to look at history to better understand present practices. 
This is why Bain (2009: 151-162) argues that the ‘use’ of ‘history’ in the ES 
ought to be different from the traditional explanatory narrative of historians. 
He defends an approach to history supported on Michael Oakeshott’s 
concern with ‘understanding the present.’ Oakeshott’s main premise was that 
history ‘is tied up in the judgement of the historian’, and thus it should consist 
of an attempt to go beyond the gathering of facts, an activity that by itself 
already involves ‘judgements that are necessarily informed by the historian’s 
current state of knowledge.’ Oakeshott also rejected the existence of a clear 
distinction between past and present. Thus, what is needed is the 
understanding of the past so that the scholar can shed light on his/her’s 
present concerns. 
Given this project’s aim of shedding light on the nature of the issue of 
failed states in international society, we adopt a sociological approach to 
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history, which involves an attempt to understand context and the minds of the 
peoples and politics of a given time, all as an exercise to shed light on one’s 
present concerns. Far from having ‘one foot in interpretivism (understanding) 
and the other in the legacy of positivism (explanation)’ (Price, 1994: 204), we 
combine a focus on understanding the motives of the actors in international 
society, and the context in which they operated, with the notion of 
methodological pluralism. This meta-theoretical choice also derives from a 
view that both the historical context and process that led to the formation of 
contemporary international society are best understood when accounting 
simultaneously for: the international system level, e.g. the role of power; the 
international society level, e.g. the minds of statesmen; and the world society 
level, e.g. the international actions of individuals/non-state actors. While the 
international society level is the central one, the other two levels are also 
taken into consideration insofar as they assist in the task of understanding 
the history of the former. 
The ES approach to history has received accusations of being 
‘morally complacent’ and ‘conservative’ (Callahan, 2004: 305, 322). A 
prominent critique comes from Keene (2002: xi), who argues that Bull 
ignored the ‘dualistic nature of order in world politics’, and the consequent 
processes of imperialism and colonialism that characterised order beyond 
Europe. Little (2009: 97-98) believes that Keene’s account of the expansion 
of international society not only is ‘more convincing’ than what the ES has 
developed so far, but it also provides a ‘very much darker account of what 
the expansion of the European international society involved.’ However, 
Keene’s narrow emphasis on Bull’s The Anarchical Society (1977) at the 
same time as Keene ignores a number of other i m p o r t a n t  ES works,  
is a self-serving choice to the argument that the ES has ignored the 
processes of imperialism and colonialism that are inherent to the 
expansion of international society. Bull’s (1977) study is not primarily a 
historical one. If one considers Wight (1952; 1991), Bull and Watson 
(1984), or Gong’s (1984) historical investigations, there is a lot in these 
works when it comes to the history of imperialism and colonialism. In 
particular, as Epp (1998: 57-58) notes, the issues Bull and Watson’s 
(1984) edited book deals with, from the ‘standard of civilisation and the 
imposition of unequal treaties in relations with Asia’ to race and the
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‘reassertion of non-Western cultures over against colonialist presumption’, 
have led some to note ‘a rare instance when an international relations text 
has intersected the concerns of post-colonialist literature’ (e.g. Darby and 
Paolini, 1994: 380). The ES has also looked at the ideas of post-colonial 
nationalism and self-determination, to the related processes of decolonisation 
(e.g. Mayall, 1990: 111-144; Jackson, 1990; 1993), and to the ever present 
legacy of colonialism in Africa (Mayall, 2005). 
Regarding the history of the idea of defective polities and related 
international practices, there are also a number of important contributions to 
be mentioned. Reference was already made to Bull and Watson (1984), 
Gong (1984), and Bain (2003a). Within the ES, Wight (1952; 1991) is 
perhaps the most neglected author in this regard. As Epp (1998: 56) notes, 
‘long before it could be intellectually fashionable, Wight’s lectures put the 
problem of relations with the other, the outsider, the barbarian, at the moral- 
ontological centre of the study of international relations.’ In British Colonial 
Constitutions 1947 (1952), Wight provided an extensive analysis of 
constitutional, legislative and administrative aspects of the governance of 
dependencies of the British Empire. In International Theory (1991: 49-98), 
Wight referred to the ‘fit of world conquering fanaticism’ that characterised 
‘the Greeks under Alexander, the Arabs under the first four Caliphs, the 
Mongols under Genghis Khan or the West since 1500.’ He reflected upon the 
Greeks and Romans’ views of ‘the barbarians’, as well as on the issues of 
difference, paternalism, colonialism, and anti-colonialism. Nevertheless, the 
nature of the issue of failed states is still pointed out as worthy of being 
explored by future ES investigations (e.g. Watson, 2007: 12). 
The assessment that the narrative/explanatory mode dominates the 
ES accounts of the history of international society (Keene, 2008: 386-387) 
amounts to a misrepresentation of what is a far more complex body of work. 
A fine example of how most ES approaches to history have avoided the 
narrative mode is the school’s rejection of reductionist definitions of 
empire/imperialism, as well as of explanatory accounts of the motives behind 
imperialism. Above all, the ES historical investigations are in line with the 
idea that there are ‘imperialisms rather than Imperialism’ (Reynolds, 1981). It 
should be mentioned in this regard that the task of defining empire and 
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related notions such as imperialism and colonialism has always been a 
controversial one. Attempts range from ‘narrow definitions of empire as the 
formal annexations of conquered territory’, to much broader notions that 
encompass ‘any form of international economic inequality’ (Doyle, 1986: 20). 
This controversy and contestation is also present among historians. 
Gallagher and Robinson (1953: 1) noted how the ‘imperial historian’ is very 
much dependent on ‘his own particular concept of empire’, and on his own 
selection of the facts he sees as of ‘imperial significance.’ Also the forms of 
imperial control can be of diverse nature. In this regard, ‘informal imperialism’ 
(Gallagher and Robinson, 1953: 1) can be related to a number of notions. 
These include: (a) ‘spheres of influence’, whereby ‘competing great powers 
delineate their areas of dominance’; (b) ‘neo-colonialism’, as popularised by 
Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah; (c) ‘dependency’, as (re)adopted by a 
group of Latin American intellectuals; or (d) cultural imperialism, namely the 
role of communications technology, language, or education. Moreover, 
imperialism as a concept can be seen as a philosophy (e.g. the mission 
civilisatrice) and/or a policy (Stern, 2000: 193-199). Accounts of the motives 
behind imperialism have included psychological explanations such as fear, 
prestige, or even the attempt of distraction from domestic issues. There also 
structural theories of imperialism, ranging from views of power as expanding 
indefinitely until demise comes; sociological accounts that see imperialism as 
‘an outcome of elitist, authoritarian, and despotic governments’; or economic 
theories that see in capitalism and the financial interests of a variety of 
groups the main driving force behind modern imperialism (Stern, 2000: 204- 
206; Doyle, 1986: 20). 
The criticism that the ES largely ignores or overlooks imperialism and 
colonialism in the history of international society is further dismissed by the 
fact that members of the school have contributed to the view that hierarchy 
and anarchy, far from being mutually exclusive, most often coexist. As 
Hobson (2002: 18) notes, this can be observed in the works of Wight (1977), 
Bull and Watson (1984), Clark (1989), and Watson (1992). The ES historical 
investigations support the idea that one is very likely to find elements of 
hierarchy in the history of any international system and of international 
society. Seeing international politics as a pendulum swinging between the 
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notions of absolute independence and absolute empire as advanced by 
Watson (2007), with hierarchy and anarchy as ideal types, brings clarity to 
this issue. The essential idea to keep in mind is that there is much more 
complexity in practice than what the dichotomy of hierarchy/anarchy 
indicates; international systems of states continuously ‘tighten and loosen’; 
and the relationships between the various political communities of the system 
shift constantly along the spectrum (Watson, 2007: 19-22). 
The history of what is often called modern international society is 
also the history of the sovereign state. Members of the ES have tended to 
emphasise a notion of novelty associated with the emergence of international 
society. They are aware that various others ‘hybrid political communities’ 
preceded the rise of sovereign states (Van Creveld, 2004:1-51). In recent 
years, the idea that Westphalia represents the defining moment of the 
modern states system has been convincingly challenged in IR (e.g. Osiander, 
2001; Teschke, 2003; De Carvalho et al, 2011). While the ES has looked at 
the history of pre-Westphalian international relations (e.g. Wight, 1977; 
Watson, 1992), Buzan and Little (2000) are the first authors within the ES to 
deliberately challenge the Westphalian divide. Nevertheless, these 
interpretations that challenge the treaties of Westphalia as the key moment in 
the emergence of the sovereign state are not incompatible with the ES’s 
account of the emergence of international society, quite the contrary. The 
notion that there is something unique about the modern states system, 
including the process of universalisation of the state that led to the first global 
international society of mankind, still stands. This process is a result of the 
expansion of European empires (Bull and Watson, 1984), and the 
consequences of the imposition of an alien model of political organisation 
were deeply felt, and are still a reality today (Mayall, 2005). But no less 
relevant is to comprehend how the state and the idea of a universal right to 
sovereignty became ‘the institutional alternative to empire’ (Reus-Smit, 2011: 
207). 
 
 
2.3 International Conceptual History 
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This thesis maps the perpetuation of an idea and category, and thus it 
highlights a notion of continuity. However, it is also mindful of the issue of 
change, namely in the practices and norms that form the context of the 
history of that idea. Bellamy (2004: 7) argues that ‘why and how do the 
norms, interests, and rules that underpin international societies change and 
sometimes erode and dissolve’ is one of the major historical questions ‘yet to 
be answered satisfactorily’ by the ES. It is important to recall that, for the ES, 
norms are effects – effects that are the result of a complex social context, 
and not causes. As claimed by other scholars (e.g. Williams, 2005), it is not 
only possible but desirable for the ES to be concerned with the issue of 
change, as long as the focus on understanding/interpretation is not 
undermined. 
With these considerations in mind, this project combines an ES 
approach with t h e  history of ideas/international conceptual history, a step 
seen as promising by various scholars (e.g. Holden, 2002: 255; Hobson and 
Lawson, 2008: 428; Navari, 2009: 10-12; 2009b: 41-42). As Navari (2009b: 
42) puts it, ‘the closer mode’ to the ES’s focus on understanding the history 
of international society ‘is Quentin Skinner’s concern with context and intent, 
with original meanings and concepts in context.’ Moreover, as mentioned 
above, Wight himself was a historian of ideas, and recent studies of the ES 
(Bain, 2003a; Jackson, 2007), have added to his legacy. 
Equated with a ‘humanistic turn in parts of the social sciences’, 
conceptual history ‘studies concepts as interesting and relevant in 
themselves.’ It is thus a different exercise from conceptual analysis, which 
traditionally belongs to the realm of political science and where the aim is 
usually to come up precise definitions for concepts. As Waeaver (2002: 9) 
puts it, in conceptual analysis the study of concepts is ‘not in itself 
informative.’ There are three main schools of conceptual history, the French 
tradition, the German School, and the English School, often referred to as the 
Cambridge School (CS). These three gave rise to other projects of 
conceptual history, such as the work on history of ideas developed in the US 
by Arthur O. Lovejoy in the Journal of the History of Ideas and in the 
Dictionary of the History of Ideas (Richter, 1995: 22). 
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The French tradition, grounded on a category of historiography 
known as the Annales School, of which the leading figure was Fernand 
Braudel, focuses essentially on the histoire des mentalités. This tradition was 
further expanded by the influence of Foucault and his contribution to 
discourse analysis, genealogy and ‘systems of thought.’ It can be described 
as essentially critical in the sense that its main purpose is to expose the 
‘tensions and contradictions of a given discursive system’ (Waever, 2002: 13 
and 18). Not surprisingly, the French tradition has been a major influence for 
post-structuralist IR scholars. 
The German School (Begriffsgeschichte) of conceptual history 
extensively explored the history of numerous political, social, and 
philosophical concepts used in Germany and France. Led by Reinhart 
Koselleck, as Waever (2002: 11-13) explains, the German School’s 
‘encyclopedic projects focused on the study of either the changing meaning 
of one given concept (composed of one or two words), or on whole families 
of concepts.’ Koselleck believed that a ‘concept condenses in itself a 
multitude of context of meaning and experience’, and thus, ‘by studying all 
meanings of a term… and all terms in a language for the same meaning’ the 
German School of conceptual history ‘aims at grasping a whole semantic 
field of political vocabularies.’ There is an important difference between 
writing the history of words or terms based on what these terms meant 
originally (etymologies), and doing conceptual history. The aims of the latter 
are more ambitious and theoretical, and go beyond simply tracing words and 
their shifts in meaning. Instead, according to Koselleck, the logic of focusing 
on conceptual continuities and changes lies on the notion of conceptual 
changes as reflection of periods of crisis or revolution in politics and society. 
In other words, the changes or shifts of important concepts, usually the result 
of a contestation, provide valuable lenses with which to identify and 
understand political and social change, and shed light on the values and 
interests that are subject to disagreement (Richter, 1995: 5, 10). 
The CS of conceptual history shares with the German School a 
concern with treating political language historically, and the view that, as 
Richter (1995: 124) explains, both ‘political thought and behaviour now and in 
the past, cannot be understood without reference to the distinctive
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vocabularies used by agents.’ Discourse in the CS is understood in a less 
restrictive sense than in the French tradition. The CS notion of discourse is a 
broader one that includes ‘speech’, ‘literature’, and ‘public utterance in 
general’ (Richter, 1995: 127). A crucial difference between the French 
tradition and the German and British Schools is both the latter’s refusal ‘to 
collapse history into discourse’ (Melching and Velema, 1994: 4). The two 
essential authors of the CS are John Pocock and Quentin Skinner. Beyond 
Pocock and Skinner, authors such as John Dunn (Tuck, 1993: 77-79) and 
Peter Laslett (Perreau, 2007: 107-108) played an important part in the 
development of the CS. Moreover, a number of figures influenced the CS, 
including Collingwood, Wittgenstein, Austin, and Weber (Goldie, 2006). 
While Pocock is known for his ‘identification of distinct political 
languages, ideologies or ‘discourses’’, Skinner’s work focused on a ‘more 
methodologically reflective demonstration of how historically defined linguistic 
limits shape political developments’, inclusively through speech act theory 
(Waever, 2002: 11). Skinner’s central influence in this regard was John 
Austin (Richter, 1995: 130). Austin’s (1962: 12) theory of speech acts holds 
that speech is also action, an idea efficiently conveyed by Wittgenstein’s 
remark that ‘words are also deeds’ (Skinner, 1988b: 260). Thus, ‘language is 
not only the medium by which we describe politics, it makes politics possible, 
and much of politics is done in the form of language’ (Waever, 2002: 11). In 
this perspective, language has two dimensions: meaning and function. While 
the first dimension refers to ‘the study of the sense and reference allegedly 
attaching to words and sentences’, the second is understood in Austin’s 
sense as ‘the range of things that speakers are capable of doing in (and by) 
the use of words and sentences.’ In other words, while meaning refers to the 
social connotation of the concept, function refers to the legitimating effects of 
concepts and their normative power (Skinner, 2002: 1-4). 
Probably the greatest influence in Skinner’s work was Collingwood 
and his opposition to British positivist historians, and their scepticism 
regarding understanding. The effort to understand human conduct is well 
expressed in Collingwood’s Idea of History (1946), where he argued that any 
attempt to explain past historical actions necessarily involves an effort ‘to 
discern the thoughts’ of the actors that performed those actions (Skinner, 
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2002: 129). Instead of writing history as an attempt to ‘answer a canonical set 
of questions’, Collingwood believed that history of political thought should be 
written as ‘a sequence of episodes in which the questions as well as the 
answers have frequently changed’ (Richter, 1995: 130-131). While Skinner 
often called for caution regarding the connections between past and present 
in the study of history, he gradually moved away from this position (Bevir and 
Rhodes, 2007: 247). Skinner’s cautiousness probably derives from his 
scepticism regarding ‘grand narratives.’ In particular, Skinner was very critical 
of the Whig interpretations of history that described England ‘as the 
culmination of a happy history of freedom, thanks to the Reformation and the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688’, and that led to Herbert Butterfield’s renowned 
critique The Whig Interpretation of History (1931) (Perreau, 2007: 106). 
As Tully (1988: 8) explains, ‘Skinner was mainly preoccupied with 
how can one identify ideologies and their formation, how to survey and map 
this process, and the relation between political ideology and political action.’ 
The term ‘ideology’ in the CS context does not refer to specific ideas such as 
liberalism, republicanism or Lutheranism. Ideologies in “Skinnerian” terms 
ought to be understood as ‘normative vocabularies’. This emphasises the 
issue of ‘linguistic action’ and the need to go beyond the meaning of ideas to 
study utterances, the functions that political ideas serve, and the normative 
and legitimising potential of concepts (Palonen, 2003: 3, 56, 78-79). Skinner 
analysed what ought to be the most accurate way to study a text, insisting in 
the importance of recovering the historical meaning of the text as the 
necessary condition to understand it, a process that, according to him, ‘can 
never be achieved simply by studying the text itself’ (Skinner, 1988a: 104). 
Instead, what ought to be done is ‘to situate the text in its linguistic or 
ideological context,’ defined as ‘the collection of texts written or used in the 
same period, addressed to the same or similar issues and sharing a number 
of conventions’, the term Skinner used to refer to ‘linguistic commonplaces 
uniting a number of texts’ (Tully, 1988: 8-9).18 
 
When it comes to history of ideas, this project’s approach is based 
first and foremost on the CS. It also draws from the German School, namely 
Koselleck’s notion that conceptual changes can be a reflection of periods of 
crisis or revolution in politics and society (Richter, 1995: 10, 124-127). It 
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should be noted that this combination of the CS with the German tradition 
has been described as both natural and promising (e.g. Skinner, 2002: 186- 
187; Melching and Velema, 1994: 2; Richter, 1995: 5). An important 
difference between the CS and the German School is the former’s more 
pragmatic stance regarding meta-theoretical questions, and the ability not to 
allow its efforts to be dominated by such questions. This was something that 
the German School had more difficulties with, as exemplified by its obsession 
with the nature and causes of modernity (Richter, 1995: 125). As mentioned 
above, the French tradition has tended to focus rather exclusively on words 
and discourse while ditching historical context. This constitutes a 
fundamental contrast to CS’s underscoring of the importance of reading 
things in context. To avoid issues of incompatibility, and due to the 
importance placed here on comprehending historical context, this study does 
not draw from the French tradition. 
The CS’s study of history based on understanding, or in Skinner’ 
(2002: 1) words, of ‘seeing things their way’, in looking both at the meaning, 
function, and normative potential of language, is very much in tune with the 
ES cognitive goals. It is now pertinent to explain in more detail how the 
insights from conceptual history inform the ES approach of this project. As 
mentioned in the introduction of this study, the concept of failed states rose to 
international prominence in the early 1990s. Yet the more historically 
informed literature indicates that the nature of the issue is not an exclusive 
feature of the post-Cold War. According to the CS, an isolated history of a 
concept will have very limited results. What is needed instead is ‘to work 
across concepts in order to be able to reconstruct the larger discourses 
and/or ideologies in which these concepts obtain their meaning’. This allows 
a proper understanding of the context one is studying, but also an escape 
from the potentially misleading assumption that ‘a story’ lies exclusively in 
one concept (Waever, 2002: 13). Instead of tracing an ‘etymological line’ of a 
single word, there is the need to identify the genesis of the concept by 
looking at the ‘concept’s pre-history’ (Farr, 1989: 38). This implies that to 
understand the nature of the issue of failed states in international society, 
one ought to look to the historical period that precedes the emergence of the 
concept of failed states in the early 1990s. Thus, one is required to study 
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other concepts in international society that preceded failed states but 
expressed the same idea of defective polities. This project not only does 
conceptual history but points to a more ambitious goal of doing international 
conceptual history. This task demands, as Waever (2002: 17) argues, to look 
at ‘how conceptual moves relate to international discourses, both among 
states (and other units) and internally in relation to international questions (in 
the languages of diplomacy, international law and war).’ 
As discussed in the introduction of this study, a number of scholars 
claim that the concept of failed states represents a category and performs a 
function. That concepts perform political and social functions is one of the 
central precepts of the CS, reflected on the notion of the ‘legitimising 
potential’ of vocabularies (Palonen, 2003: 78-79). The dual nature of 
concepts, i.e. meaning and function, implies, as Skinner (2002: 156) puts it, 
that their ‘availability… is a question about the prevailing morality of their 
society’, and that their ‘applicability is a question about the meaning and use 
of the terms involved, and about how far these can be plausibly stretched.’ 
As Goldie (2006: 7-8) notes, Skinner (1978) wrote the following in his most 
famous book: 
 
 
The problem facing an agent who wishes to legitimate what he is 
doing at the same time as gaining what he wants cannot simply be 
the instrumental problem of tailoring his normative language in 
order to fit his projects. It must in part be the problem of tailoring 
his projects in order to fit the available normative language. 
 
 
From this follows, as Goldie (2006: 7-8) puts it, that ‘deeds are predicated 
upon the possibilities and constraints which words offer.’ Thus, conceptual 
changes reflect moral changes in politics and society. 
Concepts ‘do not have an agency or life apart from the political actors 
who use and change them’, and thus it is the “job” of conceptual history to 
attempt to comprehend ‘why these actors used and changed them as they 
did’ (Farr, 1989: 38). The CS emphasis on conceptual changes as possible 
reflections of changing social norms is another important insight for the 
purposes of this study. According to Bell (2002: 328), ‘by concentrating on 
conceptual change and the constitutive role played by language in shaping 
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the normative architecture of (any given) society, we can reach a more 
sophisticated understanding of language in both the reproduction of social 
norms and conventions and consequently in the process(es) of change itself.’ 
We can also, he argues, gain a better understanding of how ‘political 
legitimacy is embedded in and constrained by the set of political vocabularies 
available at any given time.’ This relationship between political legitimacy and 
political vocabularies points to the notion practices and is associated with 
what Navari (2009a: 12) calls the ‘self-conceptions of the actors’, related to 
the idea that ‘the actors discourses of self-justification can be a major source 
for detecting norm change.’ 
Moreover, because concepts are not subject matters, the CS 
highlights the importance of context. As Navari (2009a: 10) argues, to 
theorise ‘causes demands theorising context, as well as the relationship of 
action to context.’ If not delimited, the exercise of contextualising can be both 
too broad and also a rather undetermined notion (Holden, 2002: 262). 
Therefore, in this project the context of this international conceptual history is 
primarily the history of international society, and in particular the interests, 
norms, values, and beliefs that informed its relationship with those polities 
seen as defective. 
Finally, there are differences between word, concept and idea. 
According to Waever (2002: 13-14) ‘a concept can be defined as something 
in between word (a purely textual phenomenon) and idea: more independent 
than a word in terms of linguistic expression, but not as independent as an 
idea.’ Yet, as Richter (1995: 21) argues, there is little or no point in trying to 
come up with ‘stipulative definitions of concept and idea.’ Given the ambiguity 
of ‘concept’ as a philosophical term, ‘the meaning of concept can be 
determined only within the context of a theory and cannot be satisfactorily 
defined in isolation.’ In this project we see failed states as a concept. 
Moreover, it belongs to a list of concepts prevalent in international society 
that refer or did so in the past, to the idea of defective polities. We use the 
terms ‘prevalent/preponderant’ when referring to a group or list of concepts to 
underline the fact that, as Koselleck (1985: 113) notes, ‘only concepts with a 
claim to durability, repeated applicability, and empirical realisability’ are an 
appropriate object of study for a conceptual history. The terms
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prevalent/preponderant also highlight the importance accorded both by the 
ES and the CS to ‘intersubjective understandings’, namely the idea of ‘shared 
meanings’ (Navari, 2009b: 41). 
 
 
2.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
 
 
To shed light on the idea and category of defective polities in the history of 
international society, and understand what the role of international law/state 
sovereignty in its perpetuation was, we combine an ES approach with 
insights from international conceptual history/history of ideas. The ES 
framework of this thesis entails a historical-empirical approach, based on the 
sociological interpretation of human conduct. The aim is to understand the 
practices, i.e. norms, interests, beliefs, and values that generated, shaped, 
and changed the concepts that expressed the idea we are concerned with. 
This approach is in line with the move towards methodological pluralism. In 
this case a useful notion to keep in mind so as not to exclude any level of 
analysis that can be of assistance to shed light on those concepts. Regarding 
the role of international norms and rules, the ES rejects the view of norms as 
independent variables and the argument that they can be an important 
cause/driver of behaviour in international society. Instead, and by definition, 
to comprehend the nature and role of international rules, one ought to 
understand the nature of the society from which these rules emanate. 
Generally speaking, the ES study of history has rejected causal propositions 
and explanatory views of the history of international society. This applies to 
the ES treatment of issues such as the universalisation of the sovereignty 
state or empire and related notions of imperialism and colonialism. Based on 
the legacy of the ES, this thesis adopts a sociological approach to history, 
grounded on the importance of understanding context and the politics and 
the minds of the peoples of a given historical time. This exercise has the 
purpose of shedding light on one’s present concerns. 
The importance of understanding context and seeing things through 
the perspective of those who live through the events are two essential tenets 
of the CS. The combination of an ES framework with a number of insights 
from history of ideas/international conceptual history, especially the CS and 
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to a certain extent the German School is a move compatible with the ES 
cognitive goals. More important, international conceptual history is a meta- 
theoretical line that offers a way to understand change and continuity in 
international society, namely in relation to prevailing and contested values, 
interests and beliefs. It is sensible to the connections between the distant and 
more recent past, while providing a sophisticated approach to identify political 
and social change. In this regard, it highlights how concepts are a product of 
the normative vocabulary available to actors, and how normative changes 
reflect contestation surrounding the values and interests that form the social 
context of those concepts. 
71  
Chapter 3 - On Infidels, Pagans and Barbarians 
 
 
 
 
 
But where there is  some reasonable doubt as to whether an 
action is good or bad, just or unjust, then it is pertinent to question 
and deliberate, rather than acting rashly without any prior 
investigation of what is lawful and what is not. 
 
 
Francisco de Vitoria (in Muldoon, 2006: 141) 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
 
 
The emergence of an international society of sovereign states in Europe is 
best comprehended when bearing in mind the political system from which 
that society departed (Jackson, 2007: 24). Hence, this chapter starts with a 
few considerations about Medieval Latin Christendom. Of particular 
relevance for our purposes are the crusades, one of the dominant 
international political developments of that era. In the context of the 
crusades, the aim is to identify the concepts that referred to those polities 
seen as defective, and understand the functions these concepts served. This 
matters insofar to comprehend if that idea and category is a product of the 
rise of the norm of state sovereignty, or if it preceded the latter. The aim is 
also to comprehend the role played by Christian faith and canon law in the 
crusades. Another goal is to illustrate some of the normative debates that 
characterised the crusades, some of which would reappear in the context of 
the conquest and colonisation of the New World. 
The second section of the chapter contextualises the early Spanish 
and Portuguese overseas expansion. Again it looks at the place of faith, 
canon law, and natural law in that enterprise. It attempts to shed light on the 
motives and interests behind that expansion into the Atlantic and the 
Americas. It also illustrates how the conquest and colonisation of the 
Americas became the topic of an intense and polemic debate in Spain, 
namely regarding the rights of the Indians and the treatment they received at 
the hands of the Spanish conquistadores and colonisers. 
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The colonial encounter in the Americas is seen by a number of 
scholars as a retreat from medievalism and canon law, whereby the 
development of the doctrine of state sovereignty contributed decisively for the 
legitimation of European colonialism. In this perspective, the conception of a 
law of nations devised by the scholastic Francisco de Vitoria is pointed out as 
instrumental for the pursuit of the Spanish Kings’ imperial quest. It is 
consensual that his contribution to the development of a jus gentium later 
advanced by the likes of Suárez and Grotius was a central one. From this 
consensual point follow two discussions, which are relevant for our purposes 
not only in relation to the Spanish colonisation of the Americas, but also to 
the subsequent considerations about the relation between 
imperialism/colonialism and international law. These discussions revolve 
around: (a) the possible deliberate intention of Vitoria and of the Salamanca 
School to create a range of not only ethical but legal arguments that provided 
the legitimating basis for the actions of the Spanish colonisers in the 
Americas; and (b) the legacy of Vitoria’s arguments when it comes to the rise 
of an inherently imperialist/colonialist norm of state sovereignty. Therefore, 
the third section of the chapter outlines these views, to then reflect on 
Vitoria’s natural law of nations’ conception, and on how his ideas related and 
applied to the affairs of the Indies. 
 
 
3.2 A Divine Right to Christianise 
 
 
 
The respublica Cristiana was, as Watson (1984a: 13) describes it, ‘organised 
horizontally across the whole Christendom.’ God as the highest authority 
above religious and secular powers was the commanding idea, one that 
worked as the moral standard against which all conduct was judged. Even 
the figure of the secular emperor, held by the Habsburgs since the later 
Middle-Ages, was at the service of Christ. It was the duty of every member of 
this Christian community, from the pope and the emperor to barons and 
clergy, to defend it (Jackson, 1999b: 436-437). Christian faith provided a 
sense of community and an unrivalled justification for political government. 
The expansion of Islam into lands inhabited by Christians (in Southern and 
Eastern Europe, Asia Minor, Persia, and Africa) was a threat that reinforced 
that sense of unity. By the High Middle-Ages, the idea that Christendom was 
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a community ‘spiritually defined, ecclesiastically organised, and 
geographically delimited’ had become an established reality (Brown et al, 
2002: 177). 
Nevertheless, this general characterisation hides a much more 
complex picture about the politics and governance of Christendom. 
According to Brown et al (2002: 177-181), because both secular rulers 
(secular in the sense of not being members of the Church) and the figure of 
the pope received their authority from God, conflicting views about who 
possessed the ultimate authority within Christendom often arose. This 
division was essentially one of legal interpretation between those who saw 
the pope as the supreme ruler of Christendom, over both church and secular 
rulers, and those who believed that secular rulers and church had equal 
authority. A noteworthy case of a challenge to the pope’s authority is the 
controversy that arose between the French king Philip IV (r. 1285-1314) and 
Pope Boniface VIII over the former’s right to tax and regulate the French 
church. In On Royal and Papal Power (1302), the Dominican John of Paris 
defended the French king by arguing that there should be only one ruler 
within a political community (Brown et al, 2002: 179-180). Furthermore, 
Christendom was not a unified hierarchy but rather a dual one, given the split 
of the Roman Empire into Western and Eastern spheres, with centres in 
Rome (Catholic) and Byzantium (Orthodox), conquered by the Ottomans in 
the mid-fifteenth century (Jackson, 2007: 25). 
Although it is possible to trace the idea of a pluralistic, secular rule to 
medieval Europe, that idea would only start to gain ground across Europe by 
the sixteenth century. As Jackson (2007: 23) rightly notes, to speak of the 
existence of the state, nation, and of sovereignty ‘understood in ideal terms 
as an authority that is supreme over all other authorities in the same territorial 
jurisdiction, and is independent of all foreign authorities’ in relation to 
medieval Europe is misleading. There were various kingdoms/regna and 
territorial lordships of diverse size. Kings had to face a number of rivals apart 
from other kings: the Church, including the pope and his clerical 
administrators in Rome but also their representatives; the feudal nobility, who 
often resisted and questioned the authority of the king; or local authorities, 
namely cities which were semi-independent (e.g. London). Authority was
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constantly disputed, and wars were fought between popes, kings, powerful 
nobles, mercenaries and medieval nights. There were no internal borders 
demarcating separate territorial jurisdictions, and there were a number of 
overlapping laws and regulations. There was also no clear conception of 
different dimensions of life, including politics and religion, or a separation 
between private and public spheres. According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, ‘sovereignty’ had a number of meanings in the medieval era, 
including ‘a husband in relation to his wife’, ‘a mayor or provost of a town’, 
and ‘the Superior of a monastery’, but the meaning of ‘sovereignty 
understood as the supremacy and independence of a state’ is only ‘clear by 
the sixteenth century.’ This rather fragmented political space might raise 
doubts about the existence of an overarching authority. Yet the sense of 
a cosmopolitan Christian Commonwealth, ‘devoted to Christian redemption 
and salvation’, as well as the duty to defend this community (Riley Smith, 
1977: 11), were the most powerful elements behind political ideas and 
actions of this era (Jackson, 2007: 19-35). 
The crusades, a philosophy and policy of both conquest and re- 
conquest, initiated in 1096 and that lasted until the mid-sixteenth century, 
expresses very much this sense of Christian unity (Horowitz, 2009: 163). A 
crusade can be defined as a ‘religious, legal, and military enterprise that had 
to be proclaimed by the Pope, preached by the Church, open to volunteers 
from all Christendom, and justified by reference to the interests of the whole’ 
(Watson, 1984a: 12-14). As Watson illustrates, ‘this medieval expansionary 
drive beyond Christian frontiers was led by rulers and knights, and appealed 
to merchants and to the common man, as faith, trade, warfare, prestige, land 
and new techniques and ideas formed a complex yet politically compatible 
range of motives and goals.’ The powerful incentive provided by the Church – 
‘in God’s honour and for the redemption of mankind’ – disguised the motives 
of profit, fame, or vengeance. However, to see religion simply as an 
instrument legitimising other goals, and to downplay its importance as a true 
motive would be a fundamental misunderstanding of the whole process. As 
Horowitz (2009: 174) puts it, ‘in exchange to this service to God, the Church 
offered those who participated in the crusades remission of all sin.’19 
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The conviction that Christian faith was ‘the beginning of truth’, i.e. 
fideism, and that the right to exercise government was dependent on the 
possession of faith (Donelan, 1984: 75), was the commanding idea of this era 
and of the crusades. The centrality of canon law as a legitimating force for 
the crusades, making them legal in the eyes of Medieval Latin Christendom, 
ought to be read as a natural outcome of the preponderance of Christian faith 
in all aspects of life. According to medieval theory of universal papal 
jurisdiction, the pope had a divine and a legal responsibility, as well as an 
undisputed legal authority in this matter, to pursue the vision of a universal 
Christian community. Regardless of the existence of strategic concerns such 
as the defence of European territory and conquered lands from the infidels’ 
armies, the infidels were unsuitable for self-government because they were 
not Christian, or in the words of Pope Urban II ‘a race completely foreign to 
God’ (Williams, 2009: 29, 35). This status made them unequal subjects under 
the Church’s law. This fed into the sense of duty to bring, i.e. impose by the 
sword, Christianity on behalf of the redemption of all mankind (Watson, 
1984a: 12-14), in which the infidels/pagans – a concept most often referring 
to the Moslems, Saracens, Moors, Arabs, and Turks (Tolan, 2002: xv, 4) – 
were included despite their non-Christian status. 
At least since the early thirteenth century, European intellectuals and 
clergyman criticised the brutalities committed by the crusaders to the non- 
Christian peoples they encountered. Consequently, the issue of the rights of 
the infidels began to be considered in relation to those living within 
Christianity as well as those living on its borders. Pope Innocent IV (1243- 
1254) was the first leading canonist to develop a papal theory of relations 
with non-Christian societies. He asked the following question: ‘is it licit to 
invade the lands that infidels possess, and if it is licit, why is it licit?’ This led 
to a widespread discussion regarding papal relations with infidel societies, 
including the topic of peace between Christians and non-Christians. 
Innocent’s thoughts about the matter were based on the idea of natural law 
under which all men had the right to possess property and lordship (Muldoon, 
1979: vii, 5-28, 153). Yet his application of a universal natural law was 
determined by the Christian-infidel/pagan dichotomy that was preponderant 
at the time, and thus infidels did not enjoy of equal rights. In the words of 
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Pope Innocent, the non-Christian peoples ‘belong to Christ’s flock by virtue of 
their creation, although the infidels do not belong to the sheepfold of the 
Church’ (Williams, 1990: 14). From this followed, as Williams (1990: 14) 
notes, that the pope who possessed jurisdiction ‘over all men and power over 
them in law but not in fact’, was responsible for the infidels, irrespective of 
whether or not they recognised his lawful authority.20 
 
Backing the role of the pope in providing the legal support for the 
crusades was the idea of just war. Ever since what is generally seen as the 
first crusade, proclaimed by Pope Urban II in 1095 to help the Byzantine 
Emperor Alexius I Comnenus against the Turks’ invasions, the idea of a just 
cause in terms of the recovery of property or of defence against aggression 
was always used to justify the crusades (Riley-Smith, 1977: 21). The legacy 
just war theorists was central in this regard. The likes of St. Augustine and St. 
Thomas Aquinas elaborated a normative framework, based on a number of 
ethical and legal precepts, with the aim of contributing to more peaceful and 
just human relations. This emphasis on justice was, of course, grounded on 
God’s commandments which, for Augustine and Aquinas, were the unifying 
universal bonds of all peoples, races and political communities (Behr, 2010: 
51, 65-66). Yet their thoughts were based not only on the language of 
theology, but also of a non-discriminatory natural law. Their concerns were 
not restricted to issues of justice within Christendom. They considered 
questions of justice and diversity among all men (Brown et al, 2002: 183- 
185). 
In The City of God, Augustine developed the notion that the only 
desired outcome of a just war must be peace. He equated war with misery. 
According to Augustine 
 
 
 
the human race is made even more miserable, either by warfare 
itself, waged for the sake of eventual peace, or by the constant 
fear that conflict will begin again. I could not possibly give a 
suitable eloquent description of these many evils, these manifold 
disasters, these harsh and dire necessities ... Let everyone, 
therefore, who reflects with pain upon such great evils, upon such 
horror and cruelty, acknowledge that this is misery. And of anyone 
either endures them or thinks of them without anguish of soul, his 
condition is still more miserable; for he thinks himself happy only 
because he has lost all human feeling (in Behr, 2010: 68). 
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From this scenario of tragedy and misery followed that all war ought to be 
avoided. Nevertheless, as Riley-Smith (1977: 34) explains, Augustine’s 
suggestion that warfare could only be legitimised by a figure of authority 
provided a solution to the moral dilemmas of Christians regarding war as a 
sinful action. 
The view of war as a consequence of sin was inherited by Aquinas 
from Augustine. In a number of writings that include Summary of Theology 
(1265-1273), he discussed the circumstances when war could be waged 
without sin. For Aquinas, although war was a sin, it could also be a means to 
combat sin, if waged by the ruler – the only figure entitled to do so – to 
punish aggression or other offenses, with a rightful intention and for the 
common good. As he put it, ‘those who are attacked should be attacked 
because they deserve it on account of some fault’, and those who wage war 
should ‘intend the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil.’ Crucial 
within this formulation was the internal motive or spirit of the ruler waging 
war. Greed, glory, pride, hatred, and so on could never be the driving force of 
a just war (Brown et al, 2002: 183-185). 
The Christian just war tradition has been criticised among other 
things by its vagueness and over-simplification of a legacy that was more 
coherently elaborated by previous thinkers of this tradition such as Cicero 
(Behr, 2010: 50). One of the arguments used to justify that accusation is the 
fact that while Aquinas does speak of the ruler as the only authority that can 
declare war for it to be just, he does not specify who that ruler is (pope, king, 
or noble) (Brown et al, 2002: 185). More important, although they spoke of 
justice, peace, love towards neighbours and enemies, and of the need to 
avoid all war, the legacy of Christian just war theorists is often seen as 
having provided the legitimating basis for holy war against the 
infidels/pagans. These wars were indeed characterised by those who wage 
them as wars of self-defence. In this logic, Behr (2010: 68-69) argues that 
‘the unrestricted legitimisation of wars in the name of Christianity is the main 
reason why it is impossible to deduce and accomplish a coherent pacifism 
from Christian orthodoxy.’ 
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Neither Augustine nor Aquinas, however, talked explicitly about ‘self- 
defence’, a term that in the time of the crusades was stretched to such an 
extent that rendered the concept a lmost  meaningless. Instead, they 
spoke of wars which were ‘imposed upon’ (Behr, 2010: 68-69; Brown et al, 
2002: 184). In this regard, it is interesting to note that Augustine began to 
write The City of God three years after the ‘barbarian’ invasions of Rome 
(Merton, 2000: xv). It is true that the idea of just war provided an important 
legitimating element for the crusades. But it does not follow from this that 
moral tradition of just war theory was the cause of the crusades, much 
less that the intention of this tradition of thought was to come up with an 
instrumental argument that could serve the interests of particular policies of 
expansion. It is important to recall that this tradition occupies the middle 
ground between pacifism, i.e. the notion that war is always wrong, and the 
view that war is not constrained by morality (Macmahan, 2007: 669).21 
It is common in the literature about this era to see the notion of the 
civilising mission associated with the crusades. As Tyerman (2006: xiv) 
notes, ‘the battles of the cross are held to presage the conflicts of European 
imperialism, colonialism, and western cultural supremacism.’ Jackson (2007: 
26) argues that ‘converting barbarians to Christianity was conveniently an act 
of civilising them too: once they were Christians they could no longer be 
pagans or heathens or barbarians.’ The civilisation-barbarity dichotomy 
seems indeed to have informed Latin Christendom’s views of and relations 
with Islamic peoples in the early medieval era. The following words are part 
of a letter that Maximus the Confessor wrote from Alexandria in the first half 
of the seventh century, where he lamented the outcome of Arab invasions: 
‘What could be more dire than the present evils now encompassing the 
civilised world? To see a barbarous nation of the desert overrunning another 
land as if it were their own, to see our civilisation laid waste by wild and 
untamed beasts who have merely the shape of a human form’ (Tolan, 2002: 
43). These words ought to be read in the context of the establishment in the 
Near East, Egypt, the southern Mediterranean coast, and much of the Iberian 
Peninsula, of an Arab empire centred on the figure of the caliph of Baghdad, 
the Commander of the Faithful. By the ninth century, the threat to Christianity 
was a genuine one (Tyerman, 2006: 1, 54). 
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In its Greek origins, the concept barbarian meant foreigner, or non- 
Greek speaker. One account of the origins of the term is that of Homer’s 
reference to ‘bar-bar’ speakers whom he could not understand (Mazlish, 
2004: 2). It might not have had a depreciative connotation since its geneses, 
as barbarian applied to all foreigners, including Egyptians whom the Greeks 
respected. Yet there are indications that by the fourth century B.C. barbarian 
would refer to cultural or mental inferiors, who could not control their animal 
nature and did not possess the faculty of reason (Pagden, 1982: 15-18). 
However, Plato questioned this exercise of grouping all non-Greeks under 
one single term. The following words are part of dialogue between ‘young 
Socrates’ and the ‘visitor’ in Statesman (1995: 11): 
 
 
Young Socrates: Well, perhaps you could explain what mistake I 
was making when I was trying to categorise things just now. 
Visitor: All right, here’s an analogy. Suppose one wanted to divide 
the human race into two parts. What most Greeks do is to make 
the division by separating Greeks from all the rest: they use the 
single term ‘barbarian’ for all the other categories of people, 
despite the fact that there are countless races who never 
communicate and are incompatible with one another, and then 
expect there to be a single category too, just because they’ve 
used a single term. 
 
 
As it is possible to assert, Plato reflected on the fact that to apply the concept 
barbarian to all non-Greeks was an exercise that obfuscated more than it 
illuminated. 
In Ancient Greece the concept of barbarian is more commonly 
associated with Aristotle’s notion of polis (city), and the idea that the good 
life, virtue, and civility were only possible within the polis (Brown et al, 2002: 
24; Pagden, 1982: 15-16). Much has been written about Aristotle’s position 
regarding the non-Greeks, and a possible sharp distinction he drew between 
Greeks and non-Greeks/barbarians. The idea that Aristotle did indeed 
believe in the Greek polis as the highest form of political community, and that 
this informed his views of the non-Greeks, is still dominant in the literature. 
He was, after-all, the mentor of Alexander the Great, who conquered 
‘barbarian’ territories from Turkey to the Indian sub-continent. As Aristotle 
argued in The Politics, ‘it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and 
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that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by 
mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity; he is 
like the Tribless, lawless, heartless one, whom Homer denounced – the 
natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be compared to an isolated 
piece at draughts.’ Aristotle criticised the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, 
Celts, and Spartans’ glorification of war, domination and conquest. Although 
he thought that to conquer another community constituted a denial of the 
freedom of other human beings, he believed that offensive war was justified 
when a community of free men was under attack, or ‘when a community 
cannot rule itself’ (Brown et al, 2002: 18-27, 64). Aristotle emphasised the 
free nature of Greeks as opposed to the slave nature of barbarians, and 
recalled the suggestion of Greek poets that ‘barbarous people should be 
governed by the Greeks’ (Wight, 1991: 51). As Diller (1971: 18, 25) notes, ‘in 
spite of a few cosmopolitan spirits like Heredotus and the early philosophers’, 
the Greeks had very limited knowledge of the institutions and customs of 
foreigners. A good example is their unwillingness to understand the 
‘barbarian’ languages. In his view, the result was ‘an exaggerated sense of 
their own superiority based on the assumption that they alone enjoyed the 
finer feelings and the nobler pursuits of human life.’ Thus, the Greek- 
barbarian dichotomy was a sharp one. According to Cartledge (1993: 11) it 
was ‘not just contradictory but jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive.’ 
This dichotomy was inherited by the Romans from the Greeks, and 
as historians of the Roman Empire show convincingly (e.g. Burns, 2003: 12- 
41; Heather, 2006: 69-123), it was central in the Romans’ ethnocentric 
conception of the world and imperial expansion. As with the Greeks, Romans 
also believed that cities were the only place where a virtuous and civil life 
was possible. For Cicero, the Roman political community was the only 
civitas, and the ‘barbarians’ were ruled by the Romans ‘because servitude in 
such men is established for their welfare’ (Pagden, 1995: 18-21). Cicero drew 
this image from Aristotle’s theory that some men were slaves by nature. Yet, 
according to Pagden (1995; 22-23), the dichotomy civility-barbarity in Rome 
was less static than in Ancient Greece, in the sense that the will to export the 
civitas was much stronger among the Romans than in Ancient Greece. While 
Aristotle thought that the natural slave would never leave that condition, 
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Cicero believed that barbarians could be instructed, as Pagden puts it, ‘in the 
ways of civil society.’ Thus, Africans, Spaniards, or Gauls were entitled to just 
rule because, despite of their barbarous status, they could eventually be 
transformed in the image of Romans. 
With the advent of Christianity, the Imperium Romanum became 
eventually the Imperium Christianum. The notions of singularity and 
exclusivity were as Pagden (1995: 24) outlines, ‘further enforced by the 
Christian insistence upon the uniqueness both of the truth of the Gospels and 
of the Church as a source of interpretative authority.’ Yet, in medieval 
Europe, the distinction between civilisation and barbarism inherited from 
Ancient Greece and Rome was increasingly replaced by the dichotomy 
dividing Christians and non-Christians, i.e. infidels and pagans (Brown et al, 
2002: 177). Jackson’s assertion that, in the minds of the crusaders, 
converting the infidel/pagan Muslims to Christianity amounted to an act of 
civilising them too, is not altogether misplaced. Nonetheless, the fact that the 
crusaders did not refer to ‘barbarians’ or to ‘civilisation’ reveals something 
about the predominant mind-set of the crusades and Latin Christendom’s 
views of the Islamic world. The crusades were informed by the notion of a 
duty and right to Christianise rather than a mission to civilise. This difference 
is not one of semantics only. The preponderance of the Christian-non 
Christian dichotomy in medieval Europe’s political vocabulary and imaginary 
ought to be understood as an outcome of the importance of Christian religion, 
the expression of the unity of Christianity against the non-Christian, i.e. 
infidel/pagan, as well as the legal (supported by the pope) and legitimating 
power of that dichotomy in the context of the crusades. 
Moreover, the civilisation-barbarity dichotomy inevitably implies a 
sense of superiority of the civilised over the inferior barbarian beings, a sense 
which was not always prevalent in Christianity’s views of the Islamic world. 
As Tolan (2002: xvi, 171) notes, from the ninth century up to the twelfth 
century, Christian Europeans ‘explained Islam in ways meant to reassure 
their Christian readers of the superiority of Christianity.’ They described the 
Arabs, Saracens, Turks and Mors as infidels/pagans, ‘semi-human 
barbarians’ who worshiped idols, practiced heresy and the cult of Antichrist. 
Yet the advance of Islam, in what constituted a conquest of unprecedented
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proportions, generated increasing doubts within Latin Christendom about its 
own civilisational superiority. By the twelfth century, the Christian responses 
to the advance of Islam were essentially defensive, and included an effort to 
convince fellow Christians not to convert to Islam in the face of the prestige 
and power of the Muslim world. For various Christian authors, the Islamic 
invasions represented ‘the coming apocalypse, the end of the world as 
predicted in the Holy Scriptures’ (Tolan, 2002: 41, 171). 
The relationship between Christians and infidels was far more 
complex than the simplistic picture of two opposing peoples claiming moral or 
divine superiority over each other. As Tolan (2002: xvii) explains, feelings 
of ‘rivalry, contempt, and superiority have existed on both sides all through 
the intervening centuries, tinged or tempered at times with feelings of 
doubt, inferiority, curiosity, or admiration.’ The concepts infidels/pagans did 
not refer exclusively to Muslims, but also to Prussians, Lithuanians, Tartars, 
Mongols, and so on. War was not a permanent state of affairs between 
Christians and non-Christian peoples, and there were many instances of 
missionary work that did not involve or resulted in armed conflict (Muldoon, 
1979: 3, 29). Also, there were instances of willing assimilation/acculturation, 
as it happened with the crusading kingdoms in Spain and the Levant 
(Wight, 1991: 52). Moreover, the sense of unity that informed the military 
expeditions on both sides masked divisions between Sunni and Shi’ite on 
the one hand, and the Latin tradition and the Greek Orthodox on the other 
(Tyerman, 2006: 1-2). In spite of all these nuances, the concepts 
infidels/pagans were dominant in the crusaders’ views of Muslims, and 
contributed to reinforce the notion of moral righteousness provided by the 
fideism that characterised the crusades.22 
 
 
 
3.3 The Catholic Overseas Expansion 
 
 
 
The European world colonising system was inaugurated by the Portuguese 
and Spanish voyages of discovery and conquest based on a divine mandate 
to Christianise.23 As with the crusades, the pope’s legal support for this 
enterprise played its part, by providing the Portuguese and Spanish 
monarchs with an important legitimating basis for this enterprise (Williams, 
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1990: 59). The role of this divine mandate is exemplified quite well in the 
Portuguese occupation of the Canaries, and the Spanish conquest of the 
New World. Yet, this period witnessed the gradual demise of the papacy’s 
dominant position in the definition of relations of Christian powers with the 
non-Christian world. The rhetoric of crusade was still appealing, but the 
Spanish and Portuguese rulers were increasingly in charge of directing their 
Christian expansionist policies. They informed the pope of their activities, 
justified the expansion with the will to spread Christianity, but they were 
seeking papal backing for policies that were already under way (Muldon, 
1979: 132-133). 
In the words of King Duarte of Portugal (1433-1438), in the context of 
the crusades in Africa, the inhabitants of the Canary Islands 
 
 
…are not united by a common religion, nor are they bound by the 
chains of law, they are lacking normal social intercourse, living in 
the country like animals. They have no contact with each other by 
sea, no writing, no kind of metal or money. They have no houses 
and no clothing except for coverlets of palm leaves or goat skins 
which are worn as an outer garment by the most honoured men. 
They run barefoot quickly through the rough, rocky and steep 
mountainous regions, hiding… in caves hidden in the ground (in 
Williams, 1990: 69). 
 
 
These words above are an excerpt from a letter written by the Portuguese 
king in which he contrasted the infidel Canarians, who lived under no form of 
law, with the Christian Canarians recently converted by the Portuguese. The 
latter had been provided with ‘laws and an organised form of society… 
Where the name of Christ had never been known, Christ is now worshipped’, 
king Duarte wrote (Williams, 1990: 69). 
The papal bull Romanus Pontifex of Nicholas V (1455) praised the 
Portuguese advances in the African coast and encouraged the Portuguese to 
‘not only restrain the savage excesses of the Saracens and of other infidels, 
enemies of the Christian name’, but also compelled the Portuguese to 
‘vanquish them and their kingdoms and habitations’ for the sake of the 
‘defence and increase of the [Christian] faith.’ Romanus Pontifex authorised 
King Afonso V, who succeeded King Duarte, ‘to convert the barbarous 
natives and control the islands on behalf of the papacy’, and gave the 
Portuguese the right of dominium over all territories discovered and 
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conquered.24 
The rediscovery in the Renaissance of the Roman right of dominium 
is understood in the literature as an important development towards the rise 
of the doctrine of state sovereignty. Indeed, Roman law influenced the work 
of the post-Medieval Europe theologians and lawyers that developed the 
doctrine of a natural law of nations (Kingsbury and Straumann, 2010: 1-5). 
There is, however, less a consensus about what that right of dominium 
referred to exactly. One the one hand, Kratochwill (1995: 25) contends that 
the core of the idea was the notion of mutually exclusive areas for the 
exercise of supreme authority, which derived from the arrangement in Roman 
private law of the dominium of a property holder. Holland (2010: 540) argues 
instead that it was the notion of representation that was recovered from 
Roman law, echoing the idea of the nation-state. 
The bull Romanus Pontifex was, according to Williams (1990: 8, 13- 
67), part of the legal framework whereby Europeans asserted that ‘unless 
non-Christian peoples would act according to the European’s totalising 
normative vision of the world, they could rightfully be conquered and their 
lands confiscated by Christian Europeans, for violating the Eurocentric vision 
of natural law.’ Consequently, Europeans would enforce their vision of a 
‘universally binding natural law.’ While Williams correctly highlights the role of 
canon law and of this legal discourse as legitimating Christian imperialism, 
the pope’s legal sanction was no longer a necessary pre-requisite for 
Christian expansionist policies. Indeed, some of the most important laws 
promulgated by the Pope referred to already unfolding events. This was the 
case with the bull Inter Caetera (1493), issued by Pope Alexander VI soon 
(roughly six months) after Columbus arrival at the New World, at the request 
of the monarchs of Spain Ferdinand and Isabella (Donelan, 1984: 79). The 
bull had essentially two purposes. One was to provide guidance to the 
imperial rivalry between Portugal and Castile, which dated back many years 
to the expansion in the African coast of both powers, and could be seriously 
aggravated by the maritime expansion westwards. Thus, Inter Caetera 
conceded the Spanish the exclusive rights to acquire territory 
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discovered and to be discovered, towards the west and south, by 
drawing and establishing a line from the Arctic pole, namely the 
north, to the Antarctic pole, namely the south, no matter whether 
the said mainlands and islands are found and to be found in the 
direction of India or towards any other quarter, the said line to be 
distant one hundred leagues towards the west and south from any 
of the islands commonly known as the Azores and Cape Verde. 
 
 
This shows a clear concern to avoid an armed conflict between Spain and 
Portugal over their overseas possessions, and reveals the universal 
ambitions of both church and European imperial monarchs. It also threatened 
any violator(s) of this bull that they would be incurring ‘the wrath of Almighty 
God and of the blessed apostles Peter and Paul.’ 
The other purpose of the bull was to provide the Spanish with a legal, 
divine mandate to Christianise the pagan inhabitants of the territories 
discovered and to be discovered: 
 
 
Moreover, as your aforesaid envoys are of opinion, these very 
peoples living in the said islands and countries believe in one God, 
the Creator in heaven, and seem sufficiently disposed to embrace 
the Catholic faith and be trained in good morals. And it is hoped 
that, were they instructed, the name of the Saviour, our Lord Jesus 
Christ, would easily be introduced into the said countries and 
islands. 
 
 
These words already reflect a reaction to the accounts of Columbus’s 
encounters with the inhabitants of America, whom he called Indians, because 
he initially thought to have reached India (Donelan, 1984: 79). In Pope 
Alexander VI’s perspective, ‘the most outstanding is that the Catholic Faith 
and Christian Religion especially in our times is being exalted and spread 
and extended everywhere and the salvation of souls procured and barbarian 
nations subdued and brought under that faith’ (Pagden, 1982: 37). Another 
relevant attempt to regulate this relationship in the newly discovered lands 
and seas was the Treaty of Tordesillas, signed by Kingdom of Portugal and 
the Kingdom of Castile and Aragon (1494). This treaty included some 
changes to the criteria defined in the bull Inter Caetera (Grew, 2000: 257- 
258), and it is a good example of how the Christian expansion was no longer 
dependent on the pope’s sanction. 
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The Indians were described by Columbus almost as animals, ‘these 
are indeed very wild people’ he wrote in his diary. For Columbus, as well as 
for Hernán Cortés and the Spanish conquistadores, eating human flesh, 
performing human sacrifices, not wearing clothes, and the practices of incest 
and sodomy, were symptoms of barbarism. He also saw these barbarous 
Indians as very generous people, because they often offered gifts to the 
Spanish – a view that might have contributed to the rise of the later myth of 
the ‘noble savage’. This partially sympathetic view of the Indians was 
probably what led Columbus to assume a position of assimilationist towards 
them. He took several Indians back to Spain with him so that, ‘upon their 
return they might be the interpreters of the Christians and might adopt our 
customs and our faith’ (Todorov, 1984: 35-45). In his view, the Indians were 
fit ‘to be made to build cities, to be taught to wear clothes, and to adopt our 
customs’ (Donelan, 1984: 77). 
The motives behind Spanish expeditions are multi-fold. These 
include: the will to spread Christianity (Columbus himself was profoundly 
religious); curiosity about the unknown world; and the material aspect, which 
became evermore influential once the first accounts of the gold found in what 
is now Mexico arrived to Spain. To these we can also add the 
conquistadores’ quest for a higher rank in society, for land where they could 
establish themselves as landowners, and for glory. It is likely that the Spanish 
kings would not have supported such a long and expensive enterprise if it 
was not for the potential material gains. Yet this does not refute the role of 
religion as a true motive driving the expeditions (Todorov, 1984: 8-14; 
Donelan 1984: 76). 
The idea of assimilationism quickly gave place to a policy of 
conquest and enslavement. The Spanish started shipping Indians to Spain as 
slaves, and were able to overthrow even powerful kings as Montezuma 
(Aztecs) with a few hundred men, due to a deadly combination of superior 
military technology, the high incidence of diseases, and the instrumental 
exploitation of rivalries among the tribes (Todorov, 1984: 46-76). The 
Dominican Bartolomé de Las Casas attempted to calculate the magnitude 
of what he described as the ‘wholesale slaughter of innocent people’ 
(Cavallar, 2002: 76). As Todorov explains, later attempts of historians to 
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determine the extent of this tragedy have ‘managed to estimate with great 
plausibility the population of the American continent on the eve of the 
conquest, in order to compare that population with what the Spanish 
calculations report fifty or a hundred years later.’ Some of these figures 
are, in fact, compatible with the numbers Las Casas described. According 
to some estimates, if in the year 1500 the population of the Americas was 
80 million (and the world population 400 million), by the mid sixteenth 
century only 10 million remained. What happened in the Americas does not 
mean necessarily that the Spanish empire was eviler than other European 
empires. Instead, it was a combination of circumstances that were only 
verified in the Spanish occupation of the Americas that determined the 
events. Moreover, the majority of deaths were caused by diseases. Yet the 
brutal treatment of the inhabitants of the Americas by Spanish, including 
enslavement and torture of various forms, not to mention the complete 
destruction of their traditional way of life, surely contributed to the 
deadliness of the diseases carried by the Europeans to the Americas 
(Todorov, 1984: 132-138). 
The conquest of the Indies posed a different question to the Spanish 
monarchs when compared to the crusades. The latter enterprise was 
essentially seen in Latin Christendom as an act of defence or reconquest, as 
was the case with the crusades aimed at the recovery of the Holy Land. 
Because war was a common state of affairs between Christians and 
Muslims, it was easy to justify the next war on the basis of defence of 
Christianity. While the crusades belonged to the realm of just war, in the case 
of the Indians of the Americas the argument of just war was mostly absent 
from the Spanish legitimating discourse of conquest. The spread of Christian 
faith was the chief argument that Spanish monarchs used in the beginning of 
the colonisation of the Americas. These developments revived a moral and 
legal debate about the rights and status of non-Christian peoples (Williams, 
1990: 59). 
The heated debate that ensued was allowed, and occasionally 
encouraged by the Spanish Crown (Donelan, 1984: 78-83), whom together 
with some ecclesiastical circles had an old moral unease and anxiety 
regarding the legitimacy of their military enterprises (Pagden, 1992: 24). On 
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the Christmas of 1511, the Dominican Antonio the Montesinos delivered a 
sermon and addressed the Spanish colonisers by asking 
 
with what right and with what justice do you keep these poor 
Indians in such cruel and horrible servitude? By what authority 
have you made such detestable wars against these people who 
lived peacefully and gently on their own lands? Are these not 
men? Do they not have rational souls? Are you not obliged to love 
them as yourselves? (in Pagden, 1992: 10-11). 
 
 
These words became almost a motto for those “fighting” for the rights of the 
peoples of the Americas. Soon after Montesinos’ sermon, King Ferdinand 
asked the Dominican Matiaz de Paz and the civil jurist Juan Lopez de 
Palacios Rubios for advice on the question of the Indians. Their studies 
concluded that although the Indians had full rights of personal liberty and 
ownership, the pope’s sanction granted the Spanish king the right to rule over 
them (Donelan, 1984: 83). 
The purpose of Las Casas’s endeavour, by travelling to the Americas 
to understand what was happening and what had happen, and writing 
extensively about it, was not to challenge the Spanish king’s right to rule in 
the Indies, as some of his fellow-Dominicans did. Probably to prove it, Las 
Casas also wrote the Comprobatory Treatise in the Imperial Sovereignty and 
Universal Jurisdiction which the Kings of Castile Have over these Indies, 
printed in the same year (1552) as A Short Account of the Destruction of the 
Indies. As the very title indicates, despite his determination to show that the 
Crown had gravely mishandled the administration of the colonies, and that 
the behaviour of the colonists had ‘given reason for the name of Christ to be 
loathed and abominated by countless people,’ Las Casas was careful to 
distinguish between both issues. For him, there was no doubt that the kings 
of Spain were the legitimate rulers of the Americas because Pope Alexander 
VI had given them sovereignty over the lands in the Atlantic, unoccupied by 
other Christian princes. The main claim advanced by Las Casas was that this 
divine mandate did not confer the Spanish monarchs with the property rights 
over the peoples of the Americas and their lands, which were theirs by 
natural right, nor did it mean that the native rulers had no political authority. 
He noted that Pope Alexander VI had entitled the Spanish Crown to ‘induce 
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the peoples who live in such islands and lands to receive the Catholic 
religion, save that you never inflict upon them hardships and dangers.’ 
Because the Indians were subjects of the Castilian Crown, and not things or 
animals, to treat them as such would be a violation of God’s laws (Pagden, 
1992: 15-16). As Muldoon (1979: viii) explains, Las Casas’s thoughts on the 
matter were influenced by the rediscovery of arguments from medieval canon 
law about the rights of non-Europeans. 
A Short Account, written in 1542, addressed the king directly to call 
the monarch’s attention to the treatment of the Indians, and at the same time 
suggest legal and institutional reforms of the Spanish administration of the 
colonies in the Americas. Las Casas particularly despised an institution 
known as the Encomienda, which gave the colonisers lordship over the 
Indians and was a source of an angry controversy between the Spanish 
colonisers and the Christian missionaries. According to the Encomienda, the 
Indians, in exchange for their labour, would receive the protection of the 
Spanish, instruction in the Christian faith, and a symbolic wage. For Las 
Casas, this system that in his words ‘daily consumes these people’, 
represented a denial of the Indians’ right to property and simply meant the 
Indians were slaves. Through the Requerimiento, the Spanish colonisers 
constructed the case that Indians could be enslaved if they waged an unjust 
war to resist the colonisers (Pagden, 1992: 17-18, 23; Donelan, 1984: 82). 
The absurdity of the Requerimiento was such that, before launching an 
attack against the Indians, a Spanish priest would read in Castellano a 
declaration of Christian beliefs to the Indians, so as to explain them the 
Spanish actions (Muldoon, 1979: 140). 
The criticism of the Spanish colonial enterprise by Las Casas gave 
rise to the Leyenda Negra (Black Legend), which was used as an instrument 
of Anglo-Dutch, i.e. Protestant propaganda to depict the atrocities of the 
Spanish in the Americas, and against any other Spanish imperial adventure. 
It is this appropriation of Las Casas work by rival European imperialisms at 
the time when Spain was already under pressure in the colonies, that 
probably explains why The History of the Indies, also authored by Las Casas, 
was only published in 1875. The purpose of this work was to demonstrate 
that no people on earth, regardless of their ‘barbarous’ condition, could be 
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denied membership to the Christian universal community. He also published 
An Apologetic History of the Indies, a work of comparative ethnography 
where he argued that the Indians were actually more civilised than many 
Europeans (Pagden, 1992: 8-9, 18).25 
To compensate for the deteriorating native labour force, slaves were 
transported from Africa to the Americas, thus contributing to the formation of 
increasingly miscellaneous colonial communities. By the mid-sixteenth 
century the population of New Spain, a colony established after the conquest 
of the Aztec Empire, was composed by 150.000 white Spanish, 150.000 
mestizos, 130.000 mulattos, and 80.000 African slaves, and an estimated 1 
million Amerindians. This resulted, as Darwin (2008: 64) notes, in the 
development of colonies not in the image of Castile, but in a ‘distinctive if still 
protean Spanish-American culture, a new Creole society’, where colour and 
ethnic origin played a central part in defining the societal hierarchy. 
 
 
3.4 A Moral Obligation to Protect 
 
 
 
A crucial figure in these debates that involved the Spanish crown, church, 
and conquistadores regarding the colonisation of the Americas and related 
wars and atrocities committed against the Indians was Francisco de Vitoria. 
Vitoria was a Spanish Dominican who for twenty years (1526-1546) was 
professor of the most important chair of theology in Spain, in the University of 
Salamanca (Nys, 1917: 72). He studied humanities, philosophy and theology 
in Burgos and then Paris, before taking up the Chair of Theology at the 
University of Valladolid in 1522. Four years later, he was appointed Chair of 
Theology in Salamanca (Valenzuela, 2006: 17). Vitoria, together with 
Domingo de Soto (1494-1560), are considered the founders of the 
Salamanca School. The work of the School was then followed on by 
Bartolomé de Medina (1527-1581), the Dominican Domingo de Bañez 
(1528–1604), and the Jesuit Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) (Koskenniemi, 
2011: 5-7). Vitoria’s intellectual influences were many and varied, but chief 
among these were the legacy of Aquinas – Vitoria began teaching Summary 
of Theology – and the Italian humanists of the Renaissance (Valenzuela, 
2006: 17). Attesting to Vitoria’s prestige is the fact that, following a long 
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established tradition of the Spanish Crown to consult men of the church 
regarding Spain’s military enterprises, King Charles V often submitted 
questions to Vitoria and consulted him about matters taking place in the 
Indies, e.g. the baptism of the Indians against the will of their parents (Nys, 
1917: 72). 
That Vitoria willingly created moral and legal arguments to support 
the Spanish conquest and colonisation of the Americas is a view shared by a 
number of scholars. According to Pagden (1982: 2-3), Vitoria helped to 
develop the idea that the Indians’ ‘poor and barbarous education’, as well as 
their child-like mentality, prevented them, ‘temporarily at least’, from 
exercising government responsibly. In this perspective, this was done by 
shifting Aristotle’s notion of natural slaves to that of a ‘natural man’ (the 
Indian) unable to do rational, and thus moral choices. It followed from this 
that it was the duty of the Christians ‘to care for peoples who were still in a 
condition of childlike imbecility.’ Another portrait of Vitoria as an apologist of 
imperial domination comes from Anghie (1996), who argues that Vitoria used 
the concept jus gentium to demonstrate that the Indians were in breach or 
violation of natural law. Anghie thus compares Vitoria’s role with Juan Ginés 
de Sepúlveda’s – a figure seen at the time as intellectually very orthodox, 
chauvinistic and dogmatic (Pagden, 1982: 109) – in coming up with the 
justifications for Spanish colonisation of the Americas, by defining a number 
of Indian cultural practices as violations of the precepts of natural law. In 
Anghie’s interpretation of Vitoria, these violations required the Spanish to act 
as sovereigns in the Americas. 
Regarding Vitoria’s development of an inherently 
imperialist/colonialist law of nations conception, Williams (1990), Anghie 
(1996), and Koskenniemi (2011) argue his legacy was a lasting one. Williams 
(1990: 99) makes the case that Vitoria’s elaboration of a jus gentium was a 
deliberate attempt to provide ‘Western legal discourse with its first secularly 
oriented, systematised elaboration of the superior rights of civilised 
Europeans to invade and conquer normatively divergent peoples.’ According 
to Anghie (1996: 322-324, 334), Vitoria developed his ‘sovereignty doctrine’ 
so as to address the problem of the cultural difference, i.e. his 
‘characterisation of the Indians as different on the basis of their different 
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social practices, rituals and ways of life.’ Thus, international law was created 
by Vitoria out of this colonial encounter between the Spanish and the 
inhabitants of the Americas, based on his ethnocentrism and cultural 
preconceptions about the Indians. In Koskenniemi’s (2011: 1, 16) view, 
behind the development of a vocabulary of dominium by the ‘Salamancans’ 
was the goal of enabling ‘the universal ordering of international relations by 
recourse to private property, contract, and exchange’. In this logic, this 
vocabulary of private rights provided the basis for the ‘informal empires’ that 
Europeans established all over the globe. This quasi-demonisation of Vitoria 
(and by extension the Salamanca School) as the chief architect of what can 
be called a second wave of legal arguments for the Spanish colonisation of 
the Americas beyond the initial justification of the non-Christian and 
barbarian, almost animal status of the Indians, is quite problematic. Most of 
these views are highly de-contextualised, and often taken to the extreme for 
the sake of driving home one’s point. Furthermore, the issue is much more 
complex than what is often recognised. 
The departure from the notion of a respublica Christiana was one of 
the Salamanca School’s essential tenets. It was inspired in Aquinas’ 
conception of natural right guiding and directing human law, as a basis for 
justice, rationality, and legitimacy in politics. What Vitoria and other members 
of the Salamanca School aimed to do was to apply this Thomistic notion 
about the unity of mankind, and of the existence of political and social rights 
pertaining to all humans regardless of their religious beliefs, to the relations 
between political communities. In principle, this position represented a 
powerful rejection of the old aspiration of bringing the world into unity through 
the imposition of Christianity. It was thus an indirect – indirect because 
initially it was a position of principle and not associated to the colonisation of 
the Americas – refutation of the main claim or justification of the Spanish 
conquistadores and the jurists that supported their enterprise. It was a 
dismissal of the pope’s universal authority over the indigenous populations of 
the Americas, based on the Indians’ non-Christian status and their refusal to 
accept Christian faith. Thus, Vitoria’s jus gentium highlighted the equality of 
all men, which inevitably implied the equality between political communities 
internationally. Not surprisingly, Vitoria was a vital influence in the later work 
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of Grotius. This influence is quite evident in the fact that he quotes Vitoria 44 
times in De Jure Bellic a Pacis (Valenzuela, 2006: 7-13, 42, 78-79). 
The following question is thus pertinent: how could Vitoria have been 
an apologist of the colonisation of the Americas by intentionally developing 
legal and moral arguments that justified it, while at the same time being a key 
figure of an intellectual tradition that questioned the divine right of the 
Spanish kings to rule over the Indians of the Americas. There were a number 
of works in Spain that were obvious statements of support for the Spanish 
colonisation of the Americas and where there was no reference to rights of 
the barbarians of the New World. These include Matias de la Paz’ Dominio 
regum Hispaniae super indos (1512); Juan Lopez Palacios Rubios’ De Insulis 
Oceanis (1512); and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda’s – who was the Spanish 
crown’s chaplain and official chronicler – Democrates Primus (1535), where 
religious proselytism is presented as the main justification for the conquest, 
and his Democrates Secundus sive de justis causis belli apud Indos (1547) 
that attacked Vitoria’s position on the matter (Valenzuela, 2006: 89-90). As 
Pagden (1982: 109) puts it, Democrates Secundus was ‘the most virulent 
and uncompromising argument for the inferiority of the American Indian ever 
written.’ Even the Scottish philosopher and theologian John Mair justified the 
Spanish conquest of the Americas with the overthrow of pagan rulers and 
their barbarian subjects who rejected Christian faith. In the context of these 
statements supporting the Spanish Crown’s enterprise in the Indies, Vitoria’s 
dissertations on the topic, namely De Indis Noviter Inventis and De Jure Belli 
Hispanorum in Barbarous (both of 1532), read much more as critical 
intellectual enquiries to the matter rather than a defence of the 
conquistadores’ actions (Valenzuela, 2006: 89-90).26 In fact, de Sepúlveda’s 
Democrates Secundus was condemned by the universities of Alcala and 
Salamanca, essentially due to the influence of Vitoria. As a theologian 
involved in these debates wrote to de Sepúlveda at the time, ‘as the 
celebrated doctor Fray Francisco de Vitoria, who is worthy of every respect, 
has written at length on this matter and in opposition to your views, we could 
do little else than reject your opinion, there being arguments against it that 
were not to be despised’ (Pagden, 1982: 110-111). 
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It is essential to understand that Vitoria developed his ideas in 
relation to an already existing reality. By the time he made his ideas public 
the conquest of the Americas was an established fact, and the colonisation of 
many territories was already under way. As Ortega (1996: 99-100) puts it, 
Vitoria ‘was a theologian faced with a new reality: his country had to govern 
extensive territories inhabited by different peoples hitherto unknown. 
Particularly from the late 1520s, with the growth of the Spanish presence in 
the New World, the proliferation of reports of abuses by the Spanish 
conquerors and colonisers, and the increasing number of Indians that were 
vassals of the Castilian crown, the issue of the rights of non-European 
peoples became a topic of increasing public interest (Pagden: 1982: 57-59).  
In Vitoria’s view, the atrocities committed by the Spanish in the 
Americas demanded a moral reaction. His unease with the Spanish Crown’s 
enterprise in the Americas is evident: 
 
If the Peruvian natives were monkeys instead of human beings, I 
would recognise that they could not be victims of injustice. 
However, being our fellow-men and subjects of the Emperor, I 
cannot see how to excuse the conquistadores from the worst kind 
of cruelty and tyranny… Even if I desired the Archbishopric of 
Toledo, which is vacant now, very badly, suppose they offered it to 
me under the condition that I proclaimed the innocence of those 
Peruvian adventurers, I could never bring myself to do such a 
thing. I would rather lose my tongue and my hand than to say or 
write such an inhuman and anti-Christian statement. They can 
keep the seat of the Archbishop for themselves; all I want is to be 
left in peace. They will surely find somebody ready to go along 
with their plans; even among our Dominicans, they would find 
somebody ready to excuse them, to praise their deeds, their 
massacres, their pillages (in Valenzuela, 2006: 89). 
 
 
This was part of a letter Vitoria wrote to the Provincial of the Dominicans in 
Andalucia, after the conquest of Peru and Atahualpa’s execution. In another 
passage of it, he further expressed his disquiet with the events of the Indies: 
‘no business shocks me or embarrasses me more than the corrupt profits 
and affairs of the Indies. Their very mention freezes the blood in my veins’ 
(Muldoon, 2006: 139). 
The divine right of the Spanish Crown to rule over the inhabitants of 
the Americas based on the non-Christian status of the Indians was not the 
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only argument rejected by Vitoria. He also discarded a number of other 
arguments that had been developed by the Spanish to justify their deeds in 
the Americas (Muldoon, 2006: 134). Among these was the claim defended by 
others that the barbarian Indians were not rational beings. Inspired by a 
compassion based on his Christian beliefs, Vitoria went on to claim the 
Indians were rational beings, and thus were rightly entitled to own property 
and to be treated as subjects of the Crown, and not as slaves as it had 
happened so far (Ortega, 1996: 99-101). According to Vitoria, the fact that 
the Indians had princes, magistrates, and laws proved that they had 
dominium and were able to live rationally in society. Thus, because they 
possessed reason and had the capacity to understand principles of justice, 
they ought to be treated as equals (Valenzuela, 2006: 83-85, 93). He 
questioned what he saw as the instrumental use of Aristotle’s idea of natural 
slaves to justify the subjugation of the Indians. He challenged the idea that 
the Indians were slaves by nature, could not be their own masters, or own 
property, by noting that before Spanish arrival to the Americas, the Indians 
did rule themselves, own property, and had their own laws, cities and 
commerce. Even if the Indians were natural slaves, or intellectually deficient, 
or children, this did not mean that they did not have rights, namely the right 
to of a rule that defended their own good. It surely did not justify the 
brutalities they were subjected to, argued Vitoria (Brown et al, 2002: 188-
189). Other justifications he rejected included the idea that the Indians 
submitted freely to the Spanish, and the belief that God gave the Indies to 
the Spanish (Donelan, 1984: 83-84). Vitoria also rejected the justification 
based on inventio, i.e. the right of discovery, in relation to which he argued 
that it was only valid in connection with uninhabited regions. ‘According to 
the Law of Nations’, as Vitoria put it, ‘that which has no owner become the 
property of the seizor; but the possessions we are speaking of were under a 
master, and therefore they do not come under the head of discovery’ (Nys, 
1917, 86). He concluded that ‘the barbarians in question cannot be barred 
from being true owners, alike in public and in private law, by reason of the 
sin of unbelief or any other mortal sin, nor does such sin entitle Christians to 
seize their goods and lands’ (Muldon, 1979: 145). 
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An important discussion regarding Vitoria’s teachings on natural 
rights revolves around the extent to which the Spanish scholastic developed 
a doctrine of subjective rights. For example, Pagden (1982: 94) argues, 
wrongly, that Vitoria believed that the Indians were not fully rational beings, 
and could thus be deprived of their right to property. It is clear that Vitoria did 
see the Indians as rational creatures. He argued that 
 
 
according to the truth of the matter they are not irrational, but they 
have the use of reason in their own way. This is clear because 
they have a certain order in their affairs, ordered cities, separate 
marriages, magistrates, rulers, laws…Also they do not err in things 
that are evident to others, which is evidence of the use of reason. 
Again, God and nature do not fail for a greater part of a species in 
what is necessary. But the special quality in man is reason, and 
potency which is not actualized is in vain. 
 
 
He believed that ‘nature does nothing in vain’. The hypothetical existence of 
peoples who did not fulfil their potential as human beings would amount to a 
failure of God and nature (Tierney, 1997: 269-270). The interpretation that 
Vitoria did develop a doctrine of subjective rights stems from the possibility 
that his professed Thomism, including the definition of jus as ‘the object of 
justice’ or ‘what is just’, was corrupted by nominalist and voluntarist currents 
of thought. As Tierney (1997: 257-262) explains convincingly, such 
interpretation is highly misleading. Vitoria accepted Aquinas’s objective 
definition of right. Only when discussing the issue of restitution in relation to 
the affairs of the Indies, namely of the Indians’ deprivation of their rights to 
property by the Spanish, did he talk in terms of jus as a power or faculty that 
can be owned. Moreover, the language of dominium (referring to property) as 
a right or faculty one possesses can be traced back to natural law theories of 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. According to Aquinas, restitution was ‘to 
reinstate a person in possession or dominion of his thing.’ 
In his lectures and writings, Vitoria did refer to the inhabitants of the 
Americas as barbarians (Bain, 2003a: 15-16). But it is not only simplistic but 
wrong to assume that this defined his views on the matter, namely that he 
thought the Indians were incapable of or unsuitable for self-government. For 
years, especially Vitoria and de Sepúlveda were involved in a heated 
controversy about the matter, with the latter constantly attacking Vitoria’s 
unorthodox positions which included the rejection of the Spanish right of 
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dominium based on canon law and the divine right to Christianise. Thus, 
Vitoria’s references to the inhabitants of the New World as barbarians is only 
natural given that it was how de Sepúlveda and all other Spanish involved in 
these moral and legal debates referred to the them (Ortega, 1996: 99-101). 
Vitoria attempted to define first and foremost the moral rights and obligations 
that ought to inform the relationship between the Spaniards and the Indians. 
As Valenzuela (2006: 87-89) explains, Vitoria was ‘outlining the licit means 
by which different peoples may justly govern their mutual relations on the 
basis of a universalist, i.e. natural law, conception of humanity.’ 
This said, the practices of cannibalism and human sacrifices horrified 
Vitoria at least as much as he was repulsed by the Spanish massacres of the 
Indians (Todorov, 1984: 149-150). In his lecture ‘On Dietary Laws, or Self- 
Restraint’, he reflected on the extent to which cannibalism, incest, sodomy, 
and human sacrifice, practices which were forbidden by natural law, could 
justify expropriating the Indians from their lands. It was his view that the 
Indians’ condition of ‘barbarism’ and related customs was not a sufficient 
justification. What those customs such as human sacrifices justified, in 
Vitoria’s view, was the exercise by the Spanish of the rights of 
guardianship/protection. The idea of trusteeship was developed by Vitoria in 
his lecture ‘On the American Indians’ (1539), where he asked ‘by what right 
were the barbarians subjected to Spanish rule?’ (Brown et al, 2002: 187- 
189). He also developed this idea in more general terms in a number of 
passages of his writings about politics and morality (Vitoria, 1991: 6, 20, 203- 
204, 336-337). In this context, Vitoria explored what the moral obligations of 
the Christian princes towards their Indian subjects ought to be, calling for a 
rule based on the interests of the community, to which the Indians also 
belonged to (Brown et al, 2002: 188-189). In Vitoria’s words, everything had 
to be done ‘for the benefit and good of the barbarians, and not merely for the 
profit of the Spaniards’ (Bain, 2003a: 15). This point was the logical corollary 
of his argument that the Indians were rational beings, were entitled to 
property, and ought to be protected and treated as equal subjects of the 
Crown, not as slaves. 
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In trying to limit the brutalities that the Indians were constantly 
subjected to, Vitoria also attempted to define some limits and think through 
the circumstances when war against the Indians could be morally justified. In 
his view, the Spanish could wage war to defend other innocent Indians from 
the evils of sacrifice and cannibalism. However, war could only be justified to 
address that injustice, and once that was done the Spanish should stop 
there, and not seize the properties of the Indians. This logic of an intervention 
to address an injustice over other human beings very much echoes what 
would be called humanitarian intervention a few centuries later (Muldoon, 
2006). The Spanish could also defend themselves against attacks from the 
Indians. In Vitoria’s view, the Spanish had the right to travel, settle, trade, and 
make use of the natural resources in the Americas, as long as this did not 
clash with the rights of the Indians (Brown et al, 2002: 187-189, 231). 
Although he believed the pagan princes were obligated to accept the 
presence of Christian missionaries as ‘the ambassadors of Christianity’ 
(Nussbaym, 1961: 81), Vitoria repudiated the argument that the Spanish 
could wage war against the barbarians for their refusal to accept Christian 
faith (Nys, 1917: 86-87). As Muldoon (2006: 133-140) shows, Vitoria’s 
concluding line of argument regarding Spanish military interventions in the 
affairs of the Indians was that, even with good intentions, it could lead to 
damaging consequences. Overall, he was unsure about these ideas about 
intervention he developed. At the end of his lecture on the Indians, as 
Nussbaum (1961: 83) explains, ‘he took up the hypothesis that none of his 
reasons in favour of the war against the Indians or of the occupancy of their 
territory might be valid.’ His scepticism regarding some of the arguments 
himself developed should not be surprising, given the scholastic method – sic 
et non – of putting forward pros and cons regarding an issue, so as to be 
able to envision all the potential scenarios (Muldoon, 2006: 140). 
Vitoria’s opinion that the Spanish had a right to travel, settle, trade, 
and make use of natural resources derived from his notion of a universal 
society of mankind, of the existence of natural rights pertaining to all humans. 
These rights were to be enjoyed by all communities so as to ensure equality 
and justice, and under the fundamental precept that local populations should 
never by harmed (Valenzuela, 2006: 83-85). What is more, Vitoria’s theory 
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about the right of hospitality was only valid as long as the Spanish did not 
harm the Indians. If this happened, the latter were rightly entitled to expel the 
former (Cavallar, 2002: 107-114). This might strike one as a rather naïve or 
overtly idealistic take on the nature of international politics, but nothing 
indicates that it was his intention to provide the Spanish expansionist hunger 
with novel legitimating basis for their actions. Quite the contrary, his intention 
was essentially to call for moral restraint, respect, and tolerance. Moreover, 
there is no evidence in the literature about the topic that the Spanish 
colonisers appropriated the moral arguments developed by Vitoria to justify 
their actions in the Americas. 
Regarding the influence and effects of Vitoria’s idea of trusteeship 
and of a rule based on the interests of the community in which the Indians 
and their rights ought to be included, these were very limited at best. Las 
Casas and Vitoria’s efforts did have its results in the form of legislation 
passed to protect the rights of the Indians and impose limits to the brutality of 
the conquistadores. Famous among these were the Laws of Burgos, which 
forbade the Spanish to treat the Indians as ‘dogs’, and addressed the 
working conditions of the Indians by among other things limiting the number 
of hours they were required to work. However, the problem of enforcing 
legislation in the remoteness of the Americas was insurmountable. The 
dictum obedezco pero non cumplo (I obey but do not comply) became the 
attitude of the encomenderos and other colonial administrators towards this 
legislation (Koskenniemi, 2011: 5). Moreover, the reason why Cortes (in 
Mexico) and Pizarro’s (in Peru) expeditions were described as less 
destructive than Velazquez’s (in Cuba), was probably because the motive of 
the former was already the establishment of a feudal society, which required 
the Indians to be the working class (Pagden, 1992: 23-26). 
With the gradual integration of the remaining Indians as Christian 
subjects of the Spanish Crown, they were no longer outsiders but members 
of the European-centred Christian society, and thus their rights had to be 
considered (Plamenatz, 1960: 6; Brown et al, 2002: 186). Thus, with the 
definitive establishment of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in the 
Americas, Vitoria’s idea of trusteeship lost its momentum (Bain, 2003a: 15- 
16). Nevertheless, as Plamenatz (1960:  7) puts it, ‘although the natives
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ceased to be outcasts from Christian civilisation, they belonged to society 
and yet they profited little from it.’ Despite having done very little for the 
inhabitants of the Americas, the principle of trusteeship and the arguments it 
generated would have a lasting legacy in foreign policy debates ((Brown et 
al, 2002: 188-189; Bain, 2003a). 
The idea that the Salamancan scholastics’ most lasting legacy was 
their contribution to the development of an international law with an inherent 
colonial nature (Williams, 1990; Anghie, 1996; Koskenniemi, 2011) is not only 
highly misleading, but ignores the fact that the moral precepts developed by 
the Salamanca School played an essential part in bringing the events of the 
Americas under moral and then legal scrutiny. Surely this scrutiny of the 
Spanish colonisation of the Americas did little for the Indians. In the words of 
a sixteenth century Spanish historian, ‘great disputes took place among 
famous jurists, canonists, and theologians… yet no good came to the land or 
the Indians’ (Tierney, 1997: 256). Nevertheless, imperialism and colonialism 
in the Americas were no longer an unchecked enterprise, subject to the 
brutality of a few men certain of being on the right side of faith. 
Finally, the transition accorded to Vitoria’s work on jus gentium from 
a natural law of mankind to a law between sovereign states (e.g. Valenzuela, 
2006: 7, 160-161) should be faced with some caution (Anghie, 1996: 322). 
This caution should not be used to downplay his contribution to the 
subsequent development of the doctrine of state sovereignty (Donelan, 1984: 
84-85), which surely was important. The Salamanca school’s conception of 
jus gentium, not only with Vitoria but also with Suárez, is still far from 
distinguishing between natural law and positive customary law (Valenzuela, 
2006: 83-85; Koskenniemi, 2011: 30). Vitoria viewed political communities as 
part of a universal natural community, and thus with obligations towards one 
another. For him, ‘the conquest of the Americas was not a technical issue of 
jurisdiction, but a moral and spiritual problem for priests, not lawyers, to 
address’ (Muldon, 1979: 144). 
 
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
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Inherited from the Ancient Greeks and the Roman Empire, the concept of 
barbarian informed the respublica Cristiana’s ethnocentric view of the world. 
Yet in the Middle Ages, the Christian-infidels/pagans division replaced, or at 
least was far more preponderant than the dichotomy civility/civilisation- 
barbarism. Impelled by fideism and by Christian faith as the ultimate and 
universal moral standard, the concepts of pagans and infidels dominated the 
crusaders’ views of their Muslim enemies. Questions about the rights of non- 
Christians were raised by clergyman and intellectuals, namely just war 
theorists, based on natural law conceptions. That the rights of non-Christians 
were considered in principle is expressed by the justification of the crusades 
as wars of self-defence. Yet the Christian-infidel/pagan dichotomy often 
dictated that the latter did not enjoy of equal rights in the face of the pope’s 
universal authority. In a Christian community that was regularly divided by 
feuds and wars but that worked as a whole when there was an external 
threat or opportunity, canon law played a central legitimising and mobilising 
role in the crusades. This central role of canon law should be read as an 
outcome of the prevailing morality of the time, namely of the preponderance 
of Christian religion and the universal authority of the pope as the 
representative of God on earth. 
As with the crusades, Christian faith continued to be one of the 
motives as well as a legitimating element of the Portuguese and Spanish 
overseas expansion. Although this expansion was also supported by canon 
law, the sanction of papal authority was no longer a pre-condition for 
Christian expansion. The Spanish encounter with the native inhabitants of the 
Americas is illustrative of how the concept of barbarians re-surged in the 
legitimating vocabulary of the discoverers and conquistadores, which 
indicates the revival of the notion of superiority of the civilised Europeans. 
Together with the non-Christian status of the inhabitants of the New World, 
the concept of barbarians worked as a justification for actions of the Spanish, 
in a context where the argument of self-defence could hardly apply. 
Nevertheless, this encounter also revived a moral and legal debate about the 
status and rights of non-Christian peoples. In particular, the likes of Las 
Casas and Montesinos condemned determinedly the atrocities committed by 
the Spanish conquistadores and colonisers, and recalled that the
102  
Indians/barbarians also had rights, although they did not question the King’s 
right to rule in the Americas based on the right to Christianise. 
Regarding Vitoria’s jus gentium conception, although he rejected the 
idea of papal universal jurisdiction, his arguments do not represent a radical 
break with the past in terms of the emergence of a secular law of nations, but 
instead a revival of medieval thought based on theological notions and a 
natural law of nations, coupled with humanist precepts. This is not to dismiss 
his contribution to the future development of the doctrine of state sovereignty. 
Vitoria’s intention was not to create a range of legal arguments to provide the 
Spanish colonisers with novel legitimating basis for their actions. Quite the 
contrary, he was responding on a moral basis to an already existing reality. 
Vitoria rejected a number of arguments put forward by the Spanish apologists 
of conquest and subjugation of the barbarians of the New World. He was 
essentially moved by what he considered an extremely morally unjust, un- 
Christian situation. This led him to call for the protection of the Indians 
against the brutalities of the conquistadores and colonisers, to defend a 
government based on trust between ruled and ruler, or to explore the 
possibility that, in certain conditions, intervention in Indian affairs could be 
morally justified only to address a circumstantial situation. The limited effects 
of his ideas when it comes to the protection of rights of the Indians does not 
counter the notion that he was indeed a defender of their rights, and very 
critical of the Spanish actions in the Americas. Thus, Vitoria’s legacy in 
relation to European imperialism and colonialism is that of a call for restrain, 
of a moral check over the actions of ruthless imperialists and colonisers, and 
the acknowledgement of the rights of the non-European peoples, irrespective 
of their customs or religious beliefs. 
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Chapter 4 - From the Divine Right to Christianise to the Mission to 
Civilise 
 
 
 
 
Long ago, Plutarch pointed out that the civilising of barbarians 
served as a cloak for greed, or in other words, that shameless lust 
for another’s property was wont to take cover in the excuse of 
introducing civilisation into barbaric regions. Nowadays, even this 
pretext of bringing reluctant peoples to an acceptance of more 
refined customs – an explanation to which recourse was had in 
earlier times by the Greeks and by Alexander – is regarded in the 
judgment of all the theologians, and particularly in that of the 
Spaniards, as unjust and impious. 
 
 
Hugo Grotius, De Jure Praedae Commentarius (1950: 222). 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
 
 
The Dutch Jurist Hugo Grotius, who passed away three years before the 
Peace of Westphalia, is widely considered to be the father of the modern 
doctrine of the law of nations. The main purpose of this chapter is to address 
Keene’s (2002) claim that there is a relation of causality between Grotius’ law 
of nations conception, and the idea and category of defective polities. 
According to Keene, Grotius’ jus gentium conception, developed in the first 
half of the seventeenth century, contributed decisively to the division of the 
world by Europeans into two distinct types of order in the eighteenth century, 
and particularly in the nineteenth century. In his perspective, the principle of 
state sovereignty as envisioned by Grotius became an exclusive tool of 
European imperialist states to deny non-European political communities their 
right to sovereignty and self-government, under the claim that only civilised 
states possessed such right. In this regard, Keene (2002: 42-43) contends 
that Grotius’ project ‘was not to determine what prerogatives peopled should 
hold, but rather to identify those which in fact they did hold.’ As we will see, 
Keene is partly right to note that Grotius attempted to address and reflect 
upon an existing reality, although Keene fails to appreciate all the 
implications of this. This means that to comprehend Grotius’ law of nations 
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conception, it is necessary to place Grotius in the context of his time 
(Kingsbury, 1996: 45). As we will discuss, this is something that Keene fails 
to do in his attempt to associate Grotius’ thought with later stages of the 
European imperial and colonial expansion. 
An argument similar to Keene’s about Grotius’ law of nations 
conception is the one advanced by Clapham (1999) regarding Westphalia. 
According to Clapham (1999: 522), the establishment of ‘the European 
sovereignty regime’ with the treaties of Westphalia ‘created the template for 
the division of much of the rest of the world between European powers.’ In 
his view, Westphalia ‘provided the formula under which territories that did not 
“count” as states according to the criteria adopted by the European state 
system could be freely appropriated – subject only to their capacity to 
conquer the incumbent powers holders – by those which did count.’ 
The first section of this chapter makes a few observations about the 
rise of international society in Europe and the corresponding norm of state 
sovereignty. It discusses the notion that Westphalia constitutes a defining 
moment in that regard. This will allow us to consider the argument that the 
normative outcomes of Westphalia are intimately related with European 
imperialism and colonialism (Clapham, 1999), and discuss Grotius’ law of 
nations conception against the international political background of Grotius’ 
age. The second section illustrates the extra-European context that informed 
the conception of law of nations developed by Grotius. It traces the rise of 
Protestant overseas expansionism since the late sixteenth century, especially 
of the United Provinces, which not only preceded Grotius but also marked the 
period in which he lived. The purpose is to shed light on the motives and 
legitimating arguments of that enterprise. The third section reflects on 
Grotius’ ideas and conception of law of nations, and its connections with 
Dutch and other European expansionism. The goal is to discuss the relation 
between Grotius’ law of nations conception and the idea and category of 
defective polities. 
 
 
4.2 On the Rise of International Society 
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It is plausible to talk about separate/autonomous political communities, 
whose mutual relations shape their behaviour, and characterised by a 
number of shared norms of conduct, such as the ancient Chinese system, 
the ancient Indian system, and what is often called the ‘Greek city-states 
system’ (Stern, 2000: 56-74). Nevertheless, the notion of an authority that is 
recognised as constitutionally independent and supreme over others in the 
same territorial jurisdiction (James, 1986: 266), one that emerged gradually 
out of Medieval era, is still a fundamentally distinct development, as Watson’s 
(1992) comparative historical study shows. To talk about sovereign states 
before this era amounts to falling in the trap Waever (2002: 15) alerts to, of 
projecting back an idea and concept and assume it has always existed, ‘even 
where it is not expressed in the language’, and one should add the practices 
‘of the time.’ It was mainly in the sixteenth century that the language of ‘state’ 
and ‘sovereignty’ came to be present in the vocabulary of Europeans. As 
Jackson (2007: 7, 20) notes, in the past there were not notions of sovereignty 
between different political communities, but arrangements of suzerainty, 
whereby more powerful political communities allowed less powerful ones 
some degree of autonomy in exchange for the payment of a tribute, as was 
the case with the imperial dynasties of China, the Ottoman Empire, and the 
Mughal Empire. 
Two developments in particular are essential to understand the 
gradual disintegration of the cosmopolitan Christian Republic and the rise of 
the idea of state sovereignty. One is the influence of the Italian states-system 
of the Renaissance spreading northwards. The power of the Italian ruler was 
called stato, initially referring to a situation/status quo, to then mean a 
government or political nation as used in the writings of Machiavelli about 
reason of state. Together with the constant diplomatic dialogue between 
Italian rulers, their eagerness to acquire and consolidate power generated an 
anti-hegemonical concern leading to the rise of a conscious balance of power 
mechanism. The great concentration of power in the hands of a few princes, 
the artistic and scientific advances that characterised the Italian cities, and 
their societies’ human and not God-centred morality, all appealed to 
European kings, nobility and bourgeoisie. In the second half of the fifteenth 
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century, these ideas started to hold sway in Europe, especially in courts and 
universities (Watson, 1992: 153-164). 
The balance of power and the establishment of diplomatic 
representations are two patterns of behaviour that illustrate the rise of the 
norm of state sovereignty.27 The exact origins of the balance of power are 
disputed. Hjorth (2007: 598-599) identifies some ambiguity in ES regarding 
this matter, namely in the work of Butterfield (1966) and Wight (1973). 
According to Hjorth, this ambiguity derives from the existence, particularly 
in Wight, of numerous definitions of the balance of power. However, what 
Wight aimed to do was to show that although there were a number of 
definitions of balance of power in history, it is possible to identify an essential 
core to it that does not vary much across time, a point which Hjorth ends up 
agreeing with. The term ‘balance of power’ was first used by Bernardo 
Rucellai in De Bello Italico Commentarius (written between 1495 and 1509) 
(Wight, 1973: 86-88). It was transported to international politics by Lorenzo 
de Medici, the ruler of Florence, who decided that his city could be 
endangered in case one of the various powers in Italy obtained a status of 
hegemon (Butterfield, 1966: 136). 
Regarding the question of when did the balance of power became a 
‘conscious and continuous policy’ (Stern, 2000: 77-78), Wight (1973: 86) 
noted that ‘the system of the balance of power provides a striking example of 
the priority of practice to theory in politics.’ He argued that ‘statesmen were 
operating it before they and their diplomats had formulated the rules, and still 
longer before thinkers had formulated the concepts for analysing and 
describing the rules.’ According to Wight, the balance of power presupposes 
the existence of: (1) sovereign states ‘that could effectively and continuously 
organise their human and territorial resources’; (2) a diplomatic system that 
provided statesmen with the necessary information for the operation of the 
system; and (3) a ‘sufficient sense of common interest among them.’ It was in 
fourteenth-century Italy that those three features can first be observed. 
The establishment of resident ambassadors was in the sixteenth 
century organised as a profession across Europe, framed by a number legal 
procedures (Bull, 1977: 30), including the ‘legally sacrosanct status of the 
diplomat and his embassy’ (Stern, 2000: 77). In this regard, Alberico Gentili 
(1552-1608) played an important part in the systematisation of the rules that 
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ought to govern the functioning of embassies (Nussbaum, 1961: 94). The 
practice itself did not emerge in post-Medieval Europe. In Medieval Europe, 
the role of the diplomat was performed essentially by representatives/agents 
of the Church (Jackson, 2007: 35). However, there were substantial 
differences between the sixteenth century professionalisation of the practice 
all over Europe, which included French as the language of diplomacy, and 
the ‘old diplomacy’ of the Middle Ages that was, as Neumann (2003: 363) 
puts it, ‘incidental, bilateral, secretive, and hierarchical.’ 
Related with the influence of the Italian Renaissance, the other 
fundamental development to comprehend the transformation ‘from regnum to 
stato and from ecclesium to national churches’ was the Protestant 
Reformation, first felt in Germany and then across north-western Europe. 
This was not only a struggle for religious freedom by Protestants against the 
Catholics’ religious orthodoxy. As expressed by the political theology of 
Martin Luther, it was also a quest for political authority over religious one in 
an attempt to reject foreign authority and interference, namely the pope’s. A 
foremost example is the English Statute of Appeals (1534), which followed 
King Henry VIII demand from parliament of an Act of Supremacy which he 
obtained. It gave the rulers of England authority over the Church of England 
and the same time immunity from ‘foreign law’ and ‘foreign authorities’. 
Another example is the Peace of Augsburg (1555), where the principle cujus 
region, ejus religio was subscribed to by both German Lutherans and 
Catholics, under the agreement that religion could no longer be used as a 
valid justification for military intervention. The king was gradually becoming 
the all-powerful figure, the head of the national church, a process that also 
took place, although less ostensibly, in Catholic states. The sixteenth century 
also witnessed the growth of national conscience, as land and the properties 
of the church started to be converted into state property, and the population 
into subjects of the king. It was also then that kings started to monopolise the 
power and resources to make war (Jackson, 2007: 2, 6, 38-51). This latter 
aspect, as Tilly’s (1990) tour de force illustrates, was key in the formation of 
states in Europe, particularly since the sixteenth century, although such 
process was far from homogenous across Europe. 
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For decades and to most IR scholars, Westphalia was seen as the 
defining moment of the European system of sovereign states. According to 
this perspective, the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück of 1648 marked the 
definitive break from the Church’s hierarchy and centrality in Europe’s 
political life, and the crucial shift towards an international law of territorially 
separate states (De Carvalho et al, 2011: 739).28 In this logic, Westphalia is 
 
also associated with the advent of modernity, namely the rise of the modern 
Europe and of the modern state (Keene, 2002: 15). There is also a view of 
Westphalia not as much as a defining moment of a new system, but as a 
‘convenient reference point’ to be mentioned when talking about the modern 
states system (Stern, 2000: 74). An example is Sorensen (1999: 591), who 
notes that ‘there was no momentous change from one day to the next in 
1648’, but argues that ‘it is justified to look at 1648 as a crucial point in the 
transition from feudal to modern authority.’ Building on the work of historians, 
IR scholarship has in recent years challenged the Westphalian moment as a 
myth (e.g. Krasner, 1995; 1999; Osiander, 2001). 
A valuable overview of the literature that challenges Westphalia as 
the defining of the emergence of an international society of sovereign states 
is provided by De Carvalho et al (2011: 738-745). A closer analysis of the 
text of the two treaties reveals that, instead of constituting the birth of state 
sovereignty, ‘Westphalia actually represents a retreat, even if only temporary, 
from an idea that rulers did have sovereignty over their territories.’ In 
Westphalia there was no reference to the principle cuius regio, eius religio 
(De Carvalho et al, 2011: 738-745). In the Treaty of Munster (1648) there is 
reference to the free exercise of religion by the people for the sake ‘of 
tranquillity of Empire.’ This reference, as Grew (2000: 290) observes, is a 
concern to protect religious minorities. The treaty also stated that ‘the most 
Christian King shall … be obliged to preserve in all and every one of these 
Countries the Catholic Religion, as maintained under the Princes of Austria, 
and to abolish all Innovations crept in during the War.’ 
The permission of states to pursue an autonomous foreign policy 
and enter in alliances was not a new development, and was restricted in 
Westphalia to those political entities that belonged to the Holly Roman 
Empire. Moreover, the view that the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) was
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fought between the enthusiasts of a hierarchical order (the Holy Roman 
Emperor and the Spanish Catholic King) and those sovereign states aiming 
to counter it (France, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands), as the best 
way to define the nature of this conflict has been increasingly challenged. 
Instead, the declining position of the Habsburg Empire led those who aimed 
to take advantage of that fact, as was the case of the interventions of 
Denmark, Sweden and France, to confront those who feared for its collapse 
and thus came to its defence (De Carvalho et al, 2011: 738-745). As 
Osiander (2001: 252-262) shows, the Habsburgs were not a threat to the 
emerging states outside the empire. As he puts it, ‘none of the actors fighting 
the Habsburgs went to war for defensive purposes.’ It was a war of 
aggrandizement by the French, Swedish, and Danish. 
Seeing Westphalia in the perspective of those who lived through the 
events reinforces the idea that, insofar as the goals of political and religious 
emancipation from the pope and the Holy Roman emperor’s hierarchical 
authority are concerned, this moment represents more of a step back than a 
step forward. The treaties themselves did not confirm the independence of 
the two non-German signatories (French and Sweden). This is only natural 
given that their independence was never at stake. Instead, the main focus of 
both treaties was, as Osiander (2001: 266) explains, ‘the internal affairs of 
the Holy Roman Empire.’ Westphalia confirmed the existence of the empire 
composed by princes and cities that were entitled to vote on the imperial 
Reichstag, with the emperor as their hierarchical superior (Osiander, 2001: 
260, 267-270).  Both treaties saluted the Christian Republic in their 
preambles, and spoke of the congress as the ‘senate of the Christian world’ 
(Jackson, 2007: 50-51). Those who negotiated and provided comments to 
the Peace of Westphalia did not think of the formal introduction or 
consolidation of a norm of sovereign equality. As Stirk (2011: 3, 6) notes, 
‘they saw the peace as restorative not innovative. The concept of sovereignty 
in something like its modern form was available but not dominant and the 
notion of sovereign equality, so far as it was recognised at all, was explicitly 
rejected.’ While by this time the references to the balance of power were 
widespread in Europe (Butterfield, 1966: 139), the balance of power was only 
implicitly present as an objective in Westphalia (Bull, 1977: 31). 
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Far from a moment of radical transformation, the treaties of 
Westphalia ought to be understood as one more episode within a larger 
complex process, with advances and setbacks, towards the norm of state 
sovereignty. This picture certainly appeals for a much more nuanced 
understanding of the emergence of state sovereignty as a gradual process, 
driven by political, moral, religious, economic, and military developments that 
incrementally eroded the centrality of the church and of the feudal order in 
Europe. While many scholars still stick with the 1648 moment, others trace it 
back to the Council of Constance (1414-1418), or even further back to the 
eighth or tenth centuries, while others argue that this happened essentially in 
the eighteenth century (De Carvalho et al, 2011: 738-745). It should be noted 
that those who trace the idea and principle of state sovereignty back to the 
eight, tenth, or fifteenth centuries talk essentially about the origins of the idea, 
and do not refer to the time when this idea became a widespread, 
established practice of states. As Jackson (2007: 40) puts it, a number of 
episodes in the Medieval Ages ‘anticipated the emergence of state 
sovereignty.’ These included the efforts of church councils to place limits to 
the unchecked power of the papacy and the settling of disputes, through 
bilateral agreements known as ‘concordats’, between national monarchies 
and the papacy. Some thinkers were early advocates of the doctrine of state 
sovereignty (e.g. Marsiglio of Padua, who lived in the late thirteen/early 
fourteenth century), who rivalled with cosmopolitan thinkers who called for 
the universalisation of monarchy to pacify the world (e.g. Dante Alighieri). 
Overall, these disputes reflected the respublica Cristiana’s defining feature, 
i.e. its dualistic  arrangement of authority, whereby popes and emperors, 
claiming to be the rightful representatives of God on earth, were constantly 
involved in feuds and quarrels (Jackson, 2007: 36-37, 40-41). 
Contrary to what others have argued (e.g. Keene, 2002: 21-22), 
there is not exactly a unified position in the ES regarding the importance of 
Westphalia. For example, while the aim of Buzan and Little’s (2002) historical 
study is to challenge the idea that the history of the present international 
system starts in Westphalia, Watson (1992: 186) sticks with the 1648 
moment. Yet those ES authors that have focused in more depth on the 
nature of state sovereignty present a rather nuanced view of the emergence 
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of European international society. This is the case not only with Jackson’s 
(2007) history of the idea of sovereignty, but also in Bull’s work (1977; 1984). 
‘In the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries’, as Bull described in 
The Anarchical Society (1977: 26), ‘the universal political organisation of 
Western Christendom was still in process of disintegration.’ Bull (1984b) 
referred to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as the ‘formative period’ 
of international society. Far from seeing Westphalia as the definitive break 
between politics and religion, he also highlighted the continuous importance 
of Christianity in providing a sense of unity. 
Bull (1977: 26-28, 31) showed how the thinkers of this period were 
intellectually divided. Political philosophers such as Machiavelli, Bacon, and 
Hobbes, ‘saw the emerging states as confronting one another in the social 
and moral vacuum left by the receding respublica Christiana’. The pro- 
Papacy and imperial writers struggled to give a new lease of life to the 
universal authority of the Church. In particular, they attempted to use the 
doctrine of a natural law of nations to perpetuate the idea of an imperius 
mundi under the Church’s realm. Then a group of thinkers which included 
Grotius, as well as Vitoria, Suárez, Gentili, and Pufendorf, developed the 
notion that there was a connection between all nations through the doctrine 
of a natural jus gentium.29 While Bodin’s conceptualisation of sovereignty in 
 
Six Livres de la Republique (1576) would only become influential later on, the 
likes of Vitoria, Suárez, Gentili, Grotius, and Pufendorf developed the 
foundations of what would be called ‘international law’. Yet, as Bull rightly 
notes, ‘their purpose was not to ground the law of nations primarily in the 
practice of states. Instead, the philosophical (natural law) and theological 
(divine law) basis of their work occupied a key place in their law of nations’ 
conception.’ During this formative period there were still no defined criteria, 
amidst a variety of political units in Europe (e.g. principes, regni, gentes, 
respublicae), about who the members of international society were. Despite 
the existence of numerous treaties (e.g. the bodies of maritime and 
mercantile law), natural law prevailed ‘in defining the source of the rules by 
which Christian princes and communities were bound’ (Bull, 1977: 28-30). 
From this follows that Westphalia was not a decisive moment when it 
comes to the emergence of the sovereign state. Moreover, the point made by 
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Clapham (1999) that the treaties of Westphalia generated a normative 
division of the world between European states and ‘much of the rest of world’ 
is also incorrect. As chapter 5 will show, in the international society of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, positivism – regardless of whom one 
considers to be the responsible for its emergence – was still not the dominant 
doctrine in international law. 
 
 
4.3 Civility, Savagery, and the Protestant Expansion 
 
 
 
At least until the third quarter of the sixteenth century, Spain was Europe’s 
imperial hegemon. It possessed an unrivalled navy, and was by far Europe’s 
richest and militarily most powerful state. Portugal could hardly challenge 
Spain’s supremacy (there was even a union of the two crowns in 1580-1581); 
France, at least in the continent, had the potential to become a fearful rival, 
but was still recovering from the disruption of the so-called Wars of Religion; 
and England was at the time a medium power. A factor that contributed 
enormously to this supremacy was that among the Great Powers of the old 
continent, Spain was the only one largely spared by confessional splits. As 
Israel (1997: xiv-xvi, xxi-xxii) explains, this ‘religious uniformity’ provided the 
Spanish Kings with a ‘strong sense of allegiance and purpose’ for their 
overseas imperialism. However, Spain’s hegemonic position would be 
increasingly challenged. The contest to the Catholic kings’ imperial 
enterprises came chiefly from Dutch and English expansionism, which 
rejected outright any sort of Papal jurisdiction over their colonial objectives 
(Williams, 1990: 119). 
The Dutch challenge to the Spanish overseas empire was part and 
parcel of the Spanish War of Succession. In 1581, the confederation of the 
Seven United Provinces of the Free Netherlands emancipated from Spanish 
rule. Initially, the Dutch overseas expansion assumed almost a form of 
Calvinist crusade against the hegemony of the Christian princes, 
accompanied by the internal elimination of Roman Catholicism. Yet the 
prominence of trade (even with Roman Catholics) and the idea of free trade, 
gradually took over the Dutch expansionist drive. Nevertheless, during most 
of the seventeenth century the Dutch waged wars against their commercial 
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rivals: Spain, Portugal, England, and France.30 The confederative nature of 
the United Provinces meant that each of the provinces was very fond of its 
own rights and liberties, and there were great rivalries between the towns 
and provinces. Likewise, there was no centralised government taking 
decisions. The Calvinist oligarchies were the main supporters of the effort to 
keep a strong and united military and navy. Providing also some sense of 
unity to this complex political picture was the House of Orange (Amsterdam), 
mainly through its financial power (Plumb, 1965: xx-xxii). 
In its expansion towards the East Indies and the Americas, the Dutch 
would look at the native inhabitants of the Americas, or those of the islands 
that today form Indonesia, with much of the same contempt than the Spanish 
and Portuguese did. They described them as barbarians and infields, as well 
as savages. A number of Dutch individuals, however, such as Steven van der 
Hegen and Laurens Reael in the Moluccas, or Dr. Jacob Bontius at Batavia, 
rejected the European views of Asians as ‘blind heathen,’ ‘treacherous 
Moors’, and ‘feckless barbarians.’ Admiral Piet Heyn (1577-1629), who 
served both in the East and West Indies, challenged their countrymen ‘to see 
ourselves as others see us’, and lamented the fact that most indigenous 
peoples ‘feel very deeply the wrong that is done them, and this is why they 
become even wilder and more savage than they already are’ (Boxer, 1965: 
231). 
It is important to reflect on the presence of the concept of savages in 
the vocabulary and moral views of the Dutch seamen and colonisers in the 
sixteenth century. The concept ‘savage’, from the latin word silva (referring to 
a wood), was used even before the sixteenth century to describe men who 
lived in German forests outside of what was considered organised society. 
The high incidence of the concept is illustrated by the various associations it 
generated, including the noble savage/le bon sauvauge, the figure of the man 
free from the ills of organised society. The concepts of barbarian and savage 
were subject of analysis in the writings of Michel de Montaigne’s (1533- 
1592), a prominent French Renaissance thinker, namely in his essays ‘On 
Cannibals’ and ‘On the Custom of Wearing Clothes’, published in French 
(1580) and English (1603). In the former essay, Montaigne reflected on the 
concepts of barbarians and savages upon his encounter, roughly eighteen 
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years earlier, with a few native inhabitants of the Americas that had been 
brought to France. He wrote: ‘I do not believe… that there is anything 
barbarous or savage about them, except that we all call barbarous anything 
that is contrary to our own habits’ (Salter, 2002: 19-22). This view of 
tolerance expressed by Montagne, who used the image of the savage as 
morally superior to the civilised man and to criticise French society (Muthu, 
2003: 14-23), was not shared by most of his countrymen or other Europeans. 
Instead, fear, disdain, or scorn dominated the European views of those called 
savages. In the views or minds of most Europeans, the ‘ignoble savage’ 
violated, as Sheehan (1980: 37) illustrates, ‘all the limitations imposed on 
ordinary men by social usage. Violence, treachery, brutality, and destruction 
were the foundations of savage existence.’ 
The concept of savages was used interchangeably with barbarians 
from the sixteenth until the eighteenth century in the context of European 
imperialism (Salter, 2002: 19-20). Both concepts necessarily imply a sense of 
ethnocentric superiority against which the barbarians/savages are judged, as 
well as a sense of fear regarding the threat they represented to those that 
see them as such. Yet the emergence of the concept of savages cannot be 
understood without acknowledging the emergence of the concept of civilité, 
which existed in France at least since the sixteenth century. It had a variety 
of social meanings, depending also on which social groups used it. For 
example, civilité came to mean what was considered proper behaviour for 
children, based on the work of Erasmus on how to bring up children 
according to certain moral standards. In other instances, it defined proper 
behaviour within nobility. In essence, as Richter (1995: 104) explains, civilité 
was mainly associated with social order, as part of ‘an effort to suppress 
spontaneity and disorder, to provide a clear scheme of the existing political 
and social hierarchies, and to uproot the violence which was threatening the 
continued existence of the social order, and the space it provided for its 
members.’ Civilité was always connoted with social order and proper 
behaviour, and by definition in contrast to savagery (Richter, 1995: 102-107). 
In this regard, Elias (1994) major historical-sociological work traces back the 
relation between social manners and etiquette and the idea of civility to the 
late  Middle-Ages.  As  Salter  (2002:  20)  notes,  for  most  Europeans,  ‘the 
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“savage” lived without the benefit of society and European “civility”’. Civility 
worked as an assurance, a protection that defended human beings from the 
worst, natural inclinations of man (Sheehan, 1980: 63). Illustrative enough, 
Hobbes’s work is filled with references to ‘civil law’, ‘civil state’, ‘civil society’, 
and the ‘enforcement of civil order’ (Williams, 2005: 31-41). In Hobbes, the 
virtues of civility such as peace, the arts, or agriculture contrasted with the 
savagery of the state of nature (Tuck, 1999: 150). 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the concept of barbarians 
already informed the Christian colonisation of the New World and their views 
of the Indians. The concept of barbarians, however, was often used 
interchangeably with infidels and pagans, denoting first and foremost that the 
political communities formed by these peoples were defective because they 
were not Christian. It is thus possible to see a gradual change in the context 
of the Protestant expansion, whereby the mission or the duty of Europeans 
was increasingly less about bringing, i.e. imposing, their religion on barbarian 
peoples, and instead about exporting European civilised values, manners, 
and customs to the lands of barbarian and savage peoples. The fact that 
Christian religion progressively ceased to be the measure of all things in 
international society is probably not alien to this growing emphasis on the 
mission to civilise in detriment of the right and duty to Christianise. 
This gradual shift from the duty to Christianise to the mission to 
civilise can also be verified in the Catholic expansion. In the context of the 
establishment of the first trading company in Canada in 1627, the French 
King Louis XIII proclaimed the will ‘to continue the same desire of the 
deceased Henry the Great, his father of glorious memory’ to: 
 
Discover in those lands and countries of New France, called 
Canada, some habitation capable of sustaining colonies, for the 
purpose of attempting, with divine assistance, to bring the peoples 
who inhabit them to the knowledge of the true God, to civilise them 
and to instruct them in the faith and Apostolic, Catholic and 
Roman Religion (in Pagden, 1995: 34). 
 
 
To impose ‘the civil life’ and to Christianise were presented by King Louis XIII 
as analogous goals. Yet, a few decades later, Charles Rochefort in his 
Histoire naturelle et morale des Iles Antilles de L’Amerique (1665) wrote that 
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the single purpose of the French colonies was to civilise and guarantee ‘the 
edification and instruction of the poor barbarians’ (Pagden, 1995: 35). 
As mentioned above, the Dutch expansionism would constitute a 
challenge to the Catholic overseas empires. The United Provinces’ empire 
would extent from the Caribbean to the islands of Indonesia, and Amsterdam, 
replaced Antwerp as the commercial capital of Europe. A particular feature of 
the Dutch seaborne trade was the cooperative enterprise known as the 
rederij. These were capital ventures by which a group of people that often 
included wealthy merchants as much as the skippers/masters of the vessels 
would invest in buying, owning, building, or freighting a ship as well as its 
cargo. These ventures contributed decisively for the expansion of Dutch 
trade beyond the Mediterranean, the Levant, and the south Atlantic and 
towards the Indian Ocean and the spice-trade. The pioneering rederij project 
was formed in March 1594, when nine merchants founded the Company of 
Far Lands in Amsterdam, with the purpose of sending two fleets to explore 
the spice-trade in the islands that today form the archipelago of Indonesia. 
The rederij proliferated from here onwards, to the point that in 1601 sixty-five 
ships integrated into fourteen fleets left to the East Indies. The fact that they 
were organised on a regional/municipal basis led to intense competition 
between these companies (Boxer, 1965: 3-6, 21-24). 
In the face of the scenario of competition between the various 
companies, in 1598 the States-General of the United Provinces suggested 
that the various companies should unite. In 20 March 1602 the companies 
did unite under one monopolistic corporation named the United Netherlands 
Chartered East India Company (Boxer, 1965: 24). This company became a 
powerful enterprise that would only cease to exist when it was absorbed by 
the Dutch state in 1799 (Ward, 2009: 9). The company was given a 
monopoly of Dutch trade and navigation east of the Cape of Good Hope and 
west of the straits of Magellan for the following twenty-one years. The charter 
of the company empowered the Heereen XVII (the company’s governing 
body) with the right to conclude treaties of peace and alliance, to wage war 
for defensive purposes, and to build ‘fortresses and strongholds.’ According 
to the charter, the company could not wage war against the interests of other 
European  powers  in  the  Indian  Ocean  (Boxer,  1965:  24).  However,  as 
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apologists of free trade, the Dutch rejected the idea of a trade monopoly of 
any kind, as they rejected any sort of papal jurisdiction over the lands of seas 
of the East Indies. Thus, and given that the United Provinces were constantly 
at war with Portugal, the Dutch East India Company was entitled to conquer 
the Portuguese positions in the Indian Ocean while that status of war 
remained (Ward, 2009: 53). Nevertheless, this bellicose character, even if 
‘defensive’ in principle, did not please a number of leading investors, who 
sold their shares. In 4 December 1608, they declared that ‘they as merchants 
had themselves organized those companies solely for the purpose of 
honourably engaging in peaceful and friendly trade, and not to indulge in any 
hostilities or aggressive actions’ (Boxer, 1965: 24). 
Despite the concern of the States-General to regulate the actions of 
the company, its charter entitled the company to pass and enforce its own 
laws. In the 1620s the Heereen XVII changed the charter to meet the 
company’s quick establishment of imperial outposts. As (Ward, 2009: 54-59) 
explains, the charter recognised three categories of territorial and commercial 
claims: (a) ‘rule by conquest’, whereby the company would exercise direct 
territorial sovereignty (e.g. Banda islands and Batavia); (b) ‘authority and 
trade by monopoly contracts’ (e.g. Ambon and Ternate); and (c) ‘trade 
through treaties signed with Asia rulers’. This system of rule was formalised 
in 1650, and would be supervised by the governor-general and the Council of 
the Indies in Batavia. In this regard, Boxer (1965: 93-94) notes that the first 
two categories expanded considerably after 1650. 
The Dutch East India Company, as Ward (2009: 6-18, 54-59) 
demonstrates, established an imperial, commercial, and legal network that 
operated separately from the laws of the United Provinces. This network that 
extended across the Indian Ocean and into the Pacific Ocean included forts, 
factories, and structures of governance that applied civil and criminal law in 
territories it possessed. The company controlled the population under its rule, 
and assigned clear categories in terms of legal and social status to the local 
inhabitants. For the sake of profit and to address labour shortages, the 
company established maritime links of forced migrants and slaves. To 
maintain order within its territories and defend them from other Europeans 
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and non-European enemies, it hired foreign mercenaries in huge numbers 
(Boxer, 1965: 90).31 
At the same time that they offered all flexibility needed in the 
company’s charter, the Herein XVII continued to emphasise the need for 
restraint, and peaceful trade rather than conquest. They not always opposed 
the use of force, but only in cases where that option could prove too 
expensive, or in situations when it was too difficult to secure the company’s 
trading interests. In 1644, in the aftermath of the campaigns of Malacca and 
Ceylon and in the face of a number of casualties faced by the company, the 
Delft Chamber warned that ‘a merchant would do better honourable to 
increase his talent and send rich cargoes from Asia to the Netherlands, 
instead of carrying out costly territorial conquests, which are more suitable for 
crowned heads and mighty monarchs than for merchants greedy of gain.’ In 
a set of instructions of 1650, the Herein XVII condemned the company’s use 
of force in ‘the neutral places belonging to free nations, where we find the 
laws and do not have to bring them.’ It reminded the company’s workers that 
the inhabitants of Amboina had to be treated with fairness and consideration. 
It mentioned that the natives of Formosa, ‘having always been a free people, 
must be kept loyal to the Company by being well treated, without those poor 
people being too heavily taxed.’ The essential idea was that the company 
could cultivate friendly ties with the most powerful Asian rulers (e.g. the 
Shogun of Japan and the Shah of Persia), a situation that could then be 
explored by the company for its own advantage (Boxer, 1965: 95-97). 
The tone of the colonists’ reactions was usually the same. Antonio 
van Diemen, an important colonial governor, and his council highlighted the 
differences between this principle to avoid territorial conquests and the 
practical needs of empire. As they put it, ‘we are taught by daily experience 
that the Company’s trade in Asia cannot subsist without territorial conquests.’ 
The founder of Batavia, Kan Pietersz Coen, had adopted a similar position 
thirty years earlier, when he addressed the Hereen XVII: ‘Your Honours 
should know by experience that trade in Asia must be driven and maintained 
under the protection and favour of Your Honours’ own weapons, and that the 
weapons must be paid for by the profits from the trade; so that we cannot 
carry on trade without war nor war without trade.’ In a report of 1655, the 
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future Governor-General of the company, warned that these ‘Christian 
maxims’ of restraint and respect carried by the 1650 instructions were being 
(mis)interpreted by the hostile Asian powers as a sign of weakness. The 
words of the Director-General at Batavia reacting to a written order from the 
Heeren XVII are clear in this regard: ‘The Directors in the fatherland decide 
matters, as it seems best to them there; but we do here, what seems best 
and most advisable to us.’ As Boxer (1965: 95-97) rightly notes, this was 
another version of the Spanish colonisers’ ‘I obey but do not comply’ maxim. 
The Dutch West India Company, modelled on its eastern counterpart, 
received its charter from the States-General on 3 June 1621. It was given a 
monopoly of all Dutch trade and navigation with America and West Africa. 
While in the case of eastern company its role regarding war was initially 
limited, that of the western company was outwardly offensive. It could wage 
war against all Portuguese and Spanish positions, was authorised to wage 
war and establish peace with indigenous political communities, and maintain 
naval and military forces as well as exercise judiciary and administrative 
functions in those regions. Although created with the aim of challenging the 
Spanish dominium in the Americas, particularly the control of Mexican and 
Peruvian silver, the Spanish proved to be a hard match. Thus, in the light of 
what the East India Company did, the West India Company ended up 
focusing the majority of its efforts against Portuguese possessions in Brazil 
and the west coast of Africa (Boxer, 1965: 24-28). This company was much 
more active regarding the slave trade that the Dutch East India Company. In 
fact, the Dutch imperial system in the Atlantic, like those of other European 
empires, was essentially fuelled by the slave trade and slave work (Ward, 
2009: 22-23). 
Contrary to the outwardly religious Portuguese and Spanish imperial 
ideology, religion soon ceased to be at the forefront of the Dutch’s legal or 
legitimating arguments for their expansion. As Ward (2009: 35-36) notes, ‘it is 
trade and profit rather than religion and evangelisation that ought to be seen 
as the main driving force of Dutch expansionism.’ Yet Ward’s assertion that 
‘the Company was practically indifferent to proselytising’ seems misleading. 
A number of leading Protestant reformers (Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli) did 
not bother much with the possibility of spreading Protestantism outside
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Europe, as their main concern were the European religious disputes. Thus, it 
is not surprising that in their initial stages both the Dutch West India and East 
India companies were not concerned with evangelisation. The original 
charters of the two companies did not make reference to any obligation to 
spread faith. However, both companies ended up assuming explicitly those 
obligations among ‘benighted Papists’, i.e. Catholics, and the ‘blind Heathen’, 
i.e. Muslims. As an example, during the two centuries of the East India 
Company’s existence, their directors sent roughly 1,000 Calvinist predikanten 
(preachers) to the East Indies, as well as several thousand lay-readers and 
schoolmasters (Boxer, 1965: 113-114, 132-152). 
The other great Protestant challenge to the Spanish overseas 
supremacy came from England.32 As was the case with the United Provinces, 
the early English expansion under Queen Elizabeth I (r.1558-1603) can be 
seen almost as a protestant crusade against Catholic Spain (Williams, 1990: 
193). The passivity of the English state regarding overseas matters begun to 
be addressed when a few influential Protestant figures, including Sir Francis 
Walsingham, Secretary of State to Queen Elizabeth and head of intelligence, 
alerted to the major strategic and material advantages that the Spanish had 
gain with their overseas expansion (Canny, 1998: 3). In the document titled 
‘A Discourse Concerning Western Planting’ (1584), Richard Hakluyt, one of 
the foremost propagandists for English expansion, attempted to convince 
Queen Elizabeth to support colonisation plans. He argued that ‘no greater 
glory can be handed down than to conquer the barbarian, to recall the 
savage and the pagan to civility, to draw the ignorant within the orbit of 
reason’ (Pagden, 1998: 35). This important document, which became a 
reference for the movement in support of expansion, constituted an outright 
rejection of religious justifications for imperialism and colonialism (Tuck, 
1999: 110). As Williams (1990: 136) explains, for the English Protestants, it 
was Ireland that served as a training ground for the practice of colonising and 
civilising techniques among savage peoples. Nevertheless, the English poet 
Edmund Spencer, in A View of the Present State of Ireland (1596), still called 
for the destruction of the Gaellic order and the construction by English 
settlers of a colony based on civil life and Protestant faith (Ohlmeyer, 1998: 
137). 
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As with the United Provinces, there was soon a shift from the spread 
of protestant faith to colonisation essentially as a commercial enterprise. This 
happened under the realm of the Scottish King James I, who signed a peace 
treaty with Spain in 1604. The James-town venture of the Virginia Company, 
England’s first New World colony, was initially established (1607) for the sake 
of evangelisation, and to ‘bring the infidels and savages living in these parts 
to humane civility and to a settled and quite government’, as its Charter 
stated in 1609 (Pagden, 1995: 35). Yet the commercial character of the 
enterprise, driven by profit and economic efficiency, eventually prevailed over 
religious aims (Williams, 1990: 133-136). In the words of Robert Johnson, a 
promoter of the Virginia Company, ‘all the States of Europe have been 
asleep so long that for a hundred years and more the… riches of the East 
and West should run… but into one coffer.’ As Sheehan (1980: 88-182) 
illustrates, the image of the savage was central in the Virginia Company 
settlers’ views of the native inhabitants of the New World. The savage status 
of the inhabitants of North America represented both an opportunity and a 
threat to the civility of the Englishmen. Although the English colonisers view 
themselves as men of commerce and agriculture, and not conquerors, their 
actions were questioned by some on moral grounds, even if that did very little 
for their treatment of the native savages. In A Good Speed to Virginia (1609), 
Robert Gray asked ‘by what right or warrant we can enter into the land of 
these Savages, take away their rightful inheritance from them, and plant 
ourselves in their place, being unwronged or unprovoked by them’ (Pagden, 
1998: 34-37). 
 
 
4.4 Empire, War, and Grotius Theory of Morality 
 
 
 
Born in 1583 to a Dutch Calvinist family, Grotius developed precociously a 
number of intellectual interests such as Latin poetry, mathematics, law, and 
theology. This diversity of interests was reflected on the variety of jobs and 
projects he took on along his career, which included diplomacy; his 
appointment as Advocate-Fiscal or Attorney General of the provinces of 
Holland, Zeeland, and Friesland; or the composition of a religious tragedy 
titled  Christ’s  Passion,  certainly  not  alien  to  the  fact  that  he  was  often 
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absorbed by political-theological problems, including the idea of reunion of 
the Christian churches. His most famous book is De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On 
the Law of War and Peace, 1625), translated at the time to French, German, 
Swedish and Spanish (Nussbaum, 1961: 102-105). Although he is usually 
described as a jurist, he had no formal legal training (Tuck, 1999: 78). 
Grotius first became directly involved with the matter of the law of 
nations when he was asked by the Dutch East India Company to provide his 
legal opinion in relation to an incident regarding their capture, near Malacca, 
of a Portuguese ship, the Santa Catarina. Portugal was then under the 
domination of the Spanish, who were at the time at war with the Dutch. After 
its capture, the ship was carried back to the Netherlands and its very 
expensive cargo was sold. The stockholders of the company opposed the 
action under the argument that Christians ought not to wage war. Grotius’ 
study on the matter ended up vindicating the action of the company. This 
legal opinion would later be published under the title Mare Liberum (The Free 
Seas, 1609) (Finch, 1950: xiii-xv). As noted by Brown et al (2002: 313), this 
study was more than a mere legal opinion. It was a broader reflection on the 
issues of self-preservation, self-defence, and just war by public and private 
entities. 
The argument that Grotius’ conception of a law of nations contributed 
decisively to the rise of an unequal, extra-European order is based on two 
assumptions. First, his theory on public authority and the divisibility of 
sovereign prerogatives envisioned the possibility of separating sovereignty 
across different institutions within the same political community. 
Internationally, in Keene’s interpretation, this meant that a state could hold 
sovereign prerogatives that originally belonged to another state, and exercise 
the corresponding powers on its behalf. Keene (2002: 44) explains that 
Grotius asserted that ‘in principle sovereignty is indivisible’, but then went on 
to show that ‘in both theory and practice it is often divided.’ The second 
aspect of Grotius’ theory respects his take on private law and the rights of 
individuals. According to Keene (2002: 3-4), in Grotius’ conception ‘under 
certain conditions individuals have a right in the law of nations to appropriate 
unoccupied lands; furthermore, if no established political authority acts to 
protect their rights, the individuals themselves may conduct a “private war” in 
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their defence and would be justified by the law of nations in so doing.’ These 
two ideas became, according to this logic, mirrored in the European imperial 
and colonial practices. 
Keene (2002: 6) does not think Grotius intentionally developed this 
dual vision of order to serve the projects of European empires. As he notes, 
Grotius thought about the international legal order in universal but ‘broadly 
non-discriminatory terms.’ In Keene’s view, while ‘Grotius himself can hardly 
be assigned all the responsibility for the different ways in which international 
order developed within and beyond Europe after the seventeenth century,’ he 
nevertheless ‘provided an account of the law of nations that was used by 
Europeans to legitimise their behaviour towards non-European peoples.’ 
Therefore, Keene sees Grotius’ law of nations conception as the crucial 
framework that enabled Europeans to construct a view of a world separated 
between civilised and uncivilised nations. Crucially in Keene’s (2002: 79) 
account, this started to happen in the late seventeenth century, i.e. a post- 
Grotian development. In the logic of his argument, Europeans did not hold 
ethnocentric or non-discriminatory views of the non-Europeans they 
encountered until the late seventeenth century. Up to then, Keene argues 
that ‘Europeans confronted indigenous rulers on terms of parity, or even, on 
occasion, inferiority’, a point based exclusively Alexandrowicz’s (1967) 
analysis of the European presence in the East Indies.33 Keene thus confers a 
relation of causality between the rise of a Grotian law of nations, and the 
Europeans discriminatory and actively aggressive views towards non- 
Europeans in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
As discussed above, however, the Protestant overseas expansion 
that originated before Grotius was already informed by the discriminatory 
concepts of barbarians and savages. Initially justified with the spread of 
Protestant religion to rival the Catholic expansion, the United Provinces and 
the English overseas imperialism soon became driven first and foremost by 
economic motives. Their views of the native inhabitants encountered as 
barbarians and savages justified their enslavement and the appropriation of 
their lands, and it also implied a sense of moral duty to bring European 
civility, customs, and manners to the lands of barbarian and savage peoples. 
In the face of this, Grotius’ natural law of nations was a reaction to an existing 
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reality that concerned him. His work was not a cause behind European’s 
discriminatory and actively aggressive views towards non-Europeans. 
Moreover, the argument that Europeans legitimised their actions based on 
Grotius’ conception seems misplaced. 
There are a few conflicting positions in the literature about where to 
situate Grotius’ jus gentium conception regarding naturalism and positivism, 
as well as doctrines of subjective rights. On the one hand, Grotius is 
associated with a ‘natural conception of a law of nations, antithetical to the 
positivist tradition’ (Cutler, 1991). For Grotius, the sources of the law of 
nations were natural, divine, and human. In this perspective, the latter 
source, which includes law made by the will of nations, ‘only supported and 
did not override’ the other two (Grew, 2000: 347-350). On the other, Grotius 
is credited for breaking with natural law theory due to his emphasis on jus as 
something one possesses (e.g. Tuck, 1979: 58-81; Haakonssen, 1985). This, 
the argument goes, amounts to a subjectivisation centred on the person, 
related with a person’s moral quality. In the middle of the spectrum are those 
that see Grotius’ jus gentium conception as representing the transition from 
natural law to positivist law (e.g. Kingsbury and Roberts, 1990: 30-32; Grew, 
2000: 347-350). If legal positivists are defined as those who ‘limit 
membership in international society to sovereign states and delimit the 
boundaries of society according to the areas of state agreement’ (Cutler, 
1991: 58-59), then Grotius was surely not a positivist. In this regard, Cavallar 
(2002: 277, 306-308) argues plausibly that there was a gradual 
transformation of the tradition of natural law from the inside, whereby natural 
lawyers modified constantly their doctrines in response to an increasing 
scepticism. 
As we will discuss, Cutler seems to be correct when she argues that, 
for Grotius, the sources of the law of nations were natural, divine, and 
human. Moreover, as Milbank (2012: 1, 14) clarifies, the notion of subjective 
rights ‘as possessive individualism’ is very different from the kind of 
arguments Grotius – and Vitoria for that matter – developed in relation to 
‘active and claim rights nonetheless objectively grounded.’ Some point the 
Swiss author Emmerich de Vattel as the responsible for the definitive shift, 
while others challenge this claim by arguing that Vattel was still a
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representative of the ‘via media’ (Kingsbury and Roberts, 1990: 30-32). 
According to Grew (2000: 347-350), it is Hobbes – who was contemporary to 
Grotius – who should be considered as the father of not only individualism 
but of modern legal positivism. The influence of William of Ockham, a figure 
of the University of Oxford’s nominalist school, was central in Hobbes’s 
attack on natural law. He asserted that a legal order between states, based 
on natural foundations, was impossible due to the absence of a mechanism 
that ensured the enforcement of rules. Hobbes thus concluded that the ‘law 
of nations’ was ‘identical with the law of nature.’ It is due to this reasoning 
that Hobbes is considered the founding figure of a group called the ‘deniers 
of international law’, which also includes Spinoza. In this regard, the fact that 
the precursors of liberalism (Gray, 1995: 12) led the skeptics’ attack on the 
old tradition of natural law gives credit to the argument about the close 
connections between the development of what is called modern international 
law and liberal thought (Keene, 2009: 133). 
In developing his jus gentium conception, Grotius was influenced by 
Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), particularly when it comes to organisation and 
documentation. There is a tendency to see Gentili as belonging to the 
humanist tradition as opposed to the scholastic one (Kingsbury and 
Straumman, 2010: 3, 18). The logic behind this division is that while the 
scholastics tended to emphasise the existence of a sphere of moral and legal 
constrains ‘beyond the established polities’, the humanist tradition breaks 
with this view by combining the classical Roman tradition of reason of state 
with a renewed account of natural rights. The humanists, according to this 
dual picture, ‘reveal a marked tendency for imperialist aggrandisement’ 
(Straumann, 2010: 122). For one, Gentili’s nostalgic views of Roman 
imperialism were based on his belief that there was a very significant legal 
constraint over imperial power (Kingsbury and Straumann, 2010: 7-8; 
Richards, 2010: 27). More important, there are a number of problems with 
the division humanists-scholastics. There is never a clear border between the 
two traditions. Vitoria was himself a scholastic/theologian with an 
unquestionable humanist influence in his education and work. Like Vitoria, 
Gentili challenged the imperial claims of the Spanish and Portuguese kings, 
based on papal bulls and on a divine right to rule. In his view, natural law and 
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not divine law ought to regulate the contested high seas and the newly 
discovered territories. Gentili also rejected the Spanish right to wage war on 
the Indians under the claim of self-defense, by arguing that the Spanish 
objective was not commerce but dominium of lands that already had rightful 
owners (Straumann, 2010: 111-123). Moreover, as Malcolm (2012: 127, 145) 
shows, there is not in Gentili an absolute separation between secular and 
theological assumptions, despite his famous phrase ‘theologians, mind your 
own business’. Insofar as he was influenced by the humanist tradition, Gentili 
is best described as a ‘representative of moderate humanism’ (Lesaffer, 
2010: 218). 
Notwithstanding the influence of Gentili, the scholastics of 
Salamanca were Grotius’ main inspiration in terms of substance and method 
of argumentation. As noted in the previous chapter, Grotius quotes Vitoria 44 
times in De Juri Belli ac Pacis. Moreover, he praised the legacy of moral 
theology in his writings (Nussbaum, 1961: 102-106, 108). Like the 
scholastics, as Murphy (1982: 482) explains, Grotius ‘contemplated the 
universe as subject to the reign of jurisprudence.’ Nussbaum (1961: 108-109) 
argues that Grotius broke from the scholastics’ view of natural law as divine, 
by separating natural law from theology. The need to live in a way that is 
‘peaceful and organised according to measure of his intelligence with those 
of his own kind’ was, according to Grotius, an essential characteristic of man. 
Nevertheless, the point about Grotius’ separation of natural law from theology 
is more complex than it appears. Grotius was profoundly religious. In his 
doctrine, the moral principles of natural law would be available to those who 
men who had the capacity to distinguish what is good and altruist. These 
conceptions of what is good and what is altruist that Grotius talks about have, 
in his conception, an implicit Christian foundation. As Murphy (1982: 480) 
puts it, ‘Grotius thought to give the principles of natural law a human, as well 
as divine, authority.’ This inspiration on natural rights and natural law, 
associated with human nature but implemented by God, should not be 
surprising given the influence of the scholastics in his work. Grotius was not 
the creator of a new theory of natural rights and natural law. Instead, he 
adapted the scholastics’ theory to the world and events he witnessed 
(Tierney, 1997: 319, 342). 
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One of the flaws in Keene’s argument is that he downplays 
considerably the central influence of Vitoria in Grotius’ theory of law of 
nations. Although he recognises that Vitoria rejected the argument that being 
non-Christian was enough to justify the appropriation of property from the 
Indians, and believed that they had reason and thus were legitimate right- 
holders, he fails to consider the implications of this position in Grotius’ 
thought. Consequently, Keene does not acknowledge what it seems as clear 
as significant: the fact that Grotius’ take on the relations between Europeans 
and non-Europeans is adopted from Vitoria. In particular, this is the case with 
the ‘minimalist’ conception of natural law and natural rights that applied 
indiscriminately and impartially to the moral community of mankind (Cavallar, 
2002: 127, 150-151).34 
 
Moreover, Keene attributes the idea of a right to occupy uninhabited 
lands to Grotius, one that was appropriated by European imperial and 
colonialist projects. Yet, this was a legitimating argument already used by the 
Spanish, one that Vitoria rejected precisely because those lands belonged to 
the Indians. Thus, instead of developing a notion with which European 
Empires could appropriate non-European territories, Grotius simply asserted 
Vitoria’s point that all non-Europeans were humans that possessed reason 
and were thus rightfully entitled to property. In the De Jure Belli ac Pacis, he 
claimed that the infidels or heathens were entitled to own property based on 
their own systems of law (Kingsbury and Roberts, 1990: 43-47). Grotius 
believed Vitoria was right and thus concluded that the natives of the East 
Indies ‘enjoyed public and private ownership’, as was the case with the 
natives of the Americas. The denial of their natural rights and their right to 
property amounted to ‘an act of thievery and rapine no less that it would be if 
perpetrated against Christians’ (Cavallar, 2002: 150-151). According to 
Cavallar, in De Jure Praedae Grotius even went further than the scholastics 
of Salamanca on their rejection of any special rights of Europeans on the 
basis on the barbarians/savages’ non-Christian status, the argument of papal 
donation, and the mission to civilise. As illustrated in the beginning of this 
chapter, in De Jure Praedae, Grotius considered the civilising mission 
immoral and unjust. In the De Jure Praedae (1950: 216) he also argued that 
‘infidels cannot be divested of public or private rights of ownership merely 
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because they are infidels, whether on the ground of discovery, or in virtue of 
a papal grant, or on grounds of war.’ Likewise, in De Jure Bellic ac Pacis, he 
dismissed the civilising mission as a pretext, based on the false claim that ‘it 
is for their own good’, and argued that the true motive was greed (Cavallar, 
2002: 151). Thus, when it comes to European relations with non-Europeans, 
Grotius can hardly be classified as an apologist of European imperialist 
practices, quite the contrary. 
As opposed to Vitoria, however, Grotius was more concerned with 
war and the overseas issues between the United Provinces and Spain and 
Portugal, than with the relations between Europeans-non- 
Europeans/Christians-non-Christians (Kingsbury and Roberts, 1990, 43). To 
prevent war between Europeans and to bring order to the chaos and conflict 
of early-seventeenth century Europe can be seen as the main concerns of 
Grotius’ work (Murphy, 1982: 480). As he stated in De Juri Belli ac Pacis: 
 
 
I have had many and weighty reasons for undertaking to write 
upon this subject. Throughout the Christian world I observed a 
lack of restraint in relation to war, such as even barbarian races 
should be ashamed of; I observed that men rash to arms for slight 
causes or no cause at all, and that when arms have once been 
taken up there is no longer any respect for law, divine or human; it 
is as if, in accordance with a general decree, frenzy had openly 
been let loose for the committing of all crimes (in Cutler, 1991: 44). 
 
 
Unlike the pacifists of his time such as Erasmus, who believed that war could 
under no circumstances be in accordance with Christian precepts (Murphy, 
1982: 480), Grotius believed that war was inevitable. However, he 
distinguished between just and unjust wars, in relation to which only wars 
that were in accordance with rights of defence, recovery of property, 
enforcement of promises, and the infliction of punishment fell into the 
category of the former. Together with his notion of a jus ad bellum, he also 
reflected about just in bellum, developing principles to govern the conduct of 
war (Claire, 1991: 44-45). Book two of De Juri Belli ac Pacis is entirely 
devoted to the matter of just war. Here, he expressed concerns that the right 
of humanitarian intervention was susceptible of being abused by wrongdoers 
(Cavallar, 2002: 142). With De Juri Belli ac Pacis, Grotius aim was to touch 
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the minds and hearts of men, especially rulers. He called for the personal 
responsibility of those holding the sovereign power. He also rejected the idea 
of ‘reason of state’ as a motivation for war, and made a call for rulers to have 
in consideration not only the interests of their subjects but also those of 
humanity as a whole (Murphy, 1982: 482-483). Grotius desired peace not 
only between states but between individuals. In his view, the respect for and 
protection of others’ rights, namely property rights, was a crucial condition for 
peace. On the contrary, disputes over rights were a primary cause of war 
(Tuck, 1979: 73-74).35 
 
Again following Vitoria, as well as Gentili, but going beyond Vitoria in 
the sense of developing a much more elaborate argument, Grotius 
developed a claim for the freedom of the seas. This happened in the context 
of claims of dominium of the oceans by Spain and Portugal, based on papal 
mandate and the right of discovery, which Grotius opposed (Grew, 2000: 
257). His study titled Mare Liberum was initially aimed at the Portuguese 
claims of dominium over the Indian Ocean, but the implications of his 
argument and of the whole issue were much broader. Contrary to Grotius’ 
take on the matter was the essay Mare Clausum sive de dominio mares 
(1635) by the Englishman John Selden, hugely influential in the English 
doctrine (Nussbaum, 1961: 111).36  In this regard, it should again be noted 
 
that Grotius’ position on the issue does not precede or give rise to political 
practice, but it is actually preceded by the latter. England took over the 
leading role in the struggle for the freedom of the seas in the kingdom of 
Queen Elizabeth I (r. 1558-1603), years before Grotius wrote his first legal 
opinion on the topic (Grew, 2000: 259). 
If one uses Grotius’ main work, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, published in 
1625, to situate him chronologically in relation to the political context in the 
United Provinces and in international society more generally, it becomes 
evident that Grotius was trying to provide a moral guide for conduct based on 
his own observance of and concern with international events that both 
preceded and were contemporary to his work. This is a point that Keen 
recognises to then utterly ignore. The very turbulent times in which Grotius 
lived, not only the Protestant imperial and colonial expansion, but also the 
Thirty Years War, the violent process of Dutch independence from Spain, or 
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the overseas conflicts against Spain and Portugal (Kingsbury and Roberts, 
1990: 1), motivated him to develop a theory of morality that could appeal not 
only to rulers but to all entities involved, public and private. This view holds to 
most if not all the issues he considered, including: the divisibility of 
sovereignty; private law; the rights and duties of individuals; the idea of free 
commerce and freedom of the seas; self-defense and just war; or the rights 
of the savages/barbarians/infidels/heathens. Grotius observation that the 
principle of sovereignty was often divided in practice (Keene, 2002: 44) can 
plausibly be read as a reference to the power and sovereign prerogatives of 
the private companies of the United Provinces. And the same holds for his 
thoughts on the rights and duties of private individuals and entities, in their 
relations with Europeans and non-Europeans. It was an issue he identified 
and his observation about divided sovereignty does not mean he backed 
such an arrangement. As Tuck (1999: 80-81) notes, the Dutch expansion 
characterised by an offensive war for the sake of trade was a rather novel 
situation, given that it was not conducted ‘through conventional political 
structures’, but through a series of companies that were not controlled by a 
state. In the first paragraph of the De Jure Bellic ac Pacis, which explains the 
purpose of the book, he talks about ‘the controversies among those who are 
not held together by a common bond of municipal law’, and which ‘may arise 
among those who have not yet united to form a nation, and those belong to 
different nations, both private persons and kings’ (Bull, 1990: 83-84). 
Overall, Grotius’ work was not an attempt at systematisation of 
international practices, including that of states, but the development of ‘a 
theory of morality applicable to any person, individual or collective, whose 
natural rights are threatened by the actions of others’ (Brown et al, 2002: 
135). He believed in a natural, even if somewhat limited, sociability of man 
(Tuck, 1999: 94-99, 102). Grotius’ universal theory of natural law, one that is 
hardly an original one when considering the work of Vitoria and the 
Salamancan scholastics, did not separate European states from non- 
European peoples/political communities. His conception of international 
society naturally included an inner circle of Christian nations, but the law of 
nature and jus gentium encompassed the outer circle of non-Christian 
communities. He believed that these non-Christian communities and peoples 
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were rightfully entitled to self-government under systems of rules of their own 
choosing (Kingsbury and Roberts, 1990: 14, 48-49). In his words, ‘just as, in 
fact, there are many ways of living, some being better than others, and out of 
so many ways each is free to choose the one he wants, so also a people can 
select the form of government it wishes’ (Tierney, 1997: 338). 
 
 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
 
 
The rise of the idea of state sovereignty is best understood as a gradual, 
non-homogenous development in Europe. This idea of separate sovereign 
states gained considerable ground at least since the sixteenth century, 
propelled by the influence of the Italian Renaissance and the Reformation in 
north-western Europe. The transition from the Respublica Cristiana to an 
international society was a revolution in Europe’s political map, but one that 
cannot be identified with a precise moment such as 1648, which is only 
natural given the magnitude of such transformation. Westphalia was not a 
decisive moment in the emergence of the sovereign state, and it also had no 
influence in the European views of the rights of non-Europeans. International 
society in Grotius’ period was still very much in process of formation. 
The overseas expansion of the United Provinces as a Protestant 
challenge to the Catholic empires was since its geneses informed by the idea 
of defective polities, as expressed by the concepts of barbarians, savages, 
infidels, and pagans. The same applies to the English expansion. While 
religion and the right to spread Protestant faith were present in the initial 
Dutch and English overseas expansion, it is possible to observe the steady 
demise of the right to Christianise as a motive and legitimating element. At 
the same time, with the emergence of the concept of savage as opposed to 
European civility, the mission to impose European civilised manners and 
customs to barbarian and savage peoples gradually became an important 
motive and legitimating argument of the Protestant overseas expansion. 
Rather than an attempt to systematise a body of rules that could 
regulate international relations between sovereign states, the jus gentium 
conception developed by Grotius was much more a theory of morality that 
was sensitive to difference, and that could work as a guide to international 
132  
relations between various actors. His reflections on a jus gentium with divine, 
natural, and human sources were essentially a response to a reality that 
preceded him, including the Dutch and other Europeans’ discriminatory views 
of non-Europeans. When it comes to the relations between Europeans and 
non-Europeans, Grotius was greatly influenced by Vitoria, and subscribed 
and reinforced the view of the Spanish scholastics on the matter, namely that 
barbariasn/savages/infields were rational beings and were rightfully entitled 
under natural law to own property. There are various parallels between 
Vitoria and Grotius, not only the fact that they were both attempting to think 
through already unfolding imperial enterprises through a moral point of view, 
but they were concerned with the events they witnessed. Many of the same 
questions that arose in the Spanish colonisation of the Americas were 
present in the context of the Dutch expansion, including the absence of any 
sort of restraint over the colonialists’ actions. When placed in context, it is 
easy to see why Grotius, who was absorbed by questions of morality and 
justice among all human beings, could hardly have been an apologist of 
discriminatory views towards non-Europeans. To justify such views was 
surely not his intention, and the claim that his work could have generated the 
division between civilised states and uncivilised political communities is 
misplaced. 
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Chapter 5 - An International Society of Civilised States 
 
 
 
 
 
I have always thought with you, that we possess at this time very 
great advantages towards the knowledge of human Nature. We 
need no longer go to History to trace it in all its stages  and 
periods. History from its comparative youth, is but a poor 
instructor. But now the Great Map of Mankind is unrolled at once; 
and there is not state or Gradation of barbarism and no mode of 
refinement which we have not at the same instant under our View. 
The very different Civility of Europe and China; The barbarism of 
Tartary, and of Arabia. The Savage State of North America, and of 
New Zealand. 
 
 
Edmund Burke, 1777 letter to William Robertson, in Marshal and 
Williams (1982: ii). 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is essentially twofold: (1) to reflect on the concept of 
civilisation in eighteenth and nineteenth century international society, and the 
related functions that the existence of the concept necessarily entails; and (2) 
to address a few claims in the literature about the relationship between the 
nineteenth century positivist turn in international law and the civilised- 
uncivilised dichotomy. Regarding the first point, chapter 3 discussed how the 
conquest of the Americas revived the concept of barbarians, which 
necessarily implied a sense of ethnocentric superiority of those who 
employed the concept. Chapter 4 illustrated how the mission to export 
civilised values, manners, and customs as a justification for the subjugation 
of barbarian and savage peoples became ever more present in the European 
expansion since the sixteenth century, as the duty and right to Christianise 
gradually waned. Nevertheless, as it will be addressed below, a few scholars 
argue that the eighteenth century represents a period of change vis-à-vis the 
European concept of civilisation. 
A prominent thesis  about the relationship between European 
imperialism,  the  civilising  mission,  and  international  law  remains  that  of 
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Alexandrowicz (1967). According to him, it was the nineteenth century 
positivist turn in international law that generated discriminatory relations 
between European states and non-European peoples/political communities in 
the ‘East Indies’, and the consequent forced subordination of the latter by the 
former. What happened was that positivist international law came to establish 
a division between the civilised states that belonged to international society 
of sovereign states, and the uncivilised non-European political communities 
not entitled to sovereign status. Alexandrowicz thesis about the causal role of 
positivist international law still is an important reference for a number of 
scholars that look at the relationship between international law and European 
imperialism and colonialism (e.g. Gong, 1984: 9; Anghie, 1999: 5; 2005: 38; 
Keene, 2002: 28-29; Simpson, 2004: 36). 
 
By definition, the standard of civilisation in international law is 
necessarily preceded by the notion of civilisation, which then generates the 
standards/criteria which express what is civilisation and what manners, 
values and behaviour are civilised. In this logic, Gong (1984: 4-5, 43-45) has 
pointed out to the need to understand the ‘social milieu’ of the standard of 
civilisation. The aim of the first section of this chapter is to understand the 
concept of civilisation in the context of eighteenth and nineteenth century 
international society, as seen by those who thought, wrote, and debated it 
during that period.37  It attempts to comprehend if there is anything novel in 
 
the nature of the concept when compared to previous periods of the history 
of international society. It also discusses the arguments about what can be 
called the Enlightenment project, and its close connections to the civilising 
mission and the idea and category we are concerned with. The following 
section addresses three claims about the relationship between nineteenth- 
century international law and the civilising mission: (a) Alexandrowicz’s thesis 
about the positivist turn and the standard of civilisation; (b) Anghie’s (2005) 
argument regarding the instrumental role of positivist international lawyers in 
the imperial expansion of international society; and (c) Simpson’s claim about 
the Grotian tradition as generating, since the Congress of Vienna (1815), the 
legal category of outlaw, uncivilised state based on the state’s internal 
characteristics. 
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5.2 Enlightenment and Civilisation 
 
 
 
According to Mazlish (2004: xiii-xiv, 1), there is an important difference 
between ‘the old, simple dichotomy civilised and barbarian’ and the 
appearance in the eighteenth century of ‘the neologism ‘civilisation’’. While it 
is often assumed that the ‘reified noun’ civilisation has always been present, 
this is only the case with the adjective ‘civilised.’ The former, he argues, is a 
specific product of eighteenth century European Enlightenment and did not 
exist before it.38 Mazlish (2004: 73) does recognise that ‘the line between the 
two [civilised and civilisation] is hardly rigid.’ For example, as discussed 
before, the letter of Maximus the Confessor written in the seventh century 
referred to the barbarous Arab invasions as a threat to Christian 
‘civilisation’.39 Bar the extreme assumption that the noun civilisation was 
never uttered before the eighteenth century, Mazlish’s argument is still 
pertinent, in the sense that in the eighteenth century the concept of 
‘civilisation’ became far more preponderant in international society when 
compared to previous periods. Both Collingwood (1992: 280-285, 481-488) 
and Mazlish’s (2004: 73-90) attempts to comprehend the essential meaning 
of the concept of civilisation focus on understanding what a number of people 
that used it in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe meant be it. Their 
conclusion is that civilisation was most often understood as a civilising 
process towards the ideal of civility, and of resistance against or which led 
away from barbarism or savagery. 
In Mazlish’s (2004: xiii-xiv, 7-8) view, the Enlightenment ideas came 
to offer a ‘universal measuring rod: a civilisation had certain material 
characteristics and it behaved and thought in a certain spiritual manner.’ He 
highlights in particular the Enlightenment ideas’ ‘overturn of religious beliefs, 
the secular emphasis on human reason and progress, and the influence of 
natural history and the attempt at scientific classification.’ In this context, the 
concept of civilisation came to be seen as ‘the last state in the movement of 
humanity from savagery to barbarism and then to civilisation.’ A similar point 
is made by Starobinski (1993: 3-4), who notes that civilisation and progress 
are two concepts that arose simultaneously in Europe. Civilisation ‘included 
such notions as improvements in comfort, advances in education, politer 
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manners, cultivation of the arts and science, growth of commerce and 
industry, and acquisition of material goods and luxuries.’ It referred first to 
‘the process that made individuals, nations, and mankind civilised’ and then 
‘to the cumulative result of that process. It served as a unifying concept.’ The 
concept became much more preponderant in international society, reflecting 
the shared conscience that international society was the realm of civilisation, 
the end point of the civilising process. As Gong (1984: 5) and Grew (2000: 
291) note, the increasing self-identification of international society with a 
coherent group of civilised states and no longer with Christian peoples was a 
defining mark of this period. According to Voltaire (1694-1778), Europe was 
 
 
kind of a great republic divided into several states, some 
monarchical, the others mixed; the former aristocratic, the latter 
popular, but all corresponding with one another. They all have the 
same religious foundation, even if divided into several 
confessions. They all have the same principles of public law and 
politics, unknown in the other parts of the world (in Gong, 1984: 
46). 
 
 
This picture reflects the Europeans’ prevailing view of the political and 
geographical space they shared, one that also influenced their perceptions of 
the extra-European world. 
The power and preponderance of the concepts of civilisation, 
civilised, and civility in eighteenth and nineteenth century international society 
is well illustrated by the fact that most if not all the main Enlightenment 
thinkers wrote about the topic. The liberal conception of man and society is 
central in these debates about civilisation and the civilising process. In 
particular, and despite the diversity and complexity of the various liberal 
currents, crucial features of liberalism, namely universalism, egalitarianism, 
individualism and the rights of man, and belief in the progress of politics and 
society (Gray, 1995: xii-xiii), are all present in the work of Enlightenment 
philosophers. Beyond the influence of English and Scottish liberalism, French 
thinkers and bourgeoisie played a central role in the dissemination of 
Enlightenment ideas, even if Enlightenment was a more pluralistic, and less 
homogeneous age than what is often recognised. Indeed, this period is 
characterised by historians as the ‘French Age’, when French language, 
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literature, and customs were hegemonic and spread across Europe (Dorn, 
1940: 179-182). Civilité had an important political connotation in the context 
of the French revolution. Montesquieu and Rousseau associated civilité with 
citizenship and political virtue, namely with the ideas of egalité and liberté. 
These ideas became central ‘in Republican morality’ (Richter, 1995: 102- 
107), and were discussed as a solution to the problems faced by the 
absolutist French monarchy (Mazlish, 2004: 13). 
According to Kant, ‘Enlightenment’ represented the ‘man’s 
emergence from his self-incurred immaturity.’ He defined immaturity as ‘the 
inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another. For 
Enlightenment… all that is needed is freedom… freedom to make public use 
of one’s reason in all matters… if it is asked whether we at present live in an 
enlightened age the answer is no, but we do live in an age of Enlightenment’ 
(Brown et al, 2002: 379-381). Kant’s words provide an idea of the 
Enlightenment as ‘an intellectual project in collision with tradition.’ The 
Enlightenment does represent a group of scholars, philosophers, writers, and 
activists who shared a belief in the generic values of progress, liberty, 
tolerance, and criticism. However, this general characterisation hides a much 
more complex and diverse picture. In particular, while some of these thinkers 
believed piously in the potential of rationalism and the natural sciences to be 
a powerful driving force of progress not only in politics but in all fields of 
human activity, others were quite skeptic about those ambitions (Brown et al, 
2002:  379-381). The thesis defended by Mazlish’s (2004: 1, 20-67), 
Starobinski (1993: 5), and other scholars (e.g. Pagden, 1988; Buchan, 2005), 
that the idea of civilisation and the civilising process as imperial/colonial 
ideology is a product of the European Enlightenment, ignores that there was 
not a unified view about those matters among some of the most important 
Enlightenment thinkers. It is even likely that some of them might have had 
great doubts about these issues. In this regard, Muthu (2003: 1, 259-266) 
argues that the Enlightenment ideas are best characterised by pluralism 
rather than homogeneity. The purpose of the remaining of this section is to 
shed light on these era’s debates about empire, civilisation, the civilising 
mission, and the status of non-Europeans. While the influence of
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Enlightenment thinkers on these issues is undeniable, their thoughts on 
these matters were far from monolithic.40 
In The Spirit of the Laws (1989: 234, 290-291), Montesquieu (1689- 
1755) related the climate in the South with the Indians’ ‘barbaric customs’, 
and argued that they needed a stronger legislator than Europeans. He 
attempted to understand the difference between barbaric and savage 
peoples: 
 
 
The difference between savage peoples and barbarian peoples is 
that the former are small scattered nations which, for certain 
particular reasons, cannot unite, whereas barbarians are ordinarily 
small nations that can unite together. The former are usually 
hunting peoples; the latter, pastoral peoples. 
 
 
He is commonly seen as the father of political and economic liberalism, and 
proponent of the advantages of commerce. As Cavallar (2002: 266-267) 
explains, for Montesquieu ‘trade could potentially turn people into gentler 
beings, cure “destructive prejudices”, and lead to peace. Yet he argued that 
freedom of commerce was not about granting traders the freedom to do 
whatever they want, and believed in regulations “in favour of the state”’. His 
argument seems more utilitarian than moralist. In his view, colonies could 
foster national power, but could also undermine it (Cavallar, 2002: 266-267). 
Nevertheless, Montesquieu (1989: 250) also explained how he would build a 
moral case against slavery. As he saw it, it was the ‘extermination’ of the 
peoples of America by the Europeans that led the latter ‘to make slaves of 
those of Africa in order to use them to clear so much land.’ 
In Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality Among 
Men (1984: 114-115), Rousseau (1712-1778) argued that ‘many authors 
have hastened to conclude that man is naturally cruel and needs civil 
institutions to make him peaceable, whereas in truth nothing is more 
peaceable than man in his primitive state.’ Rousseau’s study of man in the 
state of nature, a state which he doubted that could ever have existed, was 
driven by his quest to reach or comprehend the essential nature of humanity 
(Williams, 2005: 58-59). In the Enlightenment, the term ‘natural man’ was 
often used to refer to those who were still unfettered by the moral and 
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intellectual constraints of civil society (Pagden, 1982: 8). This feeling of 
sympathy towards the image of the natural man or the noble savage is quite 
characteristic of the Romantic movement of which Rousseau is often 
considered to be the founding figure, despite the German origins of the 
movement. Rousseau highlighted the qualities of the savage, namely ‘the 
absence of greed, kindness, and being characteristically a good husband and 
father’ (Russel, 1946: 651, 668). He was an evolutionist, in the sense that he 
spoke of the passage of man from the state of nature to ‘nascent society’ 
(Cranston, 1984: 25, 35-37). But Rousseau’s vision of the state of nature was 
very different from Hobbes’. As Williams (2005: 58, 65) explains, for 
Rousseau, the modern state was ‘not the realm of freedom, security, and 
morality at all.’ Instead, it was another form of domination. His ideas about 
the state of nature and the social contract were also different from those of 
Locke (1632-1704). Whereas Rousseau believed that the state of nature was 
one of equality among men, and the imposition of law represented the 
destruction of this ideal state, Locke defended that the state of nature was a 
condition that could be perfected with the establishment of a legal order that 
would work as a civilising system (Simpson, 2004: 32-33). In his Second 
Treatise on Civil Government (1690), Locke developed a conception of ‘civil 
society’ where men were free and equal under the law (Gray, 1995: 13-14). 
Instead of claiming the inferiority of the savage man, Rousseau saw 
the philosophy of the Enlightenment, especially the belief in science and 
progress, as a development that would bring ‘ruin on mankind’. ‘It would 
destroy virtue, which was only possible in simple societies, and corrupt men’ 
(Cranston, 1984: 25, 35-37). For Rousseau, the civilisation’s ‘degrading of 
human nature had started with the first act of a person claiming enclosed 
land as his own.’ This generated tyranny and conflict (Fidler, 1996: 122-125). 
The example of the savages confirmed that that state was the genuine one 
and that le genre-humain should have remain in it. ‘All subsequent progress 
has been so many steps in appearance toward the perfection of the 
individual, and in effect toward the decrepitude of the species’, he argued 
(Muthu, 2003: 35). His opposition to imperialism and colonialism is evident. 
As Rousseau put it, ‘nothing is as oppressed and miserable as conquering 
nations. Their success abroad only increases their misery at home.’ He was 
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also far more suspicious of the supposed benefits of commerce than 
Montesquieu was (Cavallar, 2002: 256, 284-287). He noted the way that the 
European prejudices towards non-Europeans influenced decisively travel and 
anthropological accounts of the New World (Muthu, 2003: 31-33). As he 
argued in Discourse (1984: 212), ‘although the inhabitants of Europe have for 
the past three or four hundred years overrun the other parts of the world, and 
are constantly publishing new collections of travels and reports, I am 
convinced that the only men we know are the Europeans.’ 
The ambiguity of Enlightenment thinking in relation to empire and the 
civilising mission is evident in Diderot (1713-1784). He talked about the 
possibility of a ‘soft colonialism’, whereby the natives would voluntarily and 
peacefully receive the Europeans and adopt their religion, manners, and 
technology. He also shared with other Enlightenment thinkers the belief in the 
existence of ‘degrees of humanity’, but contrary to Rousseau he believed in 
the superiority of the civilised. He thought the Europeans were more civilised 
than savage nations, but also that the former were barbarians due to immoral 
practices such as slavery (Cavallar, 2002: 263). This ambivalence of thought 
is even more puzzling when compared to a number of his writings, which 
reveal him as fierce critic of empire and colonialism. He argued that the lack 
of supervision of legal institutions and sanctions over the ‘uncivilised 
colonists’ was the main reason why colonial empires were often sites of 
extreme brutality. He rejected the notion that foreign traders had the right to 
access inhabited lands, arguing that past experience showed that European 
traders were ‘dangerous as guests.’ His condemnation of European 
imperialism was based on its disastrous effects upon non-European peoples: 
‘it seems as if from one region to another, prosperity has been pursued by an 
evil genius that speaks our [European] several languages, and which diffuses 
the same disasters in all parts.’ He saw European imperialism as increasingly 
driven by commercial ambitions of European trading companies, despite 
other motivating forces such as geopolitics, the civilising mission, and 
religious conversion. In his analysis of the British Empire in India, Diderot 
denounced the devastation caused by conquest and trade. ‘The rage of 
conquest, and what is no less destructive an evil, the greediness of traders 
have, in their turns, ravaged and oppressed the finest country on the face of 
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the globe’, he wrote. In his view, what started as a trading enterprise had 
soon transformed into absolute rule. Quite interestingly, Diderot noted that 
internally weak and vulnerable nations would inevitably fall in the hands of 
conquering nations. Yet this process would produce even a worst kind of 
barbarism, due to the clash between the conquerors’ customs, religions, 
manners, and languages, and that of the conquered. Diderot believed that 
the result of this forceful coexistence, one that so far had been very limited, 
would be a chaos that would last for centuries (Muthu 2003: 75-97).41 
 
This ambivalence regarding empire and the civilising mission is also 
characteristic of Kant’s (1724-1804) thoughts about the matter. His Perpetual 
Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (based on Abbe de St. Pierre’s work), aimed 
to understand the relations between political communities through a social 
and moral perspective, in order to envision a scenario where moral life was 
universally possible (Richmond, 2005: 25-27). Yet his views regarding the 
civilising mission are quite inconsistent. His inconsistencies have led to two 
different explanations. The most common is that Kant has a pre-critical and a 
critical period. Another explanation lies in the radical division that Kant 
established between ethics and anthropology, in the sense that he argued 
that racially inferior nations enjoyed of equal rights. Numerous passages of 
his writings about non-Europeans have been depicted as racist and 
ethnocentric, and it is easy to see why. He wrote for example that ‘the race of 
the American cannot be educated… They hardly speak, do not caress each 
other, care about nothing and are lazy.’ He believed that Africans could be 
educated, ‘but only as servants (slaves), that is if they allow themselves to be 
trained.’ For him, the white race was superior to any other race, because it 
‘possesses all motivating forces and talents in itself’ (Cavallar, 2002: 348). 
While the nineteenth century is commonly considered as the age of race- 
based classifications among European thinkers, theories about race were 
developed by eighteenth century natural historians such as Buffon and 
Blumenbach. Kant contributed to these theories with his attempt to account 
for the diversity not only of customs and traditions, but also of skin colour and 
physiognomy, as evidenced by a number of essays and lectures on 
anthropology and physical geography. Some of his writings also depict him 
as an evolutionist. In his social contract theory, Kant argued that individuals 
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in the state of nature, such as the inhabitants of the New World, should leave 
their non-civil condition and establish a government based upon the rule of 
law (Muthu, 2003: 182, 200). 
Yet, in his late writings, Kant departed from the typical ethnographic 
representations of non-European peoples of the eighteenth century: 
biological/intrinsic ability and environmentally induced characteristics. The 
sociologically based distinction between hunting, pastoral, and agricultural 
peoples he adopted, with the goal of understanding diversity, served as the 
basis for the pluralistic argument that they were all rational peoples whose 
practices were not determined biologically or by the climate. Kant’s work is 
also full of statements critical of imperialism and paternalism, including the 
repudiation of the Europeans’ eagerness to acquire colonies by ‘fraudulent 
purchase’ of the lands of non-Europeans ‘without regard for their first 
possession.’ He defended the freedom of all societies to organise themselves 
in the way they saw fit. He believed that the power of European states would 
continue to be a problem in Europe and beyond, a problem which influenced 
his theory of justice and rights in many important ways. His ideas about 
philanthropy are even more critical. He denied that there was a special moral 
merit of the rich in helping others in need, given that the very existence of 
such inequality and humanitarian necessity already derived from a situation 
that was ‘politically maintained’ (Muthu, 2003: 172, 180-182). Kant defended 
the rights of various non-European peoples (in Southern Africa and Siberia) 
against the territorial ambitions of Europeans. Very much in Vitoria and 
Grotius’ line, he argued that non-Christians were rightfully entitled to 
ownership and property and developed a more restricted conception of 
international hospitality than Vitoria. He rejected the argument that civilised 
nations had a duty/right to civilise savage or barbarian nations, and 
considered such attempts violations of mutual spheres of external freedom of 
the cosmopolitan world republic (Cavallar, 2002: 349-362).42 
 
By the late eighteenth-early nineteenth century, it became quite 
common to speak of civilisation as a matter of degree (Collingwood, 1992: 
488).43 Burke’s (1729-1797) words at the beginning of this chapter are a 
clear of example of that. As Welsh (1995: 1) explains, Burke has been 
associated by scholars with  a variety of ‘causes  and political traditions’, 
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including modern conservatism and liberal utilitarianism. He was a fierce 
opponent of the revolutions of his time, above all of the French revolution. He 
was also, as Vincent (1984a: 216) puts it, a ‘great imperialist’, but as an MP 
he often criticised British imperial policy in India, America, and Ireland, 
especially the British denial to indigenous of their traditional rights. He 
believed in the civility of Europe and his ideas were characterised by the 
paternalism of his era, but he was sceptic about the civilising mission. For 
Burke, civilisation did not stop at the borders of Europe. China was civilised, 
and so was India before the British conquest. India was not, according to 
Burke, constituted by ‘an abject and barbarous populace; much less of gangs 
and savages... but peoples for ages civilised and cultivated’ (Vincent, 1984a: 
206-207, 216-217). According to Welsh (1995: 41-44), Burke’s conception of 
rights was heavily influenced by Grotius and stands in the via media between 
naturalism and positivism. Burke believed that natural law could govern 
the relations between Europeans and non-Europeans, but he developed a 
conception of ‘public law of Europe’ to regulate relationships between the 
members of international society. 
The travel literature provided a feeling of growing awareness about 
the world beyond Europe, and it became fashionable to compare European 
socities to other societies in terms of the amount of progress each had 
achieved. A renowned writer of travel books hoped that his work on China 
could ‘enable the reader to settle in his own mind, the point of rank China 
may be considered to hold in the scale of civilised nations.’ This way of 
accounting for the progress of human societies is most commonly associated 
with the work of Adam Smith and other Scottish philosophers of the 
Enlightenment such as David Hume, John Millar, William Robertson, and 
Adam Ferguson (Marshal and Williams, 1982: 2, 134).44  A former Russian 
 
student of Adam Smith and John Millar gave a lecture at Moscow University 
in 1781, where he argued that it was not possible to ‘measure the various 
successes of the human race, its risings and falling, on the basis of its 
imputed childhood, youth, maturity, and old age.’ Yet, he went on to say: 
 
 
Fortunately  for  our  times,  the  newest  and  most  assiduous 
explorers of human nature have discovered incomparably better 
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means for studying nations in their various successes according to 
the circumstances and conditions through which those peoples 
starting from their primordial society with wild animals, rose to the 
highest degree of greatness and enlightenment’ (in Meek, 1976: 
6). 
 
 
In 1794, Condorcet published The History of Human Progress, a renowned 
defense of the meliorist doctrines and belief in the perfectibility of mankind 
characteristic of this era (Gray, 1986: 19). 
As Cavallar (2002: 265-266) explains, the idea that the economic 
philosophers of the Enlightenment ‘were supportive of a “naïve” 
cosmopolitanism, whereby global commerce was a unifying and pacifying 
factor’ is widespread in the literature. The same is true in relation to the view 
that they criticised colonialism, mercantilism, and opposed conquest as a 
‘futile endeavour.’45 Again, such simplistic views seem not to make justice to 
 
a more complex picture. Adam Smith is considered as one of the fathers of 
economic liberalism and liberal internationalism. He is most often depicted as 
a rejectionist of the association between national economic wealth and 
national power. Yet, according to Walter (1996: 142-144), in The Wealth of 
Nations (1766) Adam Smith rejects a natural harmony of interests and 
supports mercantilist policies. Cavallar (2002: 272-275) also highlights that 
Smith’s ideas ‘are indeed conventional rather than revolutionary.’ This said, 
he did offer a moral condemnation of colonialism and hoped for a better 
future for non-Europeans. Quite in contrary, David Hume seems to have 
been less critical of the civilising mission. As he wrote in the essay titled ‘Of 
National Characters’ (1748), ‘I am apt to suspect the Negroes, and in general 
all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be 
naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilised nation of any other 
complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or 
speculations’ (Muthu, 2003: 183). 
Influenced by Adam Smith’s lectures, Ferguson is believed to be the 
first to have used the word civilisation in English (in 1752). He also developed 
a clearer version of the theory according to which there were for stages of 
human social organisation, defined by the types of economic activity and 
modes   of   subsistence:   ‘savage   (hunger-gatherer),   nomadic   pastoral, 
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sedentary agricultural, and industrial-commercial’ (Starobinski, 1993: 4). 
Nevertheless, he doubted the view that the inhabitants of the New World 
were asocial and purely natural. As he wrote in ‘An Essay on the History of 
Civil Society’ (1767), ‘Thucydides, notwithstanding the prejudice of his 
country against the name of Barbarian, understood that it was in the customs 
of barbarous nations [that] he was to study the more ancient manners of 
Greece’ (Muthu, 2003: 315). 
Also influenced by the likes of Adam Smith and James Bentham was 
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). In his essay ‘Civilisation’ (1836), he noted how 
 
 
we are accustomed to call a country more civilised if we think it 
more improved; more eminent in the best characteristics of Man 
and Society; farther advanced in the road to perfection; happier, 
nobler, wiser. This is one sense of the word civilisation. But in 
another sense it stands stands for that kind of improvement only, 
which distinguishes a wealthy and powerful nation from savages 
or barbarians. It is in this sense that we may speak of the vices or 
the miseries of civilisation; and that the question has been 
seriously propounded, whether civilisation is on the whole a good 
or an evil. 
 
 
Although he recognised the contentious nature of the civilising mission, Mill 
made an acute distinction between civilised and barbarian nations, and 
believed in the impossibility of reciprocal relations between them on the basis 
that barbarians ‘as a nation’ have no rights (Brown et al, 2002: 487-489), 
although he consented that barbarians as individuals did possess  some 
rights (Cavallar, 2002: 372). Grew (2000: 503) argues in this regard that the 
Anglo-American legal positivism has close connections with the ideology of 
Mill. He was an important proponent of British imperialism, surely not alien to 
the fact that he was not only a scholar, but an official of the British East India 
Company. Mill developed the argument, one that became greatly influential 
among the following generation of liberal imperialists, that the threat by 
economic and political rivals to England’s once dominant position should be 
countered by the retention of empire and its expansion. This position, 
according to Sullivan (1983: 605), marks a steep departure from the classical 
liberal tradition that Mill inherited. For Mill, the colonies of Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand, with populations of ‘European race’, and at the same 
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stage of civilisation as the English, should be granted ‘home rule’ because 
they were perfectly capable of governing themselves. They should only be 
subject to England in matters of international affairs. On the contrary, the 
barbarous and uncivilised peoples of Asia and Africa could not govern 
themselves. The solution Mill proposed to these cases was a type of 
benevolent despotism, to be administered by autonomous bodies like the 
East India Company (Sullivan, 1983: 599-606). 
In the nineteenth century, as Marshal and Williams (1982: 300-301) 
note, the concept of backward became a popular and influential one. 
Associated with the theories of stages of development, it implied the 
‘opportunity for improvement.’ Increasing calls for more scientific, detailed, 
and impartial observation of the non-European world and societies, which 
sidelined the travel literature with the label of amateurish, did little to avoid 
generalisations about non-European peoples and societies. In this context, 
Darwin’s theory of evolution and natural selection was highly influential.46 
 
Also influential was Joseph Arthur de Gobineau’s Essai sur l'Inégalité des 
Races Humaines (1853-1855), that defended the thesis that the races of 
humankind were divided into black, yellow, and white. In his view, the latter, 
particularly those of Aryan descent, were better equipped for civilisation 
(Diller, 1971: 9). Thus, slavery was justified under the logic that superior 
races should rule over inferior ones (Gong, 1984: 48). Particularly in Britain, 
the assurance of intellectual, moral and practical superiority was in itself a 
justification for expansion. The notion of the savage as the man that was free 
from the negative influences of Western organised society was no longer 
influential. The views of the savages were either of criticism or of concern. As 
Marshal and Williams (1982: 300-301) put it, ‘the life of the savage was not 
an alternative to that of the European: it was enforced backwardness 
produced by adverse circumstances.’ The idea of changing non-European 
societies for the better through outside intervention became a hallmark of this 
era, expressed in the abolitionist movement, in the humanitarian ideas, and 
in the founding of missionary societies. In the words of a contributor to the 
Edinburgh Review in 1802, ‘Europe is the light of the world, and the ark of 
knowledge: upon the welfare of Europe, hangs the destiny of the most 
remote and savage people’ (Marshall and Williams, 1982: 300-303). 
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Illustrative of the lasting repercussions of this vision of the world and 
mode of thinking about most non-European political communities is Lord 
Salisbury’s speech, in 4 May 1898, to an audience at the R o y a l  
Albert Hall in London. The Living and Dying Nations’ speech reflected 
about the differences of progress between political communities. It applied 
Darwinian principles to the international states system and to the 
challenges facing Britain (Morton, 2005: 372), in the context of European’s 
definitive conquest and colonisation of Africa. According to Salisbury: 
 
 
You may roughly divide the nations of the world as the living and 
the dying. On one side you have great countries of enormous 
power growing in power every year… by the side of these there 
are a number of communities which I can only describe as dying… 
…and in these States disorganisation and decay are advancing 
almost as fast as concentration and increasing power are 
advancing in the living nations that stand beside them. Decade 
after decade they are weaker, poorer, and less provided with 
leading men or institutions in which they can trust… …and in their 
various degrees they are presenting a terrible picture to the more 
enlightened portion of the world – a picture which, unfortunately, 
the increase in the means of our information and communication 
draws with darker and more conspicuous lineaments in the face of 
all nations, appealing to their feeling as well as to their interests, 
calling upon them to bring forward a remedy. …it needs no 
specialty of prophecy to point out to you what the inevitable result 
of that combined process must be. For one reason or for another – 
from the necessities of politics or under the pretense of 
philanthropy – the living nations will gradually encroach on the 
territory of the dying and the seeds of and causes of conflict 
among civilised nations will steadily appear… Of course it is not to 
be supposed that any one nation of the living nations will be 
allowed to have the profitable monopoly of curing or cutting up 
these unfortunate patients, [laughter] and the controversy is as to 
who shall have the privilege of doing so, and in what measure he 
shall do it. Undoubtedly we shall not allow England to be at a 
disadvantage in any rearrangement that may take place. 
 
 
Salisbury described the dying nations as both an opportunity that appealed to 
values and interests, and a concern or problem. The concern lied not only 
with the instability and misgovernment of those nations, but also with the 
danger that Great Powers would eventually need to intervene, which could 
lead to conflict among the latter. His speech also reveals a perception about 
the unity of mankind, with common challenges and problems, accentuated by 
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the revolution in the means of information and communication. On the one 
hand, Salisbury is described as a deeply moral individual, to whom human 
suffering was an evil (Grenville, 1964: 6, 19). He is characterised as a 
reluctant imperialist, sceptic of the benefits of colonies both for the colonising 
powers and the colonised (Roberts, 1999: 42-43, 169). On the other, 
Salisbury nurtured and extended massively the British Empire for about 
fourteen years (Roberts, 1999: 2). The edition of the Canadian newspaper 
Daily Mail and Empire of 21 May 1898, published Salisbury’s speech with the 
subtitle: ‘Weak States Grow Weaker, and the Strong States are Becoming 
Stronger – What Will be the Result?’47 
 
This centrality of the notion that the purpose of empire was to 
civilise/change the backward, to place them in the path of progress, and 
eventually bring them into the realm of civilisation, is an important legacy of 
the Enlightenment. Notwithstanding the plurality of views of the 
Enlightenment and liberal thinkers about the topic, the optimism and at the 
same time the concern regarding the progress of all mankind seems to mark 
a certain departure from the previous nature of the civilising mission, one less 
troubled about the fate of those barbarians and savages to be civilised. That 
this worked as a powerful justification and legitimating element (Anghie, 
2005: 96-97) is undeniable. Yet to dismiss it as simply an empty but 
instrumental justification for the pursuit of other goals such as trade and profit 
seems rather simplistic, particularly when bearing in mind moral and 
philosophical setting of the time (Bain, 2003a: 14-15). In this regard, 
Collingwood (1992: 501-502) notes that one of the most prominent senses of 
the ‘civilised man’ in the nineteenth century was the man ‘who treats his 
fellow-men with ‘civility.’’ 
 
 
 
5.3 The Standard of Civilisation in International Law 
 
 
 
The previous section was based on the assumption that it is not possible to 
comprehend the emergence of the standard of civilisation in international law, 
without first looking at the concept of civilisation in international society. 
Likewise, the positivist turn in international law can only be understood in the 
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context of wider developments in international society. As Simpson (2004: 
 
31) explains, positivism in international law refers to the ‘move towards 
removing the philosophical precepts, namely naturalist ones, from the 
foundations of the legal order for the sake of the agnostic pursuit of clarity 
and certainty.’ It is characterised by the need to justify law on scientific basis, 
and by a quasi-obsession with codification (Berkowitz, 2005: 2). It is based 
on the primacy of the state, in the sense that states are the main actors of 
international law and are only bound by the laws to which they consented 
(Anghie, 2005: 33). 
If the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries can be seen as the 
formative period of international society, the eighteenth century was one of 
consolidation. As referred to before, the balance of power was only implicitly 
present as an objective in Westphalia. Explicit reference was made to the 
principle in The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) that placed an end to the War of 
Spanish Succession. The treaty would mention that ‘the peace and 
tranquillity of the Christian world may be ordered and stabilised in a just 
balance of power, which is the best and most solid foundation of mutual 
friendship, and a lasting general concord’ (Wight, 1973: 89-91, 98). Vattel 
would define the balance of power in Droit des Gens (1758) as ‘a state of 
affairs such that no one power is in a position where it is preponderant and 
can lay down the law to others’ (Bull, 1977: 97). The balance of power was 
the crucial anti-hegemonic mechanism, one that reflected the commitment to 
prevent a return to formal hierarchy in Europe. All the European Great 
Powers, not only France and Austria, but also Britain, Prussia, Russia, and 
the Ottoman Empire, were active participants in the balance. And so were 
Spain, the Netherlands, and Sweden, the three drained by war and weaker 
than they were. In the diplomatic profession, foreign offices and ministries of 
external affairs were created, and congresses were held to convene 
statesmen and professional diplomats. Together with the definitive 
institutionalisation of the balance of power and diplomacy, the instrument of 
war became an explicit norm of international society in the eighteenth 
century. War was now conducted by professional paid armies with national 
uniforms. The use of force was one more persuasion element in the
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necessary adjustments to the balance of power, for the sake of preservation 
of sovereign equality (Watson, 1992: 199-206).48 
Increasingly, the notion of a natural law of nations came to be seen 
as unsatisfactorily vague. Thus, this period also witnessed a move towards 
the systematisation and secularisation of what, particularly in the second half 
of the eighteenth century, would be gradually referred as the ‘public law of 
Europe/Droit public de l’Europe’ (Grew, 2000: 292). In this regard, Watson 
(1992: 202-203) argues that, in the eighteenth century, international rules no 
longer had a natural or divine source, and could now be negotiated by the 
members of international society so as to be in accordance with unfolding 
practice. He points in particular to the work of Vattel, who emphasised the 
equality of all states with respect to the law of nations. As he put it, ‘a dwarf is 
as much a man as a giant is: a small republic is no less a state than the most 
powerful kingdom.’ Without the balance of power, Vattel argued, there would 
not be much point in developing these rules, aim of which was to provide 
more civility, order, safety, peace, and predictability to international relations. 
Yet, the assumption that he was a positivist might be somewhat misleading, 
given that Vattel referred constantly to ‘men’s rights and obligations asequally 
proceeding from nature’ (Stirk, 2011: 7-8).49 
The point made by Gong (1984: 4) that the second half of the 
eighteenth century witnessed the demise of the idea of a Christian Europe 
and its replacement by a notion of European secular states seems pertinent. 
Nevertheless, Christian religion still influenced the foundations of 
international rules. As Grew (2000: 288-299) explains, beyond the ‘spheres 
of rational speculation, all throughout the eighteenth century the international 
treaties reveal that the public law of Europe was still very much a legal order 
of “Christian Europe”’, as per the wording of that time. As the allusion above 
to the ‘peace and tranquility of the Christian world’ in the Treaty of Utrecht 
exemplifies, the preambles of these treaties are full of references to the 
Christian character of international society. Grew (2000: 291) pertinently 
notes that to interpret these references as formalities without meaning is to 
ignore the fact that, in this time, ‘much care was accorded to give an 
appropriate outward appearance to intellectual content.’ Georg Friedrich von 
Martens (1756-1821), an important German professor, jurist and diplomat, 
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considered by some to be one of the key figures that oversaw the legal 
transition from naturalism to positivism (e.g. Koskenniemi, 2008: 190, 193- 
197), identified ‘the similarity of morals in Christian Europe’ as the foundation 
of international law. These words attest to the idea that, while the defining 
element of eighteenth century international society was the independent 
character of the state, the Christian heritage still mattered in the definition of 
international rules. What had once been an idea of solidarity between 
Christian peoples was now in the process of being replaced, as Grew (2000: 
291) puts it, by a secularised notion of ‘the solidarity and cohesiveness of the 
Western Christian nations.’ 
The gradual demise of the influence of religion in politics and the 
organisation of all spheres of life within the realm of the state, on the basis of 
a mechanical understanding of the world, is pointed out by most historians as 
one of the defining features of eighteenth century Europe. Dorn (1940: 17-18, 
184-190) illustrates how, despite cultural, economic, and social differences 
among European states, the ‘Leviathan state’ became a reality adapted to 
each particular  national context in Europe, including France, Spain, The 
Hapsburg Monarchy, Prussia, Russia, and England. Propelled by a whole 
range of new inventions and processes of industrial production, and 
supported by the booming colonial commercial activity, the Industrial 
Revolution generated a wave of economic growth and material prosperity in 
Europe and America. The dissolution of the feudal order and the 
preoccupation with administrative issues all over Europe were reflected on 
the creation of a variety of new government departments, including for the 
registration of properties, lands, and stock. This period also witnessed an 
unprecedented construction boom, with the building of infrastructures such 
as dams, canals, bridges, and roads (Dorn, 1940: 17). The notions of 
achievement, reason, progress, science-based knowledge, secularisation, 
economic growth, industrialisation, order, social efficiency, bureaucratisation, 
were all translated into the way European states and governments were 
organised (Darwin, 2008: 25-26).50 
 
In this context, positivism reached all sciences, and it had a clear 
political purpose. As Simon (1963: 4) puts it, ‘positivism was in fact more than 
a method’, it was a ‘system of affirmations’, a ‘conception of the world and of 
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man.’ The aim was the development of not a philosophy but a system and a 
doctrine for science as a whole. The most important aim of this system was 
the re-organisation of society, the regeneration of humanity. Henry de Saint- 
Simon (1760-1825) is one of its early proponents, and August Comte, who 
was mentored and employed by Saint-Simon, became positivism’s most 
prominent figure (Lenzer, 1975: xxxv). The very term positivism in the context 
of international law was coined by Comte is his Cours de Philosophie 
Positive (1830-1842) (Gong, 1984: 47). According to Comte, the philosopher 
should become the holder of the ‘spiritual power’, ‘the High Priest of the 
Religion of Humanity’ (Simon, 1963: 5-6, 35). Comte (1975: i) himself hoped 
that ‘the motto that I have put forward as descriptive of the new political 
philosophy, Order and Progress, will soon be adopted spontaneously.’ As 
Comte (1975: 317) wrote in Système de Politique Positive (1851-1854), in a 
chapter titled ‘Social Dynamics, or Theory of the Natural Progress of Human 
Society’: ‘Positivism consists essentially of a philosophy and a polity. These 
can never be dissevered – the former being the basis, and the latter the end, 
of one comprehensive system.’ Système was a more elaborated work than 
his earlier ‘Plan of the Scientific Operations Necessary for Reorganising 
Society’ (1822). In the ‘Plan’, he reflected upon ‘the successive states the 
human race must pass’ on the path towards perfection. He made a call for 
observation based ‘upon the nature of things’, stressing the relative state of 
civilisation. He criticised the theoretical assumptions of some of his 
contemporaries: ‘each of them perceives in its peculiar system of institutions 
a sort of universal panacea applicable to all political evils.’ However, 
according to Comte, they disregarded the ‘stage of civilisation actually 
reached by the people for whom the remedy is destined.’ According to 
Comte, civilisation was man’s power over nature, and the components of 
civilisation were science, fine arts, and industry (Lenzer, 1975: xxxiv-xxxvi). 
The positivist system was quite influential in Europe, which is only 
natural given the social, philosophical, and scientific developments that 
characterised the European Enlightenment, and of which positivism was also 
a product. These included the belief in scientism, phenomenalism, the 
atmosphere of anticlericalism, the faith in the potentialities and perfectibility of 
men, the betterment of society, secularism, pragmatism, and utilitarianism 
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(Simon, 1963: 9-10, 44-46). According to Simon (1963: 46) positivism 
embodied ‘totalitarian notions of social engineering.’ Among the most notable 
exponents of positivism were Pierre Laffitte, author of a General View of 
Chinese Civilisation; Émile Littré, who published various works on positivism 
and politics; John Stuart Mill; Henry Thomas Buckle, author of History of 
Civilisation in England (1856-1865); or Arthur de Gobineau (Simon, 1963: 
264, Gong, 1984: 48-49). 
The definitive transformation from natural law doctrine to legal 
positivism occurred in the nineteenth century. It took place against the 
background of these wider developments that included secularisation and 
systematisation not only in international law but in most fields of public 
activity, as well as the consolidation of the state and the reinforcement of its 
power (Grew, 2000: 503; Cavallar, 2002: 371). In particular, the idea that 
treaties of Vienna of 1815 mark the definitive shift towards positivism is 
widely shared in the literature (Alexandrowicz, 1967: 11; Grew, 2000: 288- 
289). As Grew notes, the treaties contained the formula ‘toutes les nations 
civilisées de la terre.’51  The Declaration against the Trade of Negroes, also 
 
signed in Vienna, reflected the idea that slave trade was an uncivilised 
practice. This move towards abolition followed an intellectual attack on both 
slavery and slave trade, one that became particularly acute in the last third of 
the eighteenth century including in Britain, France, and the US, as reflected 
in the formation of numerous abolitionist societies (Clark, 2007: 40). Although 
dominant, juridical positivism was contested during the nineteenth century by 
some international lawyers who did not restrict international law to the 
custom of civilised states, and recalled the previously existent natural law of 
nations (Grew, 2000: 503-512). 
A renowned thesis about the relationship between positivist 
international law and European imperialism and colonialism remains 
Alexandrowicz’s (1967: 1-4) history of the law of nations in the ‘East Indies.’ 
The term ‘East Indies’, as Alexandrowicz (1967: 1) uses it, includes not only 
the Indian subcontinent but also Ceylon, Burma, Siam, and the Indonesian 
Islands. That term ‘also extends in a wider sense to Persia, particularly in 
connexion with her commercial and strategic position in the Persian Gulf’, 
while the Ottoman Empire is ‘only indirectly brought into the picture.’ 
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According to his analysis, it was the nineteenth century positivist turn in 
international law that generated discriminatory relations between European 
states and non-European peoples/political communities, and the consequent 
forced subordination of the latter by the former. What happened was that 
positivist international law came to establish a division between the civilised 
states that belonged to the civilised club of European sovereign states, and 
the uncivilised non-European states that, because of their uncivilised 
character, were not entitled to sovereign status. In Alexandrowicz’s view, the 
relations in the East Indies between Europeans and non-Europeans from the 
sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries were informed by a universally tolerant 
or non-discriminatory natural law of nations. Moreover, he argues that 
international law is  not an exclusive product of European Christian 
civilisation, but the result of an interexchange of practices, ideas, and 
products between Europeans and non-Europeans that dates back at least to 
the sixteenth century. Until the nineteenth century, non-Europeans enjoyed 
sovereign status, and then saw that status removed by the positivist turn in 
international law. 
Regarding the first point about the positivist turn, in the previous 
chapters it was rendered clear that the civilising mission and the dichotomy 
civilised-barbarians/savages was an important part of the European 
expansion at least since the late sixteenth century. In particular, the Dutch 
expansion into the East Indies was partly characterised by conquest, 
colonisation, and slavery, hardly examples of respectful or tolerant relations 
between Europeans and non-Europeans. Moreover, the previous section 
showed that the division between the realm of civilisation, i.e. European 
civilised states and the non-European barbarian nations and savage peoples 
(with a few exceptions, e.g. China) was a powerful idea in eighteenth century 
international society. Also, the idea of superior civilisation and simultaneously 
the notion of decline/crisis of non-European empires was a dominant trend in 
the imperial expansion of international society at least since the seventeenth 
century. As it will be discussed in the following chapter, this was the case 
with the British conquest of territories in India during the late seventeenth 
century and during much of the eighteenth.52 
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Another example of how the idea of European civilisational 
superiority, and simultaneously the notion of decline of non-Europeans, 
informed European expansion is Russia’s conquest of substantial territories 
of the Ottoman Empire. This followed a process of ‘forcible westernisation’ 
led by the Czar Peter the Great and initiated by some of his ancestors. The 
aim was to join the European international society of civilised states. Peter 
admired in particular the Protestant north of Europe, namely English and 
Dutch’s industries, navies and traders, and Sweden’s military tactics. It was 
this admiration that led him to tour the West (the so-called Grand Embassy) 
to capture ideas for his project to Westernise Russia. Russia experienced a 
revolution not only in the realm of the state, in industry, navy, and the military, 
but at the level of society. Peter expressed his determination ‘to cut off his 
subject’s beards, make them wear Western dress, emancipate the women, 
break the power of the anti-Western church and of the traditionalists among 
the aristocracy.’ According to his Chancellor, ‘we have stepped from the 
darkness of ignorance onto the stage of fame, and have joined the society of 
political peoples’ (Watson, 1984b: 67-70).  Thus, in the end of the 
seventeenth century, Russia experienced a period of rapid assimilation into 
European international society, with the declared aim of ‘civilising’ Russia 
according to the civilised standards of Western Europeans (Gong, 1984: 101- 
106). 
This legacy was given continuity by Peter’s successors and by the 
modernised army he created. Another feature inherited from Peter was the 
goal of defeating the Turks. To reach the Black Sea, then a monopoly of the 
Ottoman Empire and of its Muslim clients was a primary objective. Since the 
reign of Catherine II (Catherine the Great), Russia recovered substantial 
territories from the Ottoman Empire, becoming not only one of the central 
players in the management of European international society but also in the 
European expansion into Asia (Watson, 1984b: 61, 67-71). It should be 
mentioned that the Ottoman Empire was part of Europe’s balance of power, 
because it was too powerful to be neglected and cooperated informally with 
France and the Protestant states against the Habsburgs. However, as 
Watson (2007: 17, 23) puts it, ‘the Ottomans despised European diplomacy, 
and its rules and institutions, as Europeans despised theirs.’ The Ottomans 
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even developed a code of conduct for their dealings with European states, 
the capitulations. As Naff (1984: 143) recalls, ‘the very idea of the state was 
alien to Muslim political theory and the Ottoman theories of politics and 
government.’53 
As it was the case with other European imperialisms in this era, the 
Russians justified their conquests with the civilising mission (Darwin, 2008: 
21). From the late seventeenth century until the end of the eighteenth 
century, the Ottomans suffered a series of setbacks and strategic defeats 
that would culminate with Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt (Quataert, 2005: 37- 
51, 84).54 As Faroqhi (2006: 3-4) notes, in the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, numerous European authors wrote about the topic of 
‘Ottoman decline’, although the Ottomans sill remained a force to be reckon. 
One of the most popular explanations for the Ottoman decline was, in the 
perspective of the members of international society, despotism and the 
malign effects of Islam (Marshall and Williams, 1982: 164). As Quataert 
(2005: 76) explains, ‘the “Terror of the World” had become the “Sick Man of 
Europe”’. By the second half of the eighteenth century, following the 
Ottoman’s abandonment of the traditional view of the binary Dar al-Islam and 
Dar al-Harb (house of Islam and house of war) which informed their views of 
and conquests in Europe, Ottoman rulers adopted relations with Europeans 
based on diplomatic usages and communications, sovereign equality, and 
recognition of the European law of nations. In the eyes of the European- 
centred international society of the second half of the eighteenth century, the 
Ottoman Empire had move from uncivilised to semi-civilised status (Naff, 
1984: 152-153). 
So far, it was demonstrated that it was not the positivist turn in 
international law that generated the division between the civilised states that 
belonged to international society, and those political communities in the ‘East 
Indies’ seen as uncivilised. The civilising mission and the European’s 
discriminatory views and behaviour towards non-Europeans as a practice of 
European states preceded the positivist turn and the emergence of the 
standard in international law. The other main argument advanced by 
Alexandrowicz – that until the nineteenth century the relations between 
Europeans and non-Europeans were based on the idea of sovereign equality 
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– defeats itself. Alexandrowicz (1967: 1-2) starts by providing an idea about a 
pre-nineteenth century tolerant and egalitarian world where European and 
non-European sovereign states respected each other’s sovereignty, 
independence, and customs. However, and surprisingly (or perhaps not), 
Alexandrowicz (1967: 14-26, 129-144) historical illustrations pertaining to the 
period between the sixteenth and the eighteenth century are marked by an 
absence of examples about relations among sovereign entities. Instead, they 
are full references to: suzerain-vassal relations; instances of territorial 
conquest; the humiliation of envoys; the imposition of discriminatory treaty 
provisions by Europeans on non-European rulers; and to the imperial and 
colonial modes not only of Europeans but those of China and Persia. These 
references are all evidence that the relationship between Europeans and the 
non-European political communities of what Alexandrowicz calls in broad 
terms the ‘East Indies’, did not operate according to a norm of sovereign 
equality. 
Moreover, by talking about trade concessions, treaties, and alliances 
between Europeans and non-Europeans, and noting that the rights of non- 
Europeans were recognised by Europeans, Alexandrowicz assumes that 
such instances are enough evidence to claim that there was a law of nations 
working on the basis of state sovereignty between Europeans and non- 
Europeans. He thus conflates the history of the notion of international law 
with the norm of state sovereignty, ignoring that the former naturally 
precedes the latter (Lesaffer, 2007: 31-32). While all part of the history of 
international law, a distinction ought to be made between the history of the 
notion/idea of international law, the history of the norm of state sovereignty 
as it emerged in post-Medieval Europe, and the explicit nineteenth century 
concept of international law.55 This is not the refute Alexandrowicz’s (1967: 3, 
 
97) convincing assertion that Europeans learned and adopted legal 
expressions and provisions of Eastern origins.56 In fact, this is something that 
has been pointed out by members of the ES (e.g. Watson, 1984a: 25-26).57 
Nevertheless, the sovereign state and the norm of state sovereignty is a 
European product, and its expansion is a result of European imperialism and 
colonialism. 
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As Keene (2002: 26-27) notes, the ES did not remain indifferent to 
Alexandrowicz’s argument. Wight (1977: 117) gave credit to Alexandrowicz’s 
attempt to challenge the ‘orthodox’ account about the ‘limits of the states- 
system’ based on what can be described as a ‘one-sided story exclusively of 
European design.’ Yet, Wight (1977: 123) argued that Alexandrowicz grossly 
underestimated the fact that most ‘Europeans approached the non-Christian 
world with a different set of assumptions from those with which they 
approached one another.’ He also noted pertinently that Alexandrowicz 
exaggerates considerably the extent to which there was a communion of 
interests, spirit and values between Europeans and non-Europeans, one 
sufficient to argue that there was a universal international society based on a 
natural law of nations. One thing is to note that the likes of Vitoria and Grotius 
did envision the existence of such universal and non-discriminatory 
international society of mankind. Another is to argue that the behaviour of 
European imperialists and colonialists and the relations between Europeans 
and non-Europeans were informed decisively by such a conception. In this 
regard, Jackson (1990: 57-58) notes that it is unlikely ‘something resembling 
Grotius’ law of nations was observed routinely in relations between European 
merchants and non-European rulers’, given some aspects such as the huge 
distances in the age of sail and the acute differences between European and 
non-European societies. Also in response to Alexandrowicz, Bull dismissed 
the notion of a universal natural law as hypothetical. Bull also argued that 
there was no such thing as an international society constituted by Europeas 
and non-Europeans (Keene, 2002: 26-27). As Bull (1984b: 117) put it, ‘they 
were not united by a perception of common interests, nor by a structure of 
generally agreed rules setting out their rights and duties in relation to one 
another, nor did they cooperate in the working of common international 
institutions.’ 
The characterisation, made by Gong (1984: 4-6), of the standard of 
civilisation as expressed in nineteenth century European international law as 
a product of older practices, is in accordance with what discussed so far. In 
his view, such division is closely related with the definitive replacement, in the 
second half of the eighteenth century, of the idea that international society 
was distinctively Christian, by a secular notion that international society was 
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composed by and confined to civilised states, i.e. of European civilisation. In 
this logic, ‘the previously implicit standard of ‘civilisation’ espoused by this 
society took on an increasingly explicit juridical character.’ What Gong fails to 
recognise is that the dichotomies established by the notion of superior 
European civilised values, manners and customs was a feature already 
present in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. And the same holds for 
the role of those dichotomies in the imperial and colonial expansion of 
international society during that period. Nevertheless, Gong’s (1984: 5) point 
that the ‘implicit standard of civilisation’ emerged in eighteenth century 
international society is not a completely misleading assumption, in the sense 
that this period did mark the consolidation of international society and of the 
idea that international society was the end point and the realm of civilisation. 
Thus, in the nineteenth century, propelled by the Europeans’ 
eagerness to systematise and organise all realms of public activity, the 
standard of civilisation became a concept with an explicit juridical character. 
Far from causing a division of the world between civilised and non-civilised 
nations and the related discriminatory practices, it expressed such 
longstanding division in the practices of international society. In particular, the 
standard emerged as the Europeans’ solution for two issues closely linked 
with the European imperial expansion. One was how to determine which 
countries were entitled to recognition and legal personality, and consequently 
to membership of international society. In the perspective of European legal 
positivists, Russia, Japan, and the Ottoman Empire’s membership of 
international society, as well as the independence of the United States and of 
South American nations added to the significance of considering the legal 
borders of international society. The standard of civilisation limited the 
recognition in international law and consequently to membership in 
international society to states regarded as civilised, and accorded ‘semi- 
civilised’ or ‘uncivilised’ status to those that qualified only to partial 
membership or were not qualified at all. As other Europeans had done for 
centuries, a number of international lawyers (at the time referred to as 
publicists) divided the nations of the world into the categories of civilised, 
barbarous, and savages, reflecting legal capacity and personality. The other 
purpose was the perceived need to regulate the relations between European 
160  
and non-Europeans in the areas where Europeans had acquire territories. 
The standard of civilisation was constantly updated by treaties and 
international lawyers to include new requirements. These included the 
guarantee of basic rights such as those of property and freedom of religion, 
travel, and commerce; the existence of a political bureaucracy that could run 
efficiently the state apparatus; capacity to organise self-defence; adherence 
to the laws of war; the existence of domestic juridical system; or the 
acceptance that certain behaviours such as polygamy and slavery were 
uncivilised practices to be banned (Gong, 1984: 4-15, 24). 
While it is misleading to see international law as the cause of 
European discriminatory views and behaviour towards non-Europeans, it 
surely provided legal backing for such practices. As Bull (1984d: vii-viii) 
notes, it is evident that the standard of civilisation worked as a legitimating 
tool of Europeans ‘for denying equal rights to the political communities of 
Asia, Africa, and Oceania, whose fate in that era was either to become 
colonies of the European imperial powers or to be assigned a subordinate or 
second class form of independence.’ The subjectivity and political nature of 
these criteria are obvious. For most non-Europeans, the standard 
represented a humiliating imposition (Gong, 1984: 7). It required that 
European standards be imposed on the non-Europeans, or that the latter 
adopt the former’s standards as their own (Keal: 1995: 192). 
The standard of civilisation also defined a code of expected 
behaviour within international society, of obligations which ‘civilised states’ 
ought to observe, as expressed at the time by humanitarian sentiments, the 
notion of noblesse oblige, or the later ‘sacred trust of civilisation’ (Gong, 
1984: 4-12, 24, 76-81). Jules Hermand, a French advocate of colonialism, 
noted the necessity to ‘accept as a principle and point of departure the fact 
that there is a hierarchy of races and civilisations, and that we belong to the 
superior race and civilisation, still recognizing that while superiority confers 
rights, it imposes strict obligations in return.’ He believed that ‘the basic 
legitimation of conquest over native peoples is the conviction of our 
superiority, not merely our mechanical, economic, and military superiority, but 
our moral superiority. Our dignity rests on that quality, and it underlies our 
right to direct the rest of humanity. Material power is nothing but a means to 
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that end’ (Said, 1993: 10). Prominent examples of state practice in the late 
eighteenth-early nineteenth century according to the standard of civilisation 
are the intervention of the concert of ‘civilised’ powers in the Boxer rebellion 
in 1900 on behalf of ‘civilised society’, and the Hague 1899 and 1907 
conferences of the ‘civilised’ countries with the purpose of among other 
things to codify the rules of ‘civilised warfare’ (Gong, 1984: 5). Another 
interesting case is that of Japan. Initially forced by the US to open its ports to 
Western merchants, ‘uncivilised’ Japan gradually gained ‘civilised’ status by 
following the norms of state sovereignty and of European diplomacy. As with 
Russia, Japan also came to justify its imperial expansion with the civilising 
mission (Suzuki, 2005: 137-140). 
The thesis of Alexandrowicz has inspired other scholars to 
investigate the relationship between international law and European 
imperialism and colonialism in the nineteenth century. Anghie (2005) 
explores how the colonial encounter was crucial in the development of the 
discipline of international law, together with the preoccupation of order 
among sovereign states. Anghie’s thesis can be summarised as follows. In 
response to the critique of the English jurist John Austin that international law 
could not be considered law at all, nineteenth-century positivist jurists 
(including James Lorimer, W. E. Hall, John Westlake, Thomas Lawrence, 
and Henry Wheaton) attempted to confer a ‘scientific’ character to the 
discipline (Anghie, 2005: 33-54). Austin’s premise was that law was set by 
sovereign authority. Given the absence of an international authority to 
enforce and regulate the conduct of sovereign states, international law did 
not have the status of law (Cavallar, 2002: 371). At the time when the 
imperial and colonial expansion of international society was at its peak, with 
almost all territories of Asia, Africa, and the Pacific in the process of being 
colonised, positivism replaced naturalism as the ‘principal jurisprudential 
technique of the discipline of international law.’ Positivist jurists ‘sought to 
reconstruct the entire system of international law as a creation of sovereign 
will.’ The only sovereign will they recognised was that of the sovereign states 
that belong to international society, whose practice they considered as the 
only source of international law. Yet, ‘through their racial and cultural 
prejudices,’ these jurists also contributed to the universalisation of 
international law. International law, i.e. European law, applied universally but 
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unequally, playing a role in the subjugation of all uncivilised political 
communities that were not recognised as members of international society 
(Anghie, 2005: 33-54). As Anghie (2005: 67-72) rightly explains, a doctrine of 
assimilation was also developed, so as to bring non-European peoples into 
the realm of international law. Four ‘techniques’ were established in this 
regard: (a) unequal treaties, often signed under the use of force or the threat 
of the use of force, which often ceded sovereignty to Europeans in matters 
such as trade; (b) colonisation not only by conquest but also by a treaty of 
cession or by annexation; (c) the already referred civilised requirements that 
non-European states had to meet; and (d) protectorate agreements. 
In Anghie’s (4-5, 9-10, 38) interpretation of the work of nineteenth 
century international lawyers, non-European political communities were 
‘deemed by jurists to be lacking in sovereignty – or else, at best only partially 
sovereign’. They ‘established’ and ‘maintained’ the dichotomy between 
civilised and uncivilised ‘while refining and elaborating their understanding of 
each of these terms.’ They ‘exclude[d] the non-European world as backward 
and uncivilised’ and ‘elaborate[d]’ a legal framework that justified colonisation 
as a means of accomplishing the civilising mission.’ ‘They were engaged in 
an ongoing struggle to define, subordinate and exclude the native,’ and they 
presented the natives as ‘suitable objects for conquest’ and legitimised ‘the 
most extreme violence against them, all in the furtherance of the civilising 
mission.’ In this logic, positivist jurists or international lawyers were 
instrumental in the expansion of international society. They provided the 
crucial legal instruments through which the members of international society 
subjugated non-European nations, and at the same time forced them to 
adopt European rules, customs and values. 
This narrow focus on nineteenth century international legal positivist 
developments provides an idea of a group of all-powerful international 
lawyers playing a key role in the imperial and colonial expansion of 
international society. Surely the standard of civilisation worked as a 
legitimating element in this process, one that was quite discriminatory and 
humiliating for those accorded the status of uncivilised or semi-civilised. But 
those non-European political communities excluded in juridical terms from 
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the realm of civilisation, had long been excluded from by the practices of 
international society, and did not enjoy of equal rights before the positivist 
turn. By conferring causation to international law, and disregarding how it 
reflects the prevailing morality of international society, Anghie ignores that 
these positivist international lawyers were in fact systematising a long 
established practice in international society. As Schwarzenberger (1955: 215- 
216) noted, beyond the more material aspect of the term civilised, i.e. 
meaning the criteria through which a certain group is considered to be 
civilised, it is prior ethics and morals that are behind the idea of civilisation. 
Moreover, in their eagerness to accord an element of causality to 
positivist international law in the subjugation of non-European peoples, both 
Alexandrowicz and Anghie downplay or ignore considerably the role of 
material power. At least until the second-half of the eighteenth century, 
Europeans’ confidence regarding their own superiority was limited. They had 
to coexist with powerful empires such as the Ming in China, the Persian 
under the Safavids, or the Islamic one in North India. A number of writers, 
thinkers, and travelers of that time, did not describe the Safavid, the Mughal, 
or the Chinese empires as susceptible of being conquered by Europeans, in 
both the material and moral aspects (Darwin, 2008: 51, 117-118). Invariably 
in the work of historians, the nineteenth century represents the height of 
European supremacy (Doyle, 1986: 109-113; Darwin, 2008: 15-17, 94-110), 
not only in terms of economic, technological (O’Brien, 1984) and military 
power (Howard, 1984), but in the capacity and means to project it over long- 
distances through railways, steamships, and a complex web of 
communications. 
Another account of the role of international law as instrumental in the 
perpetuation of international inequality is the one offered by Simpson (2004). 
According to him, the Congress of Vienna represented the first crucial 
constitutional moment in the history of international society which 
institutionalised legalised hierarchies between states.58 In particular, it 
established in international law two categories: (1) the Great Power status 
and the responsibilities in the management of international order associated 
with that status; and (2) the outlaw state, ‘estranged’ from and ‘demonised’ 
by international society on the basis of its ‘moral characteristics or internal 
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politics.’ This does not mean that the norm of state sovereignty did not 
matter. Simpson (2004: 9, ix-xi) emphasises the ‘role of sovereign equality in 
establishing the originating ‘groundnorms’ of the international legal order’, 
and the concern of the Great Powers in ‘willing into existence new legal 
regimes in moments of constitutional crises’, invoking a community of 
interests/the interests of humanity, to ensure their actions were in 
accordance to international law. Most important for our purposes, Simpson 
(2004: 4) characterises this tradition of drawing legal distinctions between 
civilised and ‘exceedingly cruel, uncivilised, and outlaw states’ as ‘De Jure 
Praedae conception of international law.’ In his view, this tradition was 
inaugurated by Grotius in De Jure Praedae, which begins with the following 
words: 
 
 
A situation has arisen that is truly novel and scarcely credible to 
foreign observers, namely: that those men who have been so long 
at war with the Spaniards… are debating as to whether or not, in a 
just war and with public authorisation, they can rightfully despoil an 
exceedingly cruel enemy. 
 
 
Simpson argues that it was the recovery, in the nineteenth century, of 
Grotius’ distinction between civilised and uncivilised states that explains that 
distinction in the international legal order. This legacy of ‘legalised hegemony’ 
would, in his analysis, be a lasting one. In this respect, his argument is quite 
similar to Keene’s (2002) who, as discussed, sees the Grotian tradition as 
responsible for the division of the world in the late eighteenth-early 
nineteenth centuries according to two different conceptions of international 
order, one tolerant and egalitarian, the other hostile and discriminatory. 
The previous chapter has shown how Grotius’ natural law of nations 
conception was a tolerant one, in the sense that it made no discriminatory 
distinction between the inner circle of Christian nations and the outer circle of 
non-European nations. On the contrary, Grotius argued that non-European 
individuals and political communities, regardless of their morals or religious 
beliefs, were rightfully entitled to property and to govern themselves in the 
way they saw fit. Simpson also ignores that the classification of political 
communities as morally inferior was long establishe practice in
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international society. The previous dichotomy between civilised and 
barbarians/savages, was now in the process of being replaced by the 
spectrum civilisation/civilised states-uncivilised/backward political 
communities. Moreover, Simpson disregards an essential aspect of Grotius’ 
work: that he was primarily concern with war and violence that characterised 
his era in Europe and beyond. The passage with which Grotius initiates the 
Jure Praedae is a reference not to the internal/moral characteristic of a state 
(Spain), but to its international conduct in the time of war. In fact, De Jure 
Praedae is essentially a book about justice and morality of war and in war. 
There are no discriminatory passages in it or distinctions between European 
civilised states and non-European uncivilised nations pertaining to their moral 
or internal characteristics. In this sense, De Jure Praedae is the natural 
precursor of Grotius’ more famous De Jure Belli ac Pacis. 
 
 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
 
 
The existence of the concepts of civilisation and civilised in the eighteenth 
century does not mark a significant departure from the previous history of 
international society, characterised by the civilising mission and the 
dichotomies civilised-barbarians/savages. The difference lies in the influence 
and preponderance of the noun civilisation in eighteenth century international 
society. In this sense, it can be argued that there is indeed a notion of 
change. In this period, the concept civilisation not only represented the 
civilising mission and the process away from barbarism/savagery and 
towards civility, but also the shared conscience that the European 
international society formed the realm of civilisation, the clear end point of the 
civilising process. In terms of wider context, it was also noted that the 
reification of the concept of civilisation in eighteenth century Europe 
coincides with the consolidation of international society. In relation to the 
claim that the preponderance of the concept is a product of the 
Enlightenment, it was argued that while such preponderance is indeed a 
feature of the Enlightenment period, and figured highly in the intellectual 
concerns of the major Enlightenment and liberal thinkers, their ideas 
regarding the topic are far from monolithic. By the lateeighteenth-early 
nineteenth century, however, the notion that the whole of mankind was, in its 
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various stages of progress, on the same path towards the end point of civility 
became an influential one. The appearance of the concept backward 
highlights precisely this notion of an on-going process where even the most 
savage and barbarian peoples could gradually be brought into the realm of 
civility/civilisation; they could be transformed in Europe’s image. It implied, in 
all its paternalism and optimism in progress, that there was no uncivilised 
nation or backward peoples that could not be gradually changed and 
civilised; it embodied the opportunity for improvement of all mankind. It 
represented less a dichotomy, and more a spectrum. This also marks a 
certain departure from the previous notion of the civilising mission, in the 
sense that it denotes a greater concern with the fate of those being civilised. 
This, it should be emphasised, is very different from arguing that it proved 
beneficial for the latter. This duty and the optimism to carry it forward, it was 
argued, can be considered as the main legacy of the Enlightenment so far as 
the civilising mission is concerned. 
The standard of civilisation in international law represents the 
systematisation of a long-standing practice in international society. 
Alexandrowicz’s claim that the positivist turn in international law and the 
related standard of civilisation generated a division between civilised states 
and uncivilised nations and the related discriminatory and aggressive 
practices of the former over the latter is highly misleading. Gong’s argument 
that a moral standard already existed in the practices of international society 
before it assumed an explicit juridical character is in line with what was 
discussed. The emergence of the standard of civilisation in international law 
as a result of the positivist turn has to be understood as an expression of 
wider changes in Europe’s political and philosophical scene, which naturally 
reached the science of law as well. It is undeniable that: the criteria of the 
standard were highly political and discriminatory; it was influenced by the 
racist and ethnocentric views of Europeans; represented a humiliation for 
those that were classified as uncivilised or semi-civilised; and worked as a 
legitimating tool in the hands of European empires. However, it is misleading 
to see the standard as a powerful driver behind the expansion of international 
society. It simply marks the systematisation and codification of long-standing 
167  
practice in international society. In this regard, Anghie overemphasises 
considerably the role of positivist international lawyers as instrumental in the 
expansion of international society. The category of outlaw, uncivilised state, 
far from being an outcome of Grotius’ conception of the law of nations as 
argued by Simpson, reflected the growing, shared conscience that 
international society was the realm of civilisation. What had previously been a 
dichotomy between the civilised and barbarians/savages peoples was 
increasingly replaced by a spectrum, with civilised states on one end and 
uncivilised and backward peoples and political communities on the other. 
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Chapter 6 - Backwardness and the Promise of Self-Government 
 
 
 
 
 
I cannot forget that the natives are not represented amongst us, 
and that the decisions of the Conference will, nevertheless, have 
an extreme importance for them. 
 
 
Edward Malet, British ambassador to the Berlin Conference (in 
Bain, 2003a: 11-12). 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
 
 
This chapter looks at the idea of trusteeship in international society and the 
corresponding operationalisation of the norm in different moments of its 
history. It attempts to shed light on the nature of trusteeship, and to unravel 
what kind of motivations and ideological projects were behind what can be 
called the spirit of trusteeship. The aim is to understand how it relates to the 
perpetuation of the idea and category of defective polities in international 
society. 
The first section discusses the re-emergence of the principle of 
trusteeship in the context of the British imperial presence in India, and 
considers the role of Edmund Burke in this regard. We then look at the 
Conference of Berlin (1884-1885), characterised in the literature as 
representing the internationalisation of the norm of trusteeship. The aim here 
is to understand the extent to which the idea of trusteeship and 
corresponding norm were present in the ‘scramble for Africa.’ According to 
Bain (2003a: 1-2, 14-17), this was a time when the ‘justification of empire’ 
relied on ‘the benefit it conferred on the governed’, as Europeans believed 
that they could ‘improve the lives of the world's most destitute and oppressed 
people through direct intervention.’ Thus, in Bain’s analysis, the principle of 
trusteeship was not empty rhetoric, or merely a justification for the pursuit of 
other goals. It represented a true, influential motive behind the civilising 
mission. 
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The following two sections address the institutionalisation of the norm 
through the League of Nations Mandates System, and the United Nations 
(UN) Trusteeship System, the successor arrangement of the Mandates 
System. Regarding the former, we look in particular at the role of two figures 
in the setting up of the Mandates System, Jan Christian Smuts and Leonard 
Woolf. The purpose of these sections is to address two, somewhat divergent 
perspectives regarding ‘the spirit’ of trusteeship. One, subscribed to by 
Anghie (2005: 96-97, 137-156), is that throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, the ‘humanitarian rhetoric’ of trusteeship worked as a 
‘refined’ justification for colonialism, in a time when the administration of 
empire was under more scrutiny than before. With the institutionalisation of 
trusteeship in the League of Nations Mandates System, ‘international law 
built the foundations for and legitimised the next stage of the civilising 
mission.’ That this link of ‘power and responsibility’, based on ‘what it could 
achieve for others’ i.e. the backward peoples, provided ‘enlightened empire’ 
with a powerful justification is a view also shared by Bain (2003a: 1-2, 14-17). 
However, in his perspective, by rendering the backward peoples subjects of 
international law, the norm of trusteeship also provided the backward 
protection against exploitation and tyranny. Similar points are made in 
relation to the UN Trusteeship System. Mazower (2009: 8) describes the 
system as a legitimating tool of the Great Powers, one that institutionalised 
the latter’s domineering views on how ‘the world’s weak and poor should be 
governed.’ Bain (2006: 196) acknowledges the existence of important 
security and strategic interests of the Great Powers, but argues that the 
institutionalised norm of trusteeship did not prioritise the security and 
strategic interests of the Great powers in detriment of the ‘well-being of 
dependent peoples.’ 
 
 
6.2 The Re-emergence of an Idea 
 
 
 
The idea and principle of trusteeship was present in the debates among 
Spanish scholastics and intellectuals in the context of the Spanish conquest 
and colonisation of the Americas. The principle re-emerged two centuries 
later in the East Indies joining, according to Bain (2003a: 17), ‘the best 
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traditions of enlightened empire and the worst traditions of empire seduced 
by theories of racial and neo-Darwinian superiority.’ It gained form in the 
territories of the British East India Company, an enterprise which Edmund 
Burke would denounce as ‘a state in disguise of a merchant.’ The presence 
of the company in the East Indies dates back to the early seventeenth 
century. Initially, it relied on the permissions obtained from the Mughal 
Emperor to established trading posts. The words of Sir Thomas Roe in 1616 
illustrate the policy approach of the Company: ‘Let this be received as a rule 
that if you will profit, seek it at sea, and in quiet trade; for without controversy 
it is an error to affect garrisons and land wars in India.’ At this stage, the 
company’s directors believed that commerce and war and conquest were 
incompatible (Bain, 2003a: 27-28). Since its arrival in India, the company 
maintained naval and military forces designed for protection and to scare 
potential competitors, as well as intimidate less receptive local rulers. 
Nevertheless, in these initial stages the presence of the company was 
marked by peaceful trade rather than conquest and war. It was based on 
permissions granted by the Mughal Emperor and, generally speaking, local 
rulers did welcome the wealth generated by commerce with Europeans 
(Marshall, 2005: 53). According to Bain (2003a: 27-28), things began to 
change when ‘the Mughal Empire entered into a long period of decline’ in the 
last quarter of the seventeenth century. This led the Company to adopt a 
different approach, no longer based on non-intervention. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the notion of decline of non- 
European empires was an important legitimating element of the imperial 
expansion of the members of international society. Surely the spectrum 
civilised-uncivilised/semi-civilised/backward, influenced significantly this view 
of decline of non-European political communities. Yet, to comprehend the 
change of policy of the British East India Company, one cannot ignore the 
events that affected the Mughal Empire and led to its collapse. It is 
consensual not only among historians of European empires (e.g. Doyle, 
1986: 114; Marshal, 2005: 53-57, 121-136; Darwin, 2008: 175-179), but 
among those of the Mughal Empire (e.g. Muzaffar, 1993; Richard, 1995: 1-2; 
Alam and Subrahmanyam, 1998: 59), that the period from the late
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seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth century in the territories of the latter was 
characterised by war, popular upheaval, rebellion and dismemberment.59 
Among the factors associated in the literature with this 
dismemberment, it remains difficult to separate between what are considered 
causes and consequences. These include: (a) constant war; (b) the rebellion 
of important chiefs; (c) Emperor Aurangzeb’s religious intolerance towards 
Hindus (Bain, 2003a: 28); (c) the Iranian, Afghan, and Maratha invasions; (d) 
increasing assertions of autonomy from the Empire’s tributaries; and (e) the 
British, French, and Dutch rivalry in the region and their involvement in the 
conflicts (Darwin, 2008: 163, 176-179). Despite the increasingly belligerent 
and aggressive presence of Europeans, it would be wrong to assume that 
this was the main reason for the collapse of the Mughal Empire. 
Nevertheless, it is evident that this period of instability provided the Company 
with the justification to change policy. 
The Mughal incapacity to defend and hold on to the territories it 
controlled was faced as a threat by the British, given the vulnerability of the 
company’s positions to war and the wills of kings of new emerging kingdoms. 
However, it also represented an opportunity. In 1677, the Governor of 
Bombay, Gerald Aungier, suggested to the company’s Court of Directors that 
‘the times now require you to manage your general commerce with your 
sword in your hands.’ In turn, the Court of Directors instructed the company’s 
agents to ‘maintain and defend against all persons, and govern by our own 
laws, without any appeal to any prince or potentate whatsoever, except our 
Sovereign Lord the King.’ A decade later, Governor Sir Josiah Child 
announced to the company’s employers the need ‘to establish such a politie 
of civil and military power, and create and secure such a large revenue to 
maintain both as may be the foundation of a large, well-grounded, sure 
English dominion for all time to come.’ This strategy was formalised in 1689 
by the Charter granted by King William III. It claimed the dominion of the 
British possessions in India and authorised the Company to ‘raise, train, and 
muster, such Military Forces as shall or may be necessary for the Defence’ of 
the company’s positions. Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, 
the company was able to install their preferred candidates for disputed 
thrones of regional kingdoms; fought successively European (particularly
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French) and local enemies alike; strengthened its own armies composed of 
British and local soldiers; and deposed local leaders who did not favour the 
company’s trading interests (Bain, 2003a: 28-31). 
An important step in this process of transformation from peaceful 
trading positions to an aggressive and belligerent colonial empire was the 
grant of the diwani, by Emperor Shah Alam, in August 1765. It gave direct 
administrative responsibility to the company of the whole province of Bengal, 
assuming control over revenue resources of Bengal as well as of Bihar and 
Orissa, but also the obligation to defend the territory and maintain order. 
There was great surprise among the British public regarding this event, 
although there were little doubts that sovereignty in the East Indies should 
belong to Britain. The question that was asked was whether it should belong 
to the British state or to the company (Marshall, 2005: 135-155). Robert 
Clive, a prominent Company official, remarked in the occasion that ‘so large 
a sovereignty may possibly be an object too extensive for a mercantile 
Company.’ This point marks the beginning of a novel activity for the 
company, the government of large swaths of territory and huge populations. 
The practical result of the company’s rule was disastrous, culminating in a 
famine that struck the Bengali countryside, killing millions (Bain, 2003a: 31- 
32). 
Subsequently, a great controversy arose in Britain, with widespread 
accusations of complete misrule. The North Regulating Act of 1773 passed 
by the British Parliament aimed to prescribe some reforms. It declared that, 
unless authorised to do so, ‘it shall not be lawful’ for the company ‘to make 
any orders for commencing hostilities, or declaring or making war, against 
any Indian princes or powers.’ The opposition to the Act was not based on a 
contestation of the argument of misrule, but on the grounds that it was 
contrary to the chartered rights of the company and an attack of the freedom 
of property and private enterprise. Burke was among those that voted against 
the Act. This attempt to define standards of conduct that should guide the 
company’s actions in India proved mostly fruitless, and its participation in a 
number of controversial wars gave rise to harsher and more widespread 
critiques. As Burke remarked, ‘in its present state, the government of the 
East India Company is absolutely incorrigible.’ He was appointed Chairman 
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of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Affairs of India. 
The Committee was in charge of investigating the allegations and 
accusations of misrule. Its report’s conclusions represented a shattering 
accusation against the Company. The report mentioned that the reforms 
suggested by the North Act had been completely ignored, and recommended 
that the company should be subordinated to the strict supervision of 
Parliament. Another of the Committee’s recommendations was that, in order 
to address the abuses and misrule in India, ‘the prosperity of the native must 
be previously secured, before any profit from them whatsoever is attempted.’ 
In a speech in support to Charles Fox’s motion to supress the company’s 
dominion in India, Burke argued that the British right of dominion was 
dependent on the welfare and prosperity of the natives, and the respect for 
the natural rights of man. He believed that this ‘trust’ had been hopelessly 
damaged, called for the end of the company’s dominion and argued that the 
Parliament should be in charge of the supervision of developments in India. 
As he put it, ‘self-derived rights, or grants for the mere private benefit of the 
holders, ... are all in the strictest sense a trust: and it is the very essence of 
every trust to be rendered accountable, and even totally to cease, when it 
substantially varies from the purposes for which alone it could have a lawful 
existence’ (Bain, 2003a: 32-35). 
The aversion to despotic and centralised power that led Burke to vote 
against the North Act was the same that made him one of the fiercest 
critiques of the company’s rule. He was conservative and imperialist, but 
alerted to the need to respect local customs and traditions instead of the 
imposition of British/European civilisation. As he put it, ‘I never was wild 
enough to conceive, that one method would serve for the whole. … I was 
persuaded that government was a practical thing, made for the happiness of 
mankind, and not to furnish out a spectacle of uniformity, to gratify the 
schemes of visionary politicians.’ His model of empire and colonial policy was 
‘an aggregate of many states under one common head’, where the 
‘subordinate parts have many local privileges and immunities.’ He 
emphasised the existence of moral duties and obligations, especially the 
need to ‘observe the laws, rights, usages and customs of the natives, and to 
pursue their benefit in all things.’ Burke’s interpretation of the imperial
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problems in India and America was the same – ‘the arrogance and 
carelessness of the metropolitan power.’ In his view, the company’s right to 
rule was not an unlimited one, it rested on trust; the company had to be held 
accountable. As he argued, to allow such breaches to go unpunished would 
‘break the faith’ and the ‘indispensable oath’ to which the British rule in India 
was bound, ‘by the eternal frame and constitution of things, to the whole 
human race.’ Burke was a pragmatist. His argument was not only a moral 
one. He was concerned with the viability of empire, and it was also this 
concern that led him to call for the respect of the traditions, customs, and 
manners of the native inhabitants of India (Welsh, 1995: 58-65). 
Although Burke was unsuccessful in his attempt to revoke the 
company’s chartered rights, his and others’ efforts culminated in the passage 
of the India Act of 1784. It did not alter the company’s commercial rights, but 
it defined principles that should guide conduct, in order to ‘secure the 
happiness of the natives.’ In the words of the then Prime Minister William Pitt, 
the company’s rule ‘must chiefly depend on the establishment of the 
happiness of the inhabitants, and their being secured in a state of peace and 
tranquility’ (Bain, 2003a: 36-37). This controversy reached its climax with 
Burke’s move to impeach Warren Hastings, the Governor General of Bengal, 
in 1786. Burke’s accusations against Hastings were based on the moral 
corruption of his rule, which violated all principles of justice and moderation.60 
 
Burke attacked Hastings’ denial of the existence of the ‘law of nature and 
nations, the great and fundamental axioms on which every form of society 
was built.’ He highlighted the equality of European civilisation and the Indian 
people: ‘[the] sun, in his beneficient progress round the world, does not 
behold a more glorious sight than that of men, separated from a remote 
people by the material bounds and barriers of nature, united by the bond of a 
social and moral community.’ As Welsh (1995: 65-66) explains, Burke 
believed that the principles that should guide and apply to the British 
colonists in India were the ‘immutable principles of natural law.’ 
Overall, Burke’s defense of rule based on trusteeship was quite 
influential in shaping British policy in the East Indies. The principle that ‘all 
power which is set over man, and that all privilege claimed or exercised in 
exclusion of them, being wholly artificial, and for so much a derogation from 
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the natural equality of mankind at large, ought to be some way or other 
exercised ultimately for their benefit’, did make its way into the most 
important British imperial debates of the time. Regarding the effects, these 
were visible at times but still limited. As Bain (2003a: 50) puts it, ‘it would be 
an exaggeration to say that the East India Company governed British India 
according to a policy of trusteeship as such.’ While there was some 
noticeable concern in the ground to follow the recommendations from the 
British Government, the imperial expansion often showed a striking disregard 
of those principles. The calls for respect, moderation, and accountability were 
eventually overshadowed by the dominant view of Indian inferiority. John 
Stuart Mill’s famous history of India suggested that India had experienced no 
progress since its contacts with the Greeks and referred to its population as 
‘barbarous’ (Bain, 2003a: 36-45). He described the government of 
dependencies whose population was not ‘in a sufficiently advanced state to 
be fitted for representative government … as legitimate as any other, if it is 
the one which in the existing state of civilisation of the subject people, most 
facilitates their transition to a higher state of improvement’ (Robinson, 1965: 
65). Quite in contrary, Burke believed that the natives of India needed 
protection from the predatory interests of European empires, not 
improvement (Bain, 2003a: 51-52). 
These divergent views of Burke and Mill illustrate the existence of 
important differences between the principle of trusteeship and the civilising 
mission, differences which the literature about the topic has ignored or 
downplayed considerably. Bain (2003a: 50-51) does refer to Burke’s belief 
that ‘the people of India required protection rather than improvement.’ In 
Bain’s interpretation, Burke’s position was that ‘their need for protection 
stemmed, not from a self-incurred condition of ignorance that made them a 
danger to themselves and to others, but from the rapacity, corruption, and 
misrule of the Europeans that lorded over them.’ However, Bain reads this 
essentially as an example of Burke’s conservatism as opposed to others’ 
(Mill included) more revolutionary liberalist aims of changing India’s society 
according to progressive visions of social engineering. 
Trusteeship as envisioned by Burke and by Vitoria for that matter 
was about trust between ruler(s) and ruled; protection of the natural rights of 
176  
native inhabitants and their ways of life from the wrongs and abuses of 
empire a n d  the civilising mission; and the accountability of ruthless 
imperialists and colonists. Moreover, with Vitoria and later with Burke, the 
idea of trusteeship emerged as a reaction to unfolding events that, in 
their view, represented outrageous violations of universal natural rights. On 
the contrary, the mission to civilise was based on the inequality of men and 
the superiority of the civilised over the barbarians, savages, uncivilised or 
backward. It essentially represented the drive towards changing the inferior 
natives, whose political communities were seen as defective, according to 
civilisation’s own standards. As we will see, however, this distinction between 
the rule based on trusteeship and the civilising mission would fade away. 
 
 
6.3 Berlin and the Myth of Trusteeship 
 
 
 
Until the late nineteenth century, European contact with most African political 
communities was very sporadic, and essentially limited to coastal and 
offshore areas. Some exceptions were the Portuguese incursions in Angola 
and Mozambique, the French penetration of Senegal, and British and Dutch 
settlements in the south of the continent. By the late eighteenth century, the 
project to eradicate slavery had gained widespread support in 
international society. A few colonial projects that were announced as 
humanitarian were the British settlement of freed slaves at Sierra Leone in 
1787; the black state of Liberia developed from the settlement of freed 
slaves founded by the American Colonisation Society in 1821; and the 
French settlement of Libreville in 1849 (Bull, 1984a: 99, 101-102). In the 
nineteenth century, the movement in international society to eradicate 
slavery and slave trade was on full-steam. Military posts were established 
in Africa’s coasts with the single purpose of fighting the slavery and the 
slave trade, practices which were not exclusively European. Yet, the 
African practices of slavery were used as a prominent example, including 
by Christian missionary societies, of why Africa and its native inhabitants 
needed to be civilised (Bain, 2003a: 53- 55). Thus, the civilising mission 
had found powerful legitimating grounds in these humanitarian, anti-slavery 
sentiments. 
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In 1876, Kind Leopold II of Belgium founded the International African 
Association in the Congo, of which one of the announced aims was to put an 
end to the slave trade.61 After a successful lobbying campaign by the 
monarch, the United States (US) soon recognised Leopold’s Congo project. 
In an official statement, Secretary of State Frelinghuysen declared his 
country’s sympathy ‘with and approval of the humane and benevolent 
purposes of the International Association of the Congo, administering, as it 
does, the interests of the Free States there established, and will order the 
officers of the US, both on land and sea, to recognise the flag of the 
International African Association as the flag of a friendly Government’ 
(Hochschild, 1998: 80-82). 
Despite Leopold’s ‘humanitarian aspirations’, as Bain (2003a: 68-69) 
sees it, the Congo Free State proved ‘grossly ill-prepared to undertake its 
self-proclaimed mission of spreading civilisation in the heart of Africa.’ He 
notes in particular the utopic nature of this project, given the hostility of native 
tribes, Leopold’s lack of human and financial resources, and the huge 
territory in question. The image of Leopold in Europe at the time was indeed 
one of a philanthropic monarch. He spoke about the goals of ending the 
slave trade, the advancement of science, and the moral uplifting of the native 
inhabitants. Leopold might have been moved by the civilising mission; by the 
idea of transforming the Congo and the native inhabitants. As Leopold 
described in his welcoming speech by the occasion of the first Brussels 
Conference, his enterprise’s purpose was ‘to open to civilisation the only part 
of our globe which it has not yet penetrated, to pierce the darkness which 
hangs over entire peoples, is, I dare say, a crusade worthy of this century’s 
progress’ (Hochschild, 1998: 1, 42-44). Bain (2003a: 69) seems to believe 
that Leopold did have genuine humanitarian intentions beyond the mission to 
civilise and to place the backward natives in the path of progress. However, 
everything suggests that these aspirations could not have been but a façade 
destined to legitimise a personal land-grab of a huge territory. As John A. 
Hobson (1902: 190) noted with a tremendous amount of irony a few years 
later, Leopold claimed that the ‘only program’ for his government of the 
Congo was ‘the moral and material regeneration of the country.’ 
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The accounts of the history of the Congo Free State under Leopold’s 
rule reveal one of darkest chapters of European colonisation. Profit seems to 
have been the ultimate goal. The Belgium presence in the Congo was 
marked by the development of extractive industries (ivory, palm, rubber) and 
the establishment of a massive network of slavery (including women and 
children) to work on those industries. The Protestant and Catholic 
missionaries were used to control the population, many of which ended up in 
the Force Publique, trained to become Leopold’s army. One of the main 
tasks of the force was to fight the slave trade dominated by the 
Arabs/Eastern Africans, who represented the greatest obstacle to the Congo 
Free State’s system of extraction through slave labour. The result was a 
colossal human loss, estimated at the time in several million (Haskin, 2005: 
1-2).62 
 
The colonisation of the Congo happened simultaneously with the 
colonial rivalry among most European powers, with an eye on or already in 
the process of establishing colonies in Africa and penetrating the interior of 
the continent (Bull, 1984a: 108-109). In particular, the attention of other 
European empires had turn to the prospect of finding major sources of raw 
materials (Hochschild, 1998: 27). In this context, the Conference of Berlin 
(1884-1885) was called by Bismarck initially to discuss the European 
(French, Belgium and Portuguese) presence in the Congo, and was attended 
by all European states (except Switzerland) plus Turkey and the US (Bull, 
1984a: 109). According to Bain (2003a: 63), the conference, more commonly 
associated with the partition of Africa, ‘effectively internationalised the idea of 
trusteeship.’63 
 
For Bain, Bismarck’s opening discourse at the conference is ‘more 
suggestive of trusteeship than territorial aggrandizement.’ As the German 
Minister President put it 
 
 
[i]n convoking the Conference, the Imperial Government was 
guided by the conviction that all the Governments invited share the 
wish to bring the native of Africa within the pale of civilisation by 
opening up the interior of that continent to commerce, by giving its 
inhabitants the means of instructing themselves, by encouraging 
missions and enterprises calculated to spread useful knowledge, 
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and by preparing the way for the suppression of  slavery, and 
especially of the over-sea Traffic in blacks (in Bain 2003a: 63). 
 
 
In this passage, there is no reference to the idea or concept of trust or 
trusteeship. Bain’s view of the Berlin Conference as internationalising 
trusteeship is a crucial example of his and others’ (e.g. Hall, 1948: 33) 
conflation of the norm of the civilising mission and the principle of trusteeship, 
often treating them as one and the same. Gong (1984: 76-77) also sees the 
Berlin Conference as a prominent instance where the standard of civilisation 
was reflected on the notion of the ‘sacred trust of civilisation’. In his view, 
European empires were accountable on the basis of the obligations and 
duties towards the dependent peoples. 
Yet, also in the General Act (1885) of the conference, there is no 
reference to the idea or concept of trust/trusteeship. In the 38 articles of the 
document, only Article VI makes reference to the protection of people, 
including not only natives but missionaries and travellers. In this regard, it 
does not conceal the far greater concern with the protection of European 
peoples and interests – ‘Christian missionaries, scientists and explorers, with 
their followers, property and collections, shall likewise be the objects of 
especial protection.’ It reads much more as a reference to the civilising of 
natives than to their protection, as the expression ‘bringing home to them the 
blessings of civilisation’ illustrates. 
In Berlin, the goals of establishing peace and security were closely 
related with the Europeans’ civilising mission in Africa. In this regard, Bain 
(2006: 191) notes that the first justification of trusteeship consisted in more 
than the promotion of ‘the moral and material welfare of people who, on 
account of some infirmity, are incapable of directing their own affairs’ to 
include recognition ‘of the singular importance of security as a condition of 
life in society’. Thus, according to Bain, security constituted a vindicating and 
legitimising element for European rule in Africa, in a logic whereby the 
security of both occupied and occupier was described as a win-win game 
‘against the chronic war and disorders of all kinds.’ The concern with peace 
and security is clearly stated in Article X of the General Act: 
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Being desirous, on the other hand, to obviate the 
misunderstanding and disputes which might in future arise from 
new acts of occupation (prises de possession) on the coast of 
Africa; and concerned, at the same time, as  to the means of 
furthering the moral and material well-being of the native 
populations… In order to give a new guarantee of security to trade 
and industry, and to encourage, by the maintenance of peace, the 
development of civilisation in the countries mentioned in Article 1, 
and placed under the free trade system, the High Signatory 
Parties to the present Act, and those who shall hereafter adopt it, 
bind themselves to respect the neutrality of the territories, or 
portions of territories, belonging to the said countries, comprising 
therein the territorial waters, so long as the Powers which exercise 
or shall exercise the rights of sovereignty or Protectorate over 
those  territories,  using  their  option  of  proclaiming  themselves 
neutral, shall fulfil the duties which neutrality requires.64 
 
 
However, security and peace were essentially a concern among the 
Conference participants as fundamental conditions for trade and the 
extraction of raw materials for European industry. The security of native 
populations was not a major concern in Berlin, nor was it paramount in 
European colonies in Africa in the aftermath of the Conference. As Jackson 
(2004: 35) notes, essential to this conference was the European empires’ 
intention, of not only occupying but of ‘placing on a firm foundation of civil 
administration certain war-torn territories.’ This served as a powerful 
justification to the effective occupation of those territories. 
Regarding the suppression of the slave trade, article IX of the 
General Act stated that ‘each of the powers binds itself to employ all means 
at its disposal for putting an end to this trade and for punishing those who 
engage in it.’ Bain (2006: 191) reads this resolve to abolish slavery and put 
an end to human trafficking as one more example of how the idea of 
trusteeship was present in the partition of Africa. Bain (2003a, 64-64) is right 
to note the international influence of the abolitionist movement. Nevertheless, 
as mentioned before, the African practices of slavery worked as a powerful 
argument for the Europeans’ civilising mission in Africa. Moreover, the 
resolve to abolish the slave trade proved even more destructive to the 
independence of the African political communities than the slave trade itself, 
given that it was instrumental in the imposition of political control by
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Europeans and to the booming in trade of many raw materials and primary 
goods (Bull, 1984a: 107-108). 
The notion that the Berlin Conference internationalised trusteeship as 
a practice in international society amounts to a myth. Revealing enough, the 
representatives of the US did not ratify the General Act, as they considered it 
to be counter to their idea that the African native chiefs had rights in 
international law. As Bull (1984a: 110) explains, this idea was one that ‘the 
Conference declined to endorse, while not explicitly repudiating it.’ 
Trusteeship does not seem to have been a motive or important goal in Berlin. 
The language associated with the idea was absent in the conference. As 
Mayall (2005: 37, 41) rightly puts it, in Berlin the territories to be occupied 
were seen as ‘legitimate prizes of war, and the loyalties – let alone the 
preferences – of the population were not a material consideration.’ Moreover, 
as Bain (2003a: 19-21) recognises, although the Enlightenment ideas were 
hugely influential all over Europe, trusteeship in international society 
remained ‘largely an Anglo-American tradition.’ Essentially, the conference 
successfully minimised the tensions among the partitioning powers over 
conflicting claims in the Congo by setting up guidelines, and provided ‘a 
collective sanctification or legitimisation of the partition process as a whole’ 
(Bull, 1984a: 109-110). 
Although absent in the context of the Berlin Conference, calls for 
accountability and the obligation to protect the natives against the European 
colonisers were still made in the occasion by the British Government, in 
relation to the controversy surrounding the Congo Free State. There was 
very little information in Europe and the US about Leopold’s exploitation in 
the Congo, but the horrors in the region did not go unnoticed. Edmund Morel, 
a British-shipping company official working in Antwerp, became increasingly 
aware of the slave trade and the brutalities going on in Congo. He began to 
work as investigative journalist. He disclosed facts and figures, and became 
one of the most active voices against Leopold’s project. Another detractor 
was Joseph Conrad, who wrote the famous novel Heart of Darkness (1902), 
based on this travelling in Congo. The words of Conrad’s imagined narrator, 
Marlow, became famous: ‘the conquest of the earth, which mostly means the 
taking it away from those who have a different complexion of slightly flatter 
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noses than ourselves is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much.’ 
Morel formed the popular Congo Reform Association, which exerted a 
growing pressure on Belgian, British, and American governments; edited the 
journal West African Mail; and published a huge number of pamphlets, 
books, newspaper articles, and shocking photographic essays. This 
generated a wave of support for his enterprise, not only within Britain with 
investigations by British officials, but also with the creation of affiliates of the 
Congo Reform Association in many other European countries. The issue also 
reached newspapers all over the world. Particularly in the US, it became a 
major controversy. Impressed by Morel’s enterprise, Mark Twain wrote the 
pamphlet ‘King Leopold's Soliloquy’ (1905) in support of the cause. It is 
interesting to note that, despite his efforts to raise awareness about the 
situation in Congo, Morel was not anti-imperialist. He did not oppose British 
colonialism in Africa (Hochschild, 1998: 142-146, 185-195, 206-243). 
The international pressure, particularly from Britain and the US, 
included not only accusations of misrule but calls for a change in 
administration. As a result, Leopold eventually ceded the Congo Free State, 
from this point known as the Belgian Congo, to the government of Belgium in 
1908. Because the independent status of the Congo Free State had been 
recognised in a series of international agreements, the British government 
declared that ‘the Belgian Government is under treaty obligations in regard 
to their treatment of the natives of the Congo.’ It also warned that ‘His 
Majesty’s Government’ would ‘not recognise the annexation until they are 
satisfied that these obligations are in a fair way to be fulfilled.’ It proposed a 
comprehensive program of reform for Congo, including land reform, and the 
destruction of the system of taxation and forced labour imposed on the 
natives. Britain recognised the annexation of Congo by the Belgium 
government, after the latter declared that its rule would aim at achieving ‘an 
immediate amelioration in the moral and material conditions of existence of 
the inhabitants of the Congo, and the extension, as rapidly as possible, of a 
system of economic freedom to the different regions of the vast country 
‘(Bain, 2003a: 71-74). 
The British-led international pressure does illustrate the presence of 
the principle of trusteeship, with calls for the protection of natives and their 
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rights, while noting the existence of obligations and accountability of Belgian 
colonial authorities. To a limited extent, some steps were taken by the 
Belgian Government to correct the situation, but hundreds of thousands of 
natives continued to die as a result of the authorities’ repression (Haskin, 
2005: 2-3, 11-12). In 1924, the colonial authorities undertook a population 
census in Congo, due to a serious concern about the shortage of workers. 
‘We run the risk of someday seeing our native population collapse and 
disappear’, declared the permanent committee of the National Colonial 
Congress of Belgium, ‘so that we will find ourselves confronted with a kind of 
desert’ (Hochschild, 1998: 233). 
 
 
6.4 The Road to Versailles 
 
 
 
The principle of trusteeship was an Anglo-American one, and it would remain 
so up to its institutionalisation in the League of Nations Mandates System 
(Bain, 2003a: 19-21).  In the late nineteenth-early twentieth centuries, as 
Louis (1999b: 7-8) puts it, ‘the British Empire had two, evolving faces, one 
more despotic and repressive, the other moving towards representative 
government.’ The historian J. R. Seeley observed that Britain could be 
despotic in Asia and democratic in Australia. Race still played a significant 
role in distinguishing between those political communities that were fit for 
self-government and the defective polities who were not, i.e. the backward 
peoples. According to Lord Milner, the leader of the movement to strengthen 
the British Empire and the champion of British ‘race patriotism’, there were 
‘two empires’, one non-white and dependent, the other white and self- 
governing. Not coincidentally, by 1910, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
South Africa had all become self-governing (Louis, 1999b: 7-8). An IR study 
published in Britain reflected upon the relations between ‘advanced and 
backward peoples,’ i.e. ‘the peoples of European origin’ and ‘the peoples of 
non-European origin’, a problem which ‘has always been one of the gravest 
that has presented itself to mankind.’ ‘That this difference is one of quality 
and not merely of kind,’ the author argued, ‘is one of the most fundamental 
facts in human history’ (Kerr, 1916: 141-142). 
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In this period, the debate about empire in Britain was particularly 
intense. The Boer War in South Africa generated a wave of criticism towards 
the empire. The conquest of the Dutch South African provinces as the 
outcome of this conflict was one desired by very few in the British 
government, i.e. expansion (Wilson, 2003: 25). It generated worries about the 
possible development of a more aggressive and profit-driven form of empire 
(Owen, 1999: 188-189). Britain lost over 10,000 men and, as Wilson explains 
(2003: 25), ‘only avoided defeat through a policy that combined military 
ruthlessness with the isolation of the civilian population in concentration 
camps.’ In Imperialism: A Study, the economist John A. Hobson (1902: 3) 
made the case that imperialism, together with nationalism, internationalism, 
and colonialism, ‘demand[ed] the closest vigilance of students of modern 
politics.’ His interpretation of Europe’s expansion into tropical Africa as 
motivated by profit gave rise, Louis (1999b:19-20) argues, to a widespread 
misinterpretation of the South African or Boer War as a ‘capitalist plot.’ 
Hobson’s work would influence important theories of imperialism in the 
twentieth century, including those of Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg. There were 
also other, more conservative and romantic visions of empire, as Joseph 
Chamberlain’s – Secretary of State for the Colonies between 1895 and 1903 
– programme of ‘constructive imperialism’ (Owen, 1999: 188-189). 
Nevertheless, as Louis (1999b: 3, 5) explains, in Britain’s Edwardian era, a 
considerable consensus had formed that the purpose of imperialism ‘no 
longer ought to be territorial expansion but the consolidation and greater 
unification of an already massive empire.’65 
The civilising mission had been part and parcel of United States’ 
 
imperial policy since the age of Thomas Jefferson. Beyond the appalling wars 
of extermination of the savages of North America, the US developed a 
tradition of predatory intervention in the affairs of nations in Central America, 
the Caribbean, and the Pacific, based on the idea that the latter were 
incapable not only of self-government but of maintaining free governments. 
As Jefferson wrote in a letter to de Lafayette in 1813, ‘I join you sincerely, my 
friend in wishes for the emancipation of South America. That they will be 
liberated from foreign subjection I have little doubt. But the result of my 
enquiries does not authorise me to hope they are capable of maintaining a 
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free government’ (Westad, 2005: 8-25). The 1904 ‘Roosevelt Corollary’ to the 
Monroe Doctrine asserted the right to intervene in any country in the Western 
Hemisphere suffering from ‘chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which 
results in a general loosening of the ties of civilised society.’ Based on these 
premises, and driven by a range of political and economic interests 
(Coatsworth, 2010: 202), the overthrow of foreign governments remained a 
practice of the US in Central America until the 1920s (Kinzer, 2006: 9-64, 83- 
108). As Coatsworth (2010: 202) notes, it was the rising discontent of Central 
American nations with this constant coercive interference in their affairs that 
led the US to announce a ‘Good Neighbour’ policy towards the region. 
Before the end of World War I, American President Woodrow Wilson 
declared, in the context of the formulation of his fourteen points, that ‘every 
people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live’, and 
that ‘the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for 
their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful 
nations expect and insist upon’ (Schmidt, 1998: 196). For Wilson, self- 
determination was the only mechanism through which stable states could be 
created. Yet the application of this principle of self-determination was as 
selective as Wilson’s political ancestors criteria regarding the nations rightly 
entitled to liberty. His fear of chaos and instability led him to be sceptic about 
the benefits of self-determination of numerous colonies. As Westad (2005: 
16) explains, ‘he saw the European civilising mission as an ultimate failure 
 
that consequently had created potential hotbeds of chaos and anarchy’ and 
thus, his reasoning went, ‘real independence for the colonies would only lead 
to more instability and suffering.’ 
The old dream of a system to stop war was born again in full strength 
at the end of World War I. To avoid the repetition of such tragedy, the 
intermittent conference system characterised by the balance of power would 
have to be replaced by another, more formal arrangement (Northedge, 1986: 
25). Simultaneously, the question of what to do with the colonies of Germany 
and the former territories of the Ottoman Empire assumed the utmost 
importance. Between 1919 and 1923, a series of conferences organised by 
the victors of the war discussed the status and future of some of the 
dependent peoples. Produced in these conferences were the Covenant of 
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the League of Nations, the Peace Treaties which ceded the ex-enemy 
territories to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and a series of 
decisions to be made by the Allied Powers. These included: (a) which ex- 
enemy territories were to become mandates; (b) which territories were to be 
left outside the mandates system; and (c) the terms of the mandates 
(Duncan, 1948: 29-30).66 
According to Anghie (2005: 96-97, 137-158), the Mandates System 
and the humanitarian sentiments of trusteeship worked as a ‘refined’ 
justification for colonialism, in a time when the administration of empire was 
under more scrutiny than before. Thus, ‘international law built the foundations 
for and legitimised the next stage of the civilising mission.’ This next stage 
aimed essentially at economic development, whereby the tasks of the 
mandatory powers was no longer to exploit but rather to civilise the natives, 
and transform their societies through an array of legal and administrative 
techniques. In Anghie’s perspective, this is illustrated by Lord Lugard’s ‘dual 
mandate’, where the basic function of the colony was seen in economic 
terms. In Lugard’s words, ‘[t]he democracies of to-day claim the right to work, 
and the satisfaction of that claim is impossible without the raw materials of 
the tropics on the one hand and their markets on the other.’ In The Dual 
Mandate in British Tropical Africa (1921), Lugard put forward essentially the 
same idea that Chamberlain popularised two decades earlier on the 
economic potential of vast tropical estates (Louis, 1999b: 21). Bain (2003a: 
1-2, 14-17) agrees that this link of ‘power and responsibility’, based on ‘what 
it could achieve for others’ i.e. the backward peoples/nations, provided 
‘enlightened empire’ with a powerful justification. However, Bain (2003a: 107) 
argues that the mandates system, by rendering intentionally the backward 
peoples subjects of international law, ‘afforded them protection against 
exploitation and tyranny.’ 
The Mandates System reflected essentially two compromises. One 
was between Wilson’s ideal of no annexations and the need to avoid the 
potential chaos of nations given independence without, leaders at the time 
thought, being ready (Macaulay, 1937: 10). As Hall (1948: 30-31) explains, 
instead of two other alternatives on the table – annexation or direct 
international administration – the mandates system was chosen as a solution 
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that was supposed to be temporary in character, and would come to an end 
once the various mandated territories were able to ‘stand by themselves.’ 
The other compromise was one between traditional pro-empire motivations 
and another, more complex set of aspirations that aimed to reform and 
eventually dismantle the existing empires. 
The debates and projects about the future organisation date back to 
the early war years, among private individuals and organisations in the 
Anglo-Saxon world. The centrality of Woodrow Wilson in the creation of the 
League is undisputable. Yet, he never took the lead in framing detailed 
proposals for the organisation (Northedge, 1986: 26-27). This is also true 
regarding the Mandates System, about which he drew heavily on ideas, 
plans and drafts of other personalities. As Wilson (2003: 54) explains, ‘many 
plans for the future organisation were debated both officially and unofficially 
at the time, and no single one of these plans proved decisive in building the 
intellectual foundations of the Covenant of the League.’ Nevertheless, the 
ideas of two individuals, Jan Christian Smuts and Leonard Woolf, influenced 
strongly the formation of the League and the creation of the Mandates 
System. There is no better illustration of the sort of compromise agreement 
that the mandates system represents than the comparison between their 
motivations and ideological backgrounds.67 
 
Smuts was the future South African premier, architect of white settler 
nationalism, and member of the Imperial War Cabinet (Mazower, 2009: 30- 
31).68 Smuts (1918: 14) shared Woodrow Wilson’s concerns about how to 
achieve a lasting peace, ‘founded in human ideals, in principles of freedom 
and equality, and in institutions which will for the future guarantee those 
principles against wanton assault’, as he wrote in The League of Nations: A 
Practical Suggestion. He also feared that the premature independence of the 
former German and Turkish territories would only lead to more instability and 
suffering. But Smuts agenda went beyond that. 
For Smuts, self-determination implied granting powers of self- 
government and autonomy according to the degree to which the native 
peoples were prepared to use them properly (Bain, 2003a: 91-92). Smuts 
(1918: 15) saw these colonies as ‘inhabited by barbarians, who not only 
cannot possibly govern themselves, but to whom it would be impracticable to 
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apply any ideas of political self-determination in the European sense.’ 
Regarding the former Turkish territories, Smuts (1918: 16) wrote that there 
was ‘a great deal of variation among them’ in what concerned their suitability 
for self-government. Smuts had a plan for the German territories of East 
Africa, related with the long-held dream of establishing an uninterrupted land 
route connecting Egypt with the Cape of Africa. As talks about the territorial 
settlements were already under way, he expressed the hope that it would ‘be 
borne in mind that East Africa gives us this through land communication from 
one end of the Continent to the other, but that East Africa also ensures to us 
the safety of the sea route around the Cape and the sea route through the 
Red Sed to the East’ (Bain, 2003a: 80). 
Not only was Smuts a fervent supporter of the idea of international 
organisation (Northedge, 1986: 35), he was in fact convinced that the future 
international organisation could become instrumental in ensuring the 
continuation of global white leadership (Mazower, 2009: 9-21). He was a 
believer of white rule over Africa, and thought that The Union of South Africa 
should remain, as Mazower (2009: 21) puts it, ‘within the safety of the 
empire’s embrace’, not only for South Africa’s sake, but for the continuation 
of the civilising mission in the ‘Dark Continent.’ Yet Smuts was not a 
supporter of the League of Nations as direct administrator of any territory 
(Bain, 2003a: 92). In his view, ‘the only successful administration of 
undeveloped or subject peoples has been carried on by States with long 
experience for the purpose and staffs whose training and singleness of mind 
fit them for so difficult and special a task’. Thus, Smuts (1918: 19-21) final 
recommendation regarding this issue was the following: 
 
 
It shall be lawful for the League of Nations to delegate its authority, 
control, or administration in respect of any people or territory to 
some other State whom it may appoint as its agent or mandatary, 
but that wherever possible the agent or mandatary so appointed 
shall be nominated or approved by the autonomous people or 
territory. 
 
 
The approval by the autonomous people or territory never materialised. His 
hope was that, by assuming towards the League of Nations and the 
Permanent Mandates Commission certain obligations – that he thought were 
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already being voluntarily and spontaneously fulfilled in neighbouring British 
colonies – in the mandated territories, the reproach of ‘exploitation’ would be 
removed (Macaulay, 1937: 190). 
Woodrow Wilson admired Smuts plan, which he partly adopted in a 
modified form. Ultimately, Smuts influence in Article 22 of the Covenant that 
spelled out the mandatory system for Germany’s and the non-Turkish 
territories of the former Ottoman Empire was quite evident (Northedge, 1986: 
35-37). Lord Robert Cecil mocked President Wilson’s second draft, saying 
that it looked like ‘Smuts and Phillimore combined, with practically no new 
ideas in it’. Yet, a fundamental difference was that Wilson’s draft extended 
the applicability of the mandates idea to the German colonies (Bain, 2003a: 
93). 
That the Mandates System would become one more method of 
‘soothing to sleep the unquiet conscience of just nations and just men’ was 
what Leonard Woolf feared. Woolf was a former British colonial civil servant, 
a Fabian socialist, and an important figure of the Bloomsbury circle. For him 
empire, as well as the power vacuum that its dissolution would leave behind, 
were potentially as disastrous a threat to mankind as Great Power war. As he 
wrote in his autobiography: 
 
 
The dissolution of the empires of European states in Asia and 
Africa which seemed to me inevitable would cause as much 
misery to the world as war unless the Governments of the great 
imperial powers recognised the inevitability, and deliberately 
worked for an orderly transference of power to their native 
populations, educated for self-government by their rulers (in 
Wilson, 2003: 83). 
 
 
Woolf explored the effects of economic imperialism, which he saw as ‘almost 
wholly evil’, bad for both the colonised and colonial powers. For Woolf, 
behind the evils of economic imperialism was the white settler rather than the 
European state. The only way to prevent more useless violence, war and 
further enslavement of the native peoples, was a responsible colonial 
administration that, through a genuine commitment, would prepare the 
backward peoples for self-government. However, this possibility represented 
a dilemma for Woolf. On the one hand, the modern European state was an 
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instrument of exploitation controlled by ideas and beliefs of economic 
imperialism. On the other, the immediate withdrawal of the European state 
from Africa would most likely make things worse, as it would hand over the 
future of the native peoples to ‘the more cruel exploitation of irresponsible 
white men.’ The solution to this dilemma was a period of transition during 
which the European empires would secure a responsible transition of power 
to the natives. This was the basis of Woolf’s vision for the Mandates System 
(Wilson, 2003: 83-85, 100-103).69 
 
In order to make the system work, Woolf argued, the League would 
have to become an effective force, and not a tool of the Great Powers. This 
would depend on: a) a precise definition of the obligations of the mandatory 
in a treaty; (b) the creation of a permanent commission with ‘very 
considerable powers of enquiry and inspection’; (c) the guarantee of 
‘absolute equality of commercial opportunity, by means of free trade and the 
open door’; and (d) the ability of the League to revoke a mandate if the 
mandatory was found to be in breach of its obligations. The Mandates 
System, according to Woolf, was based on a denial to imperial powers of the 
sovereign rights over trust territories they had acquired, a claim that, 
according to him, had been upheld by ‘Western civilisation and international 
law.’ Woolf defended the extension of the Mandates System to all colonial 
territories, and not only to those that belonged to Germany and the Ottoman 
Empire (Wilson, 2003: 103-104). 
The Woolf-Webb plan, based on Woolf’s book International 
Government was certainly influential in the drafting of the actual Covenant, 
and there are great similarities between both documents. Particularly in 
respect to technical, social and economic function of the League, Woolf’s 
influence was quite direct. Sydney Waterlow, a member of the League of 
Nations Section of the Foreign Office, was asked in the late 1918 to write the 
paper ‘International Government under the League of Nations.’ For this he 
drew extensively from Woolf’s International Government, lifting ‘almost 
verbatim’, according to Waterlow himself, various sections. Much of 
Waterlow’s paper was incorporated into the British Draft Covenant that later 
formed the basis of discussions between the British and US delegations at 
Versailles. Woolf’s ideas also reached US officials, including Colonel House, 
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the delegate to the Peace Conference and a chief architect of the Covenant 
(Wilson, 2003: 4, 53-55). 
Beyond Woolf’s progressivism, quite radical at the time, he was still 
highly paternalistic (Wilson, 2003: 104-105) towards ‘backward peoples’, 
‘non-adult races’, or ‘primitive peoples’, whom he believed were not ready for 
self-government (Wilson, 2008: 156). Yet he rejected this status had to do 
with colour or race, and placed much of the blame for this situation on 
Europeans, who had failed to introduce proper systems of education (Wilson, 
2003: 104-105). In Woolf’s case, there is a clear, progressive change in his 
thoughts regarding empire. This reflects the evolution of his public career and 
especially his intellectual path. From a ‘very innocent, unconscious 
imperialist’, as he would describe himself in his early-career years in Ceylon, 
he would become not only a ‘disillusioned imperialist’, but one of the most 
persistent and clearest voices of anti-imperialism (Wilson, 2008: 148. 154- 
157). As the British public opinion against imperialism rose in the 1920s and 
1930s, Woolf’s anti-imperialist ideas developed in parallel with his work as 
secretary of Labour Party’s Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions, as 
well as his work for the New Fabian Research Bureau, and the Fabian 
Colonial Bureau. Together with Charles Buxton, he drafted the first policy 
document committing the Labour Party to the ‘ultimate aim of a political 
system of self-government in Africa’ (Wilson, 2003: 83-84). 
Once in place, the League of Nations proceeded to clarify the terms 
of the mandates with the mandatory powers, to create the Permanent 
Mandates Commission, and to ultimately put all the parts of the Mandates 
System into full working order (Hall: 1948: 31-31). In order to promote 
international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security, 
article 22 of the Covenant referred: 
 
 
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the 
late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States 
which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples 
not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the 
principle that the well-being and development of such peoples 
form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the 
performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant. 
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This is illustrative of how the security concerns of the Great Powers, and the 
security of those polities seen as defective was included as part of the same 
problem and solution – the Mandates System. Sir Robert Boden noted about 
a debate in the 1919 Paris Conference regarding the future mandated 
territories, namely the question of who was to be the mandatory power 
stationed on their frontier, that ‘all the cases advanced rested upon a plea of 
security’ (Hall, 1948: 122). It should be noted that the League of Nations was 
involved in peacekeeping activities through peaceful means, but in relation to 
inter-state war, or eventual inter-state war. In the Mandates System, 
addressing potential conflicts within the backward territories was a task left 
exclusively for imperial and associated powers (James, 1999: 154-155).70 
 
Regarding the ‘best method of giving practical effect to this principle’ of 
trusteeship, Article 22 stated that 
 
 
the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced 
nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their 
geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and 
who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be 
exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League. The 
character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the 
development of the people, the geographical situation of the 
territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances. 
 
 
A prominent international lawyer, Sir John Fisher Williams, described Article 
 
22 as doing three distinct things, ‘each of outstanding importance’: (1) it 
established firmly in the international sphere the ‘Anglo-Saxon conception of 
the trust… with what may be the beginnings of a system of enforcement’; (2) 
it attacked ‘the authoritarian doctrine of national sovereignty’; and (3) it 
attacked ‘the libertarian dogma of the equality of man’ (Hall, 1948: 45-46). 
The mandates were paternalistically divided into three types, A, B 
and C. The type A referred to the peoples of the Middle East who would be 
able to ‘stand alone’ in a relatively short period of time. The type B mandates 
regarded the peoples of tropical Africa who would require an indefinite 
number of years or decades of economic and political advancement under 
European tutelage. The type C mandates meant that the ‘primitive’ peoples 
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of the Pacific, as well as the ‘Hottentots’ of South West Africa, would most 
likely remain European subjects for the foreseeable future (Louis, 1984: 
201).71 
Beyond Smuts’ influence in setting up the terms of the system, many 
other elements indicate that the institutionalisation of trusteeship worked as 
legitimating tool at the service of imperialism and the territorial ambitions of 
the victors of World War I. Mazower (2009: 140) notes in this regard that the 
main ideology behind the League was an imperial one, in particular the 
British Empire’s vision of global order. According to Owen (1999: 193-194), 
‘the reinvention of imperialism as trusteeship’ was related ‘with financial 
stringency at home in the aftermath of World War I, and a certain crisis of 
authority in the colonial territories.’ Thus, the idea of trusteeship ‘served to 
convert the anti-imperialists of one generation into the imperialists of the 
next.’ Also, the mandates’ idea was confined to the territories of the defeated 
powers, and was not extended to more than 118 colonies and dependencies 
in the world. As Hall (1984: 44) argues plausibly, this reveals the intention to 
divide and rule over the trust territories, while keeping all other colonial 
possessions away from international scrutiny. The very title of the Permanent 
Mandates Commission that supervised the Mandates System should, in 
Macaulay’s (1937: 33) words, ‘have convinced the world that there is nothing 
ephemeral about mandates which apply to backward races, especially those 
of Africa’. The duty of deciding on the mandated territories, defining their 
borders, and naming the mandatory powers belonged to the Allied Supreme 
Council, while the Council of the League was charged with the oversight of 
the administration of the territories once they had been allocated (Hall, 1948: 
33 and 145-146).72 
 
The views of the dependent peoples were not represented in the 
main decisions of the League. Britain and France showed reluctance to 
implement a plan to ascertain, through an investigatory commission to the 
Middle East, the opinion of the native peoples in relation to the Mandates 
System. In response, Woodrow Wilson sent an American commission, whose 
report concluded that the natives demonstrated vigorous antipathy towards 
the system, which they saw as merely disguised annexation (Murray, 1957: 
12-13). While Alfred Zimmern described the League as representing ‘a great 
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political ideal’, others were more sceptical. John Maynard Keynes thought ‘it 
was simply stupid to believe that there would be any room for a principle of 
self-determination except as an ingenious formula for rearranging the 
balance of power in one’s own interests’ (Bain, 2003a: 78-107).73 
Moreover, there is plenty of evidence that the principle of promoting 
the wellbeing of the natives did not correspond to a change of colonial 
practices in the trust territories. The Trusteeship System, together with the 
policy of Indirect Rule, was targeted by the critics of empire.74 Their main 
arguments were twofold: (1) ‘in the territories of east, central, and southern 
Africa, the principle of trusteeship had been discarded for the sake of a 
corrupt alliance between pro-imperial, conservative politicians at home and 
local settlers and capitalists keen to establish white dominion’; and (2) 
‘Indirect Rule had served to retard the colonies’ economic and social 
development’ (Owen, 1999: 195). As Lord Olivier (1929: 4-5) argued, ‘the 
interests of the African natives have not been regarded as paramount, and 
no one engaged in the process has ever pretended they were, or ought to be, 
so regarded.’75  Once World War I was over, serious unrest took place in 
 
mandated territories, as well as other colonies, including Egypt, Iraq, 
Palestine, Transjordan, Sudan, India, Trinidad, British Honduras, Hong Kong, 
and Samoa. These revolts were met by the imperial authorities with a 
ruthlessness and repression that included the use of air power (Clayton, 
1999: 287-290; Northedge, 1986: 203-207).76 
Nevertheless, the principles of protection of native inhabitants, 
accountability of imperial trustees, and international supervision of 
administration were greatly influential (Murray, 1957: 9). The idea of 
trusteeship reflected by these principles exerted increasing pressure – mainly 
from the US and Britain – over imperial powers in the relation to the 
administration of colonies and the treatment of colonised peoples. Even if the 
mandatory powers largely failed to uphold the principles of the Mandates 
System, the very fact that they formally committed to that principle illustrates 
the importance of the idea of trusteeship in international society. Hall (1948: 
47) highlights the factor of conscience in the League, by which the Mandates 
System gradually raised ‘the professed standard of administrative principle to 
the highest common level of human conscience and purpose’. With time, it 
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became harder for the mandatory powers, under scrutiny also at home, not to 
take the issue of the well-being of natives seriously. Had it not been for the 
mandates arrangement, the former territories of Germany and the Ottoman 
Empire would have been divided by the victors as spoils of war, while the 
rights and well-being of the natives would not have been a matter of 
international scrutiny.77 
These humanitarian concerns were also expressed in the functioning 
of the system. According to the League Covenant, the Permanent Mandates 
Commission would receive, examine and question accredited representatives 
of the mandatory Powers about their annual reports regarding the 
administration of the mandated territories. In order to guarantee impartiality, 
the members of the Commission were selected by the Council on the basis of 
personal merit and competence, and were not allowed to hold any office 
which could potentially undermine their independence. As the years passed, 
the respect of the mandatory powers for the Commission grew, and it came 
to enjoy of an independent position and exercise more authority than any of 
the other advisory committees serving the League Council. For example, the 
Commission was in a position to challenge South Africa’s constant 
references to South West Africa as one of its sovereign territories, or to 
pressure Britain to drop its pretensions to take liberties regarding its mandate 
over Tanganykia. The Commission would discuss a wide variety of subjects, 
including the prohibition of slavery, native administration, economic equality, 
the situation of women, study of native languages, public health, and 
education. The Commission also had the special task of conduction an 
inquiry when the natives rebelled against the mandatory power (Northedge, 
1986: 64, 197-201, 217). 
The complex political and moral context that surrounded the 
establishment of the Mandates System suggests that the spirit that witnessed 
the institutionalisation of trusteeship was a mixed one. Anghie seems to be 
correct when he argues that the mandates legitimised the next phase of the 
civilising mission, and reflected a greater emphasis in economic development 
and changing the backward rather than simply exploring them. Nevertheless, 
he clearly overstates the aspect of economic development in detriment of the 
existing fears of political immaturity and potential chaos as a result of
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premature independence in the perspective of the Trustees. Bain’s 
interpretation that the mandates system provided protection against 
exploration and tyranny by rendering the backward peoples subjects of 
international law is also correct. Overall, the Mandates System represented 
the merge of the principle and norm of trusteeship with the norm of the 
civilising mission, and thus it is only possible to understand the true nature of 
trusteeship as present in the Mandates System as reflecting different, even 
antagonistic ideas and motives in international society. On the one hand, it 
meant the perpetuation of colonies and the mission to change the backward 
natives. On the other, it represented the protection of natives and their rights, 
as well as the accountability of empire and its eventual dismantlement. As 
Northedge (1986: 219-220) frames it, ‘looking at it retrospectively from a time 
when the imperialist age is almost universally condemned, the League 
mandates would be regarded as part and parcel of that age.’ Yet ‘within the 
limitations of the times’, it ‘brought the government of at least a portion of 
dependent peoples into the light of the day.’ In this sense, it helped transform 
the climate surrounding colonialism, and contributed to its demise. 
 
 
6.5 The Road to San Francisco 
 
 
 
In the inter-war period, the problem of mandated territories and dependent 
areas was subject to discussion in the US and Britain. The debate was not 
only motivated by concerns of justice, humanitarianism, and imperial 
responsibility, but also by Germany and Italy’s desire to re-join the club of 
colonial powers (Murray, 1957: 23). In Britain, much of the debate centred on 
ways and means of improving the deficiencies in colonial administration. 
Moderate reformers were pushing for faster economic, social, and political 
development and increased technical and financial aid to colonies. Extreme 
conservatives were against all change, whereas some Labour Party 
members and other individuals farther left advocated for the complete 
abandonment of all colonial authority and responsibility. With World War II 
threatening the survival of the empire coupled with growing nationalist 
agitation in India and beyond, it became evident that the colonial system had 
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serious problems. Thus, the reformers’ ideas for colonial policy gained ground 
within government circles (Thullen, 1964: 19-20, 27). 
During World War II, the principle of self-determination gained 
momentum in the colonies and gave nationalist movements a powerful 
instrument with which they could claim their rights against imperial rule. 
Colonial powers had little option but to take into account the demands of 
dependent peoples. This drive towards independence finds its origins before 
World War II. World opinion had been influenced by President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s ‘Four Freedoms’, the Atlantic Charter, and the revolutionary 
ideas that pushed public opinion and governments to think of and debate 
new solutions, that could work as an alternative to the League of Nations, to 
achieve peace, security, as well as economic and social well-being for all 
nations. With the collapse of the League of Nations, the necessity of a 
solution for the international supervision of colonial administration to replace 
the Mandates System became paramount (Thullen, 1964: 19-20). 
By the end of World War II, Europe was destroyed and, as Thullen 
(1964: 11) notes ‘the European colonial empires were crumbling in the face 
of nationalist and independence movements, as well as militant ideologies, 
against imperial rule.’ This anti-empire drive did not arise in the colonies 
alone. The public opinion within the metropolitan countries was changing, 
pressuring their governments to embark upon more liberal programs of 
reform in the colonies. Nevertheless, the possibility of conceding 
independence to all colonies was eventually abandoned. This abandonment 
had as much to do with the prevailing idea that the peoples of most of these 
territories were not ready for self-government, as with the remaining territorial 
ambitions of the colonial powers. Thus, independence gave its place to a 
more conservative plan in direction of international supervision over the 
territories brought within the system, with the goal of self-government. Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill made his views public in Parliament and also at 
the Yalta Conference in discussions with Stalin and Roosevelt: ‘I have not 
become the King’s First Minister in order to watch over the liquidation of the 
British Empire.’ In the words of Mr. Stanley, the British Colonial Secretary in 
1943, ‘the administration of British colonies must continue to be the sole 
responsibility of Great Britain.’ Disagreeing with the American plans for
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independence, the British defended the solution of self-government within the 
Empire. Also the French were reluctant about any considerable changes to 
the Mandates System. Moreover, both Britain and France opposed any 
system that would include all dependent territories (Murray, 1957: 27). 
Influencing the British position was the hope that the empire could stimulate 
the depressed British economy (Louis, 1999a: ix). 
In the years that preceded the San Francisco Conference, there was 
a divergence in the US between the State Department and the War and Navy 
Department regarding the latter’s desire to keep a few of the Japanese 
mandates of the Pacific islands. The War and Navy Department saw those 
islands as strategically important, and wanted to exempt them from the future 
system and placed them under direct control of the US. The State 
Department opposed this project and made the case for trusteeship for fear 
that the position defended by the War and Navy Department would 
undermine the credibility of the Atlantic Charter (Murray, 1957: 29). 
In April 1945 in San Francisco, the Big Five plus Australia submitted 
their respective ideas and proposals regarding trusteeship. The issue of the 
basic objectives of the system was delayed due to the discussion over the 
possibility of adding the reference to ‘independence’, according to the 
Chinese and Soviet proposals, which faced British opposition, with American 
trying to reconcile the two positions (although siding with the British on the 
whole) (Murray, 1957: 23-24, 31-38). The controversy regarding whether the 
objective of the system ought to be ‘self-government’ or ‘independence’ was 
resolved through a Chinese compromise proposal, by which the objective of 
independence was linked to the phrase ‘as may be appropriate to the 
particular circumstances of each territory and its people’. This compromise 
worked as an assurance to colonial powers that their empires, as Thullen 
(1964: 12, 48) puts it, ‘would remain intact and that their colonies would be 
able to develop toward self-government within a commonwealth-type 
relation’. Thus, the new Trusteeship System would provide the mechanism 
through which the dependent territories could eventually obtain 
independence ‘through evolutionary rather than revolutionary methods.’ 
In the first session of the UN General Assembly, the desire to set up 
the Trusteeship Council was expressed unanimously. In response, the
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delegates from the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Belgium all 
indicated their countries’ willingness to place their mandates territories under 
the Trusteeship System. In doubt remained the mandated areas under 
control of France, who indicated that it would study arrangements for placing 
her territories under trusteeship; the Union of South Africa, who stated that it 
would consult the indigenous population of South West Africa; and the US, 
who remained silent about the Pacific islands previously mandated to Japan 
and now under its military control. In the final vote, the only states voting 
against the agreement were the Soviet Union (USSR) and the other 
Communist-controlled countries plus Liberia. Thus the agreements for New 
Guinea, Ruanda-Urundi, Western Samoa, Tanganyika, British and French 
Cameroons, and British and French Togoland were approved (Murray, 1957: 
51, 72-73). 
The trusteeship provisions were included in the UN Charter in 
chapter XII, which outlines the general system, and in chapter XIII, providing 
for the Trusteeship Council. Moreover, chapter XI contains a Declaration 
Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories that refers to all dependent 
territories inside and outside the trusteeship system (Murray, 1957: 43). As 
with the Mandates System, the future trust territories were also divided into 
categories, but instead of adopting criteria that obeyed to different stages of 
political and economic development of each territory, the Trusteeship System 
divided the territories into strategic and non-strategic areas. This 
arrangement would apply to three types of territories: (a) former Mandates; 
(b) ex-enemy territories; and (c) territories voluntarily placed under the 
system by states responsible for their administration. For a territory to be 
brought under the system and for Chapters XII and XIII to come into effect, a 
trusteeship agreement had to be concluded, as explained in articles 75 and 
77 of the Charter (Toussant, 1956: 39, 54-56, 77). 
Article 76 of the Charter sets the basic objectives of the Trusteeship 
System: 
 
 
1 – to further international peace and security; 
2 – to promote the political, economic, social, and educational 
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their 
progressive      development      towards      self-government      or 
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independence as may be appropriate to the particular 
circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely 
expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be 
provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement; 
3 – to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of 
the peoples of the world; and 
4 – to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial 
matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, 
and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of 
justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing 
objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80. 
 
 
Article 76 is another example of the centrality that security occupied in the 
minds of the architects of the Trusteeship System. To guarantee these 
objectives, and for purposes of local defence and maintenance of law and 
order within the trust territory, the administering authority could make use of 
the resources of the trust territories. This arrangement, as Toussant (1956: 
54-55) explains, gives an active role in the application of enforcement 
provisions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
Although he acknowledges the importance of Great Powers’ security 
and strategic interests surrounding the UN Trusteeship System, Bain (2006: 
196) observes that ‘it would be a mistake of some considerable magnitude to 
suggest that these institutionalised forms of trusteeship subordinate[d] the 
well-being of dependent peoples to the argument of national or international 
security.’ Mazower (2009: 8) is more sceptical and argues that many 
commentators at the time of the San Francisco Conference expressed a 
more wary view of the UN than historians today tend to. These commentators 
‘saw the universalising rhetoric of freedom and rights that surrounded the 
creation of the organisation all too partial, a veil masking the consolidation of 
a greater power directorate that was not different from the Axis powers, in its 
imperious attitude to how the world’s weak and poor should be governed.’ 
Regarding the proclaimed concern with the status of all peoples, Gladwyn 
Jebb, a British civil servant, praised the ability of his American colleagues to 
‘delude human rights activists in San Francisco into thinking that their 
objectives had been achieved in the present Charter.’ In particular, Mazower 
(2009: 9-21) highlights the influence of General Smuts in helping to draft the 
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UN’s preamble. The US State Department officials who met in 1942 to draft 
the outlines of the future organisation found Smut’s The League of Nations: A 
Practical Suggestion ‘surprisingly apt today’. 
While US officials expressed openly their opposition to colonialism, 
and exerted increasing pressure to the granting of self-government to the 
colonies, their position regarding the issue was often ambiguous. The same 
applies to the USSR (Plamenatz, 1960: 27). From its early stages, as Murray 
(1947: 79) notes, the Trusteeship system ‘did not escape the East-West 
struggle.’ Generally, the USSR was supportive of all national movements of 
revolutionary character as a means to achieve the end of fighting imperialism 
and contribute to the destruction of capitalism. Nevertheless, while their 
position regarding the League of Nations Mandates had been one of hostility 
towards an instrument of ‘exploitation and oppression of colonial countries’, it 
took a different, more positive attitude about the Trusteeship System plans 
being elaborated in the US during World War II. The USSR considered these 
plans an improvement when compared to the Mandates System, given that it 
explicitly provided for self-government and, implicitly, for independence of 
trust territories. They also wanted to be closely associated with the 
elaboration of the trusteeship provisions contained in the UN Charter, and 
secure membership of the future Trusteeship Council as to ensure direct 
influence over the Council’s policies. Furthermore, the USSR hoped to 
acquire one of the Italian colonies in North Africa as a trust territory (Thullen, 
1964: 44). 
The changed power relationships and the rise of determined anti- 
colonialism were an obstacle that prevented Britain and France from exerting 
the kind of extensive influence over the Trusteeship System they had been 
able to the case of the League of Nations Mandates System. At San 
Francisco, however, the non-colonial powers failed to guarantee the support 
of the US, who had its own territorial ambitions over the Japanese mandates 
islands in the Pacific. The US considered the Pacific islands vital to American 
defence. This led President Truman to announce that the US government 
would submit a trusteeship agreement ‘for any Japanese islands for which it 
[had assumed] responsibilities as a result of the Second World War’. The US 
declared its willingness to accept all obligations involved, as long as it
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remained the sole administering authority and retained exclusive military, 
naval and right rights in the islands. Through its veto power in the Security 
Council, the USSR explored the US territorial ambitions in the Pacific by 
persistently demanding a territory in North Africa, namely Tripolitania. These 
pretensions had been made at Potsdam (July 1945) by Stalin, and later 
renewed by Molotov. Faced with American and British opposition, the USSR 
changed its plan to advocate a joint Soviet-Italian trusteeship, and then an 
Italian trusteeship, with the hope that it could indirectly control the ex-Italian 
colony through a Communist-dominate government in Italy. In the end, the 
USSR voted in favour of the US trusteeship proposal for the Pacific islands 
(Thullen, 1964: 49, 57-60). 
In his opening speech before the Trusteeship Council on March 26, 
1947, UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie remarked that a ‘successful 
Trusteeship System will afford a reassuring demonstration that there is a 
peaceful and orderly means of achieving the difficult transition from backward 
and subject status to self-government or independence, to political and 
economic self-reliance’ (Thullen, 1964: 16). In terms of the functioning of 
system, each trusteeship agreement had to be drawn up by the ‘states 
directly concerned’, and then approved by the General Assembly or the 
Security Council, depending on whether the trusteeship territory was 
considered strategic or nonstrategic. Yet there were no objective criteria to 
define this. By arbitrarily classifying a territory as strategic, the administering 
authority would be able to close some areas of the territory to international 
inspection, and instead of being subject to the supervision of the General 
Assembly, the administering authority would respond to the Security Council 
(Murray, 1957: 43, 77-78). 
Nevertheless, the Trusteeship System included a few improvements 
regarding the obligations it ought to fulfil when compared to the League of 
Nations Mandates System. The idea that the trust territories would eventually 
achieve full independence in a time frame that did not involve a few centuries 
was an established one (Northedge, 1986: 196). The Council members 
consistently referred to the attainment of ‘self-government’ or ‘independence’ 
as the goal of the system, and the General Assembly constantly called for 
special reports on the trust territories with specific reference to the
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achievement of political maturity. According to the UN Charter, only as long 
as the people of the trust territory consented, the political advancement 
towards independence could take the form of self-government within a larger 
political entity such as the British Commonwealth or the French Union 
(Murray, 1957: 211-214).78 
Moreover, two important aspects distinguish the Trusteeship System 
 
from its predecessor. The inhabitants of the trust territories could submit 
petitions to make their viewpoints represented at the Trusteeship Council. 
Also, according to Article 87 of the Charter, both the General Assembly and 
the Trusteeship Council could provide for periodic visiting missions to the 
trust territories. There were, however, crucial limitations to this mechanism. 
The visiting missions would have to have the consent of the administering 
authority and, more important, the distinction between strategic (under the 
wing of the Security Council) and non-strategic areas dictated that, in relation 
to the former, the administering authority could close any areas for ‘security 
reasons.’ Yet the visiting missions, together with the petitions, did achieve 
palpable results. A good example is the visiting mission set up in response to 
a petition from local leaders of Western Samoa requesting that the territory 
be granted self-government, with the advice and under the protection of New 
Zealand. It recommended to the Council a number of changes in the 
administration of Western Samoa, according to which the people of Western 
Samoa should be granted a greater measure of self-government (Murray, 
1957: 150, 176-181). 
 
 
6.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
 
 
This chapter has illustrated how the idea and principle of trusteeship 
emerged in the context of the actions of the British East India Company. In 
particular, it has looked at Burke’s central role in raising the issues of 
protection of the rights of native inhabitants against the Company’s 
belligerence and misgovernment, which he saw as gross violations of the 
universal natural rights of man. Although the principle of trusteeship had 
limited effects over the actions of the Company, the notions of protection of 
native inhabitants and their customs, as well as the accountability and
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obligations of colonialists permeated to a great extent the political debate 
about empire in Britain. The differences between the principle of trusteeship 
and the norm of the civilising mission, as reflected in the views of Burke and 
Mill, were also addressed. While the former, in Burke as in Vitoria, was about 
protection of the natives, respect for universal natural rights of man, and 
accountability and restraint of empire, the latter represented the drive to 
civilise and change backward peoples and nations according to the 
standards of civilised society. 
The second section has challenged the argument, quite established 
in the literature, that the Berlin Conference represents the institutionalisation 
of trusteeship. The language and corresponding notions of trust, trusteeship, 
protection of the natives and their morals and customs, and accountability of 
the colonisers were notoriously absent from the General Act of the 
Conference. Instead, the Conference worked as a collective endorsement, by 
international society, of the civilising mission in Africa. The civilising mission, 
including the abolition of slavery was not only a motivation in itself but it 
worked as a legitimating argument for the achievement of other aims by the 
European powers. Nevertheless, the principle of trusteeship was still raised 
in the context of the partition of Africa. In this regard, the work of Morel was 
vital to raise awareness about the horrors taking place in Leopold’s Congo 
Free State. The rise of an international movement with epicentre in Britain 
and the US against Leopold’s misrule and right to govern that territory 
eventually led to the transfer of that right to Belgian authorities. 
The institutionalisation of principle of trusteeship in the League of 
Nations Mandates System represented more than an attempt by pro- 
imperialists to legitimise the civilising mission, related with the still powerful 
colonial ambitions in international society and the fear that the backward 
nations’ pre-mature independence would result in a chaos that would 
represent a threat to international peace and security. It was also more that 
an effort by the critics and sceptics of empire to protect the backward 
peoples, and place their destinies under the scrutiny of international opinion 
and international law. It was a complex compromise that represented 
conflicting ideas and motivations at play, not only between different views 
regarding the status of backward peoples and nations, but one between 
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conflicting visions about empire and its future. In this context, the idea of 
trusteeship and the civilising mission became part and parcel of the same 
project institutionalised in the Mandates System. 
The UN Trusteeship System owes much to the Mandates System, 
and both were characterised very much by the same debates and questions. 
The re-institutionalisation of trusteeship represented the claim, largely 
shaped by the strategic and imperial interests of the Great Powers, that the 
backward were still not yet ready for self-government. Yet it also embodied 
the notion that independence would have to follow very soon. This higher 
prominence of the promise of self-government in the Trusteeship System 
when compared to its predecessor reflects the considerable ground that the 
idea of self-determination had gained in the inter-war period. It also meant 
that the argument about the backward status of certain peoples or political 
communities was under increasing scrutiny and ever harder to sustain in 
international society. 
Finally, it should be noted that, as the claim about the backwardness 
of the trust territories became harder to sustain in international society, and 
the prospects of granting self-government to all backward peoples and 
territories became ever more likely, the project of transforming those 
territories into states in the image of the imperial centres gained further 
ground. Thus, through the institutionalisation of trusteeship, building 
sovereign states with effective institutions was applied by the empires in the 
mandated and trust territories as the only possible alternative to imperial and 
colonial domination (Reus-Smit, 2011: 211). 
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Chapter 7 - Underdevelopment in a Universal International Society 
 
 
 
 
 
The division of the planet between North and South, between rich 
and poor, could become as grim as the darkest days of the Cold 
War. We could enter on an age of festering resentment, of 
increased resort to economic warfare, a hardening of new blocs, 
the undermining of cooperation, the erosion of international 
institutions – and failed development. 
 
 
Henry Kissinger, 1975 speech to the Seventh Special Session of 
the UN General Assembly (in Donaldson, 1981: 359). 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
 
 
During the nineteenth century the concepts of uncivilised and backward were 
the most prevalent expressions of the idea of defective polities. The latter 
remained so up to the end of World War II. Yet, the aftermath of the war 
would witness the demise of the claim that certain peoples and nations were 
backward. This period would also witness the universalisation of the 
principles of self-determination and state sovereignty. The purpose of this 
chapter is to understand the extent to which the idea we are concerned with 
survived during the Cold War, despite an international normative setting that 
was naturally hostile to its perpetuation. 
The first section illustrates the demise of the concept of backward, in 
the context of the universalisation of the principles of self-determination and 
state sovereignty. The following section aims to understand if there was 
another concept(s) that came to replace the backward in expressing the idea 
of defective polities. Therfore, we look at the emergence of the concept of 
Third World underdeveloped states, and at how the new sovereign states this 
concept referred to shaped the international debates about the issue and the 
concept itself. 
The remaining of the chapter aims to comprehend the functions of 
the concept of Third World underdeveloped states in the context of the Cold 
War. This global competition unfolded essentially into two, interrelated
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dimensions, both of which reflected the two superpowers’ visions of how the 
new states of international society should be governed. One dimension was 
the competition to export the antagonistic models of development promoted 
by the two superpowers. The other was a rivalry that played out in the 
security and strategic fields, with the Third World as the stage. In this regard, 
according to a number of scholars (e.g. Halliday, 1989: 16; Gaddis, 1997: 
154; Westad, 2005: 5), the global rivalry and competition for power and 
influence between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR) is 
filled with imperialist, paternalistic, and universalistic overtones. 
 
 
7.2 The Demise of the Backward Claim 
 
 
 
The years that followed the San Francisco Conference and the setting up of 
the United Nations (UN) Trusteeship System would witness an increasing 
mobilisation against the idea that certain peoples and nations were 
backward, and thus not ready for self-government.79 A number of 
developments help to understand this changing international environment. In 
the inter-war period, the horrors and destruction of the war in Europe 
contributed to demise of the idea of civilisation as essentially European- 
centred and white. After World War II, the notion of white predominance and 
superiority was decisively challenged, and all doctrines that justified racial 
discrimination lost their moral ground. Certainly, racial politics and 
discrimination did not vanish but, as Vincent (1984b: 239-241) argues, the 
post-World War II period does represent a dramatic departure ‘from the 
previous notions of a biological hierarchy among different human types.’ A 
prominent example of this is the increasing international pressure, particularly 
in the UN realm, over South Africa’s race-based policies (Mazower, 2009: 
26). 
The revolt against ‘Western dominance’ grew in intensity after World 
War II, with the struggle for formal independence by the peoples of Asia, 
Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (Bull, 1984c: 220-223). Yet the 
abandonment of the idea of empire did not happen simultaneously in all 
European colonial powers. In fact, most European colonial powers revived 
their imperial appetite after World War II. Illustrative of how the imperial will 
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was not a spent force in Europe was the British-French-Israeli invasion of the 
Suez in 1956. Justified as a response to the nationalisation of the canal, the 
underlying aim of the intervention was the removal of a dissenting Nasser 
from power (Kyle, 2003: 148-152). 
According to Vichy, the empire was ‘the last card France has left to 
play.’ De Gaulle pointed the same way: ‘Is our defeat final? No… For France 
is not alone! She is not alone! She has behind her a vast empire.’ The project 
of recovering France’s political prestige through empire was also supported 
by the political left. When the Algerian rebellion was already under way, 
Jacques Soustelle defended that ‘to abandon Algeria’ would amount to 
‘condemn France to decadence.’ The liberal intellectual Albert Camus 
believed that Algerian independence was an illusion that would only lead to 
subjugation by a rival imperialism. In the words of François Mitterrand, 
‘without Africa, France will no longer have a history in the twenty-first 
century.’ In the early 1960s, however, France quickly adjusted to the new 
world order and the colonial consensus had disappeared by 1962. Among 
the reasons pointed out for this change of spirit were the realisation that 
France could not win in Algeria and the influential intellectual attack on 
ethnocentrism (e.g. Claude Levi-Strauss’s 1952 Race et Histoire). Four years 
after the loss of Algeria, French decolonisation was a fact (Andrew, 1984: 
336-341).80 As late as the 1950s, the Portuguese still attempted to justify 
 
their colonial rule in Angola through a description of ‘the raw native’ as 
backward, an ‘adult with child’s mentality’, and held to their African colonies 
until 1975. Also in the 1950s, the Belgians claimed that ‘the majority of 
Congo’s population does not have an idea of what effective government is all 
about.’ The Dutch, who did not have the means to retake Indonesia on their 
own, were assisted in this endeavour by British and Australian troops (Van 
Creveld, 2004: 326). 
Regardless of the Suez episode, the post-war period witnessed an 
acute transformation of British colonial policy, with the definitive replacement 
of Indirect Rule by a strategy, directly led by the Colonial Office, aimed at 
‘democratising the empire’. The goals were the ‘political advancement’ of the 
colonial territories, by pushing them towards self-government as soon as 
possible, while consolidating British links with the future ex-colonies in order 
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to keep them within the Commonwealth. A sensitive issue in this regard was 
the attempt to reconcile the demands of African nationalism with the interests 
of the white settlers in the African continent (Louis, 1999b: 22).81 According 
to H.T. Bourdillon, assistant secretary and later a deputy UK commissioner in 
Singapore, the British Colonial Officials saw themselves engaged in a 
‘gigantic experiment, a worldwide experiment in nation building.’ He 
described this process as ‘the boldest stroke of political idealism which the 
world has yet witnessed and on by far the grandest scale’ (Hyam, 1999b: 
276-277). As the Colonial Office declared in 1948: 
 
 
The fundamental objectives in Africa are to foster the emergence 
of large-scale societies, integrated for self-government by effective 
and democratic political and economic institutions, both national 
and local, inspired by a common faith in progress and Western 
values and equipped with efficient techniques of production and 
betterment (in Hyam, 1999b: 276-277). 
 
 
This statement is a clear illustration of the application by the British 
government, to all colonial territories, of one of the central notions behind the 
establishment of the UN Trusteeship System: the project of civilising the 
backward and place them on the path of progress and towards self- 
government. Thus, at the time when the drive towards self-determination was 
becoming harder to halt, building states and state institutions in the image of 
the metropolitan centre was applied by the British as the only possible future 
alternative to imperial control (Reus-Smit, 2011: 209). 
After 1945, the US and the USSR adopted rather ambiguous 
positions regarding empire and decolonisation (Reus-Smit, 2011: 212-213). 
In the inter-war period, the Bolsheviks’ support for the struggles for national 
liberation only made an impact in Asia (Lowenthal, 1984: 324-326). Stalin’s 
alliance with European imperialist powers against Nazi Germany was an 
obstacle for the former’s support for anti-imperialist movements (Bull, 1984c: 
225). When the Cold War was already taking shape, in 1947, the USSR re- 
adopted its general anti-imperialist campaign. At this point, however, Stalin’s 
recovery of the doctrine that a Communist leadership was the crucial 
condition for independence of former colonies generated tensions between 
the USSR and the leadership of the new states. It was only during the 
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Khrushchev period (1954-1964) that Soviet policy would have a greater impact 
on the Third World (Lowenthal, 1984: 324-326). 
American support for decolonisation was not always unconditional, 
particularly when placed against strategic goals and superpower rivalry 
(Louis, 1999b: 29). The US was also interested in guaranteeing access to the 
natural resources of British, French and Dutch colonies, namely oil, minerals 
and other raw materials, which were important both for the US and for the 
reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan (Painter, 2010: 486). Although 
internally it was not a consensual approach, the US helped Britain with its 
colonial expenses, including military ones, and eased the pressure for 
decolonisation in exchange for British assurances of ‘modernisation’ and 
‘democratisation’ of the empire (Louis, 1999b: 29-30). Likewise, the US 
supported financial and militarily the French in their attempts to restore their 
colonial rule in Indochina (Van Creveld, 2004: 326). 
Nevertheless, the European empires were no longer able to block the 
drive towards universal self-determination. In October 1945, the fifth Pan- 
African Congress that took place in England brought together the future 
leaders of almost all decolonised British Africa, as well as African-American 
and Afro-Caribbean delegates. The congress condemned imperial economic 
exploitation and called for the freedom of the colonies as ‘the first step toward 
and necessary prerequisite to complete social, economic and political 
emancipation’ (Bradley, 2010: 466, 471). This declaration represented a clear 
attack against the idea of conditional self-determination that was at the basis 
of the concept of backward. The rebellion of the colonised peoples, now in 
the form of diverse nationalist movements, directly shaped the post-1945 
independence wave. It started in Asia, namely with India’s independence in 
August 1947 (Krishna, 1984: 269), soon followed by the proclamation of the 
Chinese People’s Republic in 1 October 1949 (Bull, 1984c: 221). As Jackson 
(1993a: 136) highlights, in 1945 there were only three sovereign states in 
Africa south of the Sahara: Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa. In 1960, when 
the French empire was dissolved, the result was the creation of thirteen 
Francophone states, plus Nigeria, Zaire, Madagascar, Togo and Somalia. 
Twenty years later, only Namibia was still subject to alien rule. Founded by 
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50 states in 1945, by 1960 the UN’s membership numbers had more than 
tripled (Jackson, 1990: 15). 
Particularly after the big wave of independence of the late 1950s- 
early 1960s, the state became the instrument that the leaders of Asia, Africa, 
the Caribbean and the Pacific used to advance their anti-colonial purposes of 
overriding the old, Western-dominated international order (Reus-Smit, 2011: 
207). The elites of the new states used the idea of nationalism as an anti- 
colonial instrument. In Africa, the natural eagerness of nationalists of the likes 
of Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, and Sékou Touré to seize power led 
them, as Jackson and Rosberg (1982: 15) put it, to ‘brush aside Africa’s 
heterogeneous political heritage, and take over the control of the states that 
had been defined politically and geographically by the Europeans.’ These 
borders were adopted officially by the Organisation of the African Union in 
1964, during the Cairo Summit. The resulting resolution stated that ‘the 
borders of African States, on the day of their independence, constitute a 
tangible reality’ (OAU, 1964: 17). Nevertheless, the formal sovereign 
character of most of these new states contrasted deeply with their 
attachment to traditional practices and institutions, including tribal and ethnic 
identities (Jackson, 1993a: 140).82 
 
The transformation of the moral climate in international society was 
accompanied by the change in the legal one. The actions of the leaders of 
the recently independent states greatly contributed to this changing scenario. 
The leaders of the nationalist movements formed the Afro-Asian movement, 
the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Group of 77. They commanded the 
majority of votes in the UN General Assembly, and claimed to represent the 
majority of the world’s population (Bull, 1984c: 227). These efforts were also 
expressed in numerous documents, including: (a) the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (1948), which provided a powerful vocabulary to construct 
anti-colonial claims (Bradley, 2010: 471-472); (b) the 1960 Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples; (c) the 1965 resolution 
recognising the right to use force in a war of national liberation; and (d) the 
1974 Declaration of a New International Economic Order (Bull, 1984c: 227). 
The UN General Assembly’s Resolution 1514 of 1960 (the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples), under 
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Chapter XV of the Charter, institutionalised the principle that dependent 
peoples were entitled to determine their own destiny without pre-conditions, 
be it political or economic. This represented a fatal blow to the backward 
claim that constituted the basis of the UN Trusteeship System (Bain, 2003a: 
143). Point five of the resolution was quite explicit regarding the un- 
conditionality of self-determination: 
 
 
Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing 
Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained 
independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those 
territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance 
with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinctions 
as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy 
complete independence and freedom. 
 
 
Adopted by a vote of 89 to 0, with only 9 abstentions, the resolution declared 
that the ‘inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational 
preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence’ 
(Jackson, 1999: 143). In this context, the Trusteeship Council was rendered 
almost obsolete. 
In principle at least, state sovereignty was no longer contingent or 
dependent of conditions or standards set out by Europeans and peoples of 
European descent. As Jackson (1990: 16-17) puts it, the universalisation of 
the principle self-determination determined that the only condition to be a 
sovereign state was to ‘have been a formal colony.’ Resolution 1514 comes 
in the sequence of previous initiatives, such as the Montevideo Convention of 
26 December 1933 – The Convention on the Rights and Duties of States – 
which seek to ensure the unconditional right to statehood by claiming that 
‘the rights of each one do not depend upon the power which it possesses to 
assure its exercise’ (Foreign Policy, 2010: 21). The Convention was signed 
and ratified by the US and a number of Latin American States. Its Article I set 
out the basic criteria for statehood: ‘(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined 
territory; (c) a government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other 
States’ (Crawford, 2006: 45-46). The view that the right to statehood did not 
depend on the power of the state to assure the exercise of sovereignty 
obtained further legal support in 1963, with the UN Security Council
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resolution 183. It acknowledged formally the interpretation of self- 
determination laid down in General Assembly resolution 1514 (Bain, 2003a: 
135). 
Despite these developments, various figures from the political and 
intellectual spheres suggested that the imperial age was not really over. In 
Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (1965), Kwame Nkrumah 
argued that the ‘neo-colonialism of today represents imperialism in its final 
and perhaps its most dangerous stage.’ As he put it: 
 
 
Neo-colonialism is based upon the principle of breaking up former 
large united colonial territories into a number of small non-viable 
States which are incapable of independent development and must 
rely upon the former imperial power for defence and even internal 
security. Their economic and financial systems are linked, as in 
colonial days, with those of the former colonial ruler. 
 
His essential point was that, particularly when it came to the economic 
systems of the former colonies, these were ‘directed from outside.’ This 
undermined the formal independence of the new states. He expressed 
serious concerns about the continuous interference, largely covert, by 
‘Western intelligence set-ups either by persuasion or by force’, in the affairs 
of the former colonies. He gave the examples of Algeria, Guatemala, Iran, 
Iraq, Egypt (Suez), Korea, Burma, Formosa, Laos, Cambodia, South 
Vietnam, and Congo. 
In his now famous Orientalism (1978) thesis, the Palestinian Edward 
Said criticised the old but alive stereotyped pre-conceptions at the basis of 
the Western scholars, travellers, and imperialists’ ‘constructions of the Orient 
and Oriental peoples.’ In his view, the reproduction of these images of the 
Orient in the academic institutions of the West was intimately connected with 
relations of power, namely Western imperialism, colonialism and neo- 
colonialism. Said’s thesis would give rise to the field of ‘postcolonial studies’ 
(Kennedy, 2000: 14-16, 111-113). 
 
 
7.3 The Third World Underdeveloped States 
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To the declining power of Europe after World War II corresponded the 
confirmation of the US and the USSR as superpowers, and the 
(re)affirmation of China in the international stage (Bull, 1984a: 226). At centre 
of this new international order was a new conflict between its two most 
powerful states (Gaddis, 1997: 6, 15). This conflict would soon be called the 
‘Cold War’, a concept first used by George Orwell in his article ‘You and the 
Atom Bomb’ (1945).  He feared that humanity could be ‘heading not for 
general breakdown but for an epoch as horribly stable as the slave empires 
of antiquity’, and warned about ‘the kind of world-view, the kind of beliefs, 
and the social structure that would probably prevail in a state which was at 
once unconquerable and in a permanent state of “cold war”’. This was a 
critical reference both to the US and the USSR’s systems of thought. As 
Westad (2005: 2) explains, from a critical term, later in the 1950s Cold War 
‘came to signal an American concept of warfare against the USSR: 
aggressive containment without a state of war.’83 
Together with Cold War, probably no other concept marked world 
politics during the second half of the twentieth century as profoundly as ‘Third 
World’. In what concerns the concept’s geographical origins, there is a 
consensus in the literature that one should look at France, namely to Abbé 
Sieyès’ eighteenth century pamphlet Qu'est-ce que le tiers état? Yet there is 
much disagreement about when exactly in the post-1945 period was the 
concept (re)used in the French political context. Wolf-Phillips (1981: 3) notes 
that the concept Tiers Monde was popularised in France between 1947 and 
1949 ‘to describe the political parties that took their stance between the 
Gaulist Rassemblement du Peuple Français and the regime of the Fourth 
Republic’. Worsley (1980: 15) challenges this assumption, arguing instead 
that it was the French independent left – who sought for an independence of 
the Communist Party on the left and opposed the rightist capitalist parties – 
that through a ‘non-alignment’ policy gave meaning to the concept of Third 
World and its synonyms Third Force and Third Way. Regarding the question 
of who might have coined the concept, Wolf-Phillips (1980: 3) points to Alfred 
Sauvy, who used it in 1952 to refer, in the context of the two Cold War blocs, 
to the ‘non-aligned’ countries. Worsley (1980: 15-16) shows instead that 
Claude Bourdet used the term as early as April 1949. Yet as Worsley
215  
recognises, Bourdet’s use of the concept referred essentially to internal 
politics in Europe, while Sauvy’s usage of the concept is already in its 
international, Cold War context. In this latter sense, it was probably 
Argentina’s President Juan Peron the early champion of the concept with his 
neutralism policy, or Third Position (Love, 1980: 33). 
In the late 1940s-early 1950s, Third World was indeed associated in 
international society with the idea of neutrality and non-alignment in relation 
to the two Cold War blocs (Wolf-Phillips, 1980: 3). It was present in the 
political initiatives of leaders such as Nasser, Tito and Nehru and their 
countries’ non-aligned foreign policies. The concept gained prominence after 
the 1955 Bandung Conference, a result of a series of initiatives by India, 
Ceylon, Pakistan, and Indonesia, with the goal of forming a protest group 
against two inter-related issues: the deadlock over new UN memberships, 
and the failure to secure a wide-spread decolonisation since 1947-48 
(Westad, 2005: 2). Furthermore, this group objected to the way that the Cold 
War rivalry monopolised the UN. Symbolically, it represented an expression 
of Asia and Africa’s political renaissance, opposed to the white 
races’hegemony (Lyon, 1984: 229-230).84 
Contrary to what many observers wrote about the topic at the time, 
the Bandung Conference was not a non-aligned conference, given that 
Turkey, Pakistan, or Japan, to name a few examples of countries already 
aligned, were present at the Conference (Lyon, 1984: 230). Thus, the claim 
that until the big wave of independence in the 1960s, the concept Third World 
referred to that group of nations, essentially from Africa and Asia, that were 
anti-colonialist and that adopted non-aligned policies (Wolf-Phillips, 1980: 4), 
needs to be partly reconsidered. Third World did mean in its initial 
international usage non-alignment, but it took on another, more important 
meaning before the 1960s, one also related with the Cold War dynamics.85 
 
The striking variety of states that, during the Cold War, were 
considered part of the Third World raises the important question of what 
element they had in common. They were not all colonies at the end of World 
War II, and as Gaddis (1997: 153-154) notes, ‘a few had never been’. 
Moreover, not all of them were non-aligned. In fact, many of them were 
aligned with either Washington or Moscow. Also racism fails to offer an 
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explanation for the commonalities between the Third World states, as both 
alliances and antagonisms were largely immune to racial elements. Gaddis 
concludes that the one characteristic shared by Third World states is the fact 
they were seen as pre-industrial by the industrialised world. That all Third 
World countries were pre-industrial takes us to the key meaning that the 
concept adopted since the 1950s: the ‘underdeveloped’, soon regarded as 
pejorative by the governments of the states to which it applied (Wolf-Phillips, 
1980: 4). This sentiment was expressed in the speech of President of 
Indonesia, Sukarno, in the Bandung Conference. When talking about the 
states present at the conference he stated that ‘many of us, the so-called 
“underdeveloped” nations, have more or less similar economic problems’ 
(Bradley, 2010: 479-480). 
Opposed to the pre-industrial character of the Third World countries 
was the industrialised nature of the two superpowers. There was a major 
material gap between the “two worlds” led by the superpowers and the Third 
World. As Wolf-Phillips (1981: 4) and Gaddis (1997: 153-154) note, this 
originated the three-fold division of the world into the Western, capitalist 
world; the USSR-led group of communist, centrally-planned economies; and 
the Third World underdeveloped. Although conceptually the Third World 
reflected a division of the world based first and foremost on economic 
standards, a few scholars (e.g. Worsley, 1981: 14-15; Muni, 1981: 23) 
naturally point out that this division is political as well.86 
The preponderance of the concepts of developed and 
underdeveloped in post-World War II international society echoes very much 
the nineteenth century notion of stages of progress. As it was the case with 
the concept of backward, the underdeveloped also presupposed an 
opportunity for improvement and the associated project to assist those to 
whom that condition applied, so as to help them get away from that condition. 
Closely linked to this idea was the importance that the issue of poverty in the 
Third World gained after World War II. As a panel of international experts 
declared in 1948, ‘genuine world prosperity is indivisible, and it cannot last in 
one part of the world if the other parts live under conditions of poverty and ill 
health’ (Escobar, 1995: 21-22). 
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The concept of underdevelopment was popularised on the 
international stage by US President Harry Truman, in his Inaugural Address 
on 20 January 1949 (Rist, 2008: 73). Truman’s speech described the US-led 
strategy to rebuild a new international order in four points. While point 
number one affirmed the continuation of US support to the UN, the fourth 
advanced the idea of extending the technical assistance, i.e. economic one 
that the US was already giving to parts of Latin America to the poorer 
countries of the world. Truman’s Point Four started by setting out the problem 
of underdevelopment: 
 
 
Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the 
benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress 
available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped 
areas. More than half the people of the world are living in 
conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are 
victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. 
Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more 
prosperous areas. 
 
 
According to Truman, the US led free world of developed, industrialised 
countries was in a privileged position to help the poor peoples of the world to 
escape their undeveloped condition through capital investment, and industrial 
and scientific techniques. The UN and its specialised agencies would play an 
important role, in a ‘worldwide effort for the achievement of peace, plenty, 
and freedom’, as well as ‘international security’. This was seen as a 
‘righteousness’ mission for America, to meet her ‘responsibilities’ to help all 
those ‘who wish to live in freedom’, in a clear reference to the Communist 
threat. Finally, according to Trumann, the old imperialism had no place in the 
US strategy, which envisaged ‘a program of development based on the 
concepts of democratic fair-dealing’. 
The idea of economic development as the project and the process 
through which the underdeveloped would be assisted to escape that 
condition is closely linked with the belief in modernisation, progress, 
economic growth, and the potential of science and technology. In this regard, 
Walt Whitman Rostow’s work, namely The Processes of Economic Growth 
(1952) and The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto 
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(1960), is a prominent example of the kind of evolutionist, socio-economic 
thinking that characterised modernisation theory in the US after World War II 
(Rist, 2008: 93-94). Not only was Rostow a leading intellectual influence in 
the US, he also had close connections with successive US administrations. 
He was one of Kennedy’s speech-writers, and later one of Johnson’s top 
aides (Haefele, 2003: 82-90). Another influential voice on the benefits of 
modernisation was Seymour Martin Lipset an American political theorist and 
sociologist. In Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (1960), Lipset 
defended the existence of a direct correlation between economic prosperity 
and the advance of democracy within states. 
On the one hand, the leaders of Third World states expressed their 
unease with the concept of underdeveloped. Quite in vogue after World War 
II, the concept would be not only increasingly challenged and contested, but 
also replaced by other similar concepts such as ‘developing’ – the most 
notable and the preferred one in the UN realm (Cooper, 2010: 62) – ‘less- 
developed’, or ‘en vie de development’, also used by Third World states as 
self-referential. These conceptual shifts reflected not only the economic 
growth experienced by Third World states in the 1960s (Waterlow, 1979: 
120), and the aspiration of the elites of developing nations to move away 
from their ‘agrarian’ condition, but also the atmosphere of contestation in 
relation to the terms of development (Worsley, 1980: 17; Wolf-Phillips, 1981: 
4). As Latham (2003: 3) puts it, ‘modernisation became the subject of intense 
debate, negotiation, and division for those aspiring to development. The 
elites of underdeveloped countries redefined its meanings, goals and values 
to fit their own specific historical experiences and political contexts.’ The 
constant international debate about the meaning of development and how it 
ought to be achieved was reflected in numerous related concepts, including 
the ‘basic human needs approach’, ‘participatory development’, and ‘socialist 
development’ (Escobar, 1995: 5).87 
 
Thus, economic development came to be seen as a right of all 
sovereign states in international society, with calls by Third World states for 
preferential treatment in this regard, and was no longer a pre-condition for 
independence as expressed by the concept of backward (Jackson, 1990: 
118-122). The issue of development in the Third World walked hand in hand 
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with the former colonies’ struggle for economic justice (Bull, 1984c: 222). The 
Bandung Conference (1955) marked the beginning of collective demands by 
the Third World not only regarding decolonisation but also in relation to 
economic development. The first section of the conference’s Final 
Communiqué titled ‘Economic Cooperation’ represents a first step towards 
what later became the New International Economic Order, by emphasising 
the principles of  ‘collective self-reliance’ (later South-South co-operation). 
Nevertheless, the ‘valuable contribution’ of both bilateral and multilateral aid 
from ‘outside the region’ to the development of participating countries was 
recognised. The conference exerted international pressure to inflect the 
policies of existing international institutions dealing with development (Rist, 
2008: 82-85). Point 1 of the ‘Economic Cooperation’ section recalled ‘the 
urgency of promoting economic development in the Asian-African region’. 
What the countries present in Bandung aimed at was a re-definition of the 
terms of development, for which they suggested a number of measures, 
including: (a) ‘technical assistance among the conference participants’; (b) 
‘the establishment of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic 
Development’; (c) ‘the allocation by the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development of a greater part of its resources to Asian-African 
countries’; and (d) ‘the early establishment of the International Finance 
Corporation’ (Rist, 2008: 82-88). 
The Bandung Conference led to the definition of ‘Non-Alignment’ at 
the Belgrade Conference (1961), that later resulted in the creation of the 
‘Group of 77’ on the occasion of the Economic Conference of Developing 
Countries held in Cairo. Most of its demands were repeatedly taken up in UN 
resolutions, and gradually won acceptance (Rist, 2008: 88). The Third World 
states’ un-satisfaction with the terms of international trade, for example, led 
them to increase the pressure for the setting up of the UN Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. Yet disillusionment became 
widespread after the third meeting of the UNCTAD in Chile, with developed 
states delaying and evading the need to liberalise trade and to embark in 
monetary reform. They transferred responsibility for the issues to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund 
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(IMF), where their influence was dominant (Waterlow, 1979: 101-103, 122- 
123). 
At the end of the first Development Decade, rich countries had failed 
to fulfil the promise of destining 1 per cent of GDP to aid, although 
developing countries had met the target of 5 per cent growth. Following a 
recommendation of a World Bank report (the Pearson report), the UN 
General Assembly adopted in October 1970 the International Development 
Strategy for the Second United Nations’ Development Decade (resolution 
2626), setting new targets for growth by the poor countries and for aid from 
the rich countries, and proposing a strategy to treat development in a global 
and integrated manner. The Group of Seventy-Seven poor countries 
described the document as ‘the best possible reflection of the present stage 
of the collective conscience of mankind in one of the most crucial areas of 
organising human society,’ while the Communist bloc remarked that 
development should take place in the context of socialist policies (Waterlow, 
1979: 120-121). 
An initiative designed to raise debate about the nature of 
development ought was the 1975 ‘Dag Hammarskjold Report’, prepared on 
the occasion of the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly. 
The report emphasised the point that there was no universal formula for 
development; that development was not simply an economic process, and 
was deeply related to the particularities of each culture and society (Rist, 
2008: 155-156). Another important event for the Third World’s defence of its 
own interests in development issues was the fourth Non-Aligned Summit that 
met in August 1973 in Algiers. This summit, together with the Special UN 
Session on Development in mid-1974, launched the campaign for a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) and contributed decisively to a greater 
organisation and institutionalisation of the Non-Aligned movement. As Lyon 
(1984: 234-235) explains, the interchangeable use of the terms ‘non-aligned’, 
‘developing countries’ and ‘Third World’ in the Algiers Declaration testifies to 
a new solidarity, in the sense that ‘the non-Aligned identified their interests as 
those of all developing countries and vice-versa.’ The Algiers Summit openly 
declared that the economic imbalance between the developed and the 
developing countries was a result of ‘selfish colonialism, neo-colonialism and 
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imperialism.’ The proclamation of the NIEO was accompanied by a 
Programme of Action, and complemented by the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States. Article 10 of the Charter noted that all states ‘are 
juridically equal’ and therefore possess ‘the right to participate fully and 
effectively in the international decision-making process in the solution of 
world economic, financial and monetary problems… and to share equitably in 
the benefits resulting therefrom.’ Article 14 acknowledged the duty of ‘every 
State’ to promote material well-being and living standards of all peoples, 
‘particularly those of developing countries’ (Jackson, 1990: 122). Yet as Rist 
(2008: 144) notes, there was little of new in the NIEO, as it basically 
advocated the pursuit of development through economic growth. 
The intellectual counteroffensive against modernisation theory and 
the idea that foreign aid and domestic growth would bring a better future for 
the Third World came from a variety of sources. These included neo-Marxists 
such as Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, who published Monopoly Capital: An 
Essay on the American Economic and Social Order (1966) (Rist, 2008: 109- 
110). Another challenge to the then predominant assumption that economic 
development was the key factor for the creation of prosperous and stable 
democratic states came from Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in 
Changing Societies (1968). His essential argument was that, without order, 
be it authoritarian or democratic, development and modernisation were often 
a source of instability. The challenge to modernisation theory also came from 
Latin American intellectuals, including Raul Prebisch, Osvaldo Sunkel, 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Enzo Faletto, Celso Furtado, Orlando Fals 
Borda, and Rodolfo Stavenhagen. These were joined by other researchers 
and intellectuals from other continents, namely Samir Amin, Andre Gunder 
Frank, Pierre Jalee, Dieter Senghaas and Johan Galtung (Rist, 2008: 109- 
110). In the essay ‘The Development of Underdevelopment’, the sociologist 
Gunder Frank made the case that underdevelopment was not a result of the 
lack of capitalism. Instead, he argued, underdevelopment was a 
consequence of the development of capitalism in the First World and its 
exploitation of the Third World (Gilman, 2003: 65). 
All these international debates and initiatives surrounding the 
concepts of development, underdeveloped, and developing illustrate the 
changing normative context in international society. Those peoples and 
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nations that were considered backward until recently, were now making use 
of their sovereign character to shape the major debates in international 
society regarding their own status. Thus, while the concept of 
underdeveloped to refer to Third World states carried much of the same 
paternalism than its backward predecessor, it did not have the normative 
power, at least in principle, to deny the underdeveloped states the right to 
self-determination and self-government. In this context, the concept of 
underdeveloped was shaped and changed, first and foremost, to developing. 
This change reflected the empowerment of the leaders of Third World States, 
and their will to lead the process away from underdevelopment. Despite the 
general consensus in international society about the importance of economic 
development in the recently independent states, there were great divisions 
about what development should do and how it ought to be achieved. 
 
 
7.4 Two Conflicting Visions of Development and State-Building 
 
 
 
Regardless of their rivalry, the two superpowers shared a number of 
characteristics (Jervis, 2010: 23-24). As Westad (2005: 5, 39-40) puts it, both 
‘were founded on ideas and plans for the betterment of humanity.’ Their 
founders saw their countries as grand experiments, both their leaders had a 
universalistic approach to the world, and ideology played a particularly 
important role in defining their alliances and enmities. Both superpowers also 
exhibited, as Engerman (2010: 23-24) argues, ‘a tension between 
determinism and messianism’, in the sense that their leaders believed 
‘history was on their side’, but were ‘unwilling to wait while history took its 
course.’ They actively pursued the task of transforming the world according 
to their respective visions of modernity. Closely associated with the two 
superpowers’ visions of modernity was technology, which shaped to a great 
extent the nature of the Cold War. Beyond nuclear weapons, the advances in 
science and technology provided the two superpowers with a capacity to 
project power globally, as well as an essential tool for their respective 
development strategies (Westad, 2010: 11-12). 
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The colonised peoples appropriated the sovereign state as the 
instrument through which they achieved liberation from colonial rule. In this 
context, the modernist models of US market capitalism and Soviet (and later 
Chinese) communism constituted two competing alternatives for the 
postcolonial states (Bradley, 2010: 465).88 Many Third World states played 
with the fact that ‘the Cold War was bipolar to the point of exclusivity,’ 
meaning that if one’s enemies were supported by one superpower, there was 
always the option of getting aid from the other. As the Cold War went global, 
the Third World states became the stage of not only an ideological 
confrontation but also, as Westad (2010: 19, 89) puts it, of two competing 
‘models of state-building.’ Despite the predominance of the two superpowers’ 
projects of development, the former European colonial powers, once they 
relinquished their colonies, still kept political and economic ties with their 
former territories. Much of these ties took the form of economic development 
programs. In the case of Britain and France, both countries gave most of 
their bilateral aid to their former colonies. During the Cold War, developing 
Commonwealth countries received ninety per cent of British aid, while African 
Francophone countries received two-thirds of the French aid (Waterlow, 
1979: 116). 
The US played a central role in the re-organisation of the post-World 
War II international order. This international order consisted of two major 
inter-related settlements. One was the Cold War logic of superpower-led 
blocs, or bipolarity. The other settlement was the one among the Western, 
industrialised democracies plus Japan, resulting, as Ikenberry (2001: 163) 
describes, in a US-led ‘dense set of new security, economic, and political 
institutions’. In the logic of his plan to use American power to build an 
international environment conducive to ‘the American way of life’ (Leffler, 
2010: 68), and in the sequence of a successful Marshall Plan, President 
Truman asked Congress for a grant of $45 million to aid the underdeveloped 
world with technical assistance and capital investment. The UN responded to 
Truman’s call by setting up a Technical Assistance Board within its 
Secretariat (Waterlow, 1979: 114-115). By this time, looking at Mao Zedong’s 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the US political leadership 
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was already wary of the appeal that Communism could have outside Europe 
(Engerman, 2010: 33). 
Successive American presidents, including Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, saw the Cold War as a long-term 
ideological, military, political, economic, scientific and cultural competition. In 
particular, these three presidents believed that Western-style modernisation, 
and more specifically US values and institutions, were the best model for 
underdeveloped states. For Kennedy and Johnson, the new decolonised 
countries were part of the Cold War competition, and quite in contrary to the 
idea of ‘appeasement’, the US could not stand and watch while the USSR, as 
well as China, spread its influence (Costigliola, 2010: 112-114). 
In the US perspective, the UN ought to play an important role in the 
new international order and in the question of development, which together 
with human rights and decolonisation became the other key issue on the 
UN’s agenda after World War II. In 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted 
two resolutions titled Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries 
and Technical Assistance for Economic Development (Rist, 2008: 70). 
Another important document was the report Measures for Economic 
Development of Underdeveloped Countries (1951), published by the UN 
Department of Social and Economic Affairs (Escobar, 1995: 3). According to 
Point 36 titled ‘Measures Requiring Domestic Action’: 
 
 
There is a sense in which rapid economic progress is impossible 
without painful adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be 
scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of 
caste, creed and race have to burst; and large numbers of persons 
who cannot keep up with progress have to have their expectations 
of a comfortable life frustrated. Very few communities are willing to 
pay the full price of economic progress. 
 
 
These words describe a coming clash between the modernist drive towards 
development and economic progress of the Third World states, and their 
local, social and cultural contexts. 
Beyond Article 55 of the UN Charter that required the UN to promote 
‘higher standard of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and 
social progress and development’, and the UN General Assembly’s concern 
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with the issue of development since at least 1948, the organisation did not 
have a special structure in the area of international development (it was 
essentially a responsibility of the UN Secretary-General and the Economic 
and Social Council). On 16 November 1949, the General Assembly approved 
the creation of an ‘Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance’, to provide 
for funds to send technical experts to the Third World, to grant scholarships 
to Third World citizens, and the training of managerial personnel. In 1958 the 
UN created the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development 
(SUNFED), which later merged with the Expanded Programme of Technical 
Assistance to form in 1965 the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) (Rist, 2008: 88). 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
part of the later World Bank (WB), gradually came to allocate the majority of 
its funds to the Third World. It set up the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) in 1956 to promote private investment; established the International 
Development Agency (IDA) in 1960, charged with the task of making loans at 
better than market rates to most underdeveloped countries; and created its 
two regional banks in Africa (1964) and Asia (1966). In 1964, the stabilisation 
of raw material prices and problems of transports led to the creation of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (Rist, 
2008: 85-89). 
Both Kennedy and Johnson placed great emphasis on the issue of 
development in the Third World. For them, international development was 
part and parcel of the US national security strategy. The potential failure of 
Third World states to develop and subsequent chaos was seen as a threat 
which communism could take advantage of. In Kennedy’s words: 
 
 
To fail to meet those obligations now would be disastrous; and, in 
the long run, more expensive. For widespread poverty and chaos 
lead to a collapse of existing political and social structures which 
would inevitably invite the advance of totalitarianism into every 
weak and unstable area… We live at a very special moment in 
history. The whole southern half of the world – Latin American, 
Africa, the Middle East, and Asia – are caught up in the 
adventures of asserting their independence and modernising their 
old ways of life (in Westad, 2005: 35). 
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This expanded notion of security to include economic and social 
development in ‘poor nations’ in order to ‘prevent conflict’ and guarantee 
global ‘order and stability’ was defended by Robert McNamara, Kennedy’s 
Secretary of Defence and later president of the WB, in his book The Essence 
of Security: Reflections in Office (1968) (Del Rosso, 1995: 181-184). In his 
first year as president, Kennedy launched several programs and created 
numerous organisations with the purpose of assisting the development of the 
underdeveloped states ‘toward US-style modernisation’. These included the 
Food for Peace, the Peace Corps programs, and the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) to administer US civilian aid programs 
(Haefele, 2003: 81-82). The US also joined the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) founded in 1960 (Holbik, 1968: 29).89 
 
Kennedy gave special attention to Latina America, which he saw 
simultaneously as the ‘nation’s backyard’ and ‘the most dangerous area in 
the world’. These fears were not confined to USSR’s presence in Cuba, 
although this situation greatly influenced Kennedy in his quest to prevent 
other Castro-type revolutions in the region. Kennedy established the Alliance 
for Progress, to promote economic growth, redistribution of wealth, 
education, and democracy. For this project, he pledged $20 billion in public 
and private US capital. Outside Latin American, Kennedy established a 
client-government relationship with Saigon, seen as a vital partner and 
described by Kennedy as ‘the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast 
Asia, the keystone to the arch, the finger in the dike.’ He subscribed to 
Eisenhower’s ‘domino theory’, by arguing that keeping the ‘finger in the dike’ 
was the key to preventing the Communists from flooding all Southeast Asia 
(Costigliola, 120-123).90 
 
The US Congress’ Act for International Development of 1961 is a 
clear example of how development was interlinked with Cold War politics. It 
committed the US Government to five principles in the allocation of aid: (1) ‘to 
strengthen the economies of underdeveloped friendly nations’; (2) ‘to 
encourage the flow of private investment capital’; (3) to promote, for those 
aided, an environment ‘free of pressures and erosion by the adversaries of 
freedom’; (4) ‘to serve as an instrument of the Cold War’; and (5) ‘to stimulate 
the growth and favour the equilibrium of the economy of the United States’ 
227  
(Waterlow, 1979: 115-116). With decolonisation at its height, the idea of aid 
gained increasing international support. Following a suggestion by Kennedy, 
in 1961 the UN General Assembly pronounced the sixties as the 
‘Development Decade’, setting two targets: a growth rate for the developing 
countries of 5 per cent of national income and the rich countries’ contribution 
of 1 per cent a year of their national income in aid (Rist, 2008: 90).91 
 
The affairs of the backward peoples and territories had been of 
interest to Lenin. Yet the nature of this interest was political rather than 
economic. During the inter-war period, supporting the national liberation 
movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America was part of the strategy to 
advance the cause of international proletarianism. Even the aid treaties that 
the Russians concluded with Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and Mongolia in 1921 
and with China in 1924 did not translate into material support (Holbik, 1968: 
22-23). Immediately after World War II, USSR provided military support (in 
the form of weapons transfers) to local Communist groups in underdeveloped 
states, including the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, and Indonesia (Holbik, 
1968: 47). As Gaddis (2010: 3) explains, very much in contrast with the 
approach under Lenin, who regarded ‘imperialism as the highest form of 
capitalism and thought both were doomed’, Stalin’s strategy merged the old 
tradition of Russian imperialism with Marxist-Leninist ideology. While Lenin 
never adopted the reconstruction of empire as a strategy to destroy 
capitalism, Stalin’s plan (also in face of the rise of Nazi Germany and Japan) 
was to reclaim the territories once owned by the Russian empire, and to build 
spheres of influence with the goal of having only ‘friendly’ neighbours. 
When Stalin died in 1953, Europe was already divided across the two 
Cold War blocs. Regarding the Third World, Stalin’s strategy did not make a 
major impact (except in some parts of Asia), due to the doctrine that a former 
colony should only become independent under Communist leadership, which 
created a conflict between USSR’s leadership and that of some of the new 
states (Lowenthal, 1984: 324-326). Thus, by the time of Stalin’s death, the 
USSR’s strategic position in the Third World was quite weak, particularly 
when compared to the Western bloc, being mainly restricted to communist 
allies in Asia (Kanet, 1981: 331). 
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The USSR policy towards the Third World was reassessed with 
Khrushchev, who saw decolonisation as a ‘postwar development of world- 
historical significance’ (Bradley, 2010: 475). In principle, the US closer 
connections with colonial powers provided an advantage to the USSR in their 
promotion of the Communist model in the Third World (Gaddis, 1997: 154). In 
Khrushchev’s words, ‘we declare war upon the United States in the peaceful 
field of trade. We will win over the United States. The threat to the United 
States is not ICBM (Intercontinental ballistic missiles) but in the field of 
peaceful production. We are relentless in this and it will prove the superiority 
of our system’ (Holbik, 1968: 20). During the Khrushchev period (1954-1964), 
USSR’s strategy was to establish or reinforce its ties with Third World states, 
while at the same time convince the latter to adopt USSR’s model of 
development (Lowenthal, 1984: 326-328). USSR’s aid was directed at the 
development of the state sector of underdeveloped countries. As Bradley 
(2010: 475) explains, the USSR’s centralised planning ‘Five-Year Plans’, 
included huge new steel plants and dams, as well as the mechanisation of 
collective agriculture. In Khrushchev’s view, the USSR was offering 
postcolonial elites a strategy for economic growth and rapid industrialisation. 
Two countries where this strategy was first tested were Indonesia, under the 
nationalist government of Sukarno (Lowenthal, 1984: 326-328), and in 
Afghanistan, through a small technical assistance agreement (Holbik, 1968: 
25). 
Khrushchev’s approach was more pragmatic than Stalin’s. In spite of 
the rhetoric about constructing a model of development, i.e. Communist, in 
underdeveloped states, under Khrushchev the USSR provided assistance to 
states whose governments were not socialist, such as Afghanistan and Haile 
Selassie’s Ethiopia, with the purpose of undermining the dominant Western 
position (Kanet, 1981: 333). The USSR also supported progressive non- 
Marxist movements for national liberation, confident that its own model of 
anti-imperialism and economic growth would strongly appeal to the elites of 
the decolonising states. Thus, the USSR donated billions of rubles in 
economic (and military) aid to India, Indonesia, and Egypt (under Nasser) – 
the future leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement – with the purpose of 
bringing them into its sphere of influence (Bradley, 2010: 475). Other
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important recipients of USSR’s aid were Cuba, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen, 
Pakistan, and Somalia. Despite the importance of promoting USSR’s model 
of development, there were other motivations behind their distribution of aid 
to the underdeveloped countries, namely the degree of strategic importance 
of the recipient country, and the benefits for Soviet Union’s economy 
(particularly important in the Brezhnev era) (Kanet, 1981: 336, 339-340). 
Overall, the majority of USSR aid to underdeveloped countries was 
provided through repayable credits. Seventy five per cent of all USSR’s 
economic assistance was directed towards the construction of a state-owned, 
industrial base, consisting mainly of large machinery and equipment, 
targeting the development of heavy industry and of energy and mineral 
resources. The USSR also provided development grants, technical 
assistance, the training of local technicians, plus the education (including 
scholarships) of large numbers of students from the Third World in USSR’s 
academic institutions. It also included arms transfers, which brought political, 
and most importantly, economic advantages to the USSR (Kanet, 1981: 336- 
347). When it came to multilateral aid, however, the USSR consistently 
refused to get involved to any great extent in UN, WB, IMF, or IDA projects, 
declaring openly that these institutions were ‘tools of American imperialism’ 
(Holbik, 1968: 50-57). 
After the ouster of Khrushchev, his successor Brezhnev moved away 
from the ideological paradigm that characterised his predecessors’ policies 
towards the Third World. When Nixon succeeded Johnson, the relations 
between the two superpowers became more pragmatic and less dictated by 
ideology. This was the central principle of détente (Engerman, 2010: 42). 
Nevertheless, the USSR 1978 ‘Statement on African Policy’ confirms the 
continuation of the development strategy towards the Third World. Together 
with other goals such as strengthening their relations with all African 
governments or aiding the continent’s national liberation movements, the 
USSR declared its support to ‘progressive programs adopted by African 
governments which had embarked on the noncapitalist path of development’ 
(Papp, 1981: 70-71). 
The competition between the US-led international development 
project and the communist one (USSR and China) was a rather uneven 
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contest. Between 1954 and 1970, the aid from the communist camp to the 
Third World amounted to only about a twentieth of the aid given by OECD 
countries (Waterlow, 1979: 118). From 1954 to 1966, US bilateral aid to the 
Third World reached $42 billion, while USSR aid commitments reached £10 
billion, of which only $6 billion was delivered. The gap is even more striking 
when it comes to contributions to multilateral aid agencies: from 1950 to 
1967, Western countries contributed with 96.2 per cent of the whole (Holbik, 
1968: 27). 
The idea that the opportunity of Third World states to develop had 
been wasted became widespread. Particularly in the US, a number 
intellectuals and scholars placed the blame for this failure in the leadership 
and institutions of Third World states: Huntington (1968) argued that 
governments in the Third World ‘simply do not govern’; Krasner (1985) noted 
that ‘most developing countries have very weak domestic political 
institutions’; and Migdal (1988: 7-9) asked ‘why have so many Third World 
states been so ineffective in accomplishing what their leaders and others had 
so eagerly expected of them.’ Nevertheless, the view that it was the 
development project that failed the Third World was also widely supported.92 
A particular phase of the US-led development project that became 
the target of some of the most severe critiques is the first half of the 
1980s, closely associated with the expression ‘structural adjustment’. The 
‘Washington Consensus’, as termed by the economist John Williamson in 
1989, oversaw the replacement of the 1950s and 1960s theories of 
development (e.g. import-substitution industrialisation), by Reagan 
administration’s neoliberal economics that promoted macro-stability, 
privatisation, and the liberalisation of foreign trade and capital movements 
(Arrighi, 2010: 31-32). In order to face ‘monetary disorder’, the economies 
of the developing countries had to be adjusted and trade balances 
corrected. The structural adjustment programs, through budgetary austerity 
and market liberalisation, conducted mainly through the IMF implied cuts 
in the public sector, subsidies, health, and education (Rist, 2008: 171-173). 
It was also in the 1980s that the WB and the IMF inserted a strong element 
of political conditionality in their dealings with developing countries (Zartman, 
2005: 275-276). The Third World GDP from 1981 to 1985 grew only 1.4% per 
year, when compared with 4.9% growth rate from 1976 to 1980, and was 
231  
accompanied by the decline of US economic aid to the Third World, falling 
behind states like Canada, France, and Holland in 1983 (in terms of 
percentage of GNP) (Halliday, 1989: 65-68). 
The paternalism, universalism, vested interests, and the strategy to 
influence politically the receptors of all kinds of economic aid for 
development, are evident in the competing models of development and state- 
building that the two superpowers attempted to export to the Third World. 
Yet, these relationships did not necessarily represent a denial of the 
underdeveloped/developing states’ constitutional independence, even if the 
outcome was sometimes dependency and less autonomy. The governments 
of Third World states were receptive to the idea of economic development, 
which they believed to be their sovereign right, and attempted to take 
advantage of the superpower rivalry to negotiate in more favourable terms. A 
few Third World states were able to keep the two superpowers political 
influence at bay, while receiving aid from one or another. India, Indonesia, 
and Egypt are all examples of how the economic assistance from both 
superpowers did not generally translate into political and diplomatic alliances. 
On the contrary, in the cases of Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, or the Philippines, 
economic aid was accompanied by deeper political relations (Bradley, 2010: 
477). 
 
 
7.5 Security Competition in the Third World 
 
 
 
Successive US governments saw the problem of poverty and instability in 
underdeveloped states through the lenses of the Communist threat. The US 
interest in maintaining a favourable type of domestic order in Third World 
states was simultaneously the only way to foster the right kind of 
development, and a strategy to avoid the emergence of hostile, i.e. pro- 
Communist governments (Gurtov and Maghroori, 1984: 80). For the USSR, 
not associated with European colonial powers, many national liberation 
movements constituted an opportunity to establish alliances with the new 
governments of the recently independent countries. Yet the post- 
independence instability of those countries also constituted a threat, as it 
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could lead to the rise of pro-US governments. While nuclear weapons 
provided a crucial dissuading factor for direct confrontation, it pushed the two 
superpowers to confront each other’s influence in the Third World 
(Engerman, 2010: 33). 
Initially, the Indochina Wars (1945-1975) were a struggle for national 
liberation against the French imperial and colonial revival. The conflict 
entered the Cold War dynamics when the French played with US fears of 
Communist take-over, insisting that the USSR was behind Ho Chi Minh-led 
national uprising. This guaranteed the continuation of US financial support to 
the French war effort, in spite of US declarations of neutrality. Yet US fears 
were misplaced, as Stalin never paid much attention to the issue and saw 
France as the legitimate ruler of Indochina (Logevall, 2010: 282-283). Mao 
Zedong’s Communist take-over in China, as well as the Communist-led 
rebellions that erupted in Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines, 
decisively transformed the nature of the issue in the US view. China soon 
started to support the Vietminh with arms, advisers, and training, at the same 
time than anti-colonial uprisings erupted in Laos and Cambodia. Thus, the 
Truman administration began to pressure France to hold on to Indochina, 
while providing France with military and economic assistance. A 1949 
National Security Council report represented an earlier version of 
Eisenhower’s ‘domino theory’, advancing the idea that if Vietnam was 
allowed to fall, many others would follow suit (Logevall: 2010, 284-288). Yet 
the key security concern of the Eisenhower administration in Southeast Asia 
was Laos, a concerned that what was initially shared by the Kennedy 
administration. The threat of Communism led the US to send not only 
massive amounts of military aid, but also several hundred military advisers 
and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives, so that the Laotian 
government could successfully resist the Pathet Lao and its North- 
Vietnamese sponsor (Karabell, 1999: 206-209). 
President Eisenhower subscribed to the containment policy designed 
during the Truman administration. For Eisenhower, US national security was 
more than just the physical protection of the homeland against the 
Communist threat, it was also about protecting the American way of life, 
which required the establishment of US influence across the Eurasian
233  
heartland. One of the biggest challenges was the emergence of nationalist 
movements across the Third World, and the fear of Communist (both 
Russian and Chinese) takeover led it to frequently confuse nationalism with 
Communism. The CIA became a favoured tool to pursue the goal of 
Communist containment, through cost-effective actions that allowed the US 
administration to avoid the deployment of conventional armed forces. During 
Eisenhower’s presidency, through covert operations, the US supported the 
toppling of left-leaning governments of Mossadegh in Iran (1953) and of 
Arbenz in Guatemala (1954), while failing in its attempts to do the same in 
Syria (1957) and Indonesia (1958) (McMahon, 2010: 288: 301). As it would 
be the case with other coercive interferences in the affairs of Third World 
states, the US covert role in these operations was decisive (Kinzer, 2006: 
117-147). In the most significant use of US troops between the Korean and 
the Vietnam wars, President Eisenhower sent fifteen thousand Marines to 
Lebanon to support the US-client Lebanese government in the civil war 
(Karabell, 1999: 136-138).93 Also during the Eisenhower administration, 
Vietnam was partitioned after the peace settlement signed in Geneva. 
(Logevall, 2010: 290) Subsequently, the US installed Ngo Dinh Diem – 
praised by Eisenhower’s administration as South East Asia’s ‘miracle man’ – 
in power in South Vietnam (Bradley, 2010: 483). A very similar operation of 
installing a puppet leader in power – and acting decisively to guarantee that 
was so – took place in the Philippines, where Magsaysay became president 
in 1953 (Kinzer, 2006: 151-152). 
In January 1961, Khrushchev affirmed Moscow’s backing of the ‘wars 
of national liberation’. Almost simultaneously, Fidel Castro’s toppling of 
Fulgencio Batista (1959) and the subsequent establishment of close ties 
between Moscow and Havana; the Communist-direct insurgencies against 
the US-supported governments in Laos and South Vietnam; and the 
instability in Congo; all created a strong sense of threat to which Kennedy 
reacted with his ‘flexible response.’ This meant that the US would respond to 
each threat posed by the USSR with a tailored counter-attack. The Third 
World was an absolute priority in Kennedy’s Cold War strategy, as he 
expressed to US Congress in his first State of the Union Address (Mcmahon, 
2010: 304-308). 
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In the context of Communist insurgency in Vietnam, the US 
increasingly worried about the way Ngo Dinh Diem ignored US advice. Diem 
protested that he did not want Vietnam ‘to be a protectorate’ (Kinzer, 2006: 
156). The Kennedy administration supported the generals’ coup that 
overthrew Diem (who was murdered) in 1963 (Bradley, 2010: 483). With 
Johnson, the US launched its first direct military attacks in North Vietnam. 
After his electoral victory, the Johnson administration escalated the fighting 
with more military support to the South, combined with massive aerial 
bombing campaigns in the North. By 1968, US’ troops in Vietnam reached 
536,100. The USSR and China responded by stepping up their military 
assistance to the North. With Nixon, the US gradually reduced troops in 
Vietnam as part of his ‘Vietnamisation’ of the conflict, while attacking North 
Vietnamese positions and allies in Cambodia and Laos, particularly through 
massive and highly destructive aerial bombing campaigns (Logevall, 2010: 
294-300). 
After the end of the war in Vietnam, the conflict in Cambodia 
continued. In December 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia with the goal of 
installing its own group of friendly Cambodian Communists in power, which 
happened two weeks after the invasion, with the establishment of the 
‘People’s Republic of Kampuchea’. Following the Vietnamese invasion, the 
Khmer Rouge forces fled but later regrouped and organised a guerrilla 
campaign against the occupiers. The international dimension of the conflict 
soon came into play in another proxy war that opposed the USSR to China. 
While the USSR backed their Vietnamese ally and the new pro-Vietnamese 
government in Phnom Penh, China supported the Khmer Rouge with the 
goal of ‘bleeding Vietnam in Cambodia’ as Deng Xiaoping told 
‘anastonished’ Japanese prime minister (Rodman, 1994: 187-196, 454-
456).94 
In Central America, the strategy of successive US administrations is 
well illustrated by a statement made by Kennedy in the immediate aftermath 
of the assassination of Dominican Republic’s dictator Rafael Trujillo. 
According to Kennedy, ‘there are three possibilities in descending order of 
preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime, 
or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we really can’t renounce 
the second until we are sure that we can avoid the third’. US officials publicly 
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declared that US policy towards the Southern neighbours was to promote 
security, prosperity, and democracy. Yet stability – or more precisely, the 
guarantee that the US had a close strategic relationship with state leaders – 
and not democracy (including elections, popular participation, respect for civil 
and human rights) was the priority of US policy in Latin America during most 
of the Cold War (Rabe, 2001: 48-49). In the late 1950s, in the face of popular 
uprisings, many Latin American regimes began to disintegrate, largely as a 
result of the dictators’ internal repression, corruption, and failure to meet its 
populations’ basic needs. The Eisenhower administration was quick to blame 
Communists for the uprisings, and proceeded among other things to arm the 
Cuban exile army training in Guatemala. Kennedy pursued Eisenhower’s 
policies, and authorised the invasion of Cuba that resulted in the Bay of Pigs 
debacle. During the Kennedy administration, the question was ‘which type of 
government and leader would be most effective in thwarting Fidel Castro’. 
Trujillo’s close ties with Castro led the Kennedy administration to plan the 
former’s overthrow by supporting the Dominican dissidents, 
whoassassinated Trujillo on 30 May 1961 (Rabe, 2001: 48-66).95 
With the political rise of the anti-imperialist Allende in Chile, who was 
an admirer of Fidel Castro, Johnson’s administration launched a covert 
campaign in support of Allende’s political opponents. The CIA took the lead, 
spending millions of dollars with the latter, and cultivating close relationships 
with the Chilean military, including their training in US bases and millions of 
dollars in military aid. When Allende won the presidential elections in 1970, 
Nixon decided that ‘an Allende regime in Chile was unacceptable to the 
United States’, as later revealed by a covert operations specialist. Nixon 
wanted Chile to be an example for the rest of the region: ‘Latin America is not 
gone, and we want to keep it. No impression should be permitted in Latin 
America that they can get away with this, that it’s safe to go this way.’ Thus, 
Kissinger and the CIA were in charge of overthrowing him. This goal was 
achieved in on 11 September 1973, when a group of military led by General 
Pinochet assaulted the presidential palace (Kinzer, 2006: 170-194). Between 
1948 and 1990, successive US governments were involved in the overthrow 
of 24 governments in Latin America. As Coatsworth (2012: 220) explains, this 
involvement included four instances of ‘direct use of US military forces’, three 
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cases of ‘CIA-managed revolts or assassination’, and seventeen instances of 
encouragement of ‘local military and political forces to intervene without 
direct US participation, usually through military coups d'état.’ 
Africa did not escape this obsessive security competition. In the early 
1960s, the Americans were very concerned with the possibility of Lumumba, 
the Prime Minister of a left leaning government in recently independent 
Congo, to welcome USSR’s influence. This concern was aggravated by the 
idea of the USSR gaining control of Congo’s uranium reserves. With the US 
already using the strategy of covert action through the CIA (Halliday, 1989: 
74-75), Lumumba was captured on December 1962 by Congolese military 
loyal to Mobutu who tortured and murdered him. Although the Kennedy 
administration continued Eisenhower’s support for Mobutu, adding also 
words of praise for him, there was clearly an awareness within the Kennedy 
administration that they were ‘hanging on to a bankrupt policy’, in support for 
a Congolese regime that was ‘obscurantist, arbitrary, primitive, totalitarian, 
wilful and irresponsible’ in the words of US Ambassador George McGhee 
(Westad, 2005: 138-141). Lumumba’s followers waged a counter offensive, 
and the country’s richest province, Katanga, entered a war of secession 
(Gleijeses, 2001:71-72). 
Just before Congo’s independence, UN Secretary-General Dag 
Hammarskjold brought the issue to the Security Council and called it into 
session using, for the first time, Article 99 of the Charter which authorises the 
Secretary-General to ‘bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter 
which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and 
security’ (Parsons, 1995: 70-82). UN Security Council resolution 143 called 
for the withdrawal of Belgium troops, and authorised the UN Secretary 
General to provide the government of the Congo with military assistance, 
following a request by both the President and the Prime Minister of Congo. 
Resolution 145, adopted two weeks later, reinforced the UN Secretary 
General’s hand, requested all states ‘not to undermine the territorial integrity 
and political independence of the Congo’, and considered that ‘the complete 
restoration of law and order in the Republic of the Congo would effectively 
contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security’. The UN 
Force in the Congo (ONUC) became the biggest and most comprehensive 
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UN operation until the UN mission in Cambodia in 1992-1993 (Parsons, 
1995: 81-82). 
During the Cold War, the UN Security Council involvement in the 
Congo conflict constituted a notable exception to the rule when it came to 
Third World conflicts and related humanitarian disasters. In Cambodia, 
Angola, Somalia, Afghanistan, or Haiti, the UN Security Council only got 
involved towards the late 1980s-early 1990s. The five permanent members of 
the UN Security Council, as well as many other states, supported a strict 
interpretation of the UN Charter. Human rights violations and ‘civil wars’ were 
regarded as issues of exclusive domestic jurisdiction, and thus outside the 
scope of the UN Security Council and its Chapter VII-related powers 
(Parsons, 1995: 185; Weschler, 2004: 55).96 The tripartite division of the 
Council into East, West, and Non-Aligned paralysed the Council and made 
consensus particularly difficult. This led to the General Assembly’s greater 
involvement in security issues in detriment of the Security Council (Parsons, 
1995: 246-250; Wallensteen and Johansson, 2004: 17-21). The self- 
appointed Permanent Members had reserved for themselves a high degree 
of political flexibility in order to avoid being ‘obligated to act on security 
problems of lesser interest to them’ (Luck, 2008: 62-63), giving credit to 
Morgenthau’s interpretation of the Security Council as ‘the international 
government of the Great Powers’ (Krisch 2008: 133-134). During the Cold 
War, UN peacekeeping – an activity which was neither mentioned nor 
envisioned in the UN Charter – was more of an improvisation to respond 
towar between states (Sens, 2004: 142).97 
The superpower détente achieved by Nixon and Brezhnev aimed at 
stabilising the Cold War rivalry and breaking the arms race (Savranskaya and 
Taubman 2010: 134). An important event in this process was the Moscow 
summit (May 1972), with the signature of the SALT-I (Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty), which included ‘the Basic Principles of Relations Between 
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’, a 
code of conduct for dealing with crises in the Third Word (Halliday, 1898: 14). 
Yet the superpowers were not willing to drop their obsessive security 
competition in pursuit of their global interests. Détente was a ‘limited 
accommodation’ that would allow the US and the USSR to pursue their 
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interests while provoking less tension internationally (Savranskaya and 
Taubman 2010: 134, 149). Numerous reasons determined the gradual 
erosion and later collapse of superpower détente (Njolstad, 2010: 135). With 
the unification of Vietnam under a Communist government and the success 
of the Angolan revolution, Brezhnev bolstered USSR’s support for new 
insurrections in the Third World (Gaddis, 2010: 17). In the words of Georgi 
Arbatov, adviser to five General Secretaries of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, ‘after Angola, we went boldly down the path of intervention and 
expansion that we had beaten so assuredly. It led us through Ethiopia, 
Yemen, a series of African countries, and, eventually, into Afghanistan’ 
(Bennet, 1999: 167). In response, Carter’s vision that US foreign policy 
should reflect American values, including respect for human rights, was often 
compromised. A good example of this was Carter administration’s military aid 
to the military regimes in Nicaragua, where the Sandinistas won in July 1979, 
and in El Salvador, where the military waged a brutal campaign against 
leftists (Mitchell, 2010: 74-86). 
The Horn of Africa was also an important stage for the superpowers 
to wage their global competition for influence and allies. In terms of strategic 
value, Ethiopia and Somalia represented access to military facilities in the 
important Red Sea region. Siad Barre, the military dictator who seized power 
in Somalia (1969), was first supported by USSR, until his invasion of the 
ethnically Somali Ogaden province of Ethiopia – Ethiopia was establishing a 
‘special relationship’ with the USSR. Moscow (and Cuba) stood with Ethiopia, 
which provided an opportunity for the US to support Barre (Lefebvre, 1991: 
32-33). From Kennedy, to Carter, to Reagan, the US went down the road to 
arm Somalia heavily. As Lefebvre (1991: 22-29, 226) observes, while the 
implications of sending arms to a Somali government waging a 
counterinsurgency war and suppressing human rights was not a concern for 
the Reagan administration, what seemed to worry US policy makers was only 
the possibility of Somalia and Ethiopia fighting a ‘protracted, proxy guerrilla 
war, while refraining from sending their forces across the border’. However, 
as long as the weapons were used to ‘stabilise’ the situation in Somalia – i.e. 
used for internal purposes only, whatever those were – Washington would 
not question their use. As a result, by the 1980s, two of the world’s poorest 
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countries possessed two of sub-Sahara Africa’s largest and best equipped 
military forces, and both presented some of highest government military 
expenditures in the world (Lefebvre: 1991: 26). 
In Angola, the civil war involved three liberation groups from the 
decade-long war against the Portuguese, the Marxist-oriented Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA); the Angola’s National 
Liberation Front (FNLA); and the National Union for the Total Independence 
of Angola (UNITA). The escalation of the civil war drew Americans and 
Russians (as well as Cubans, South African, Portuguese, Zairians, 
Zambians, and Namibians). The Angola civil war was a proxy war almost 
until the late 1980s, when Angolan regime backed by Russians and Cubans 
geared up in 1986 for a major offensive against UNITA, to which Reagan 
responded with the decision to provide Savimbi (UNITA’s leader) with $15 
million of military aid, including Stinger antiaircraft missiles and TOW antitank 
missiles (Rodman, 1994: 165-77 and 371-391). 
Once Reagan took office (January 1981), he proclaimed his hostility 
to Third World social revolutions, and built up the potential of US’ intervention 
capacity – largely expanding a trend that had been reignited under Carter – 
against what the Reagan administration saw as radical states (Halliday, 
1989: 52-74). The regimes in Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Grenada, Iran, 
Mozambique, and Nicaragua were considered hostile, and the plan was to 
take advantage of any potential instability (Coatsworth (2010: 2010). The 
leading element in Reagan’s military strategy was ‘Low Intensity Conflict’. 
Drawing from counter-insurgency thinking of the 1960s, it advocated the 
minimisation of US combat involvement (using Vietnam as the example not 
to follow), and direct US military activity in the form of assistance to 
indigenous forces (either governments or opposition), Special Operations 
Forces, and covert operations (Halliday, 1989: 52-74). The Nicaraguan 
Sandinistas were a particular obsession for the Reagan administration. 
Despite all the efforts to overthrow the Sandinista government, these were 
unsuccessful. Instead, the Nicaraguan government ended up accusing the 
Reagan administration, in the International Court of Justice, of violating 
international law (Coatsworth, 2010: 210-217). In Panama, however, the US 
intervention was successful in the removal of a manipulative General Noriega 
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from power, who was accused by the US of drug trafficking charges (Arnold, 
1995: 178-181). 
In April 1978, a group of Communist military officers overthrew 
Mohammed Daoud, Afghanistan’s first president. Soon after the coup the 
Communist regime in Kabul settled a $250 million agreement with USSR in 
weapons, plus the number of Soviet advisers skyrocketed from 350 to 7200 a 
year later. When the Kabul regime tried to impose a rigid centralised control 
over the tribes, a Muslim-led tribal rebellion broke out immediately all over 
the country, soon turning into a country-wide guerrilla war. In March 1979, 
with the deterioration of the political and security situation in Afghanistan, 
USSR troops invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. Among the 
justifications for the invasion were the attempt to avoid the collapse of the 
Kabul regime, and the fear (or paranoia) of Western penetration in 
Afghanistan. The invasion sparked a reaction from a variety of states 
(including the US, Pakistan, China, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt). The US 
responded with the imposition of sanctions, and the systematic covert 
program of military and other material assistance to the Mujahedin by the 
Carter Administration, a program later expanded by the Reagan 
administration (Rodman, 1994: 202-217), with arms supplies rising to sixty- 
five thousands tons annually by 1987. By some estimates more weapons had 
been poured into Afghanistan during the 1980s than to any other country in 
the world. As soon as the Russian troops withdrew, Afghanistan ceased to be 
on the US “radar” (Coll, 2005: 238-340), while UN data in the early 1990s 
depicted a dismal scenario of human misery and material destruction 
(Rodman, 1994: 357). 
After more than a decade of confrontation – the ‘Second Cold War’ – 
the USSR and the US began to negotiate bilaterally, including discussions 
about Third World allies and opponents, and direct talks and negotiations on 
roughly a dozen Third World crises, including Cambodia, the Persian Gulf, 
the Horn of Africa, Angola, Chad, Western Sahara, Nicaragua, and 
Afghanistan. It took some time, however, for the USSR to definitely abandon 
their previous commitments to warring parties in the Third World, as was the 
case with their military assistance and direct participation (in some cases) in 
counter-insurgency campaigns pursued from 1985 onwards in Cambodia, 
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Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola and Nicaragua (Halliday, 1989: 9, 128, 150- 
 
151).98 
Beyond the Portuguese stubbornness in holding on to its colonial 
possessions, other European states that had formally relinquished their 
empires still intervened occasionally in the Third World, in cases where 
instability threatened their interests. France intervened in Gabon (1964) to 
restore M’Ba to power and thus ensure the privileges it enjoyed there – 
including a military base, and in Central African Republic (1979) to remove a 
defiant Bokassa from power and install a friendlier leader in power. Likewise, 
Britain intervened in Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda in 1964, to suppress 
three army munities in its former colonies. These army munities had been 
influenced by another munity that took place a few days earlier in Zanzibar, 
where the Arab government was overthrown and replaced by a left-wing 
African government. Although the munities were partially about low pays and 
poor working conditions, there was also an anti-colonialist element to them 
(Arnold, 1995: 119-129). 
The legacy of the Cold War when it comes to the instability that 
states like Afghanistan, Somalia, DRC, Angola or Cambodia experienced 
after decolonisation was much debated since the late 1980s. It was correctly 
pointed out the existence of many causes and no single explanation for such 
instability (Parsons, 1995: 245; Rodman, 1994: 527). Likewise, the wars in 
the Third World after 1945 – over 140 conflicts, costing over twenty million 
lives according to some estimates – were of several types. These included: 
(a) wars of colonial independence; (b) internal revolts against independent 
regimes; (c) interventions by the Great Powers; (d) borders wars and other 
conflicts between Third World states; (e) ethnic conflicts; and (f) intra-state or 
civil wars (usually with involvement by outside actors) (Halliday, 1989: 11-13; 
Arnold, 1995). According to Halliday (1989: 11-13), these wars ‘had many 
causes and permit no single description’ and, thus, they ‘cannot be seen 
simply as products of the Cold War’. 
While the causes of instability and conflict in the Third World do not 
lie exclusively in the unfolding superpower rivalry in those areas, it is 
consensual that the superpowers did much to aggravate the situation. Apart 
from the many cases of direct intervention, many wars in the Third World 
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were transformed into proxy wars by the superpowers’ interference, which in 
many instances ‘prolonged the length, the complexity, and the destructive 
character of the conflicts’ (Engerman, 2010: 43). Moreover, the two 
superpowers supplied post-colonial states with vast quantities of arms and 
military training Holm (2001: 360). Not surprisingly, the list of major arms 
recipients during the Cold War matches the list of those states called ‘failed’ 
after the Cold War such as Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia, Liberia, 
Mozambique, Sudan, or DRC (Clapham, 1996: 156). In the words of Peter 
Rodman (1994) – White House assistant secretary to Henry Kissinger in the 
Nixon and Ford administrations and senior member and then director of the 
policy planning staff of the State Department under George Shultz during the 
Reagan Administration – opposing the other superpower’s hegemonic plans 
in the Third World was, for both sides, ‘more precious than peace’. In these 
debates, the superpowers have also been accused of promoting brutal 
regimes, in what Wheeler has called the ‘moral bankruptcy of Cold-War 
international society’ (Holm, 2001: 360). For example, Kissinger explained 
how supporting authoritarian governments while ignoring their brutal internal 
repressions was legitimate because several ‘authoritarian’ governments had 
evolved into democracies. Thus, according to Kissinger, a ‘moral distinction’ 
ought to between ‘totalitarian’, i.e. Communist, regimes, who had never ever 
evolved into a democracy, and ‘authoritarian’ governments, ‘which, with all 
their imperfections, are trying to resist foreign pressures and subversion and 
thereby help preserve the balance of powers in behalf of all free people’ 
(Gurtov and Maghroori, 1984: 80). 
 
 
7.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
 
 
The years that followed World War II witnessed the demise of the colonial 
empires that Europeans and then other members of international society 
acquired coercively over centuries of expansion. In this context, the principle 
of state sovereignty ceased to be contingent or dependent of implicit or 
explicit conditions/standards set out by Europeans and peoples of European 
descent, such as race or political and economic backwardness. With the 
universalisation of the norms of self-determination and state sovereignty, the 
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Trusteeship System was rendered obsolete, given that it rested precisely on 
the claim that certain nations were backward and thus not yet ready for self- 
government. The leaders of Third World states were now the strongest 
advocates of the norm of state sovereignty and related principles of self- 
determination, autonomy, and non-interference. 
Despite the demise of the backward claim, the concept of Third 
World underdeveloped states carried much of the same logic than its 
predecessor. It reflected the belief in modernisation, but also the old 
paternalistic conception of stages of progress, and the notion that the states 
to which the concept applied were incapable of fulfilling the responsibilities of 
sovereignty by themselves. It also reflected the concern and opportunity by 
those who used the concept – the two Cold War blocs – to change the 
underdeveloped states and place them in the path of economic development. 
In this regard, they ought to adopt one or the other model of political 
organisation and economic production. Yet, the newly independent states 
were able to shape the debates about development in international society 
and about their own status, as well as to counter the notion that they were 
defective polities. In particular, the rise of the concepts of developing and 
less-developed signalled the drive of the leadership of these states to 
develop economically and to modernise; the fact that economic development 
came to be seen as a right of sovereign states; and that economic 
underdevelopment was longer an obstacle to independence in legal terms. 
While there were great divisions about the nature of economic 
development, what it should do and how it ought to be achieved, the two 
superpowers attempted to influence and shape the state-building processes 
of Third World underdeveloped states. The latter constituted a realm of 
competition between the superpowers’ respective hegemonic visions of 
politics, economics, and global order. Instability, underdevelopment, and 
poverty became increasingly a matter of concern for numerous international 
organisations, and no longer only an issue restricted to the UN and its 
trusteeship system. In this context, the sway of the US-led arrangement for 
post-World War II international order is undeniable. Nevertheless, the 
governments of underdeveloped states were receptive of the idea of 
economic development, and welcomed the economic opportunities that
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derived from this global competition. In this regard, and despite all the 
criticisms directed at aid and economic and financial assistance to Third 
World states, the concept of Third World underdeveloped states did not 
represent, in principle at least, a denial of their right to self-government. 
The Third World was the stage of an obsessive security and strategic 
competition between the two superpowers. Underdevelopment, poverty, 
instability, and war in Third World states were faced as a threat by the US 
and the USSR. Both feared that the other side could advantage to influence 
events or install an allied government in power. Both sides often intervened, 
directly and indirectly through proxies, when there was a feeling of threat, 
while largely overlooking both the immediate and the long-term 
consequences of those actions to the states and societies in South America, 
the Caribbean, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, and 
South-East Asia where those struggles unfolded. While the centrality of the 
principle of universal state sovereignty during the Cold War is undeniable, the 
principle was far from sacrosanct. 
With the collapse of the USSR and the retreat of communism, the 
liberal internationalist project lost its main adversary. The US-led liberal 
international order created after World War II was now hegemonic. In this 
context, the concern about ‘failed development’ in Third World 
underdeveloped states expressed by Truman, Kennedy, and Kissinger 
among others, would give rise to the concept of failed states popularised by 
Madeleine Albright. The idea of defective polities had found its novel and 
most prominent contemporary expression. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
One of the main purposes of university education is to escape 
from the Zeitgeist, from the mean, narrow, provincial spirit which is 
constantly assuring us that we are at the peak of human 
achievement, that we stand on the edge of unprecedented 
prosperity or unparalleled catastrophe … It is a liberation of the 
spirit to acquire perspective … to learn that the same moral 
predicaments and the same ideas have been explored before. 
 
 
Martin Wight (1991: 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
8.1 The Perpetuation of an Idea 
 
 
 
By combining an ES historical-empirical approach with insights from 
international conceptual history, this thesis has shown that the idea of 
defective polities precedes the emergence of the concept of failed states, 
which is the contemporary manifestation of that idea. This idea and category 
has always been present in the history of international society. 
The extent to which the political and philosophical legacy of Ancient 
Greece and Rome still influences contemporary international morality and 
law will remain subject of debate and speculation among scholars. However, 
it can be assumed that the category of the barbarian, a prominent one in 
Ancient Greece as well as in the Roman Empire, has travelled far in time. In 
Medieval Latin Christendom, the political system that preceded the rise of 
international society, the notion of civilisation and corresponding concept of 
barbarian were obfuscated by the preponderance of religion in all aspects of 
life. The Christians-infidels/pagans dichotomy was central as a legitimating 
element in the crusades, supporting the view that the right to exercise 
government was dependent on the possession of Christian faith. Moreover, 
the sense of superiority at the basis of the civilisation-barbarity dichotomy 
was often absent during this period, given the advance of Islam and what 
was commonly seen as a more powerful Muslim enemy. The concept of 
barbarian would reappear in the context of the Spanish and Portuguese 
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conquest and colonisation of the Americas to refer to the so-called Indians of 
the New World. Their status not only of non-Christians but of barbarians was 
used to justify the actions of the conquistadores and colonisers. 
In a time when the Protestant imperial and colonial expansion rivalled 
with the Catholic one, the concept of savages was used interchangeably with 
barbarians. While both concepts necessarily implied a sense of moral 
superiority against which the barbarians/savages were judged, the concept of 
savages cannot be understood without acknowledging the emergence of the 
preponderant notion of civilité/civility in Europe. As with the concept of 
barbarian, the concept of savages represented the denial of the right of 
savage peoples for self-government, and was used as a legitimating element 
for imperial and colonial practices. Yet, in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, the mission or the duty of Europeans was increasingly less about 
imposing their religion on barbarian peoples, and instead about exporting 
European civilised morals, manners, and customs to the regions inhabited by 
barbarian and savage peoples. 
The consolidation of international society in the eighteenth century 
coincides with the Enlightenment notion that European states formed the 
realm of civilisation and progress. Linked to this notion was the civilised- 
uncivilised dichotomy. The concept of civilisation embraced not only the 
civilising mission and the process away from barbarism/savagery and 
towards civility, but also the shared conscience that the European 
international society formed the realm of civilisation, the clear end point of the 
civilising process. The concept of backward emerged by the late eighteenth 
century-early nineteenth century. It reflected less a dichotomy and more a 
spectrum referring to the progress of humanity, in which all the uncivilised, 
semi-civilised, and backward peoples and political communities were 
included. Nevertheless, the concepts of uncivilised and backward still 
provided a powerful and influential justification for the civilising mission and 
the denial of self-government to those to whom the concept applied. 
The concept of backward and the notion of stages of political and 
economic progress were central in the institutionalisation of trusteeship, first 
in the League of Nations Mandates System and then in its successor 
arrangement, the UN Trusteeship System. The status of backwardness was 
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the main justification to place those territories and peoples to which the 
concept applied under imperial rule with international oversight. With the 
changing political and moral context, the argument about the backwardness 
of the trust territories as well as those outside the trusteeship system became 
harder to sustain in international society. The project of transforming those 
territories into states in the image of the imperial centres gained ground, as 
the prospects of granting self-government to the backward peoples and 
territories became ever more likely. 
In the years that followed World War II, international society 
witnessed the universalisation of the principles of self-determination and 
state sovereignty. The functions that the idea and category of defective 
polities could serve were limited by this novel normative context. 
Nevertheless, the emergence of concept of Third World underdeveloped 
states carried a similar logic to its backward predecessor. It suggested that 
the new states would not be capable of fulfilling the responsibilities of 
sovereignty by themselves. It reflected the old paternalistic notion of stages 
of progress, and the concern and opportunity of the developed, industrialised 
world to transform the underdeveloped states and place them in the path of 
economic development. The two superpowers attempted to shape and 
influence the state-building and economic development processes of the 
newly independent states, whose leaders in general welcomed the 
opportunity of economic assistance. While the norm of universal state 
sovereignty was central in this period of the history of international society, 
the principle was not sacrosanct. Both the US and the USSR interpreted 
instability in underdeveloped states as a threat that the other superpower 
could potentially take advantage of. Therefore, during the Cold War, the 
concept of underdeveloped states and related international practices still 
represented, in certain instances, the undermining of the sovereign 
prerogatives of underdeveloped states. This was evident in the context of the 
security competition between the two superpowers in the Third Word. 
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, the US- 
led liberal international order created after World War II was now hegemonic. 
The concerns about the scenario of ‘failed development’ expressed during 
the Cold War were transferred to the concept of failed states, which emerged 
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as the contemporary manifestation of the idea of defective polities. Any state 
associated with the category of failed due to developments within its borders 
could potentially become the target of a foreign/international intervention, 
especially if those developments were interpreted in international society as 
threat to international order, peace, and security. As a number of scholars 
have noted, underpinning the efforts to establish peace and rebuild failed 
states is a project driven by very specific ideas about how these states 
should be governed. While the dominant ideology behind these international 
practices is liberal internationalism and concomitant assumptions about man, 
politics, and society, the term ‘liberal peace’ ends up oversimplifying what is a 
far more complex picture. The merging ‘interests and values’ (Blair, 1999) of 
liberal internationalism include peace, democracy, humanitarianism and 
human rights, development, progress, order, security, and the pursuit of 
power linked among other things with the attempt to universalise these 
values and interests. 
The primary goal of this study was not to compare different historical 
epochs. Nevertheless, part of the aim of the tracing this idea in the history of 
international society was to shed light on the nature of its most prominent 
contemporary expression, i.e. the concept of failed states. This exercise 
inevitably raises interrogations about the links between the present/the recent 
past and the distant one. In particular, it begs the question about the extent to 
which the post-Cold War international practices associated with the category 
of failed states represent a reproduction of old imperial practices. There are 
many parallels that can be made between the international practices 
surrounding the history of this idea and category. These parallels render the 
divisions between past and present; between what is commonly depicted in 
the literature as the old age of empires on the one hand, and the 
contemporary age of universal state sovereignty characterised by 
international interventions to rebuild failed states on the other; less clear. 
As we have seen, the contemporary international/foreign 
interventions in the internal affairs of other political communities justified as 
being for the population’s own good, for the sake of humanity, or in the name 
of international peace, order and security, are by no means a post-Cold War 
phenomenon. Today’s rankings of failed and weak states, in which states are 
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listed according to a number of political and economic criteria, echoes very 
much the Enlightenment classification of humanity’s stages of progress. The 
very notion of globalisation, used after the Cold War by policy-makers and 
scholars alike to justify the importance of the issue of failed states in 
international society, was present as far back as the nineteenth century in 
discussions about the imperial dilemmas of intervention. Likewise, the 
interpretation of misrule or instability within failed states as a threat to 
international order, peace, and security, is akin to the concern with instability, 
anarchy, and the decline of non-European political communities that 
animated imperialism at least since the eighteenth century. Yet another 
association is that between the old mission to carry civilised morals, customs 
and manners to the lands inhabited by barbarian and savage peoples, and 
the post-Cold War interventions in the so-called failed states to establish or 
maintain peace and rebuild states through very specific ideas of how these 
states should be governed. As exemplified by the imperial motivations 
surrounding the League of Nations Mandates System, peacekeeping, 
peacebuilding and statebuilding are, to borrow James’s (1999: 154-155) 
felicitous phrase, international practices that predate their conceptualisation. 
The concept of nationbuilding in particular is not a distinctive post-Cold 
Warcharacteristic, as it existed at least since the 1940s.99 
Within the literature on failed states, the notion that there is an 
evident qualitative difference between past imperial practices and the 
international/foreign involvement in those states categorised as failed is still 
predominant. The explanations advanced for the existence of this difference 
lie essentially in the perception or assumption that the contemporary 
peacebuilding and statebuilding operations are less mercenary when 
compared to the history of imperialism and colonialism. This assumption is 
shared even by current critics of these contemporary international practices 
(e.g. Paris, 2002: 637-638). In this perspective, these international practices 
are essentially for the population’s own good, they are about ‘building 
sustainable peace within societies ravaged by war and violent conflict’ 
(Berdal, 2009: 11). Moreover, and probably unaware of the many similarities 
between today’s peacebuilding and statebuilding activities and the old 
civilising mission, the international organisations involved in these activities, 
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especially the UN, are mostly seen as neutral. For example, Jackson and 
Rosberg (1982: 20-22) referred to international organisations as ‘post- 
imperial ordering devices.’ 
The similarities between the recent past and the more distant one 
matter not only because the history of imperialism and colonialism is a 
troubling one, especially when viewed through many of today’s moral 
standards. It can also reveal important aspects about the nature of the 
normative framework of contemporary international society, and in particular 
its central norm, i.e. state sovereignty. As addressed in the introduction of 
this thesis, the prerogatives of the universal principle of state sovereignty are, 
at least in principle, the antithesis of the notion of empire. However, if 
simultaneously with the norm of state sovereignty, there is also a norm of 
foreign/international intervention and interference in the affairs of sovereign 
states by a liberal hegemonic core (as discussed in chapter 1), then how do 
we make sense of the normative framework of contemporary international 
society? There are a few possibilities, not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
One is that contemporary international society is morally deficient. It 
professes to live by certain moral and legal standards and principles, only to 
constantly violate them. Another possibility is that international norms and 
rules such as state sovereignty matter, but the most powerful members/the 
liberal hegemonic core of international society often use those norms and 
rules as instruments in the pursuit of their interests and agendas, often of an 
imperial nature. Yet another possibility is that the core notion of state 
sovereignty as a state that is constitutionally independent has remained 
constant, whereas the regulative rules of sovereignty have changed over 
time, and are essentially contested. 
The answer to this question is a mixed one. The more powerful 
members of international society are much more prone and have more 
flexibility to use norms and rules to justify and legitimise actions and practices 
that are controversial, of imperial nature, or that clash with other norms and 
rules in international society. This seems to have been the case with liberal 
hegemonic core of international society, which since the end of the Cold War 
has revived the idea of contigent sovereignty and pushed for the 
interpretation that the principle of state sovereignty carries not only rights but 
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duties and responsibilities towards both international society and the states’ 
own citizens. In other words, state sovereignty is conditional, depending on 
the ability of states to fulfil those duties and responsibilities. This highlights 
another important characteristic of international society: the fact that, beyond 
the core notion that the principle of state sovereignty refers to the 
constitutional independence of a state, there is often little consensus in 
international society about the rights, duties, and responsibilities of sovereign 
states. As discussed in this thesis, it does not follow necessarily that norms 
and rules, especially state sovereignty, explain international behaviour of an 
imperial nature, or that those norms and rules are the cause of such 
behaviour. We will return to this point later in this conclusion. 
 
 
8.2 An Evolving Normative Context 
 
 
 
Despite looking at the perpetuation of the idea of defective polities in 
international society, the meta-theoretical approach of this thesis was 
sensitive to the issue of change. In particular, we saw how this idea and 
category was marked by evolving historical conditions in which morality, 
norms, principles, and rules changed over time. This evolving normative 
context is reflected in the changes in the concepts that expressed that idea 
and category. For example, the gradual demise of the central influence of 
Christian religion in Europe’s political life was accompanied by a shift from 
the concepts of infields/pagans, based essentially on their non-Christian 
status, to the concepts of barbarians and savages, which came to reflect first 
and foremost the Europeans’ ethnocentric vision of these peoples’ morals, 
customs, and values. As the norm of state sovereignty gained ground in 
European-centred international society, and Europeans states came to see 
themselves as occupying the realm of civilisation, the concepts referring to 
defective polities were less about the barbarian/savage nature of peoples, 
and more about the uncivilised or semi-civilised status of political 
communities. As these dichotomies increasingly gave place to a spectrum, in 
which all human political communities were included regardless of their 
stages of progress, defective polities were increasingly referred to as 
backward. The concept of backward states appeared in the context of the 
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institutionalisation of trusteeship, and the rise of the notion that the only 
alternative to empire was self-government by sovereign states to be built in 
the image of the imperial centres. With the universalisation of the principles 
of self-determination and state sovereignty, the distinctions between states in 
international society became first and foremost economic. This was reflected 
by the concept of Third World underdeveloped states, closely associated with 
the influential modernisation theory, while the political (including racial) 
preparedness or unpreparedness for self-government was relegated to a 
second plan. 
Probably the most striking change in international society since its 
formation in Europe is its universalisation. This sets post-World War II 
international society apart from previous periods of its history. This 
universalisation of the sovereign state is a result first and foremost of 
European imperialism and colonialism. Nevertheless, the norm of state 
sovereignty, one that was used as a legitimating argument to deny non- 
European peoples their right to self-government, was later an instrument with 
which non-European peoples made their way to independence and self- 
determination, and demanded equal membership of international society. To 
note that the norm of state sovereignty is universally adopted by all 
internationally recognised political communities is different from arguing that 
it is universally accepted by all societies. To understand if this idea of state 
sovereignty is contested within states that have a recent history of instability 
such as Afghanistan, DRC, Pakistan, or Yemen, would be the subject of 
another thesis. However, the great extent to which this idea about how 
human groups should organise themselves politically is shared in 
international society is certainly a novel characteristic of world politics. 
A number of moral and normative factors underpin the feeling of 
legitimation that characterises international interventions in those states 
associated with the category of failed after the Cold War. One is precisely 
this general consensus in international society surrounding the sovereign 
state, almost as the ultimate political form around which human groups 
should be organised. On the contrary, as various scholars have noted (e.g. 
Doornbos, 2002: 807; Gourevitch, 2004: 257; Keen, 2008), ideas of 
statelessness, of anarchy and chronic instability within states, are interpreted 
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as instances of deviation or even aberration which cannot be allowed to 
subsist. Related to this is the notion that states not only have rights in 
international society that derive from their sovereign status, but they have 
also duties that stem from their membership of international society. Thus, 
developments in the internal realm of states that can potentially be 
interpreted as a problem for international society, such as civil wars, 
humanitarian crisis and refugee flows, or even the existence of terrorist safe 
havens, justify foreign/international involvement to address those 
developments. The contemporary international peacebuilding and 
statebuilding missions in Africa, the Balkans, or Central Asia, that involve a 
multiplicity of actors, from Great Powers and international organisations to 
NGOs and private contractors, seek essentially to take temporary hold of the 
sovereign prerogatives of states in order to stabilise and strengthen the 
institution of state sovereignty. Thus, it is argued that this idea and category 
that has always animated imperialism and colonialism in international society, 
is today characterised by a ‘reluctant’ imperialism (Mallaby, 2002). The words 
of Cooper (2002) illustrate quite well this notion: ‘All the conditions for 
imperialism are there, but both the supply and demand for imperialism have 
dried up. And yet the weak still need the strong and the strong still need an 
orderly world.’ Likewise, in one of the most prominent books about the topic, 
Chesterman, Ignatieff and Thakur (2005: 383) talk about the need to think 
about how state building efforts can reproduce ‘the better effects of empire 
without reproducing its worst features.’ 
Regardless of the novel and evolving normative context, a number of 
aspects reinforce the notion that there is continuity of practices of imperial 
nature, rather than a break with the imperial past. Even if one accepts that 
today’s practices of intervention, in the name of international society and for 
the sake of strengthening the institution of state sovereignty, are not only 
temporary but less mercenary when compared to previous eras, one cannot 
but notice that the drive towards uniformity and universalism is at least as 
great today than it was during the old imperial age. There is an inversely 
proportional relation between decolonisation and the rise of the view, present 
at least since the era of the League of Nations Mandates System, that the 
sovereign  state  should  be  the  one  and  only  constitutional  alternative  to 
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empire. In other words, the universalisation of the principle of self- 
determination and the recognition of the right of all nations to self- 
government were accompanied by the idea that free political communities 
had to be sovereign states. According to this logic, exceptions to this rule 
justify imperialism for the sake of state sovereignty. Today, this drive towards 
uniformity is not a one-way process, in the sense that formerly subjugated 
peoples have, without much of an alternative to begin with, adopted the 
sovereign state model as their own. However, there are not only pressures of 
universalism and uniformity regarding how political communities should be 
organised. As a number of scholars have noted, over the last two decades 
there was also a clear liberal hegemonic ideology, dominant in peacebuilding 
and statebuilding missions. This ideology of the ‘new liberal imperialism’ 
(Cooper, 2002) is characterised by very specific ideas about how  failed 
states should be governed. It promotes the importance of a particular type of 
internal order, based on peace and stability as well as democracy, elections, 
rule of law, human and civil rights, and economic development. 
Related to this last point, another trait that has always characterised 
this idea and category is a certain inability of international society to coexist 
with and accept difference. As early as Ancient Greece, the tendency to read 
other peoples customs and manners according to ethnocentric conceptions, 
instead of an ability to understand different values and customs naturally, 
was observed by Plato. In international society, the propensity to see 
different peoples and political communities, especially when that difference is 
interpreted as weakness, through ethnocentric standards has been noted 
across time by a number of philosophers, intellectuals, and scholars, from 
Montagne and Rousseau to Todorov, Duffield, Paris, or Richmond more 
recently. In the history of international society, this characteristic has 
increasingly animated the drive towards changing the barbarians, savages, 
uncivilised, backward, underdeveloped, and failed states in the image of the 
civilised/civilisation, of the realm of progress, of the developed world, of the 
stable and wealthy democratic states. 
Despite the evolving normative context, another aspect that 
emphasises the notion of continuity is that this idea and category, in its 
various expressions, has always generated debates and raised questions 
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about the moral righteousness of the category itself and the international 
practices associated with it. This was the case even before the emergence of 
international society. In Ancient Greece, Plato and Aristotle held differing 
views on the merits of the concept of barbarian. The issue of the rights of the 
infidels, both within and outside Christian lands were subject of some of the 
most important political, moral, and theological debates during Medieval Latin 
Christendom. The Spanish overseas expansion was marked by a heated 
controversy between the likes of Vitoria and Sepúlveda about the ability for 
self-government and rational/irrational nature of the barbarians of the New 
World. During the European Enlightenment, some of its major figures held 
different perspectives about the benefits/evils of the process of exporting 
European civilisation, as well as about the rights of the so-called 
backward/uncivilised. At the height of the British Empire, Burke’s arguments 
about a moral obligation to protect contrasted with Mill’s notion that the duty 
of Europeans was to civilise the uncivilised/backward and thus bring them 
into the realm of civilisation. In the context of the institutionalisation of 
trusteeship, Woolf envisioned a system that would soon confer the backward 
their right to self-government, while Smuts saw the emerging arrangement as 
an instrument that could justify the perpetuation of the dominance of white 
races over the non-whites. During the Cold War the concept of 
underdevelopment and corresponding status was subject to the scrutiny of 
those to whom it applied, who were now recognised as members of 
international society. In post-Cold War international society, the motives and 
ideologies behind the projects of fixing failed states were questioned by some 
segments of international society, as was the case for example of 
sovereignty as responsibility. The nature of the idea is and it has always 
been a contested one. 
 
 
8.3 The Mirror of International Law 
 
 
 
If this idea and category has always been a contested one, then how can we 
comprehend its perpetuation, even in the context of the universalisation of 
the principles of self-determination and state sovereignty. In this regard, this 
thesis  addressed  the  claim,  advanced  by  a  number  of  scholars,  that 
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international law and the doctrine and norm of state sovereignty in particular, 
have played a decisive role in the perpetuation of this idea and related 
international practices. In this perspective, international norms and rules 
matter, but they are first and foremost an instrument that the most powerful 
members of international society use in the pursuit of their interests and often 
imperial agendas. 
We have shown that international law does not explain the existence 
of such idea and category and related international practices. First of all, this 
idea and category is not a product of the norm of state sovereignty, as it 
preceded the rise of international society in Europe. It was present in Ancient 
Greece, in the Roman Empire, and in Medieval Latin Christendom. Both 
important figures of the church such as Pope Innocent IV, as well as a 
number of just war theorists that included St. Augustine and St. Thomas 
Aquinas addressed the issue of relations between Christians and non- 
Christians, based not only on the teachings of theology and canon law, but 
also on natural law precepts. Different interpretations arose from their 
considerations, some more instrumental in their intentions than others. While 
Innocent IV’s reflections on the matter were a clear endorsement of the 
notion that only Christian peoples were rightfully entitled to self-government, 
the legacy of just war theorists as well as their motivations is far more 
complex. Their intention was not to justify particular policies of expansion, but 
to provide a normative framework that could contribute to more just and 
peaceful relations between all humans. 
Without a notion of the context in which Vitoria developed his 
thoughts about international politics and morality it is fairly easy to interpret 
his work as an attempt to provide the Spanish monarchs with a set of 
legitimating arguments for their conquests in the New World, or to appease 
their moral unease about the brutalities being committed by the Spanish 
conquistadores and colonisers. However, there are plenty of indications that 
Vitoria was himself moved by a moral unease regarding the already unfolding 
events in the Americas, which he believed to be an extremely unjust 
situation, and a gross violation of universal natural rights. He rejected every 
single argument that had been or was being used by his fellow Spaniards to 
justify the subjugation of the barbarians of the New World. He attempted to 
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develop a framework of principles to guide the conduct of human beings, as 
was the case with Aquinas who greatly influenced Vitoria. Given that the 
conquest of large territories in the Americas was an established reality, he 
argued that the Indians had to be treated as subjects of the King, and not as 
animals. This is why he reflected on the principle of trusteeship. He called for 
the protection of the Indians against the brutalities committed by the 
conquistadores and colonisers, and argued that the Indians also had rights, 
namely the right to own property. He also explored the possibility that, in 
certain conditions, limited intervention in Indian affairs could be morally 
justified only to address a circumstantial situation, such as human sacrifices 
and the killing of innocents, although he ended up expressing serious doubts 
about the moral grounding of his own thoughts in this regard. The apparently 
limited effects of his ideas when it comes to the protection of rights of the 
Indians does not counter the notion that he was indeed a defender of their 
rights and very critical of the Spanish actions in the Americas. Thus, Vitoria’s 
legacy in relation to European imperialism and colonialism is that of a moral 
call for restraint, and the acknowledgement of the rational nature and rights 
of the non-Christian peoples, irrespective of their religious beliefs. 
In a time when international society was in its formative period, 
Grotius’ jus gentium conception was much more than an attempt to 
systematise a body of rules or principles that could regulate relations 
between states. While Grotius’ reflections on a natural law of nations did 
indeed refer to a pre-existing reality, both within Europe and beyond it, his 
effort was essentially one of developing a theory of morality, sensitive to 
difference, that could provide guidance to various actors in the international 
realm, including states, individuals, and private enterprises. While his chief 
concern was the issue of war, when it comes to relations between Europeans 
and non-Europeans, Grotius drew first and foremost from Vitoria. He believed 
that non-Europeans and non-Christian peoples, classified as barbarians and 
savages by many of his contemporaries, were rational beings and were 
rightfully entitled to self-government. He thus countered a prominent 
justification of the United Provinces’ subjugation of various non-European 
peoples they encountered. Far from being an apologist of imperial 
domination, Grotius was concerned about the events he reflected upon. It 
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was not his intention to provide a range of legal or moral arguments to justify 
or legitimise imperialism and colonialism, and it is difficult to envision how his 
legacy could have been responsible for the later division between the realm 
of civilised states and the non-European uncivilised peoples and political 
communities, as argued by Keene (2002). His conception of international 
society naturally included an inner circle of Christian nations, but the law of 
nature and jus gentium encompassed the outer circle of non-Christian 
communities on the basis of sovereign equality. Thus, instead of ‘the colonial 
origins of international law’ (Anghie, 1996; 1999; 2005), it is far more 
accurate to talk about the anti-imperial origins of modern international law. 
The emergence of the standard of civilisation in international law, 
particularly in the nineteenth century, was without doubt highly political and 
discriminatory, as it was influenced by European racism and ethnocentrism. 
Moreover, it was used by European empires as a legitimating tool for the 
conquest of uncivilised territories, and to deny the latter the right to self- 
government under the claim that only civilised states possessed such right. 
However, it is greatly misleading to read the emergence of the standard of 
civilisation in nineteenth century positivist international law as a cause of the 
division between civilised and uncivilised states and respective European 
discriminatory views and behaviour towards non-Europeans. As argued, the 
standard of civilisation in international law represents the systematisation of a 
long-standing practice in international society, which then assumed an 
explicit juridical character. Moreover, this practice reflected the consolidation 
in the eighteenth century of the shared notion that European international 
society formed the realm of civilisation, the clear end point of the civilising 
process. Thus, the emergence of the standard of civilisation in international 
as a result of the positivist turn has to be understood as an expression of 
wider changes going on in Europe’s political and philosophical scene, which 
naturally reached the science of law as well. 
The principle of trusteeship re-emerged in the context of the actions 
of the British East India Company. It was argued that, before the 
institutionalisation of trusteeship in the League of Nations Mandates System, 
there was a difference between the principle of trusteeship and the norm of 
the civilising mission. In this regard, what we called ‘the spirit’ of trusteeship 
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was about the protection of the native inhabitants and their customs, as well 
as the accountability and obligations of colonialists against the company’s 
belligerence and misgovernment, and not about justifying the subjugation of 
what many in Britain saw as uncivilised peoples. The notion that the Berlin 
Conference represents the internationalisation of trusteeship amounts to a 
myth. Instead, the Conference worked as a collective endorsement, by 
international society, of the civilising mission in Africa. In this period, the 
principle of trusteeship was nurtured essentially within the Anglo-saxon 
world. The principle was institutionalised with the League of Nations 
Mandates System, and thus became a norm in international society. The 
institutionalisation of this principle represented more than an attempt by pro- 
imperialists to legitimise the civilising mission, related with the still powerful 
colonial ambitions in international society and the fear that the backward 
nations pre-mature independence would result in chaos. It was also more 
than an effort by the critics and sceptics of empire to protect the backward 
peoples and place their destinies under the scrutiny of international opinion 
and international law. It was a complex compromise that represented 
conflicting ideas and motivations at play in international society, not only 
between different views regarding the status of backward peoples and 
nations, but between conflicting visions about empire and its future. In this 
context, the idea and principle of trusteeship and the civilising mission 
became part and parcel of the same project institutionalised in the Mandates 
System. The re-institutionalisation of trusteeship in the United Nations 
Trustesship System represented the claim that the backward were still not 
yet ready for self-government, and it was largely shaped by the strategic 
interests of the Great Powers. Yet it also embodied the notion that 
independence would have to follow soon. This higher prominence of the 
promise of self-government in the Trusteeship System when compared to its 
predecessor reflects the considerable ground that the idea of self- 
determination had gained in the inter-war period. It also meant that the 
argument about the backward status of certain peoples or political 
communities was under increasing scrutiny and ever harder to sustain in 
international society. 
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In the years that followed World War II, the principle of state 
sovereignty ceased to be contingent or dependent of implicit or explicit 
conditions/standards set out by Europeans and peoples of European 
descent, such as race or political and economic backwardness. Despite the 
demise of the backward claim, and the universalisation of the principles of 
self-determination and state sovereignty, the concept of Third World 
underdeveloped states carried much of the same logic as its predecessor. 
However, the functions that the concept served were shaped and limited by 
the novel normative context in international society. The leaders of the newly 
independent states were able to shape the debates about development in 
international society, and counter the notion that they were not capable of or 
suitable for self-government. Those peoples and political communities that 
were hitherto considered backward were now making use of their sovereign 
character to shape the major debates in international society regarding their 
own status. The rise of the concepts of developing and less-developed 
signalled: the drive of the leaderships of these states to develop economically 
and to modernize; the fact that economic development came to be seen as a 
right of sovereign states; and the idea that economic underdevelopment was 
no longer an obstacle to independence in legal terms. While the centrality of 
the principle of universal state sovereignty during the Cold War is undeniable, 
the principle was far from sacrosanct. In this regard, the concept of Third 
World underdeveloped states did involve violations of sovereign rights, in the 
context of the global security rivalry between the two Cold War blocs. 
From all this it can be concluded that international law and the norm 
of state sovereignty in particular are not, for the most part of the history of the 
idea and of defective polities, the cause behind its perpetuation in 
international society. The history of the principle and doctrine of state 
sovereignty and its evolution is indeed closely linked to the history of the 
imperial expansion of international society. But it does not follow from this 
that state sovereignty provided the conditions for the existence of this idea 
and category. In some periods, for example when the standard of civilisation 
was reified by positivist international law, the latter did work as a legitimating 
element for the discriminatory views and imperial and colonial practices of 
the members of international society. However, the standard of civilisation in 
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international law did not produce this practices, it systematised a long- 
standing behaviour and reflected the already existing view that Europe was 
the realm of civilisation in contrast with the uncivilised nature of many or most 
non-Europeans. In the case of Vitoria, his natural law of nations’ conception 
was a non-discriminatory one. It countered many of the imperial arguments 
used to justify the subjugation of the barbarian inhabitants of the New World; 
it called for the protection of the Indians and the respect for their rights; and it 
raised questions that placed the imperialism and colonialism of his time 
under moral scrutiny. Much the same can be said about Grotius’, who was 
also worried about an international reality that preceded him and that marked 
the era in which he lived, characterised by war and empire. His universal 
natural law principles emphasised that non-Christian or non-European 
peoples, be them barbarians or savages, could not be denied their right to 
self-government. While the institutionalisation of trusteeship was a 
justification for the continuation of alien rule and the civilising mission, it also 
represented the effort by the critics and sceptics of empire to protect the 
backward peoples and place their destinies under the scrutiny of international 
opinion and international law. Moreover, it reflected the commitment that the 
promise of self-government would be eventually fulfilled. During the Cold 
War, the principle of universal state sovereignty was central in the workings 
of international society, and was central in the process that led to the demise 
of the backward claim. 
During the last two decades, the relationship between the principle 
and doctrine of state sovereignty and the category of defective polities, 
expressed through the concept of failed states, has been a close one. In 
particular, the powerful notion of sovereignty as responsibility and 
especially as contingent, as defined by the liberal hegemonic core of 
international society, echoes the nineteenth century standard of civilisation. 
Then as now, those who do not meet the expected criteria are susceptible of 
being denied their right to self-government. While this move was certainly 
important over the last two decades as a justification and legitimating 
element in the international interventions and involvement in the so-called 
failed states, the view that the category of failed states is explained by the 
instrumentality of international law is a gross oversimplification. To talk about 
causality in a very complex international social setting inevitably leads to this 
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outcome. However, if one ought to talk about causes, beyond the role of 
power, one should look at prior sets of values and beliefs in international 
society, including ethnocentrism, the preponderance of the values of 
liberalism and democracy, different views about the status of human beings, 
as well as differing perspectives about the moral purpose of state. 
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Mandatory Powers 
 
 
Mandated Territories 
 
 
Type A Mandates (former territories of the Turkish Empire) 
 
 
British Empire 
 
 
- Mesopotamia (independent 
Kingdom of Iraq in 1932); 
- Palestine; 
 
- Transjordan (independent in 
1946). 
 
 
France 
 
 
-  Syria (independent in 1944 and 
Syria-Lebanon separation). 
 
 
Type B Mandates (former German colonial possessions) 
 
 
British Empire 
 
 
- Tanganyika (later a UN trust 
territory until independence in 
1961. Today’s Tanzania); 
- Kamerun (split with France; later 
a UN trusteeship territory); 
- Togoland (split with France; 
later UN trusteeship territory). 
 
 
France 
 
 
- Kamerun (split with the United 
Kingdom; 
later falling under UN trusteeship); 
 
Appendix 
Table 1 
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 - Togoland (split with the United 
 
Kingdom; 
 
later UN trusteeship territory). 
 
 
Belgium 
 
 
- Ruanda-Urundi (later under UN 
Trusteeship together with Belgium 
Congo; independent 
in 1962 and Rwanda-Burundi 
separation). 
 
 
Type C Mandates 
 
 
British Empire 
 
 
- Nauru (administered by Australia). 
 
 
Union of South Africa 
 
 
- South-West Africa (later UN 
trusteeship; today’s Namibia). 
 
 
Australia 
 
 
- All German islands in the Pacific 
south of the Equator, including 
New Guinea (excluding 
the German Samoan Islands). 
 
 
New Zealand 
 
 
- German Samoan Islands 
(Western Samoa). 
 
 
Japan 
(replaced by 
the United States) 
 
 
- All German islands in the Pacific 
north of the Equator, 
including Caroline and the 
Marianas. 
 
 
Sources: Hall (1948: 295), Bain (2003: 102-107), Caplan (2008: 563). 
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Notes 
 
 
Introduction 
 
1 
Wilde (2007: 21-26) defines ‘territorial administration’ as ‘a formally-constituted, locally- 
based management structure operating with respect to a particular territorial unit, whether a 
state, a sub-state unit or a non-state territorial entity’, performed by one or more international 
actors rather than states, and that have an ‘‘alien’ identity when compared with the identity of 
the territorial unit involved’ (e.g. the United Nations). 
 
2 
The idea that this category obscures more than it illuminates (Doornbos, 2002: 799-805) 
has been repeatedly pointed out in the literature (e.g. Gourevitch, 2004; Boas and Jennings, 
2005: 385; Patrick, 2007: 645-647). There have also been calls for a more critical approach 
to the notions of chaos and anarchy within states. The point made by a number of scholars, 
(e.g. Doornbos, 2002: 807; Gourevitch, 2004: 257; Keen, 2008), is that there might be more 
subjectivity in the idea of failure than what is normally accorded to in the literature. In such 
situations there is not simply chaos/anarchy/statelessness. Political life goes on, there are 
political forces pursuing their own objectives. 
 
3 
The difference between rouge states and failed states is that while the latter refers to 
certain internal characteristics of the state, the former describes foreign policy behaviour 
(Bilgin and Morton, 2002: 55-56). It is based on this crucial difference that the concept rouge 
state is left out of this study. 
 
 
1. Failed States: The Clout of a Concept 
 
4 
The WB and IMF policies were often target of heavy criticism for a variety of motives, 
including the promotion of reforms based on market liberalisation (e.g. Bird, 1996; Goldman 
2005; Hartzell et al, 2010). 
 
5 
See Winn and Lord (2001) on the EU’s development of a capacity/role in peacekeeping, 
peace-enforcement, and crisis management; on the idea of the EU as a ‘civilian power’ see 
Hill (1998); on the normative principles promoted by the EU, including peace, freedom, 
democracy, human rights, rule of law see Manners (2008). About the EU’s involvement in 
Bosnia and Kosovo’s crisis see Lucarelli and Menotti (2006), Gross (2007). For the EU’s 
administration of the municipality of Mostar in central Bosnia see Winn and Lord (2001: 74- 
82). 
 
6 
For a good overview of NATO’s adaptation to crisis management and peace operations see 
Yost (1998). Regarding NATO’s presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina see Sjursen (1998), 
Winn and Lord (2001). About NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, including the debates about 
legitimacy and legality, see Wheeler (2000: 262-276). See also the statement issued after 
the alliance’s Copenhagen Ministerial Session in June 1991, the ‘Brussels Summit 
Declaration’ (1994), and the report titled ‘Follow-on to the 1993 Athens Report on 
Cooperation in Peacekeeping’ (1995). 
 
7 
See UNDP (1994: 24). 
 
8 
Smith (2006: 38-40, 45) notes how the EU foreign and security policy after 9/11 shifted 
from foreign policy understood as diplomatic coordination towards security policy. After the 
adoption of the ESS, a number of other important documents followed suit, including the 
European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004, and the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2005 
(Biscop 2008: 2; Biscop and Anderson, 2008: 7). 
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9 
Clapan (2002: 9-14) notes that the term international administration encompasses a variety 
of ‘experiences’, historical and contemporary, and shall not be confuse with ‘the expansion of 
traditional peacekeeping operations to embrace a variety of ‘peacebuilding’ activities’. 
Although ITA and peacebuilding do reflect the same international concerns, according to 
Caplan, ‘no international field operation has been vested with as much executive, legislative 
and judicial authority as some of the international administrations that have been 
established’ since the mid-1990s. In its present form, ITA is a rather informal arrangement, in 
the sense that ‘it has no specific UN mandate’, and ‘no dedicated bureaucracy to support it’ 
despite normally enjoying of the UN Security Council backing, and thus is a rather ‘ad hoc 
innovation’. 
 
 
2. A History of An Idea in International Society 
 
10 
See also Bull and Watson (1984: 1). Institutions beyond its formal sense (e.g. international 
organisations) will be treated here as established practices, norms and standards of 
behaviour. As Holsti (2009: 136) puts it, institutions in the ES can be broadly defined as 
‘established patterns of action that contain normative elements.’ 
 
11 
The explicitly normative strain is no better represented than in the debate between 
pluralists and solidarists on the values of pluralism, diversity, independence, and 
international order on the one hand, and the moral obligation to intervene and the values of 
cosmopolitan justice on the other. As Linklater and Suganami (2006: 5) note, the pluralism- 
solidarism debate was introduced by Bull (1966). See for two important examples of 
contributions to the debate, Wheeler (2000) and Jackson (2000). The rather polarised and 
dogmatic nature of this debate has been object of criticism from a number of ES scholars 
(Almeida, 2003; Buzan, 2004a: 21, 49; Linklater and Suganami, 2006: 62). 
 
12 
Suganami’s (1988) article is a response to Halliday (1987: 217-219).The CS has also 
contributed to these debates. Skinner’s (1989b: 102-103, 122) analysis on the evolution of 
the concept of state demonstrates how common it has been to various authors the usage of 
the word state to refer to an apparatus of government. 
 
13 
The concept of state remains a disputed one IR and other social sciences (Hobson, 2003). 
The most common approaches to conceptualise what a state is can be grouped into: (a) the 
social contract tradition, identified with authors such as Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau; (b) 
Weber’s definition of ‘state’ as a ‘corporate group’ that ‘claims to hold the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force within a specific territory’; and (c) the juridical statehood approach, a 
definition of state that includes a demarcated territory, a permanent population, an effective 
government, and the capacity to formally relate with other states, according to the 1933 
Montevideo Convention (Einsiedel, 2005: 14-15). These three ways of conceptualising what 
the state is all reflect different aspects of the practice of statehood. The social contract view, 
drawn from the liberal tradition, represents the element of the population’s consent in the 
legitimacy of the government or ruler, as well as the idea that the existence and preservation 
of the state is at least a necessary condition for the realisation of any value (Buzan, 1991: 
39-40). Weber’s definition focuses on the state’s role in managing violence and security. In 
this regard, Tilly’s (1990) tour de force shows the long historical process through which those 
involved in the construction of European states gradually monopolised the coercive 
capabilities away from every other actor within their territories. While Tilly’s is essentially a 
history of a coercive process, Weber emphasises the issue of legitimacy (Thomson, 1994: 
7). The matter of organised violence echoes Hobbes’s focus on the provision of security as 
the most important moral function of the state (Van Creveld, 2004: 406; Sorensen, 2005: 81). 
Regarding the juridical approach, Crawford (2006: 31) notes how ‘there is no generally 
accepted and satisfactory modern legal definition of statehood.’ 
 
14 
Jackson’s (2009) position represents a departure from his earlier (1990: 5) view, in support 
‘to the institutionalist argument that rules and laws – including international law – can have 
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substantial independent effects on political life.’ Clark (2005; 2007) is another member of the 
ES that tends to emphasise the causal effects of norms and rules in the behaviour of states. 
 
15 
See Bull (1977: 139-140). 
 
16 
Jackson (1999a: 425) defines the internal aspect of state sovereignty as ‘a government of 
a territory’ that is ‘supreme within its jurisdiction.’ This idea of jurisdictional supremacy or 
supreme authority echoes common usage and is associated in the literature with the political 
theory of Bodin, Hobbes, and Rousseau. 
 
17 
Contrary to the assumption that the ‘scientific turn’ in IR separated the discipline from 
history, Hobson and Lawson (2008: 415-417) rightly note that international history never 
disappeared from the radars of IR scholars. From the early days of the IR discipline, not only 
international history but the philosophical and methodological questions surrounding the 
study of history were a matter of concern for scholars. Among the most important 
contributions is Carr’s (1961) critique directed at the ‘liberal historical establishment’ and 
what he saw as their strict division between past and present (Wilson, 2001: 124). Carr 
(1986: 81-82) criticised the tendency to speak about ‘interpretation’ and the rejection of 
causal approach to the study of history. For him, ‘the study of history is the study of causes’ 
by recalling previous attempts of historians and philosophers of history to ‘organize the past 
experience of mankind by discovering the causes of historical events and the laws which 
governed them.’ It was this type of approach to history that led Popper (1957: 3) to criticise 
the assumption that the aim of the social sciences concerned with the study of history is to 
discover the ‘rhythms, patterns, laws, or trends that underlie the evolution of history.’ 
 
18 
For theory of speech acts see Searle (1969; 1995), Skinner (1971), Austin (1975). 
 
 
3. On Infidels, Pagans and Barbarians 
 
19 
The French, Catalan, and Aragonese expedition that in 1063-4 recovered Barbastro in 
Spain has also been pointed out as the first crusade (Riley-Smith, 1977: 74-75). By the end 
of the fourteenth century, the crusading enterprise started to decline for a number  of 
reasons, including the Great Schism and the war between England and France. Pope 
Gregory XIII’s bull to support the Spanish war against England in the 1580s is generally 
considered the last formal crusade (Horowitz, 2009: 179-185). 
 
20 
On Medieval Europeans’ views of Islam see Southern (1962), Daniel (1993). 
 
21 
See Russel (1975) and Barnes (1982) for just war in the Middle Ages, including other 
members of this tradition beyond Augustine and Aquinas. 
 
22 
Holy war against Christians was also a Muslim tradition, as attested by the concepts of al- 
jihad al-asghar, i.e. the military struggle against infidels, and muhajideen (Tyerman, 2006: 
52). 
 
23 
Between the end of the fifteenth century and the late sixteenth century, the Portuguese 
and the Spanish developed two different forms of empire. While the former used its naval 
power to build bases in Africa, Brazil, and Asia, in most cases without the intention, and most 
importantly the manpower, to set up a territorial empire, the former were more powerful 
militarily and conquered two existing empires, the Aztec in Mexico and the Inca in Peru 
(Lloyd, 2001: 2). 
 
24 
As it will be discussed in chapter 4, there are indications that the concept of savage was 
already in use in fifteenth century Europe, but it only became preponderant in international 
society in the sixteenth century. 
 
25 
For an account of the ‘Black Legend’ controversy see Keen (1969). 
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26 
The titles of these two dissertations can be translated as ‘On the Indians Lately 
Discovered’ and ‘On the Law of War Made by the Spaniards on the Barbarians’ (Anghie, 
1996: 334). 
 
 
 
4. From the Divine Right to Christianise to the Mission to Civilise 
 
27 
There is no consensus about whether or not diplomacy is constitutive of international 
society. For example, while Neumann (2003: 350) sees diplomacy as reflective of 
international society, James (1993: 95-96) claims that diplomacy is a necessary element for 
the existence of an international society, for it its chief communications system without which 
the concept international society makes little sense. 
 
28 
As de Carvalho et al (2011) note, examples abound. See Morgenthau (1948: 254), Gross 
(1948: 28), or more recently Held (1995: 77). 
 
29 
This division echoes the three traditions captured by Wight (1991: 7-24). 
 
30 
A famous victory of the Dutch navy was its destruction of a Spanish Armada on 21 
October 1639 in The Downs (Boxer, 1965: 4). 
 
31 
These networks of empire characterised by forced migration were not an exclusive feature 
of the Dutch empire. The Portuguese established a similar enterprise centred in their Estado 
da India, and the French and British used the same system to colonise the Americas and the 
Caribbean (Ward, 2009: 13, 35-36). 
 
32 
It was in the early seventeenth century that the French began to establish colonies in 
Canada and the Antilles (Aldrich, 1996: 11-12). 
 
33 
Keene (2002: 28) notes that he does subscribe entirely to Alexandrowicz thesis, which in 
his view places wrongly all ‘of the blame for colonialism and imperialism onto the positive 
lawyers and the Gottingen historians of the European states-system.’ 
 
34 
Keene (2002) only mentions Vitoria once, in page 55. 
 
35 
Bull (1966: 72) fails to appreciate the importance of Vitoria’s influence in Grotius thoughts 
about just war. He argues that Grotius believed that ‘international society cannot survive if it 
is to tolerate resort to war for any purpose whatever’. Yet Grotius, based on Vitoria’s work, 
developed a set of principles for just war that were compatible in his view with a natural law 
of nations. 
 
36 
Another challenge was the 1625 treatise De Justo Imperii Lusitanorum imperio asiatico 
adversus Grotii Mare Liberum, by the Portuguese professor Seraphin de Freitas (Grew, 
2000: 259). 
 
 
5. An International Society of Civilised States 
 
37 
In his analysis of Norbert Elias work about the ‘civilising process’, Linklater (2004) notes 
the potential of  combining  the accounts of  the history of  international society with the 
sociological accounts of the ‘civilising process.’ Elias (1982) approach has a lot in common 
with the tradition of history of ideas, particularly the emphasis placed on the importance of 
context and in the attempt to see things in the perspective of those who lived through the 
events. In IR the term ‘civilisation’ is first and foremost associated with the legacy of 
Huntington (1993a: 22-23), who predicted that the great conflicts of the future would be 
caused by cultural differences and would unfold along civilisational lines. Huntington (1993b: 
186, 191) defended his thesis with the need for explanatory, scientific devices to simplify the 
more complex reality social scientists aim to study. As he put it, ‘a civilisational approach 
269  
 
explains much and orders much of the “bloomin buzzin confusion.”’ The ensuing debate 
generated a number of explanatory and comparative accounts of different ‘civilisations’ in IR 
(e. g. Cox, 2000); international sociology (e.g. Hsu, 2001); and international history – see 
Puchala (1997: 10-12) for numerous examples. 
 
38 
Generally in the literature, the Enlightenment is used as a temporal adjective to refer to the 
period from the late seventeenth-century up to the nineteenth century – not withstanding its 
lasting repercussions – and to the political thought that dominated the European scene 
during that period (Muthu, 2003: 1). 
 
39 
See page 78. 
 
40 
Since the late seventeenth century, France and England were the main competitors for 
imperial hegemony in the West Indies, North America, the Mediterranean, the Levant, India 
and Africa, establishing two different colonial empires. The former was monopoly of the state 
and essentially a mercantilist enterprise to which most French citizens were indifferent to. It 
was a highly centralised empire that rejected any kind of local liberties or autonomy. The 
administration of the colonies was rigidly controlled by the ministry of the marine. The 
English empire was driven chiefly by English society’s emigration and private 
entrepreneurship also of mercantilist nature. The board of trade played a crucial role in the 
supervision of the empire and colonial administration was characterised by more autonomy 
(Dorn, 1940: 104-105, 251-260). 
 
41 
The most important writings of Diderot in this regard were published in Philosophical and 
Political History of European Settlements and Commerce in the Two Indies, a ten-volume 
work edited and partly written by the Jesuit Abbe Guillaume-Thomas Raynal published in 
1780. Characteristic of it was the very critical tone regarding imperialism and the slave trade. 
Its publication was banned in France where the existing copies were burned. The 
contributors to these ten volumes were kept anonymous (Muthu, 2003: 72). 
 
42 
Kant used a tripartite conception of right: domestic, international (jus gentium), and 
cosmopolitan (ius cosmopoliticum) pertaining to ‘the rights of the citizens of the world.’ The 
development of the latter derives from Kant’s attempt to address the ethical problems of 
travel, discovery, and imperialism that characterised his era (Muthu (2003: 188-191). His 
emphasis on reason was applicable to both natural and positive law. Rights pertained to 
individual human beings and not states, but his perpetual peace was based upon the 
existence of a federation of free and independent states (Williams and Booth, 1996: 81-91). 
 
43 
In this period the number of critics of empire and colonialism also grew substantially. While 
the nature of the opposition of empire and colonialism was also based on moral grounds, the 
utilitarian arguments against empire prevailed. The central argument was an economic one: 
‘conquest does not pay’ (Cavallar, 2002: 257-258). 
 
44 
One attempt to trace the origins of this theory of stages of development points to the fourth 
century B.C. and the legacy of Dicaearchus, a Paripatetic philosopher, who worked on a 
theory based on modes of subsistence (Meek, 1976: 10-11). The work of Samuel von 
Pufendorf can also be considered as an earlier contribution to this predisposition of dividing 
history into economic stages. In his theory of commercial sociability developed in The Law of 
Nature and Nations (1672), Pufendorf refers to ‘natural’ often as a synonym with ‘fitness’ or 
‘aptitude’ (Cavallar, 2002: 237-238). See Wagar (1967) for an interesting overview of the 
debates about the origins of the idea of progress. 
 
45 
For a traditional view of Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill as 
rejectionists of the mercantilist ideology according to which Britain should maintain colonies 
to as to keep a monopoly of trade see Sullivan (1983: 600-602). 
 
46 
Although Darwin is widely considered as the father of this theory, it is more accurate to 
see him as giving popularity to a doctrine that he did not originate (Russel, 1946: 696-697). 
Despite its popularity, Darwin’s On the Origins of Species (1859) was highly criticised for, 
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among other things, not being inductive, and being based on assumptions instead of facts 
(Ellegård, 1957: 362). 
 
47 
See Megill (2005) for a historical perspective on the notion of globalisation. 
 
48 
In their descriptions of European international  relations of this period, a  number of 
important intellectual figures referred to the idea of a ‘Christian 
Europe’/‘commonwealth’/‘république’ of ‘sovereigns’/’independent states’, characterised by a 
number of norms and values: common religion; the balance of power; the law of nations; and 
the use of force (Watson, 1992: 206-210). The references to European sovereigns and 
sovereign states are a clear illustration of how, during the eighteenth century, centralised 
absolutism was not the only type of government in Europe, although it remained the 
dominant one (Grew, 2000: 317-319). The late eighteenth century was, after all, the era of 
popular sovereignty as expressed in the ideals of the American and French Revolutions and 
the Declaration of Independence and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen 
(Jackson, 2007: 78-79). Despite the local/national nature of these developments, they were 
still, as Mayall (2000: 16-17) puts it, ‘national expressions of what were held to be universal 
rights.’ 
 
49 
Vattel developed both a naturalist and a positivist conception of law. The label of 
‘transitory thinker’ suits him well (Cavallar, 2002: 277, 306-308). 
 
50 
This process is most often referred to as the ‘modernization of the state.’ Most discussions 
about modernity attempt to define what modernity is; identify its causes; or when and where 
did ‘the modern age’ start, the debate about Westphalia being a good example of the latter. 
This task of aiming at precision regarding ‘modernity’ seems as utopic as undesirable. As 
Darwin (2008: 25) rightly puts it, modernity is ‘a very slippery idea.’ Nevertheless, the 
complexity of the theme should not be a justification to ignore or downplay the importance of 
a few processes or developments such as the strengthening and consolidation  of the 
sovereign state and its power. See Nussbaum (1965) for a traditional account about the 
second half of the seventeenth century as the key period of revolution in Europe, where 
science, reason, and progress, related with the work of the likes of Bacon, Galileo and 
Newton, ‘triumphed’ over the old ways of thinking about the world, both divine and material. 
For a compelling critique of the supposed benefits of ‘modernity’ and of the seventeenth 
century as a period of crisis in Europe see Toulmin (1992). 
 
51 
The Congress of Vienna was a reaction to the period from the early 1790s to 1815 marked 
by revolution and war that followed the American and French revolutions, and the 
Napoleonic imperial ambitions (Clark,  2005: 85).  One of its central principles was the 
responsibility of the Great Powers in maintenance of international order and of the previous 
status quo. The other was that any changes to the status quo, either in territory or 
government, or the settlement of any dispute had to be made by consensus. The Concert of 
Europe reflected the artificial, positivist conception of the balance of power, now seen as a 
product of human device and no longer grounded on naturalistic assumptions (Clark, 1989: 
114-121). 
 
52 
This account about the notion of decline/crisis of non-European empires as the driver 
behind European imperialism was advanced by a group of historians led by John Gallagher 
and Ronald Robinson. As Doyle (1986: 20-21) explains, they focused on ‘the crises 
engendered in Africa, Asia, and Latin America,’ and the ‘weakness and collapse of these 
subordinate societies’ as the ‘true roots’ of Europe’s imperial expansion. See Galbraith 
(1960), Robinson and Gallagher (1962), Robinson et al (1981), Gallagher (1982). See also 
Louis (2006: 907-945) for the debate on Gallagher and Robinson’s legacy. 
 
53 
The term capitulations can be misleading, since it refers not to the act of surrender but to 
the fact that these agreements were divided into a number of capitula, i.e. brief chapters 
(Nussbaum, 1961: 55). The Treaty of Paris (1859) at the end of the Crimean War is 
generally regarded as the moment when Turkey was recognised by the European states as 
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a member of international society (Bull, 1977: 14). See Neumann and Welsh (1991: 333- 
348) for an overview of European-Ottoman relations since Latin Christendom. 
 
54 
A number of factors contributed to these defeats, not only external pressures but also the 
challenge posed by the Wahhabis and their allied Saudi dynasty to the legitimacy of Ottoman 
rule, coupled with a series of internal revolts. See Finkel (2005: 362, 373), Masters (2006: 
186). 
 
55 
See Onuma (2000) for an interesting discussion on this. The origins of international law 
have been traced back to 3100 B.C., when it is thought that a treaty was celebrated between 
two political communities in Mesopotamia (Nussbaum, 1961: 1). 
 
56 
This process of European learning from  non-European peoples is of course not an 
exclusive feature of international law and is applicable to innovations that were introduced in 
European agriculture, industry, and commerce at least since the twelfth century (O’Brien, 
1984: 51). 
 
57 
See Hobson (2004) for an interesting discussion on this. 
58 
As Klabbers (2009: 9, 11) explains, the term constitutionalism in international law debates 
corresponds very much to the Grotian notion of international order as comprising sovereign 
states who recognise the existence of basic rules of law and morality applicable to their 
interactions. While the Grotian tradition is not a positivist current, as it is also composed of 
naturalist precepts, constitutionalism has a naturalist and a positivist school. 
 
 
 
6. The Backward and the Promise of Self-Government 
 
59 
According to Richard (1995: 1-2), up to this point, the territories under the rule of the 
Mughal Empire were characterised by very high levels of public order and very low levels of 
violence. Often ignored, Marshall (2005: 121-122) notes, is that in the place of a declining 
Mughal Empire were emerging a few prosperous successor kingdoms and not simply chaos 
and anarchy. 
 
60 
See Cutler (1991: 51) about Burke as a neo-Grotian given the importance he placed on 
constitutionalism and moderation. 
 
61 
Later Zaire and Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 
62 
Mark Twain estimated that only the slave trade had cost 8 to 10 million lives in the region. 
The slave trade by Europeans, which preceded by a few centuries the establishment of the 
Congo Free State, was destined to the Americas and was dominated by the Portuguese, 
who faced the rivalry of East African slave traders (Hochschild, 1998: 2-3). 
 
63 
The European rivalry in Africa was managed by the Concert of Europe through a number 
of conferences in Berlin and Brussels between 1876 and 1912, chiefly concerned with 
adjustment of conflicts and the definition of international rules for African affairs (Gong, 1984: 
76). The first of these conferences was called by King Leopold II (Haskin, 2005: 1). As 
Hochschild (1998: 86) notes, the Berlin Conference did not partition Africa, in the sense that 
it took many more treaties to divide the entire territory among the European empires. 
 
64 
The words ‘The countries mentioned in Article 1’ refer to ‘all the regions forming the basin 
of the Congo and its outlets.’ 
 
65 
It is this consensus that leads Owen (1999: 188-190) to argue that, in the early twentieth 
century, Hobson, Morel, Henry Noel Brailsford, and others’ views were not outright 
condemnations of imperialism. Instead, they criticised the ‘unprincipled turn that the Empire 
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had taken.’ They opposed further acquisitions of territory, but believed that Britain was not 
obliged to give up to those territories already under her possession. 
 
66 
A few accounts of the German administration of African territories provide a picture not 
only of misrule and exploitation, but the systematic extermination of the natives as a solution 
to end any kind of uprising (Macaulay, 1937: 13-18). 
 
67 
The first officially sponsored draft of the Covenant was produced in Britain. The Phillimore 
Committee put forward recommendations that, as Northedge (1986: 27-29) puts it, were 
‘conservative, orthodox, and minimal’, which was not surprising given it was conservative in 
composition. The Phillimore proposal was never treated by the British government as an 
official proposal; it was instead presented as a ‘basis for discussion.’ It displeased Wilson 
mainly due to its omission of any mutual exchange of territorial guarantees. Wilson had 
made this a central demand for the future organisation. As he pointed at the end of his 
Fourteen Points Address before Congress in January 1918, ‘a general association of nations 
must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording international 
guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike’ 
(Northedge, 1986: 30). 
 
68 
Smuts had been trained as a lawyer, read widely Roman and Constitutional Law and had 
decent knowledge of British colonial history (Macaulay: 1937: 9). 
 
69 
Among his most notable books were International Government (1916), Empire and 
Commerce in Africa (1920), Imperialism and Civilisation (1928), and The War for Peace 
(1940) (Wilson, 2003: 4). 
 
70 
A couple of examples of the League of Nations peacekeeping are the settling of the  
dispute over the city of Vilna between Lithuania and Poland (1920-1922), and its involvement 
to place an end to the skirmishing over parts of Albania’s territory between Albania and 
Yugoslavia and Greece (1921-1923) (James, 1999: 154-155). 
 
71 
Table 1 in the Appendix shows the arrangement. 
 
72 
The Allied Supreme Council consisted of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the US in 
the initial period. 
 
73 
For an account of some of the most important thinkers of inter-war period see Long and 
Wilson (1995). 
 
74 
The expression Indirect Rule is closely linked to Lord Lugard, who was the founder of 
British Nigeria (and later the British representative in the League of Nations’ Permanent 
Mandates Commission), where he was faced with the problem of administering a large 
territory and huge population with a limited budget  and little military commitment. The 
administrative methods of Indirect Rule had its roots in India, and it was later developed in 
various British imperial territories such as Malaya, Fiji and Africa (Louis, 1999b: 22; 
Robinson, 1965: 22, 67). 
 
75 
Lord Olivier was Secretary of State for Indian and a member of the Fabian Society. 
 
77 
Another prominent example of how imperial ambitions over the mandated territories 
precede the creation of the mandates system is the Sykes-Picot agreement of May 1916 
(later abandoned), that would divide the former territories of the Ottoman Empire into zones 
of indirect but exclusive influence (Balfour-Paul, 1999: 490-497). 
 
78 
A particular problem regarding the measurement of the political progress of each territory 
was that there were often disputes about what constituted self-government and 
independence (Murray, 1957: 211-212). 
273  
 
7. Underdevelopment in a Universal International Society 
 
79 
The concept was still very much alive in the immediate post-War years, as illustrated by 
the UN decision to allow Italy to administer a UN trusteeship over its Somaliland territory 
begging in 1950 (Lefebvre, 1991: 79). 
 
80 
A major obstacle to French acceptance of a new European post-imperial order was the 
French conception of ethnocentrism and the belief in the universal validity of French 
civilisational values. In the words of Maurice Duverger, ‘the English would be shocked that a 
foreigner could have the idea of becoming British. The French are shocked when a foreigner 
does not have the idea of becoming French’ (Andrew, 1984: 337-340). 
 
81 
This transformation was accompanied by better information available about the status of 
colonial government, e.g. Lord Hailey’s An Africa Survey (1938) and Lord Moyne’s report on 
the West Indies (1939) (Hyam, 1999b: 276). 
 
82 
This tension between the traditional and the artificial is what Jackson and Rosberg (1982: 
15) call ‘the paradox of decolonisation.’ 
 
83 
Orwell (Erich Arthur Blair) was a harsh critique of totalitarianism, as he expressed  in 
Animal Farm (1945) and Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949). 
 
84 
As a movement giving shape to an alternative/third way to capitalism or communism, the 
Non-Aligned started to be designed in the Belgrade Summit of September 1961, attended by 
25 members, eleven from  Africa, eleven from Asia, two from Europe (Yugoslavia  and 
Cyprus), and one from Latin America (Cuba) (Lyon, 1984: 230-232). 
 
85
As stated in its Final Communiqué, the 29 conference participants were Burma, Ceylon, 
India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Cambodia,  People’s Republic  of China, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq,  Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia,  Libya, Nepal, 
Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 
State of Vietnam, and Yemen. 
 
86
Another division of the world into three distinct parts, one that never gained much 
international prominence, was the Maoist approach called ‘The Theory of Three Worlds’. 
According to this vision, described as based on imperialism and hegemonism of the two 
superpowers, the first world was formed by the US and the USSR., the second world formed 
by Japan, Canada, and Europe, and the third world formed by the whole of Asia except 
Japan, plus Latin America and Africa (Muni, 1981: 26). 
 
87
Although it had limited effects on development policies, the ‘basic needs approach’ enjoyed 
of a certain popularity among big international institutions like the World Bank, and in 
numerous NGOs, during the 1970s. It aimed to reconcile the ‘growth imperative’ in the Third 
World with social justice, namely the prioritisation of essential human needs. The concept 
gained international prominence in a speech of Robert McNamara (1972), then President of 
the World Bank. An important theoretical contribution favourable to the basic needs 
approach was Katrin Ledered, Johan Galtun and David Antal’s Human Needs: A 
Contribution to the Current Debate (1980) (Rist, 2008: 162-166). 
 
88 
The alliance between the USSR and the People’s Republic of China, established in 
February 1950, did not prove long-lasting. Numerous factors, including cultural and domestic 
ones, together with tensions between Krushchev and Mao, gradually undermined the idea 
that that the ideological, economic, political, and security interests shared between the two 
Communist powers would sustain this alliance (Zhang, 2010: 360). 
 
89 
With the Peace Corps, Kennedy’s aim was to mobilise and raise awareness among the 
young population in the US in relation to the less privileged Third World states, in the way 
the thought Communist countries were able to do (Cooper, 2010: 61). 
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90 
The Alliance for Progress was essentially an anti-Castro strategy, designed to build 
democratic, and most importantly anti-communist, Latin American states (Rabe, 2001: 59). 
 
91 
Not surprisingly, Kennedy’s ‘Decade of Development’ was closely related with a proposal 
co-authored by Rostow titled A Proposal, Key to an Effective Foreign Policy (1957), which 
called for the US to ‘associate its purposes and efforts with those of the aspiring new nations’ 
(Holbik, 1968: 29). 
 
92 
The reasons pointed out for this failure are multi-fold. One can mention the creation of 
dependency and the protective policies of rich countries, which greatly damaged the 
economies of underdeveloped/developing countries that were mostly reliant on exports, in 
many cases of one single commodity. Another of the fundamental reasons for 
disillusionment with aid was the politicisation of the goals of development, and the fact that 
the benefits of many aid programs did not extend beyond the elites of the target countries, 
thus contributing little to social justice (Waterlow, 1979: 101-103, 123-124). The result was a 
major debt crisis of most Third World states (Jackson, 1990: 124-125). In their embrace of 
one or the other models of development that the two superpowers exported to the 
underdeveloped countries, many Third World elites often employed repression in the name 
of that transformation (Latham, 2010). This largely contributed to the instability experienced 
by many Third World states after decolonisation, including lasting rebellions  and 
insurgencies (Westad, 2005: 3, 89). 
 
93 
There is ample evidence that the Lebanese government of Camille Chamoun played with 
US fears of Communist takeover, namely the threat of Nasserism, to guarantee US 
assistance in putting an end to the popular revolt against Chamoun’s policies (Karabell, 
1999). Also in the case of Guatemala, US views that President Jacobo Árbenz was leading 
Guatemala towards becoming a communist regime, and that he was being supported by 
Moscow in this affair, were incorrect. In fact, Guatemala’s communist party was rather small. 
Árbenz’s government (whose members were tortured and killed) was replaced by a military 
junta (Kinzer, 2006: 135-143; Bradley, 2010: 479). 
 
94 
According to Amnesty International, one to two million people died at the hands of the 
Khmer Rouge (Wheeler, 2000: 78). 
 
95 
Kennedy’s statement is recounted by the American historian Arthur M. Schlensinger, Jr., in 
A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the Whithouse (1965), and must be read not only in 
the context of the Cuban revolution, the Havana-Moscow alliance, and the missile crisis, but 
also considering Castro and Che Guevara’s launch of a campaign for influence with guerrilla 
movements all across South America (Bradley, 2010: 483). 
 
96 
Despite the term ‘civil war’, it is hard to find a conflict that took place in the Third World 
during the Cold War that did not involve neighbouring countries and/or at least one of the two 
superpowers. 
 
97 
The ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution (1950) is seen as an attempt by the US and its allies to 
change the institutional balance of power between the Security Council and the General 
Assembly in the face of constant USSR vetoing in the Security Council (Zaum, 2008: 155). 
 
98 
Gorbachev launched a series of initiatives on the Third World in the hope of reducing, if 
not ending, these conflicts. His policies included demilitarisation, particularly in the Third 
World; national reconciliation; and multilateral re-openings (Halliday, 1989: 119-127). 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
99 
See page 209. 
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